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The state is back on the economic agenda. After decades of the predominance of 
economic liberalism, state-centered paradigms have started to play a much more 
prominent role in economic discourse and policy. However, the increased promi-
nence of the state is not always beneficial. Sometimes, increased state activism can 
degenerate into harmful rent-seeking. It is in this context that Seeking the Best Master: 
State Ownership in the Varieties of Capitalism is a most valuable contribution to the 
international debate. Based on a broad range of empirical country case studies, it 
provides a very nuanced picture of beneficial and less beneficial forms of state in-
tervention and ownership. Its core claim that for increased state intervention to be 
broadly beneficial we need a well-working system of checks and balances should be 
heeded by policy-makers and voters.”
Andreas Nölke, Professor of International Relations and International 
Political Economy, Goethe University, Frankfurt
The state is back—and not only for a transitory period. Lastingly negative real rates 
of interest coupled with fiscal laxity counts as the ‘new normal’ macro-economics, 
from the United States to the European Union and Japan. Parallel to this sea change, 
state activism is also revived. This means both an enhanced role of discretionary in-
terventionism and a sustained role of public enterprises across the globe. The present 
collection provides ample evidence for how and why many countries at various levels 
of development opted for more activism—and more statism. As the title suggests, 
depending on the context, more active public policies may, and often do, translate 
into the shortest way to competitive markets. There is no golden route, no single 
best solution to ensure improved public welfare. Anyone interested in the theory 
and policy of comparative development should be confronted with the vast evidence, 
theoretical and empirical, marshalled in this volume.”
László Csaba, Professor of International Political Economy, Central European 
University and Corvinus University, Budapest and Member of the Hungarian 













he economic crisis of 2008–2009 signaled the end 
of the post–Washington consensus on restricting the 
role of the state in economic and development policy. 
Since then, state ownership and state intervention have 
increased worldwide. This volume offers a comparative 
analysis of the evolution of direct state intervention in 
the economy through state-owned companies in Austria, 
Brazil, France, Germany, Hungary, Poland, Turkey, Sin-
gapore, and Slovenia. Each case study includes substan-
tial explanations of historical, cultural, and institutional 
contexts.
All the contributors point to the complex nature of the 
current revival in state economic interventions. The few 
models that are successful cannot hide the potential 
problems of excessive state intervention, linked to high 
levels of moral hazard. State-owned enterprises are pri-
mary tools of market and price manipulation for political 
purposes. They can be used outright for rent seeking. Yet 
state-owned enterprises can also play important roles in 
prestigious national initiatives, like major public works or 
high-profile social and sports events. The authors con-
clude that after the uniform application of democrat-
ic market economic principles, the 2000s witnessed a 
path-dependent departure from standard economic and 
political operating procedures in developed countries.
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INTRODUCTION
The Revival of the State
Miklós szanyi
Throughout the history of mankind, the state has always been an impor-
tant actor in social life. The arenas and tools of state intervention have 
changed substantially over time in connection to social perceptions and 
political institutions. The role of the state, including its involvement in the 
economy, has always been a political issue. The state is an embedded social 
institution. Therefore, state performance can be analyzed not only from the 
technical but also from the political perspective. It is an important dimen-
sion of a state’s effectiveness, but also whose interests are mostly served and 
how state actions affect other social institutions. In the age of modern capi-
talism, three periods of intensive state activity may be observed. As Nölke 
(2014) rightly indicates, after late-nineteenth-century economic nationalism 
and the Keynesian (and corporatist) decades of the twentieth century, the 
new period of statism in the first decades of the twenty-first century has 
already become the third state-led paradigm of the capitalist world. Obvi-
ously, the three periods had very different features even from the technical 
standpoint (the usage of economic policy tools). Therefore, it is not self-
evident that these periods have so much in common that direct compari-
sons between them are possible, especially without proper analysis of both 
state policies and the global economic environment and political conditions 
in which they developed. Obviously, the state’s policy toolkit depended on 
both internal and external political conditions as well as on prevailing polit-
ical concepts and social perceptions.
Based mainly on the experience of late twentieth-century transition 
economies, Kornai (2016) differentiated between two main types of eco-
nomic and political systems. Liberal democracy goes together with the free 
market economy principle. Dictatorship is bound together with bureau-
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cratic control and coordination of the economy. Of course, most market 
economies are somewhere in between. In the group of countries with more 
stable and long traditions of political democracy and free market econo-
mies, there are countries that traditionally have more state influence in the 
economy (France) than others (Britain). The political scene also shows 
different institutional systems. Market economic institutions are some-
times coupled with weak democratic institutions and influential charis-
matic leaders. In such autocracies, we can usually see a high level of cen-
tralization in decision making that provides the state with stronger control 
over the economy. Historically we can also observe an oscillation between 
basic state concepts in some countries: autocracy (dictatorship) and liberal 
democracy (Kornai 2016).
Countries are diverse in terms of their historical and cultural heri-
tage, natural and human endowments, and level of development. There-
fore, Kornai’s dichotomy can be applied only with fairly high levels of 
abstraction. The “Varieties of Capitalism” (VoC) literature (see Hall and 
Soskice 2001; Amable 2003, and many others) identifies significant differ-
ences among capitalist models within the relatively homogenous group of 
countries of core Europe. This is despite the fact that the countries of core 
Europe are regarded as liberal democracies and free market economies. 
Moreover, their political orientation and institutional systems are stream-
lined according to the foundational documents of the European Union. 
Basic principles of economic integration describe the potential benefits of 
increased homogeneity in the single European market. The globalization 
process has also triggered important spontaneous as well as institutionally 
initiated economic streamlining in many areas from consumerism enforced 
by multinational corporations to financial market liberalization proposed 
by international organizations. Yet Gerschenkornian diversity has pre-
vailed. Relatively little attention has been paid until now to an important 
object of study within the theme of capitalist diversity: the economic role 
of the state.
Over time, the development of economics as discipline has produced 
important insights that permit a better understanding of economic systems. 
Theoreticians and policy makers generally accepted these new insights, 
thus creating economic policy paradigms. Two important paradigms of the 
twentieth century, the Keynesian and the monetarist, delivered conceptu-
ally contradictory perceptions of the role of the state in the economy. In the 
background, we can see the long-lasting effects of liberal economic thought 
(Keynes wished to reform the liberal approach to the economy). Later, 
the neo-liberal agenda developed into a pervasive principle that claimed 
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exclusive influence in economics, economic policy, and education (see, 
e.g., Csaba 2009 and Stiglitz 2010).
The neo-liberal approach to the role of the state is fairly conserva-
tive and emphasizes the principle of minimal state. Due to strong pres-
sure from the monetarist school starting in the mid-1980s, pervasive state 
intervention was scaled back drastically. Ronald Reagan’s America and 
Margaret Thatcher’s Britain took the lead in the liberalization and deregu-
lation of markets. In Britain, massive privatization of state-owned compa-
nies also took place, and direct state intervention was curtailed. Similar 
policies were applied in many developed economies to a  lesser extent. 
Moreover, international organizations (strongly influenced by the United 
States and its economic policy paradigm) suggested similar policies to 
countries with different levels of development and distinctive cultural and 
institutional heritages. “Minimal state” became the buzzword of the last 
two decades of the twentieth century. Liberalization, deregulation, and 
privatization was reinforced in many developing countries and emerging 
market economies, including the transition economies of Central and 
Eastern Europe (CEE). 
This agenda produced a  rather smooth development pattern in 
developed market economies. The period of “Great Moderation” from 
the 1990s to the 2007 financial crisis showed fairly stable and signifi-
cant economic growth in the developed part of the world. One could 
conclude that the minimal state concept could work if proper market 
economic institutions effectively regulated markets and the economy in 
general. Warning signs of recurrent currency crises in Latin America and 
Southeast Asia were neglected due to the belief that, in the long run, the 
reasons for these problems could disappear if market institutions were 
properly developed. The concept was only slightly amended to consider 
local circumstances in the implementation of proposed policies. The fun-
damental goal of introducing the liberal market economy in every country 
remained unchanged.
The neo-liberal agenda also moved full steam ahead during the transi-
tion process in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). The stabilization and 
modernization of Central European transition economies was based on 
these concepts. However, the pervasive economic decline of Russia during 
the Yeltsin era could not be considered a true success story. Yet, the chaos 
in the Russian economy did not shake mainstream economists’ belief 
in the omnipotent minimal state concept (see Fukuyama 1992). It was 
shaken only by the 2007 financial crisis, which showed the limits of liberal 
market economic institutions’ regulatory effect on the global economy.
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Economic concepts were reconsidered in many countries after the 
2008–09 global economic crisis. The devastating effects of the unexpected 
financial crisis could be mitigated only by massive state intervention. The 
meltdown of the global financial system was prevented through bailouts of 
the largest global financial institutions in the United States and Europe. 
Various techniques were applied, but the outcome was generally a massive 
increase of state ownership in the financial sector (see Voszka in Chapter 
1). In some cases, “too big to fail” corporations received the same treat-
ment. The myth of omnipotent self-regulating markets was destroyed. The 
state had to come back in for even the most developed advocates of the 
neo-liberal concept.
The starting point of this book is the state’s rapidly increasing economic 
intervention. The revival of the state has been a  general phenomenon in 
the world economy. However, this change has affected various regions and 
countries differently. The depth and direction of changes in policy concepts 
regarding direct state intervention has very much depended on historic and 
cultural heritage. While broad state intervention in the economy has had 
a long tradition in France (see Somai in Chapter 2), British and German tra-
ditions suggest a more rapid and potentially fuller retreat from state interven-
tion (to take just two examples from the developed world). Emerging market 
economies in the Third World and also in CEE possessed much weaker 
market institutions and had already become rather skeptical about the appli-
cation of the minimal state concept in their countries prior to the 2008–09 
crisis. Most countries in these regions did not hesitate to take the now much 
easier opportunity to increase state economic intervention in the long term.
Diffusing empirical evidence of economic policies shows increasing 
diversity parallel with weakening neo-liberal principles. For example, the 
European Union continues to reinforce the paragraphs of the Maastricht 
Treaty in its neighborhood policy (e.g., in the Western Balkans), but mean-
while, a significant group of EU member states (with Hungary and Poland 
taking the lead) openly question the validity of the political and institu-
tional fundamentals of the same agreement and try to prevent the applica-
tion of the Treaty. State permeated economies (Nölke 2014, 2015) have 
emerged and played roles in the global division of labor that mainstream 
economic thought reserved only for highly developed economies (e.g., 
foreign direct investment). For decades, economic development in Africa 
could not be triggered successfully by policies recommended by main-
stream international financial institutions but rather only by new policy 
approaches from the past decade that better understood and considered 
local realities (see Diao et al. 2017).
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The interpretation of post-crisis development patterns is not at all 
straightforward. This is the reason for increased research interest in com-
parative economics. For example, the evolving concept of state capitalism 
(Nölke 2014 and Kurlantzick 2016) regards increased state intervention 
as the main driver of the current changes in the world economy. Recent 
studies on state capitalism emphasize not only the role of the state in eco-
nomic coordination, but also the multifaceted interplay of social, political, 
and economic institutions affecting various dimensions of state activity.
The predecessors of this complex political economy approach (e.g., 
Nordhaus’s political budget cycle) dealt with many issues that became 
fashionable research topics after the 2008–09 crisis. Yet, the early results 
were usually interpreted as variations of the basic model in comparison 
with the mainstream approaches. This has changed recently. Earlier 
research on the development of China, for example, repeatedly treated the 
Chinese model as a specific type of market economy. But it can be also 
regarded as a rather specific model, which is very far from any version of 
a Western market economic model described in the VoC literature. The 
Chinese themselves treat their economic and social development pattern 
as a unique model (e.g., Guangdong Xu 2015) that can serve as yardstick 
for other countries in the Third World. What remains clear, however, is the 
possibility of the parallel existence and development of several capitalist 
models that have their own internal logic, are not necessarily interchange-
able, and should not be exported in a “one size fits all” manner. In this 
regard, the conceptualization in VoC literature that describes variations 
within the Western world’s free market economic models requires further 
development.
Special interest has been devoted to increased state intervention in the 
economy, especially the increasing role of state-owned companies. Earlier, 
the VoC literature (based on the analytical framework laid down by Hall 
and Soskice 2001 and Amable 2003) did not tackle this issue. Analysis 
of the state’s role was restricted mainly to market regulations, the size 
of the central budget, and the degree of income redistribution (see, e.g., 
Sapir 2006). Research on increased state intervention is in an early stage. 
Scholars concentrate on various aspects. Nölke (2014 and 2015) put the 
main emphasis on the development of globally successful national cham-
pion companies in large emerging market economies. In so doing, he con-
centrated on the technical dimensions of state intervention only in four 
large emerging market economies: Brazil, India, China, and South Africa 
(BICS). Kurlantzick (2016) compared countries with high shares of state-
owned enterprises (SOEs) in GDP production (a rather heterogeneous 
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group of countries that include, among others, Norway, Singapore, and 
Thailand).
State ownership is just one aspect of increasing state intervention. The 
current revival of the state in matters of the economy represents a rather 
complex systemic change that also involves changes in economic and 
market regulations, development policy, social policies. It also possesses 
strong linkages to political institutions. Therefore, the comprehensive polit-
ical economy approach to the role of the state in the economy is applicable. 
An important aim of this book is to interpret increased state activity in 
various capitalist models within and beyond the countries usually covered 
in the VoC scholarship.
We can list some typical features that were frequently observed in 
countries where state involvement in the economy increased during the 
2000s and especially after the 2008–09 crisis. In addition to the high share 
of SOEs in GDP production, Kurlantzick (2016) listed the general decline 
of free market policies (as listed by the Fraser Institute). Economic regula-
tion in general became selective, discriminatory, and nationalist (about the 
advance of economic patriotism see also Gerőcs and Szanyi 2019). Selec-
tive policies thwart competition in selected markets, mainly in finance and 
banking, public utility services, energy, and the gas and oil industry and 
supply. These are branches of strategic importance from the political per-
spective: through manipulated prices, governments can successfully influ-
ence consumption. Imprints of state paternalism from the pre-Washington 
Consensus period are still strongly felt in many emerging market econo-
mies. Therefore, cheap public utility prices are important dimensions of 
political competition.
This of course also means a deliberate detour from the classic liberal 
democratic principles of political competition. Nordhaus (1975) devel-
oped the theory of the political budget cycles (PBC), a predecessor to the 
theory of economy-polity interactions of emerging market economies. The 
theory argued that average voters were short-sighted and learned slowly 
about negative long term impacts of excessive state spending in periods of 
election campaigns, after several elections. Thus, they provided opportuni-
ties for the manipulation of elections through excessive public spending. 
Though some empirical evidence (for a summary, see Halász 2014) sug-
gested that over several election periods the effect might flatten because of 
social learning, the 2008–09 crisis seemed to reverse this tendency. More-
over, recent election campaigns showed an escalation of populism in highly 
developed countries of the world. Therefore, there is a worldwide depar-
ture from the classic liberal principle of economic and polity separation. 
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Because of these empirical facts, the analysis of state capitalism should not 
necessarily be limited to emerging market economies, which has been the 
case until now. Therefore, case studies of highly developed countries are 
also included in this volume. 
Another important goal of increased state intervention is the devel-
opment of national champions. These projects may also have important 
political implications because they increase national pride and boost the 
popularity of those politicians and governments who contribute to them. 
The economic development agenda is, of course, not new. Historic evi-
dence (e.g., Somai in chapter 2 or Szanyi in chapter 8 of this volume) puts 
this motive into the broad context of core-periphery and developmental 
state literature (see Ricz in chapter 9). This ambition gained new impetus 
after the crisis. One important new feature is the changed international 
environment where large multinational enterprises increased entry barriers 
to most markets. It is therefore more difficult to successfully implement 
national champion development projects (some successful cases are cov-
ered in the third section of this volume). An open question in this context 
is country size. Large countries can allocate significantly more resources to 
typically state-owned national champions. Stable long-term financing of 
such projects is a primary condition of success. Nevertheless, the mounting 
evidence of unsuccessful cases calls for caution. Money alone cannot create 
miracles. On the other hand, there are also successful cases with small 
countries like Singapore (see Völgyi in chapter 10).
The long-term stability of national champions is connected to their 
successful integration in world trade. The well-known success stories 
of the East Asian developmental state model are based on international 
trade success and export-led growth patterns, among other things (see 
Ricz in chapter 9). The concept of economic patriotism is based on the 
temporary protection of all national firms in a given branch against global 
competition (Clift and Woll 2012). The idea is to enhance the accumula-
tion of capital, expertise, and technological knowledge in national com-
panies so they may become competitive internationally. Competition in 
the national market plays important role during the protected period, 
and after opening to world markets, also internationally; this is the infant 
industry development concept. More recent examples, like Chinese prac-
tices, are rather mixed concerning the role of competition in development 
policies.
National champion development programs, and excessive state own-
ership can fall easy prey of rent seeking too. Kurlantzick (2016) states 
that the success of state development programs very much depends on 
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the level of corruption. No country is absolutely free of corruption, and 
there is a significant range of corruption levels displayed by state capitalist 
regimes, from Singapore, on the one hand, with very little state corruption, 
to many post-Soviet countries with high corruption levels on the other. 
Systemic corruption has many levels, but the most damage is caused by 
public procurement tenders directed to cronies. There is ample evidence 
from various countries of big government projects that cost several times 
more in public expenditure than similar projects in countries with better 
public and institutional controls on corruption. This practice highlights the 
danger that “elite enrichment becomes the primary purpose of state enter-
prises” (39). Besides SOEs, partisan firms’ massive involvement in public 
procurement also raises worries about increasing corruption and the dete-
riorating efficiency in the usage of public money (see Szanyi in chapter 8). 
The second part of this volume deals with these issues using case studies 
from three transition economies in Central Europe.
Usually, the slow social learning described in PBC theory substan-
tially deteriorated after the 2008–09 crisis. The Washington Consensus 
promised welfare returns attached to increasing political and economic 
freedoms that would favor the middle class. But voters’ dissatisfaction 
with political freedom increased due to increasing inequalities. After the 
2008–09 crisis, benefits realized by the middle class were also reduced. 
Increased state intervention therefore challenged the model of democracy 
and free market economics with promised welfare gains through increased 
state activity instead. This new attitude was perceived and welcomed by 
the societies of many countries as the revival of older paternalistic tradi-
tions. Changes in the perception of neo-liberal concepts were also rein-
forced by political elites who lacked a personal commitment to democ-
racy and a free market economy. Kurlantzick (2016) listed many examples 
of elected political leaders-turned-autocrats who effectively rolled back 
democratic institutions with voters’ support in order to strengthen their 
political positions. The robustly expanding state sector played a significant 
role in this process.
The short list of successful state led development models (mainly in 
East Asia) can not overshadow the potential flaws of excessive state inter-
vention. These are connected to high levels of moral hazard, especially 
if business and polity relationships are not under institutional and social 
control. As was mentioned earlier, there have been many attempts to roll 
back democratic institutions in emerging market economies, and thus the 
danger of moral hazard is growing. There have been corruption scandals 
in many countries from China to Hungary to Brazil. Some of these cases 
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reached the highest political circles, such as the imprisonment of former 
Brazilian president Lula. But besides corruption and outright theft, there is 
also widespread political rent seeking, like overspending on social welfare 
for political support (PBC) or on prestigious national programs like the 
World Cup or Olympic games (Brazil, Russia, South Korea). State-owned 
firms played an outstanding role in rent seeking and overspending.
This book concentrates on issues of public (mainly state) ownership 
as it relates to the economy-polity relationship. SOEs are the primary 
tools of market and price manipulation for political purposes. They can 
also be used for outright rent seeking. They play important roles in pres-
tigious national development programs like major construction works and 
the organization of social or sporting events. Many of the national cham-
pions are also state owned. After the 2008–09 crisis, a general increase 
in public ownership was observed worldwide. Hence, the main support 
tool of state capitalist systems was present in countries with very different 
development levels and institutional systems. The main aim of the book is 
to highlight the differences in treating and using increased state property in 
various capitalist models. The national case studies will provide examples 
of successful state capitalist models (Singapore) and less impressive results 
(Brazil). They will also highlight the struggle between democratic institu-
tions and interested political parties (Central European countries). In case 
of highly developed countries (the first part of the volume), state owner-
ship did not significantly change the institutional framework of the liberal 
market economy model.
The approach of the book is fresh in a variety of ways. First, all of the 
case studies include substantial explanations of the cultural and institu-
tional heritage of their chosen countries. This feature adds a new aspect 
to the existing VoC literature. We also would like to emphasize that the 
economic systems of countries in regions with heritages that differ from 
the classic Euro-Atlantic development paradigm cannot be regarded as 
variations of the mainstream capitalist model. The usual classifications that 
stem from the seminal works of Hall and Soskice (2001) or Amable (2003) 
cannot properly describe economic systems of other regions. Nölke (2014 
and 2015) took an important first step in defining one of the alternative 
capitalist systems in large emerging market economies (state-permeated 
capitalism in BICS). However, this concept describes the usage of sophis-
ticated new toolkits to enhance the economic convergence of economies 
in the periphery on the practice of only a few large emerging markets. But 
increased state intervention has been observed more generally and with 
potentially very different intentions and effects.
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In my view, active state development policies pursued by BICS are 
best described by Clift and Woll’s concept of economic patriotism (Clift 
and Woll 2012). In the age of globalization and the liberalized world, 
covert protection is provided. The concepts are old, and the toolkit is 
amended. However, BICS as well as many other countries increased state 
economic intervention for various political reasons. I believe that the types 
of policies that were placed in the foreground depended heavily on deci-
sion makers’ political purposes ranging from economic development to the 
monopolization of political power. In these rather diverse aims and poli-
cies, the common denominator was state ownership. SOEs are crucial tools 
for achieving the most diverse political goals.
In the discussion of this topic, we will concentrate on the political 
relevance and effects of increased state ownership. The first section con-
tains three case studies (France, Germany, Austria) from core Europe that 
highlight how stable democracies handled the problem of increased state 
ownership. The second section includes essays on three Central-European 
transition economies. The main theme in this section is the role of priva-
tization in strengthening market institutions and the interplay between 
economy and polity, which was sharply altered after the 2008–09 crisis by 
increasing nationalization. The third section is about Third World coun-
tries and compares the classic success stories of catching-up (the East 
Asian developmental state model as illustrated by Singapore) with more 
recent and less successful attempts (Brazil and Turkey). Throughout the 
book, the role of state ownership is discussed mainly in relation to various 
political goals. Although we do not intend to provide a thorough definition 
or description of the state capitalist model, all of the essays contribute to 
a better understanding of some of the most common features in the field of 
economy-polity interplay.
The main hypothesis of the book is that the weakening of the neo-
classical paradigm after the 2008–2009 crisis and the resulting increase in 
state intervention affected countries with different economic and demo-
cratic development levels differently. The social control and institutional 
embeddedness of the competition state concept prevented more developed 
countries from directly slipping into more autocratic system solutions. In 
countries with weaker and less traditional market economic and democratic 
political institutions, erosion of these has begun. Emerging state capitalist 
systems used increased state ownership for their own political legitimation 
and rent seeking. SOEs can be developed into globally competitive national 
champions, and they can participate in politically-motivated, large develop-
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ment projects. They can also serve political rent seeking (in new forms of 
state paternalism) and the enrichment of influential political lobbies. The 
balance between social goals and personal or partisan goals also depends 
on the strength of social control. Stronger control will encourage policies 
targeting more social goals that serve political self-interests (e.g., reelection) 
indirectly through rising popularity. This effect is not much different than 
the excessive budgetary spending of PBC. However, the deliberate rolling 
back of social institutions and increasing populism works in the opposite 
direction, giving way to more direct forms of rent seeking. This book has 
collected case studies that test these processes and assumptions.
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CHAPTER 1
Crisis Management in Europe:  
Nationalizations and Privatizations
Éva voszka
In the years following the 2008 crisis, the developed countries of Europe 
experienced a massive wave of nationalization. At the same time, a wave of 
privatization began, but on a smaller scale than in the preceding decades. 
This paper analyzes the drivers and movements of this complex process. 
It reveals how quiet and hidden privatization techniques became increas-
ingly important, while nationalizations also took place discreetly, without 
attracting much publicity or even without statistical review. As part of this 
process, along with the fortification and foreign expansion of state-owned 
entities and funds, a new type of public ownership emerged, which, by 
disregarding the intentions of governments in destination countries, may 
significantly differ from its traditional form in terms of its operation, 
objectives, and impact. All of this plays a role in blurring the boundaries 
between public and private ownership and nationalization and privatiza-
tion. The dichotomous approach is, therefore, worthy of replacement by 
new analytical methods.
In spite of the long wave of privatization in the past decades, state 
ownership has remained significant both in the developed countries of 
Europe and globally. In 2008–9, the scope of state ownership broadened 
spectacularly before the sale of some smaller and larger entities, which took 
place in the years that followed.1 However, this was just a milestone on 
a long and twisting path, “one of endless adventures” (Lewis 1965). How 
1  An earlier version of this paper analyzing the case of the U.S. and also some 
economic policy issues appeared in Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics 
(Voszka 2017).
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should we interpret the changes of this period and the opposite processes 
of privatization and nationalization occurring simultaneously?
This paper, focusing on developed regions of Europe, puts the devel-
opments of the post-crisis management into historico-institutional context. 
It also draws attention to some new and unusual characteristics of owner-
ship changes. It argues that although privatization as well as nationalization 
seems to be useful tools to address crisis-related restructuring needs, many 
decades of experience have shown the disadvantages of both of them. That 
is why both the expansion and contraction of state ownership became 
unpopular, and forced politicians to strike the right balance between short-
term constraints and once generally accepted principles.
The first part of the essay presents the size of state ownership in devel-
oped European countries, and provides a short summary of major devel-
opments leading to the current situation. After this, the essay turns to an 
investigation of the crisis-related nationalizations and privatizations. All 
along, we must keep in mind that, beyond basic European trends, each 
country has its own distinct pattern.
The Function of State Ownership and Its Historical Changes
In Europe, public ownership had been growing steadily since the nine-
teenth century, especially in the years immediately after 1914. This pro-
cess, covering several countries in more or less harmonized waves, inten-
sified during the two World Wars, the Great Depression, post-1945 
reconstruction, and the oil crisis of the 1970s.2
In its early days, the rise of public ownership in Europe was linked 
with the concept of the developmental state, the most important objectives 
of which were to supplement scarce private capital, build infrastructure 
as well as markets, and, in several cases—most spectacularly in Germany 
and Italy—create a unified nation state (Millward 2011). As a general rule, 
state ownership became widespread in public services, transportation, 
and—in order to finance all of this, especially in the continent’s less devel-
oped countries—financial institutions.
Later, in peacetime, the state appeared as an alternative to the market, 
able to correct market failures. The target system became more complex, 
2  For a concise history of nationalizations, see, e.g., Aharoni (1986), Toninelli 
(2000), Millward (2011), and Voszka (2018).
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comprising efforts that sought to: mitigate unfavorable effects related to 
private ownership and monopolies; reduce negative externalities; help 
under-developed regions; improve employment; and drive down prices. 
During years of economic crises, sustaining the economy, saving banks and 
companies from bankruptcy, and reducing unemployment had been turned 
into justification for even more state ownership, which was expanding 
across economic sectors considered to be strategic, as well as part of the 
manufacturing industry.3
Hence, state ownership was destined to meet a multitude of often-
conflicting objectives. According to contemporary and ex-post facto anal-
yses, governments considered it to be a panacea, a remedy for all of the 
evils of capitalism (Ward 1946; Aharoni 1986). In times of wars and crises, 
as well as during the emergence of welfare states, one could assist with the 
expansion of public property, which went hand-in-hand with the state’s 
growing role and the strengthening of market regulation.
At the turn of the 1970s and 1980s, when state ownership probably 
reached its apex, the public sector accounted for an average of 12 percent 
of GDP in developed countries of Europe by Shirley’s estimate (1983).4 
Data, however, are—as also observed in her paper —incomplete and far 
from reliable, as the definition and registration of, and accounting system 
for public property differ from country to country. Hence, the table below 
only provides a rough estimate of the importance of the public sector in the 
economy.
Table 1 
Share of non-financial SOEs (state-owned enterprises) in the economy of some European 




Portugal 25.0 52.0 12.0
France 17.0 12.1 –
Austria 14.5 19.2 –
Sweden 14.4x 11.4 3.4
United Kingdom 10.9xx 17.0 8.5
Germany 10.2xxx 10.8 4.2
3  A fine summary of objectives can be found in, e.g., Aharoni (1986), Vickers and 
Wright (1989a), Megginson and Netter (2003).
4  Financial enterprises are excluded.





Ireland 8.0 11.8 8.8
Italy 7.4 15.2 2.5
Denmark 6.3 – 2.6
Belgium 6.0 xxxx 13.1 7.5
Spain 4.1 15.6 …
The Netherlands 3.6 12.6 1.1
Average of developed countries of Europe 12 – –
Note: Most data relate to the period of 1978–81
x 1982 data, only referring to central state level (Carlsson 1988)
xx Financial enterprises included. By the account of Parris (1985), it does not contain non-corporate entities (e.g., of local public ser-
vices), or those having the same legal status as private companies.
xxx Data corrected on the basis on Pontusson (1989) referring to IMF data. 
xxxx 1961 data, not comprising local governments’ interests (Langer 1966)
Source: own composition based on Shirley (1983); data for Portugal comes from The Library of Congress (1993)
In spite of uncertainties, we can ascertain that there was a wide range of 
state-owned enterprises’ (SOE) share of GDP in individual countries: 
between 4 and 25 percent of GDP; 10 and 52 percent of gross fixed capital 
formation (GFCF), and 1 and 12 percent of employment. State ownership 
was most significant in Portugal for all examined indicators,5 with France, 
Austria, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and Germany also claiming top 
positions. At the other end of the spectrum are Spain and the Netherlands. 
Differences may be explained partly by socio-cultural heritage or specific 
factors.
In France, the state has intervened in the economy for centuries. The 
relationship between government and business, which was also based 
on the common cultural background of public and corporate elites, has 
always been strong. The first state owned manufactures were developed 
in the seventeenth century through the initiative of Louis XIV’s powerful 
finance minister, Jean-Baptiste Colbert. Later, public ownership increased 
in waves following the Great Depression, both World Wars, and—as 
a deviation from trends in Europe—at the beginning of the 1980s. In this 
5  Finland was not included in the survey and comparable statistics were not avail-
able. According to Willner’s data (2003), before the big wave of privatization, 
SOEs represented an 18–22 percent share in industrial value added, and 12–15 
percent in industrial employment, which leads us to the assumption that Finland 
occupied a prominent place in the ranking at the time.
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latter moment, it embraced approximately 3000 companies producing 
almost one-fourth of French GDP (Somai 2017). In Austria, public com-
panies (of which three big banks) produced one-fifth of the national eco-
nomic output even before the Anschluss. After 1945, both firms founded 
by the Germans and Austrian businesses they had previously acquired 
were made public. The goal was to prevent Soviet ownership (Kőrösi 
2016). In nineteenth-century Germany, greater state involvement in the 
economy had been regarded as a key factor in the catching up process; 
public ownership (i.e., the creation of a  common infrastructure) also 
enabled the creation of the unified nation-state. Public arms companies 
established during World War One, were joined by new ones following 
the Great Depression. Although in Germany no extensive nationaliza-
tion took place after World War Two, a significant proportion of indus-
trial production came from the six huge groups of companies that were 
mainly involved in heavy industry and operated with the government as 
the majority shareholder. Besides central state ownership, the role of fed-
eral states remained substantial (Naszádos 2017). In contrast, the U.K. 
initially had relatively few public properties due to their free market tradi-
tions. Following some large-scale nationalizations in the oil and electricity 
industries at the beginning of the twentieth century, public ownership 
became significant only after 1945, and covered all strategic sectors (Aha-
roni 1986; Millward 2000).
In the shadow of consecutive waves of nationalization, privatization 
also appeared, but remained sporadic for a long time. The change of direc-
tion occurred as a consequence of the failure in crisis management at the 
turn of the 1970s and 1980s. At that time, in order to save companies and 
preserve jobs, a majority of European states resorted to further national-
izations. Nevertheless, this led to a sharp rise in both losses and subsidies 
and, therefore, a deterioration of macroeconomic balances, while the state 
remained unable to cope either with the rising prices or recession. This is 
why the big wave of privatization was launched—first in England where 
expanded public ownership was the furthest from the traditionally free 
market conception of the economy—and lasted, with varying intensity, as 
late as 2008.
The goals of the process were still multifaceted and controversial. 
Some of them related to political ideology, like strengthening market ori-
entation at the expense of state intervention, depoliticizing the economy, 
boosting private ownership (democratizing ownership), and expanding 
electorate for the parties in power. Other goals related to the economy, 
such as remedying government failures, enhancing economic restructura-
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tion and modernization, improving corporate governance and compa-
nies’ competitiveness, reducing budget subsidies and risk, and restoring 
financial equilibrium.6 All this means that governments’ deemed priva-
tizations accompanied by the opening of market and deregulation to be 
a comprehensive solution for all difficulties, just as in the case of earlier 
nationalizations.
During the big wave of privatization that took place between 1977 and 
2004, Western Europe emerged as a leader in sales, and it was responsible 
for nearly half of global revenues and almost one-third of all transactions 
(Bortolotti and Milella 2006). However, differences between the individual 
countries remained significant.
Table 2 
Privatization performance in Western Europe, 1977–2002









Portugal 78 25.4 19 15 1.87
United Kingdom 183 145.5 11 11 1.40
The Netherlands 29 19.2 4 6 1.15
Spain 74 46.6 6 9 1.01
Italy 103 96.4 8 9 0.86
Germany 150 73.3 3 10 0.79
Sweden 56 18.6 6 10 0.73
Belgium 10 5.7 2 4 0.69
Austria 51 11.5 4 14 0.52
France 97 59.9 3 11 0.48
Finland 56 16.3 10 – –
Average 81 47.1 7 9 0.95
Notes:
In USD 1995 values.
Revenues: total revenues cumulated within the investigated period.
Revenues/GDP: the ratio of total revenues cumulated in the period up to 2002 GDP.
SOE/GDP is the ratio of SOEs’ value added to GDP reported the year before the first privatization.
As for the uncertainty of data, the authors themselves draw attention to it. 
Source: own calculation based on Bortolotti-Milella (2006)
6  For a good overview of the objectives of privatization, see e.g., Aharoni (1986), 
Yarrow (1986), Vickers and Wright (1989a), Toninelli (2000), Megginson and 
Netter (2003), and Parker (2003).
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The study cited in Table 2 deserves special attention as—unlike the usual 
approach—it also includes the initial size of public assets.7 On this basis, 
countries can be grouped into categories according to the size and accom-
plishment of privatization.
Table 3 
Relationship between the magnitude of public assets and that of privatization
Initial size of state assets
big
(greater than or equal to 
10% of GDP)
small






(revenues greater than 








(revenues smaller than 








Source: Calculated on the basis of Bortolotti-Milella (2006)
In Table 3, “big privatizers” emerge as one of the main types, represented 
here by the United Kingdom and Portugal, which considerably reduced 
their huge state assets. The group of “reluctant countries” consists of 
France and Austria, and, less justifiably, Germany and Sweden, which sold 
relatively few of their large shares. As for the two other groups, the Nether-
lands and Spain sold out the majority of their relatively small assets, while 
Belgium, the “moderate privatizer,” generated small revenues from the sale 
of its shares in small public sector.8
7  Although the economic incorrectness of the “assets-to-GDP ratio” had been 
pointed out by several studies, this remains, for the simple reason of data acces-
sibility, one of the most commonly used indicators. (To measure SOEs, value 
added or revenues from privatization or costs of nationalizations to GDP are all 
less problematic.) One the one hand, indices calibrated to GDP can only miti-
gate, rather than eliminate the effects of changes in assets’ value. On the other 
hand, their advantage is to make comparisons in space and time more robust 
by negating both size differences between countries and the impact of inflation. 
Therefore, wherever possible, we will disclose this (asset-to-GDP) indicator in 
addition to those in absolute terms at current prices.
8  The rest of the countries cannot, either for lack of data or overpassing the thresh-
olds, be put in any of these categories displaying extreme cases.
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Cross-country differences are influenced by institutional and historical 
conditions (i.e., state system, political structure, constitutional character-
istics, closeness of relations between cabinet and companies, attitudes of 
voters towards central government and public ownership), and by pre-
vailing economic and political circumstances: the degree of imbalance or 
growth, the need for restructuring, the strength of the central executive, 
and the balance of forces between stakeholders supporting and opposing 
the administration (e.g., opposition parties, trade unions, SOEs’ CEOs, 
public opinion).9 The more the government perceives that there are strong 
short-term economic constraints and pressure coming from supporters, 
the more they feel urged to make firm decisions. Obviously, these deci-
sions are simpler to adopt and consistently execute if governments may 
rely on a comfortable majority and do not have to bargain with their coali-
tion partners (see, e.g., the position of the British cabinet, which was also 
bolstered by the successful outcome of the Falklands War, versus that of 
the Belgian one). It is easier to proceed when the political structure is built 
on cooperation rather than a sharp rivalry between parties (e.g., in Austria 
and the Netherlands versus Germany), or when everything is in the central 
governments’ hands rather than dispersed among different levels of admin-
istration, creating a situation in which the cabinet has to reach agreement 
with regional or local authorities (e.g., in France versus Germany). Priva-
tization is easier if you can sell state assets without having to dismantle 
constitutional safeguards (e.g., as in Spain, Portugal, France or Germany), 
and if public companies are not as narrowly interwoven with political par-
ties as, for instance, in Italy or Austria. It is also helpful if both constitu-
ents and businessmen keep distance from the state as in Britain, rather 
than cultivating close ties with it (as in France or Austria). Possibilities are 
also dependent upon the composition of the state’s property portfolio: it is 
easier to privatize companies in the manufacturing sector than monopolies 
in public services. The same holds true for profitable, market-oriented sub-
sidiaries of some huge corporations versus large entities working under the 
direct control of a Ministry.
Despite the long-standing process of privatization, the state has 
remained an important player globally in the field of corporate owner-
ship. According to 2014 data (OECD 2016), 326 out of the 2000 big-
gest companies in the world had the government as a majority or minority 
9  These aspects are detailed in Vickers and Wright (1989b), Boix (1997), Borto-
lotti-Pinotti (2003), Bortolotti and Milella (2006).
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shareholder. Although only twenty-six of them were of European (French, 
German, Italian and British) origin, while one-third of them were Chinese. 
But as we will see, the size of other regions’ public property, as well as the 
“hows” and “whys” of its rapid expansion, are not irrelevant for the EU.10 
In 2012, public assets represented over 10 percent of GDP and the sector 
made up 3.5 percent of the labor force, in developed countries of Europe 
(Table 4).
Table 4 
SOEs’ weight in EU’s old member states in 2012




Finland 53 9.7 67.3
Sweden 52 4.7 35.0
Belgium 12 3.2 34.1
Ireland 25 2.4 19.4
France 68 10.0 14.2
Italy 17 2.4 14.1
Austria 11 3.0 10.9
The Netherlands 26 1.0 9.9
Denmark 19 1.5 8.3
Greece 56 5.0 6.8
United Kingdom 18 1.5 5.8
Germany 75 2.8 4.6
Portugal 84 4.1 3.5
Spain 55 0.6 1.0
Average of old EU Members 41 3.5 10.5
Source: For SOEs: OECD (2012); For employment: Eurostat http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do
For GDP: http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/submitViewTableAction.do, and
 https://data.oecd.org/gdp/gdp-long-term-forecast.htm#indicator-chart
10  In the list of Fortune’s Global 500, during the period between 2003–2014, the 
share of publicly owned companies has increased from 9 to 23 percent, which 
was due mainly to China (PWC 2015).
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Data contained in Table 4, even if more detailed than other sources’, are 
only a snapshot of the situation, and, to our knowledge, there are no long-
term data series comparable to them. If we take a look at earlier data (Table 
1), the regional average ratio of public property to GDP appears to have 
risen back to its prevailing level at the turn of the 1970s and 1980s. At 
that time, it was 12 percent, and in 2012, it was 10.5 percent. The com-
parison is, however, distorted by uncertainties in both data collection and 
data management methods, which is also a problem for more recent figures.
OECD data are of a  smaller magnitude than those cited in the 
country case studies of our volume. Somai (2017), referring to the French 
statistical office, claims that 1632 French firms were under state control 
at the end of 2014, while the OECD only reported on 68 companies. In 
Austria, according to Kőrösi’s sources, state, provinces, and municipali-
ties have shares in approximately 3,500 firms, versus the 11 that appear in 
the international survey. For the last twenty years, the state has constantly 
maintained around 40 percent of shareholdings in Austrian economy 
either directly or indirectly through the banking system (Kőrösi 2016, 15). 
Naszádos (2017), referring to another OECD paper (2011), writes that 
in Germany, there were 15,127 public companies (most of them in the 
hands of the municipalities), 111 of which had majority or minority state 
ownership, versus 75 in Table 4. According to Biedermann, Orosz, and 
Szijártó (2017), there are 70 public companies in Italy (as opposed to the 
17 indicated by OECD) representing 27 percent in total sales, and 19 per-
cent of employment. The above differences may arise from differences in 
definitions and data records. We mention here just two examples. The first 
one is about the giant companies that provide French postal and telecom-
munication services. They only appeared in the register of SOEs transfor-
mation from administrative entities into independent public companies. 
This increased the number of public employees by more than 400,000 
and their share of total employment to 8 percent (Somai 2017). Likewise, 
the Austrian state railways were reported to be part of the public sector 
until 1993, after which they were transformed into a holding company, 
and then fully privatized (Kőrösi 2016). Assuming national statistics to 
be close to reality, the weight of the public sector as reported in inter-
national sources is still significantly underestimated. Those sources can, 
at most and only with reservations, provide some clues for cross-country 
comparisons.
Longer-term data sets are further biased, in that statistics and com-
monly used indices cannot separate the impact of an increase in state own-
ership from that of stock price fluctuations. Finally, indicators for 2012 
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reflect not only the effects of nationalizations, but also those of post-2008 
asset sales, which were significant in many countries.
Crisis Management by Nationalizations
According to global data, there was a jump in nationalizations in 2008 and 
2009, amounting to a value of $270 and $325 billion in these two years 
respectively, as compared with the average of $53 billion in the previous 
two decades.11 Beyond absolute figures, in order to obtain a better compar-
ison, it is worth looking at indices expressed in terms of GDP. Calculated 
by either method, the majority of global growth came from Europe and the 
United States.
Table 5 
Growth in state ownership from 2008 to 2012
Nationalizations (in 
USD bn)
In percentage points 
of GDP 2012
Globally 1010 1.35
of which in USA 356 2.20
of which in EU 390 2.26
Source: For nationalizations in the U.S. see: TARP (2016); for nationalizations in the EU: author’s estimation. See for for GDP data 
(based on December 2012 EUR/USD exchange rate): http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?end=2015&start=1960
&view=chart.
In Europe as well as overseas, the bulk of nationalizations took place in the 
financial sector.12 
Saving the banks
Fearing a  total meltdown of the financial system and a  decline in the 
economy to a  level unprecedented for decades, and also referring to les-
sons learned from the Great Depression, banks that got into trouble were 
systematically saved in developed countries. As a combined effect of the 
11  Calculation based on Megginson (2013).
12  Hereafter, for the sake of brevity, the term “banks” is often used. But it always 
relates to the whole financial sector.
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subprime mortgage crisis—spreading quickly in the globalized system—
the liquidity shortfall, and recession, even those financial institutions that 
could not to be blamed for having purchased a massive amount of “toxic 
assets” were shaken. Thus, it became important to stop the contagion and 
avoid the domino effect.
In 2007, at the beginning of the crisis, several financial institutions in 
Europe—like those of the United States—tried to solve their problems by 
raising private capital. Then governments attempted to enhance mergers, 
which resulted in ever higher subsidies and ultimately nationalizations 
rather than success stories.13 It quickly became obvious that, at a time of 
market turmoil, capital shortage could only be overcome and market confi-
dence could only be restored with public funds.
Decisions on grants were taken by national governments, but these 
also had to be approved by the EU’s competition authority on the basis of 
European rules of procedure. By upholding the fundamental principles of 
EU competition law, the Commission stated that the assistance should, in 
general, be exceptional and of temporary nature; that the institutions in 
question, as well as their owners, should contribute to bearing the costs; 
furthermore, that it is important to limit competition distortions through, 
for example, restraining expansion or setting up strict requirements for 
reorganization (European Commission 2009a). The framework for state 
aid measures to support bailouts was set at €5.763 trillion, 44 percent of 
the EU’s 2013 GDP. Just over one quarter of these funds were used as 
guarantees, liquidity measures, impaired assets measures and recapitaliza-
tions (European Commission Directorate-General for Competition 2014).
From the perspective of nationalizations, recapitalizations are of special 
interest, for nationalization had not originally been listed as an approved 
method for rescuing banks. This option was only tolerated by the Commis-
sion starting in early 2009, after several precedents had occurred in member 
states (European Commission 2009b).14 However, no particular rules 
of procedure or criteria for decision making were prescribed. In practice 
nationalizations had been interlinked with other forms of state assistance.
This “hidden nationalization” involved an increase in capital and the 
purchase of impaired assets. It often took the form of acquiring preferen-
tial, non-voting shares with extra rights, or other securities which could 
13  See details in Voszka (2017).
14  Besides, the Union generally upholds the principle of neutrality in the ownership 
of companies. Hence, the power of determining and changing the ownership 
structure is reserved to the nation-states.
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then become convertible into freely negotiable shares, that is, shares that 
would be available also for the banks themselves to buy back.15 Due to the 
manifest reticence in using this method, the Union has never even pub-
lished any summary statistics on the size of nationalizations, hence the 
need for estimation.
One of our methods of estimation consists of approximating the upper 
limit through capital injection, and the lower one through a sum of indi-
vidual decisions. When determining the maximum value, our point of 
departure was the supposition that, although recapitalization was not nec-
essarily followed by ownership changes, public property usually emerged 
through recapitalization after 2008. From the €821 billion originally 
approved for this aid scheme, €448 billion was used (Table 6), which 
thus indicates the maximum extent of bank nationalization. Table 6 shows 
high regional concentration: half of the recapitalization came from three 
member states and over 90 percent from ten. Country differences might 
be explained by the size of the economy and the banking system, along 
with the depth of involvement in the turbulence and some other special 
features.16
Table 6 
EU member states using the highest capital injections, in 2008–2013 




As a percentage of 
2013 GDP
United Kingdom 100.1 5.0
 Germany 64.2 2.3
Ireland 62.8 38.3 
Spain 61.9 6.1
Greece 40.9 22.4
France 25.1 1.2 
Belgium 23.3 6.1 
15  A similar method was in use in the United States as well. See it in detail in 
Voszka (2017).
16  In the EU’s new member states for example, banks had only sporadically been 
bailed out by governments, owing to the low level of contamination by toxic 
assets in their portfolios and the peculiarities of their ownership structure. Here 
it was the foreign parent banks that helped out their subsidiaries located outside 
the Eurozone—the notable exception being Slovenia, where financial institutions 
had primarily been in domestic hands.





As a percentage of 
2013 GDP
The Netherlands 23.0 3.8
Austria 11.1 3.5
Denmark 10.8 4.3 
Total of the 10 countries 423.2 4.4
EU 27 448.2 3.4 
Source: European Commission Directorate-General for Competition (2014), GDP: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/tgm/refreshTableAc-
tion.do?tab=table&plugin=1&pcode=tec00001&language=en.
Nominal amounts are highest in the U.K. and Germany, the countries with 
the largest financial sectors, and those that are also the most tightly con-
nected to U.S. security markets. A special feature in Germany is the federal 
states’ (Bundesländer) extensive ownership, which reached 40 percent of 
pre-crisis banking assets (Hüfner 2010). Most banks owned by these states 
(Landesbanken) hoarded toxic assets and were badly in need of govern-
ment assistance. Other German financial institutions were also national-
ized. Ireland—a country highly ranked by the GDP-related index—saw 
its financial institutions, saddled with toxic assets, in urgent need of state 
aid immediately after the escalation of the crisis; four of the country’s six 
largest banks had to be nationalized. State ownership in the banking sector 
is significant also in Greece, which holds the second position in the above-
mentioned index, and, even if to a lesser extent, in Spain, although these 
countries had barely been hit by the mortgage crisis. For them, this was the 
second wave of the crisis, which came as a shock. Meanwhile, stress tests, 
the reassessment of capital adequacy on a  regular basis, also stimulated 
recapitalization, which under the prevailing market conditions could only 
mostly be financed from public sources.
At the end of 2008, Greek banks were stabilized with a package of 
emergency state aid worth €28 billion, while there was no nationalization 
until 2011 (Visvizi 2012). But when financial institutions, which already 
had to suffer the effects of resource shortages and deep recession, also had 
to agree to a more than 50 percent cut of Greek government bonds in their 
portfolios, nationalization became inevitable. In 2012, the second bailout 
scheme for Greece included a bank recapitalization package worth €48 bil-
lion, 27.5 billion of which was earmarked to support the four biggest banks 
(European Commission Directorate-General for Economic and Finan-
cial Affairs 2013). Three of them—the National Bank of Greece, Alpha 
and Piraeus—were able to raise 10 percentage of new equity from private 
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investors, thus avoiding falling under majority state control. The Euro-
bank failed to do so, and the state, thanks to a capital injection of €5.8 bil-
lion, gained almost full ownership of it (Hellenic Financial Stability Fund 
2014). The prudent operation of traditionally well-capitalized Spanish 
banks had been loosened during the real estate boom, but problems were 
swept under the rug, first by concealing the losses and then via mergers 
and budgetary subsidies (The EU 2012). By 2012, public assistance for 
the recapitalization of Spanish financial institutions became imperative, 
a project to which the European Union had given €100 billion. Four major 
loss-producing banks, accounting for one-quarter of the Spanish banking 
sector and having lost most of their equity, were nationalized.17
As a contrast, in France, thanks above all to structural and regula-
tory peculiarities, only a little money had to be spent on rescuing financial 
institutions. Here, a concentrated banking system emerged from the con-
text of large-scaled privatizations in the 1990s. Apart from relatively strict 
public control, the common cultural (i.e., educational and civil service) 
backgrounds of the banks’ top executives has also played a role in those 
companies’ involvement in relatively few risky businesses and, cautiousness 
about derivatives. (Somai 2017).
Our estimations of the lower limit of nationalizations were based on 
individual decisions of the Union’s competition authority regarding the 
recapitalization of nearly one hundred financial institutions. This was facil-
itated by the fact that the concentration of recapitalization was high not 
only regionally, but also on the level of individual banks. More than half of 
the €448 billion was allocated to just 17 beneficiaries.
To give a couple of examples: more than one member state took part in 
rescuing Fortis and Dexia. The financial situation of the latter, established 
by a merger of Belgian and French banks in 1996, became aggravated by its 
American subsidiary FSA and a multi-billion loan to the troubled German-
Irish bank Depfa. Later in 2011, Dexia had to post a loss of €4 billion after 
writing down the value of its Greek debt. The bank was split up, with the 
Belgian state taking over the part of the business operating on its territory 
for €4 billion, while French banks purchasing smaller parts. The remaining 
troubled assets were placed in a “bad bank,” covered by a guarantee of €90 
billion by the states concerned (Second 2008; Dalton and Gauthier-Villars 
2011). As for Fortis, its liquidity position was weakened following the acqui-
17  Fondo de Reestructuración Ordenada, available at http://www.frob.es/es/Documents/
20141223Presentaci%C3%B3n%20FROB%20prot.pdf.
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sition of Dutch ABN AMRO in 2007, bloated—as it became obvious later 
on—with toxic assets. This was a take-over mounted, after fierce price com-
petition, by a member of a consortium together with Spanish Santander and 
the Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS), which also got into trouble because of 
this deal (RBS 2007). Valued at more than a hundred billion Euros, this was 
the world’s biggest bank takeover at the time. A year later, the governments 
of Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxemburg had to save the bank, but this 
time it had to disburse only €11 billion altogether, in exchange for a 49 per-
cent stake each in the three different subsidiaries of Fortis that were in their 
respective jurisdictions. For a  further €13 billion, the Dutch government 
became the 100 percent owner of the Dutch business of Fortis, including its 
ABN AMRO business (Netherlands 2008).
The abovementioned cases of bank bailouts were not the most com-
plicated ones. The bailout process of Hypo Real Estate (HRE) holding 
entailed seven rounds of approval of the Commission’s competition 
authority from autumn 2008 to 2011 (Buder et al. 2011). The problems 
of HRE also got worse due to a 2007 acquisition of the originally Prussian 
Depfa Bank, which had been relocated into Ireland in the 1990s. HRE—
just like RBS and Dexia—finally received more support than the whole 
Spanish banking sector Keeping these big entities afloat proved to be more 
expensive than the controversial first Greek rescue package.
When looking closely at this narrower group, we found that for institu-
tions receiving the highest support, capital injection meant effective nation-
alization.18 Adding the cost of nationalization of the relatively smaller Greek 
and Spanish banks to the sum of €253 billion injected into the 17 big banks, 
we can price European bank nationalizations at a minimum of €296 billion.
As another method of estimation, we used the Eurostat dataset about 
the impact of government interventions to support financial institutions on 
budget deficits and public debt (European Commission Eurostat 2016). 
From the expenditure lines of the statistical tables derived from member 
states’ reports, we summarized those concerning capital investments 
(e.g., capital increases), other capital transfers (e.g., purchases of shares), 
and other expenditures (including special government bodies like “bad 
banks”) for the period between 2007 and 2015. In this case, we can only 
give approximate estimates, because the data are not about the increase 
of public ownership, and furthermore, the content of the cells, as it is also 
clear from the member states’ notes, is often ambiguous.
18  See details in Voszka (2017).
Szanyi - 00 könyv.indb   28 2019.11.15.   9:31
29Crisis Management in Europe
Table 7 
State capital investment in EU member states from 2007 to 2013 
(€ billion)
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Total
United Kingdom        53.1x
Germany 3.7 4.0 34.4 2.5 4.6 1.9  51.1
Ireland 0 4.0 35.4 7.3 0.6 0.5  47.8
Spain 0 0 0.4 5.1 39.1 3.0  47.6
Greece  0 0 0 0.4 9.4 21  30.8
Austria 0 2.7 0.7 1.7 1.6 2.0 8.7
Belgium 0 0 0 0.8 2.9 5.0 8.7
The Netherlands 0 2.2 1.0 0.04 0.03 1.3  4.6
Portugal 0 0 1.8 0.6 0.9 0.7  4.0
Slovenia 0 0 0 0.2 0.06 3.6  3.9
Denmark 0 0 0 2.5 0.3 0.2  3.0
France  0 0 0 0  2.6 0  2.6
Bulgaria        0.9
Latvia 0 0.2 0.4 0.1 0.1 0  0.8
Cyprus 0 0 0 0 0.1 0  0.1
Lithuania 0 0 0.03 0 0 0.09  0.1
Luxemburg 0.03 0 0 0 0 0  0.0
Total of 17 countries  267.8
x until 2015
Note: In ten member states, there was no such expenditure in the scrutinized period. For countries outside the Eurozone, whose data 
were available in national currencies, we only displayed a total amount using the average exchange rate of the year with the highest 
expenditure. 
Source: author’s calculation based on European Commission Eurostat data (2016)
The figure in the “Total of 17 countries” line of Table 7 only slightly dif-
fers from the one we arrived at by our first minimum estimation method. 
This confirms that our calculations are, by and large, correct: bank nation-
alizations in Europe roughly cost somewhere between €300 and €400 
billion.
Nationalization as an ultimate solution was, unlike in previous times, 
unpopular in many European countries. People did not consider it to be 
a matter of public interest. They rather interpreted it as a way of rescuing 
the financial elites and socializing their losses. The process was no triumph 
for other affected parties either. Management was generally removed, their 
bonuses limited, and high remunerations dropped throughout the sector. 
Governments acquired non-voting preference shares in some cases, but in 
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others, they received the right to veto, and their representatives appeared 
on boards. Shareholders and creditors had to write off a certain proportion 
of their claims. States acquired banks’ assets mainly at low prices, devalued 
to a fraction of their pre-crisis worth. Or it was the nationalization itself, 
which caused falling share prices. Therefore original owners often debated 
the methods and compensation levels applied.
Rules for restructuring were strict and required the banks to repay 
state aid (with all premiums and accumulated interest) by predetermined 
deadlines, and, partly in order to do so, to sell branches and subsidiaries, 
close offices, terminate hundreds and thousands of employees, reduce 
costs, assets, and balance sheets, and forbid acquisitions. For example, 
the Union’s competition authority prescribed the breaking up of three big 
banks out of the 17 top beneficiaries. Several giant banks had to sell their 
subsidiaries; six of them were forced to cut back their balance sheet by 40 
to 60 percent; and one of them by 85 percent. The fulfillment of these 
obligations was strictly controlled by authorities (Voszka 2017).
New ways of nationalization?
In Europe, nationalizations had not been restrained to the financial 
sector but also covered other activities, especially public services and 
energy industries. This was only indirectly linked to the crisis through the 
increased need for security and disruption in the once unambiguous direc-
tion of privatization policy. At times, the process started with the tightening 
of regulations and price caps, also called the nationalization of incomes or 
“creeping nationalization” (De Clercq 2014).
One of the methods used was re-municipalization, that is, restoring 
the role of local governments as owners or direct service providers in order 
to reduce subsidies, cut steeply rising private profits, and lower prices. 
Another method was the state repurchase of companies especially in sectors 
considered to be strategic, such as electricity, gas, or petroleum. However, 
governments also used stealthy ways of nationalization by increasing state 
ownership in partially privatized companies, setting up subsidiaries for large 
state-owned companies or launching new public investment programs.19
These methods, stealthy ones included, are not new in themselves. 
As for the order of magnitude of such nationalizations, it cannot even be 
19  See details in Voszka (2017).
Szanyi - 00 könyv.indb   30 2019.11.15.   9:31
31Crisis Management in Europe
estimated, but several sources suggest that the expansion of SOEs gained 
momentum again in the years of the global financial crisis. According to 
Somai (2017), the number of public companies in France, majority owned 
by the state, increased by around one third between 2009 and 2014, 
pushing up the number of those employed in such concerns by 400,000, 
or 2 percentage points. This was mainly due to the expansion of the large 
companies associated with the electricity industry (EdF) and the national 
railways (SNCF).
A similar trend can be observed in the case of mergers and acquisi-
tions (M&A). While this type of activity for exclusively state-owned enter-
prises accounted for less than one percent of all transactions in 1996, it 
jumped close to 20 percent in 2009, and then fell to half of this propor-
tion later on (OECD 2016).20 Although SOEs made most of their invest-
ments in domestic markets—part of which certainly fell under the so-called 
stealthy nationalization—their international expansion had been quite 
noteworthy. The latter grew 14 times between 2003 and 2009, rising to 
a peak never ever reached prior to the crisis. This is obviously linked to 
the fact that public firms depend much less on financial markets for their 
funding than do their private counterparts. Hence, because the crisis had 
less of an effect on them, they could take advantage of their rivals’ weak-
nesses. The latter statement holds true not only for companies, but also for 
countries. If investor countries are divided into those that are developed 
(consisting mostly of EU members) and those in the process of developing, 
we can find very similar transformation curves, but it must be noted that 
developing countries are responsible for two-thirds of transactions.21
Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWF) are often found in the background of 
acquisitions by governments and state-owned entities in the international 
arena. The investment of these major institutions tripled between 2008 
20  The other data cited here are from this very same study. If we took into account 
not only one hundred percent ownership, this proportion would probably be 
much higher.
21  China’s role here is significant but, contrary to public opinion, not as important 
as in the case of global companies, at least according to OECD (2016). (While 
one-third of the two thousand largest SOEs are Chinese, as for M&A, they were 
responsible for only 14 percent of the transactions in the peak year of 2009—
and for one half of them in 2014, when the global trend was already falling.) 
The Asian country announced their “Go Global Strategy” in 2000. The strategy 
urged, among other recommendations, SOEs to invest in foreign companies in 
order to boost their own competitiveness (OECD 2010).
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and 2013, through acquisitions that included well-known North American 
and European companies.22
The treatment of SWFs in statistics on international changes in cor-
porate ownership is far from consistent.23 But the relationship between 
mergers and acquisitions on one hand, and privatizations and nationaliza-
tions on the other, is not clear either. As for the latter, the picture has been 
further blurred by the emergence of state-owned firms and other govern-
mental bodies as buyers.
For example, Privatization Barometer Report listed when the state-owned 
Electricité de France (EdF) sold its minority package in EnBW Energie to 
the German Federal State of Baden-Württemberg as privatization, because 
the buyer expressed his intention to let the company enter into private hands 
in the long-run (Megginson 2011, 9–10). Similarly, the sale of part of the 
French postal service (La Poste), which was originally owned by the French 
Ministry of Finance, to the sovereign wealth fund of the French national 
government was also listed as privatization, arguing that the buyer acted as 
a commercially oriented investor rather than a politically motivated actor 
(Megginson and Bortolotti 2011, 11.). Surely these were not small transac-
tions: the former accounted for 14 percent of the total annual income from 
privatization in the EU, and for the latter it was 10 percent.
SOEs’ domestic and international expansion together with statistical 
uncertainties deserve special attention because two important conclusions 
can be drawn from them in our analysis. First, the involvement of public 
companies and funds in ownership changes points to the interconnection 
of nationalization and privatization, and also the blurring of their bound-
aries in the same transaction. For example, when a government sells stock 
market shares, it may start as a privatization, but if the buyer happens to be 
another state, a public company, or a SWF, the size of state property will 
not really change, only the identity of the public owner does. Second, in the 
case of cross-border transactions, nationalization may arise independently 
22  For example, Abu Dhabi Investment Authority (ADIA) acquired 4.9 percent 
of Citigroup after 2008, and then Chrysler HQ in New York. And as Singapore 
Wealth Fund acquired 10.7 percent of Merrill Lynch, Qatar SWF did likewise 
with 15 percent of Volkswagen and the entire Manchester United Football Club 
(Guedhami 2013; The Rise 2012).
23  Privatization Barometer first considered foreign purchases of funds (and other 
public finance organizations) as privatization (but it did not do the same with 
the domestic purchase). In the following year, all SWF investments were listed 
as nationalization (Megginson and Bortolotti 2012, 11; Megginson 2013, 20).
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from the intentions of the government of the destination country. Public 
ownership expands, but under the influence of another state, its goals, 
mode of operations, and effects may fundamentally differ from those of tra-
ditional nationalization, one purpose of which is to keep out foreign inves-
tors. This already happened earlier, but investors at the time would come 
(e.g., to the regions of Central and Eastern Europe in transition) largely 
from developed countries. Nevertheless, the expansion of the developing 
world in Europe’s core countries has been considered a genuine novelty.
This obviously raises concerns in developed host countries.24 Also, 
many fear that the level playing field in international trade competition 
(or at least the status quo) is endangered by SOEs’ large and growing role 
in foreign investments, as it is assumed that publicly-owned companies 
have easier access to resources and subsidies than private ones. No wonder 
that in recent years, this issue has been kept on the agenda by large inter-
national organizations and advisers. As the process is difficult to control 
because of respect for the sovereignty of nation-states and the framework 
of liberal principles, multilateral agreements and the strengthening of rules 
came to the forefront. Instead of pushing for privatization, the focus is 
shifting towards taking these big and expanding SOEs for granted. Several 
studies published by OECD, the World Bank, or PricewaterhouseCoopers 
recently admit that there are legitimate economic and other reasons related 
to social-value creation for the establishment and maintenance of public 
companies. According to them,25 it is important, however, to undertake 
thorough reform of the management of these SOEs’ in order to make their 
operations transparent and compliant with market principles.
The institutions of corporate governance have been transformed in 
many European countries in recent years, with market-based operations as 
the main objective everywhere. The French SWF (named Agence des par-
ticipations de l’Etat, or APE) was established in 2004 with the aim of sepa-
rating the state’s functions as shareholder from its other functions, trans-
forming the firms in its portfolio into joint-stock companies (i.e., bringing 
them into conformity with private law and opening them to outside inves-
tors), and ensuring that their operations are effective. In 2014, APE, man-
aging nearly €110 billion in shareholdings, paid €4.1 billion in dividends 
into the state budget. In the years of the Great Recession the government 
24  As, e.g., in Greek privatization.
25  See e.g., OECD (2016); World Bank (2006); Kowalski et al. (2013); PWC 
(2015).
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considered public companies viable and crisis-resistant. Thus in spite of 
some privatization following the crisis, the diminution of the public sector 
came to a halt, and an opposite process even began (Somai 2017). In Italy in 
the 2000s, under the treasury’s trusteeship, Cassa Depositi e Prestiti was set 
up under the control of the Ministry of Economy and Finance (Biederman, 
Orosz, and Szijártó 2017). In Germany after 2008, several new regulations 
were introduced and codified in the so-called Public Corporate Governance 
Codex (Naszádos 2017). Austria expects to improve the efficiency of con-
trol (and companies’ operation) by centralizing decision-making. In 2015, 
Austria’s public property fund, operating as a  joint-stock company, was 
replaced by a  limited company, Österreichische Bundes- und Industriebe-
teiligungen, or ÖBIB, which was formally obliged to follow the instructions 
of the Finance Minister, who exercised property rights (Kőrösi 2016).
Several international analyses suggest that governments may also have 
a strong influence on private companies (generally in the form of regula-
tion, including subsidies).This has been and continues to be true for all 
European countries. 
Austria appears as a good example of traditional symbiosis between 
state and market. This is reflected in the complicated ownership and part-
ownership schemes, profit-sharing, and investments. In a broad range of 
infrastructure projects, public and private investments are so completely 
interwoven in practice that there is virtually no exclusively private own-
ership in this sector. The Austrian “close-to-the-state” category includes 
all private companies regularly supplying at least one public actor. Their 
number exceeds two thousand (Kőrösi 2016). The close relationship 
between state and companies has always been characteristic of France 
too, not least because of the interconnecting elites. Here the creation of 
national champions by giving direct subsidies and supporting their acquisi-
tions abroad has been fairly widespread in manufacturing, energy and the 
financial sector (Somai 2017).
Meanwhile, state-owned companies do not form a  homogeneous 
group, not only because of their sectoral affiliation or profitability, but also 
because of the ratio of public ownership, and the ways in which ownership 
rights are exercised. According to PWC, there is a continuum of models 
spanning the public–private interface: at one end, there are executive agen-
cies (as part of the administration), while at the other end, we can find 
private companies; in between, there are eight versions that differ partly 
according to the right of disposal (PWC 2015, 15).
In light of the new approach to the role of public companies, priva-
tization ceased to be as unambiguous and exclusive solution proposed by 
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experts as it used to be in the 1980s and 1990s. Great Recession produced 
arguments in favor of this option, too, but the measures have been more 
moderate than twenty years ago.
Crisis Management by Privatization
The post-2008 privatizations can be divided into two groups: privatization 
of banks nationalized during the crisis—hereafter referred to as re-priva-
tization—and privatization in other parts of the economy. The analytical 
separation of the two categories is justified by the motives behind these 
policies rather than by sectoral differences.
PRIVATIzATION OF BANKS
With the easing of the crisis, the withdrawal of the extraordinary mea-
sures was soon placed on the agenda. The consensus around a Keynesian 
approach based on state intervention quickly disappeared (Farrell and 
Quiggin 2017), and debates began over whether it would be possible to 
return to free market policies, or if the global financial crisis marked the end 
of liberal capitalism, therefore brand new approaches became necessary
In principle, there was general agreement about the need for both re-
privatizing the banks and tightening their regulation. Politicians had to 
look at nationalizations as a temporary measure not least because of the 
EU’s own principles, and could not ignore the aforementioned unpopu-
larity of bank nationalizations. Also, financial institutions wanted to get out 
from government tutelage as quickly as possible. They tried to repurchase 
their preferred stocks, and involve private capital (by selling a percentage 
of the equity on the stock market or issuing new shares) in order to restore 
their business reputations, reduce interest and fees related to (state) capital 
injections, and loosen restrictions on executive pay. 
International statistics show that bank privatizations got off to a quick 
start. In 2009, two- thirds of global privatization revenue (the latter 
amounting to $265 billion) came from selling preference shares, acquired 
previously by governments in return for their re-capitalization support to 
banks (based on Megginson 2010). A decisive part (more than 80 percent) 
of this revenue, however, resulted from the re-privatization of a small but 
systematically important group of American banks. For them the whole 
process was terminated by 2011. In Europe, this process took much longer. 
In 2009, the share of revenues from bank re-privatization among all priva-
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tizations was higher than in the following three years, but the process 
gained momentum in the period between 2013 and 2015, only to start 
falling again (as did other privatizations) after 2016 under the shadow of 
Brexit and terrorist attacks.26
Table 8 
Revenues from privatization and re-privatization in the European Union in 2009–2016 















2009 38.8 0.32 20.4 52.6 18.4 0.15
2010 33.1 0.26 2.3 7.0 30.8 0.24
2011 19.5 0.15 4.2 21.5 15.3 0.16
2012 28.5 0.21 7.0 24.3 21.5 0.16
2013 50.7 0.37 22.1 43.8 28.6 0.21
2014 58.3 0.42 26.0 44.2 32.3 0.23
2015 80.0 0.54 33.1 41.4 46.9 0.32
2016 34.0 0.23 2.6 7.6 31.4 0.21
Total EU 
2009–2016  342.9 0.30 117.7 34.1 225.2 0.21
Total EU 
1996–2008 633.8 0.48 – – – –
Re-privatization: sale of banks nationalized after 2007 
Note: The magnitude of both nationalizations and privatizations remained below one percent of GDP per year in all countries or 
regions (except for the extreme cases of transition countries).
Source: revenues computed on the basis of Privatization Barometer Reports. 
GDP: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/tgm/refreshTableAction.do?tab=table&plugin=1&pcode=tec00001&
Privatization revenues during this period amounted to €343 billion, roughly 
equalvalent to the costs of bank nationalizations. However, only one-third 
of the sum came from the re-privatization of the banks nationalized during 
the crisis (see Table 8).27 The fifty-two transactions registered during the 
26  The U.K. government announced a pause in ongoing sales of many companies and 
assets, e.g., in case of the Royal Bank of Scotland or Lloyds (Meggingson 2017).
27  This data may be slightly underestimated as they do not include the revenues 
from the sale of overseas (especially American and Asian) divisions of European 
banks. Global lists of our sources (the annual issues of Privatization Barometer) 
only contain transactions above $500 million. As a result, sales of subsidiaries 
most likely were overlooked without, however, much affecting magnitudes.
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eight years (2009–2016), involved twenty-nine banks, out of the ninety-
two had been affected by previous nationalizations. The resulting revenues 
amount to less than 40 percent of the (minimum) €296 billion government 
spending (previous capital injections), while the U.S.’s largest banks have 
repaid their bailouts, with interest.28
The prolongation of the re-privatization process in Europe might be 
explained by the fact that nationalization took place in several steps: after 
2008–9, there was a second wave of both the crisis and nationalizations 
in 2011–12. Moreover, public ownership in this sector has always been 
well known in most countries. Here, only six banks (BNP Paribas, BPCE/
Natixis, Société General, Lloyds, Alpha Bank, ING) were able to repur-
chase (partly or entirely) their preference shares in 2009. However, for 
the majority of the banks the chances for repurchase were greatly reduced 
in Europe as opposed to the United States. Reorganization, required as 
a condition of state support, has often meant breaking up large financial 
institutions, or the forced sale of branches and subsidiaries.
Among major beneficiaries, the Anglo Irish Bank came off the worst: 
after liquidation its assets were transferred to the portfolio of the National 
Asset Management Agency (Watson 2013). ING has gradually divested 
its overseas insurance division, regrouped its similar European activities 
into Nationale-Nederlanden Group, and sold all of its NN-shares on the 
stock market between 2014 and 2016 (ING 2016). Lloyds, Royal Bank 
of Scotland and Bayerische Landesbank also sold some of their branches 
(Williams-Grut 2015).
In other cases it were the states who sold certain parts or shares of 
financial institutions, thus revenues flowed into the treasury rather than 
to the banks themselves. Half of Fortis was privatized, not for cash but 
by way of changing shares.29 It was after dismemberment that Bradford 
& Bingley was sold to Spanish Santander, and the marketable part of 
28  Taking into account only the nationalization-related investments made through 
TARP in banks and the automotive industry, net profit rate resulting from re-
privatization and other (e.g., fees, interests, dividend) revenues to the U.S. fed-
eral treasury amounted to 6.6 percent by August 2016 (computed on the basis 
of TARP 2016). According to Eurostat’s survey, government interventions to 
support financial institutions has, in every year from 2008 to 2015, affected 
member states’ budgets negatively, causing a peak deficit of close to €70 billion 
in 2010, and still a €17 billion in 2015.(European Commission 2016).
29  While remaining minority shareholders, the governments of Belgium and Lux-
emburg sold 75 percent of the bailed-out Fortis local businesses to BNP Paribas. 
In return, they obtained 12 percent in Paribas, in which they became the largest 
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Northern Rock to Virgin Money, the latter having been unsuccessful in 
its attempt to take control of the former in 2007 (BBC News 2012, UK 
Financial Investments Ltd. 2012). In 2015, American Cerberus Group 
bought mortgages issued by Northern Rock—once seen as highly toxic—
for €18.4 billion (Parker and Dunkley 2015), which was the largest deal 
of that year and the largest ever sale of financial assets in the history of 
English privatization. 
Lloyds is the stock market champion, having issued several packages 
of shares (for a total value of €13.4 billion), but in this field Greeks were 
also on top. In 2013, the biggest transaction in Europe was the privatiza-
tion of Piraeus Bank at a price of €7.1 billion, completed by the sale of 
its further stakes of €2.4 and €1.3 billion during the following two years. 
Almost €7 billion of privatization revenue was raised by the sale of assets 
of the National Bank of Greece, Eurobank, and Alpha combined. They 
were closely followed, with items ranging from €1 to €3 billion by Spanish 
Bankia and Novaglicia, Commerzbank, the English branch of Ally Finan-
cial, and the Bank of Cyprus. Sales of entire banks in their original form 
proved to be rare, confined to small institutions like the German IKB, the 
Spanish Valencia, or Irish Life.
As Table 8 indicates, most of the privatization revenue was generated 
in other sectors, that is, the focus of the process in Europe was not re-
privatization of financial institutions.
The expansion of privatization
A crisis can be mitigated not only by nationalizing but also by privatizing.
The argument that privatization might reduce public deficits and debt, 
which had skyrocketed in relation to banks bailouts in the first years of 
the crisis, became central now (Megginson 2010; Bartsch and Ng 2010). 
Selling assets can also be considered a good supplement to spending cuts 
or tax increases, as it stimulates growth and foreign investment rather than 
deepening the downturn.
In Europe, privatization in the post-crisis years has remained less 
intense than it was in the previous period. Revenues stemming from the 
sale of state assets were of €43 billion per year on average between 2009 
shareholders (Webb 2013). Privatization resulted in replacing full public control 
with minority state ownership in two financial institutions. 
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and 2016, as compared to €49 billion between 1996 and 2008 (see Table 
8). The significant distortion of data reported at current prices for as long 
as two decades can be reduced by computing GDP-related indices. This 
shows an even bigger difference: privatization revenues of the earlier period 
amounted to 0.48 percent of GDP, compared to only 0.3 percent since 
2009. Although in absolute terms 2005 was the peak year of the last two 
decades, the corresponding index (of 0.54 percent measured in GDP) was 
smaller than that of 2005 or the years from 1996 to 2000.
If looking only at sales other than bank re-privatization, post-crisis 
yearly average revenues amount to 0.21 percent of GDP, less than half of 
what they were in the pre-2009 period. This modest rate, however, repre-
sents almost two-thirds of the 2009–2016 revenues (Table 8). Hence, the 
more dynamic part of the privatization process has been found outside the 
financial sector.
The European Union has played an important role in promoting 
privatization just as in the early 1990s. Although the EU does not pre-
scribe how to shape ownership structure, it influences the process indi-
rectly. In Europe, neoliberal-inspired austerity measures have widely been 
introduced to address the surge in government deficits and the threat of 
sovereign debt crises. In 2011, new and more stringent requirements and 
sanctions regarding macroeconomic balances came into force (European 
Commission 2012), encouraging governments to increase revenues by 
continuing privatization beyond the banking sector. The EU has some-
times called attention to specific sectors, the privatization of which it 
strongly supported, including rail transport and public services, especially 
water supply. Those suggestions were, however, not met with enthusiasm 
everywhere.
In the field of transport, almost all member states concerned—Ireland, 
Bulgaria, Estonia, and Luxemburg—proved to be reluctant to take this 
step (Artner 2015). Further, plans for privatization of water supply have 
provoked a public outcry in Ireland, Greece, Portugal, and Italy. In 2011, 
the Italians rejected such a plan in a referendum, and yet a  few months 
later, the liberalization and comprehensive privatization of all local public 
services were prescribed by the European Commission as key points of 
the reform. However, the Constitutional Court declared unconstitutional 
the prescription regarding the privatization of local public services in Italy 
(zacune 2013). In 2013, a semi-public water supply company was estab-
lished in Ireland, with the parallel introduction of a water-charge, which 
did not exist before. the general tax revenues financing consumption thus 
far. The measure, widely seen as the anteroom of austerity policy and 
Szanyi - 00 könyv.indb   39 2019.11.15.   9:31
40 ÉVA VOSzKA
“pushing up prices even further” privatization, provoked civil disobedience 
in which more than half of the population refused to pay their water bill in 
the summer of 2015 (Artner 2015).
These examples already show that the EU’s influence on state owner-
ship issues has not been strong everywhere during the last eight years. In 
nearly half of member states, including most new members, no or very few 
public assets have been privatized.
Table 9 




















United Kingdom 69.5 2.9 17.1 0.7 –30.6x
France 43.7 1.96 29.7 1.3 18.6
Italy 27.5 1.6 25.5 1.5 +xx
Greece 25.2 14.3 5.3 3.0 –15.7
The Netherlands 24.7 3.5 13.4 1.9 1.7
Ireland 18.6 7.3xxx 11.2 4.4 –58.4
Sweden 18.3 3.96 18.3 3.96 +
Portugal 17.4 12.4 11.9 6.4 +
Poland 16.7 4.3 16.7 3.9 +
Spain 15.0 1.3 11.0 1.0 –46.9
Germany 12.3 0.4 7.2 0.2 –51.9
Total of 11 countries 288.9 4.0 167.3 2.3 –
x The negative sign (-) means that costs of re-capitalization exceeded revenues from privatization (see Table 6)
xx Recapitalization remained under €10 billion, so the balance is surely positive.
xxx Computation based on 2015 GDP
Source: Revenues: based on Privatization Barometer Reports; GDP: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/tgm/refreshTableAction.do?tab=tabl
e&plugin=1&pcode=tec00001&language=en.
In absolute terms, the rankings are led by two big countries: the United 
Kingdom and France. But if we set aside banks’ reprivatization, Italy, 
Sweden and Poland also hold leading positions, covering a wide spectrum 
of sectors: they have sold companies in sectors like energy, public services, 
civil aviation, and manufacturing. In Poland, a country that experienced 
no recession since well before 2008, a decisive role was played by liberals, 
who came to power not much earlier, and held the conviction that priva-
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tization revenues were needed both to reduce the deficit and boost the 
economy (Kozarzewski and Bałtowski 2016). Between 2013 and 2015, 
the U.K. was a European leader in selling public assets, primarily aimed 
at reducing public deficits and debt (Parker and Dunkley 2015). Italy 
announced a major privatization program as part of its structural reforms 
in 2014, including the launch of privatization for ENAV (aviation services) 
and Poste Italiane, and the continuation of the privatization program for 
several other big companies (ENI, ENEL, Fincantieri) (Biederman, Orosz, 
and Szijártó. 2017). Part of this program was successfully completed in 
the following years, which placed Italy second in the European rankings of 
privatization revenues in 2015 and fourth in 2016 (Megginson 2017).
Most of these countries made their own decision on privatization. 
In other member states, however, the impact of external pressure can be 
assumed. This is demonstrated in lists considering the size of the countries. 
Compared to the total national product, besides Poland three countries 
have earned significant income from privatization: Greece, Ireland, and 
Portugal.30 Since all these countries were in need of international finan-
cial assistance, it is clear that the European Commission, together with the 
European Central Bank and the International Monetary Fund, was able to 
exert strong influence on them. Apart from fiscal austerity, a key require-
ment of the rescue packages was that governments continued privatizing, 
which was considered to be a useful reform element and a  stimulus for 
growth (Visvizi 2012; Borrman et al. 2014).
Post-crisis situation has an ambivalent effect on privatization. On the 
one hand, the lasting recession and the subsequent economic and social 
uncertainties may discourage investors, while on the other hand, the artifi-
cially inflated supply of low-cost assets offers great opportunities for buyers 
from rich countries and well-capitalized companies. Greece deserves spe-
cial attention also because of the variability of its story.
Initially, plans for privatization in Greece were to produce revenues of 
€1 billion per annum, but under pressure from international creditors the 
target was raised to €50 billion. The implementation of the plans, how-
ever, has—just as in many other countries—been postponed due to the 
falling prices on stock markets (Megginson and Bortolotti 2012). Later on, 
these plans, considered unrealistic due to long-lasting economic decline 
and lack of investors’ confidence, had to be scaled back to €20 billion. 
30  Nevertheless, in the first two countries, revenues from privatization did not cover 
the cost of nationalizations, as the last column in Table 9 indicates.
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There were loud protests not only by workers in the companies concerned 
but also by powerful labor unions organizing extensive strikes against most 
of the sales.
The political costs of privatization are high—says Visvizi (2012)—not 
least because public opinion links them immediately to neoliberal eco-
nomic policy and austerity measures accompanying the rescue packages. 
According to public opinion polls, the majority of the population fears 
a sell-off of public assets and the growing role played by foreign investors 
(Poggioli 2013).
By 2012, actual sales revenues were far behind schedule, in spite of 
some major deals. Apart from bank re-privatization, the majority share of 
a gas pipeline was taken by the Azerbaijani public company, a 33 percent 
stake of the national lottery was sold to domestic investors, and Deutsche 
Telekom increased its stake in Greek telecoms by 10 percentage points. 
International organizations have been participating in the work of Athens’s 
privatization agency. What is more, when they considered the process to be 
too slow, they have threatened to take over management. But when well-
capitalized buyers from outside the group of the most developed countries 
made their bids—like Gazprom for the gas utility company, or Chinese 
firms on ports and railways—European governments as well as Washington 
expressed their concerns over the issue and the privatization agency had to 
delay the decision (Poggioli 2013). The privatization of real estate, fields, 
islands, and monuments has also been impeded by the inadequacies of dif-
ferent registries (Bräuninger 2013).
In 2013–14, the Greek government made significant steps towards 
generating more revenues from privatization primarily by selling consoli-
dated and unified banks; in 2014, the country became the third largest 
privatizer in Europe (Megginson 2017). Following the general elections 
of early 2015, the new left-wing cabinet announced the suspension of the 
privatization program. But in July, Eurozone prime ministers imposed even 
more stringent demands on the Syriza government.31 A new privatization 
and asset management agency has been set up into which Athens trans-
ferred companies with asset value 50 billion euros that were either being 
sold or run profitably. Apart from paying debt, revenues would be used for 
bank recapitalization and public investments (Cosgrave 2015). According 
to the agreement, the management is Greek but works under EU tute-
31  Euro Summit Statement (July 12, 2015), available at www.consilium.europa.eu/
en/press/.../2015/.../20150712eurosummit-statement-greece.
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lage; a French expert has been named as the fund’s executive chairman 
(Hope 2016). The quantitative target for revenues from privatization was 
restored to its original (2011) level of €50 billion. It was a relief, however, 
that Greece now has ten years to achieve it. As first steps, Piraeus port and 
its supervisory authority, as well as that of regional airports has been suc-
cessfully privatized, even if only for a few billion euros (Megginson 2017).
As an important feature of privatizations in this period, the bulk of 
the transactions meant partial privatizations, not only for banks but also 
in other sectors of the economy. According to my calculations based on 
the lists of the Privatization Barometer, sales of entire companies (including 
banks) represented one-tenth to one-third of all transactions in Europe in 
the period of between 2009 and 2016.32 In Poland for example, in transac-
tions generating three-quarters of privatization revenues, the sale of assets 
left ownership control unchanged (Kozarzewski and Bałtowski 2016).33 In 
France, the system of double-voting- rights shares was generalized in 2014, 
rewarding all long-term investors (including the government) for holding 
their shares for at least two years. The declared goal here was to protect 
firms against speculative attacks, but obviously the state’s long-term own-
ership also doubled its influence. (Somai 2017).
Partial privatizations give the opportunity to governments to sell 
shares without losing their control over the company. This method was not 
exceptional even in the past decades. Large firms are never and nowhere 
being sold in one fell swoop but in stages, taking into account the absorp-
tion capacity of capital markets and aspects of price optimization as well. 
In times of crisis or strong fiscal pressure, however, it might be especially 
important for governments to achieve two goals at once: raising incomes 
without relinquishing control. The consequence is hybridization, based on 
mixing public and private ownership. This phenomenon had already been 
strengthened by the earlier big wave of privatization (Bortolotti-Faccio 
2004), but it remained typical in the years after 2008. 
32  The data might be underestimated, considering that the lists often only include 
transactions over €10 or €100 million, while full privatization may be typical 
for smaller firms. Moreover, the lists do not show the initial share of the state. 
Therefore it is possible that the sale of a relatively small package represents the 
final phase of the privatization of an entire company.
33  According to the estimates of the authors for the year 2012, if formal ownership 
data were corrected with actual control position, public sector’s weight in GDP 
would amount to 15–20 percent instead of the official 10 percent, and 16 per-
cent in employment instead of 13 percent.
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It is also well-known, that revenues from privatization on their own 
can never solve macroeconomic imbalances (see their share in relation 
to GDP in Table 9). This is demonstrated by recent calculations: when 
assessing the “privatization potential,” it became clear that revenues would 
cover only a fraction of the public debt, even in the least probable case of 
selling all state assets.
One of the first comprehensive analyses on the issue estimated the 
potential revenue for the EU15 to be around 2.5 percent of GDP, and ten 
percent for Finland (Bartsch and Ng 2009). The International Monetary 
Fund estimated the value of privatizable assets for 32 countries to reach 
4 to 7 percent of GDP (Bova et al. 2013), while gross government debts 
were typically higher than 50 or even 100 percent of it. The Economica 
Institute in Vienna assessed all marketable (public) assets in the largest 10 
Eurozone member states and 4 non-Eurozone ones, putting it at a total of 
€511 billion. The sale of this wealth could yield more than €100 billion for 
France, €76 billion for Germany, and €59 billion for both Italy and the 
Netherlands. Expected proceeds could, however, cover only 4.4 percent of 
the debt burden on average - Finland ranked first with 14.5 percent. (Bor-
rmann et al. 2014).
Therefore, in most European countries, a new wave of privatization 
could only temper government deficits in the short term, and might poten-
tially have a positive effect by improving the income generating capacity of 
national economies.
Summary: Boundaries and Directions are Getting Blurred
As presented in our analysis, there has been a significant wave of national-
ization in developed countries of Europe in the post-crisis period of 2008. 
In a couple of years, governments spent an amount equivalent to 2 to 3 
percent of GDP on expanding public assets in the financial sector without 
considering the growth in municipal, central or federal, and also foreign 
public assets. For comparison, the earlier wave of privatization had fun-
neled to the treasuries roughly 7 percent of GDP over twenty-five years. 
The average for the public property share of GDP in Europe seems to turn 
towards the peak of the late 1970s (12 and 10.5 percent respectively),34 
34  These figures are subject to caution because of uncertainties about definitions 
and methodology. 
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which because of uncertainties about definitions and methodology must be 
viewed with reservations. 
Parallel with nationalizations, a wave of privatization has also started. 
Its order of magnitude reached 3 percent of GDP for the period between 
2009 and 2016 equaled that of recent nationalizations. However, only one-
third of the revenues stemmed from bank re-privatization, the rest was 
generated in other sectors of the economy.
Although both policies aimed at addressing the crisis, the motives 
behind them were different. The purpose of nationalization was, as it had 
been decades ago, to save companies from bankruptcy, avoid domino 
effects, minimize social losses, and restore trust, which was considered 
a prerequisite for recovery. As before, privatization focused on improving 
macroeconomic imbalances in the short run, and on promoting strong and 
healthy growth by strengthening the role of both market and private own-
ership in the longer run.
Thus, the aims of post-2008 ownership changes were similar to the 
earlier waves. Different national patterns regarding the methods and scales 
are not unusual either. Some EU members (Portugal, Poland, Sweden) 
excelled in only privatization, while others (Spain, Belgium) in national-
ization; certain countries (Greece, Ireland) were at the forefront of both 
policies, while others were not significantly involved in either process (Italy, 
France, Germany). 
The recent wave of ownership changes, however, is characterized also 
by unusual features. The most striking one was the almost parallel emer-
gence and strengthening of nationalization and privatization in Europe and 
even within single countries. This phenomenon is closely related to several 
other new features. First, the rapid change and parallel existence of the 
two processes prove that today, neither nationalization nor privatization 
is deemed to be a panacea. Disadvantages and side effects of both poli-
cies have already been widely discussed in the political arena and in scien-
tific papers; the belief that either of them could be a long-term solution to 
economic difficulties has been shaken. The nationalization of banks had 
originally been considered a temporary move, and most of the governments 
have only reluctantly undertaken privatization in other sectors 
Second, the nationalization of banks, a policy directly contradicting 
the highly praised free market principles and privatization, has been exe-
cuted in a  hidden, stealthy way, concealed by other methods like bank 
bailouts (re-capitalization, the purchase of impaired assets), which could 
be evidenced by the complete lack of relevant statistical records. The 
non-financial public sector has also often expanded due to such “silent 
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methods”: capital increases by the government, large public investment 
projects, or the expansion of—partly foreign—state-owned companies and 
funds through the acquisition of private companies. Privatization itself has 
often meant the sale of minority holdings without the transfer of control.
Third, these procedures resulted in a  further blurring of borders 
between public and private property, as well as between nationalization 
and privatization. The former process manifests itself not only through the 
expansion of mixed-ownership in joint-stock companies, but also through 
the ongoing tightening of financial regulation, the limitation of price 
increases, and the increase in tax burdens, all of which pointing towards 
a limitation of private property rights. Small wonder that companies con-
cerned called these steps the “expropriation of incomes.” As for privati-
zation, the clear identification of the direction of changes in ownership 
has been made difficult by the fact that the buyer of a public company 
often— regardless of the seller’s intention—is another public corporation, 
or investment fund. 
Growing uncertainties among politicians and in expert’s evaluations 
indicates that, in the last few years, the evergreen debate about “nation-
alization or privatization” seems to have been replaced by a push to steer 
a middle course: improve governance in public companies and create con-
ditions for their market-based activities. This keeps the old debate alive 
about whether or not ownership is more important than regulation. More-
over, there is the recognition that dichotomous approaches may be simpli-
fied: both public and private ownership involves a variety of companies and 
operation models.
If this approach becomes dominant, the dividing lines between the 
two sectors will be even more blurred.
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CHAPTER 2
Changing Role of the State in France:  
from Crisis to Crisis
Miklós soMai
Introduction
In times of great socio-economic crises, considerations about the role of 
the state in the economy and the optimal size of the public sector always 
come to the forefront of public debates. So it happened following the out-
break of the 2008 global financial crisis. Although the neoliberal para-
digm did not collapse and privatization continued (both worldwide and 
in France)1 after Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy, the strengthening 
of state intervention in the economy, which took place parallel to privati-
zation, has also been noticeable since then: first, through measures rein-
forcing the state’s shareholder position; and second, through the expansion 
of state-owned enterprises, often across national borders.
This paper presents the role played by the state in the French 
economy thanks to its ownership in and control over the corporate world. 
Following some relatively short sections devoted to France’s tradition(s) 
of centralization and the different waves of nationalization and privatiza-
tion—the background of which is the crucial turning point in 1983, it gives 
an overview of the period since the global financial crisis with special focus 
on two main topics: public wealth management and the banking sector’s 
crisis resistance.
1  During the five years following Lehman’s filing for bankruptcy protection (on 
September 15, 2008), public property worth of almost $40 billion has been priva-
tized in France (Privatization Barometer 2016 online).
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Centralization Traditions
Due to the reigns of Louis IX “the Saint” and Louis XI “the Prudent” 
among other things, France was known to be a fairly centralized state as 
early as the fifteenth century. The centralization of the country’s economic 
resources intensified during the Great Century2 with the rise of absolutism 
and Colbertism,3 as well as the implementation of fiscal austerity under 
both Richelieu and Mazarin.
Since the early seventeenth century, French governments have tradi-
tionally been closely linked to the big players of the economy; a practice 
introduced by Sully, the Minister of Finances under Henri IV. Power and 
business developed hand in hand, as the state had a continuous interest 
in maintaining a high level of intervention in economic affairs. Unlike in 
Germany or the United Kingdom where the nature of state influence on 
economy has changed with the political climate, the French people have 
a strong tradition of favoring big government and have great pride in their 
public sector.4
Taken more generally and somewhat simplifying our analysis of 
France’s unique perspective on the role of government, there are two main 
differences compared to other developed countries’ approach to state 
intervention. The first one is structural, based on the long-standing and 
steady tradition of centralization, which has led to the formation of per-
manent and powerful public administrations (“Grand Corps de l’État”), 
whose members have remained in their posts throughout changes of gov-
ernment. The second one is rooted in history and relates to the revolution 
of 1789, that is, a permanent search for the best public action for the sake 
of the French people’s happiness, liberty, and fair treatment (Kolm 2010, 
90–91).
2  The period lasting from 1589 to 1715 (i.e., from Henri IV to Louis XIV), was 
when France both politically and culturally exerted the greatest influence on the 
development of Europe and the world.
3  The royal manufactures developed by Colbert in France can be considered the 
first state-owned enterprises (Chevallier 1979, 16).
4  It is typical that although people during the French revolution were desperate 
and upset about unbearably high taxes (especially those on peasants), it was not 
the state but the aristocracy and the clergy they blamed for the economic prob-
lems of the country (Meisel 2014, 81–82).
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Waves of Nationalizations
Temporary increases in the intensity of the state’s direct economic inter-
vention during the twentieth century can be interpreted as responses to the 
socio-economic shocks of the century. Nationalization typically took place 
at the end of crisis periods when the political and economic climate made 
them not only possible but often necessary.
Already during the period after World War I, mixed public-private 
companies were established to implement large scale hydro-energy projects 
and create “commercial and industrial public establishments” for running 
autonomous ports like those of Le Havre, Strasbourg, and Bordeaux (Che-
vallier 1979, 17–19). But the first big wave of nationalizations was linked 
to the establishment of the Popular Front (1936–1938), a left-wing party 
alliance. The policy mainly focused on learning the lessons of the Great 
Depression (1929–1933) and was intended to ameliorate its consequences 
(e.g., capital shortages). Several mixed companies such as Air France and 
SNCF were created by swapping debt (actually state subsidies) for equity, 
but the establishment of the first supervisory/regulatory authorities (e.g., 
the national Grain Board)5 and the democratization of the Bank of France 
also took place during this period.6
In the aftermath of the great destruction caused by World War II, the 
political push behind nationalization dated back to the Resistance’s 1943 
program.7 Also, it is necessary to remember that the Communist Party 
was the most important political force of France in the period during and 
right after the Liberation (Brucy 2001, 67). German businesses and busi-
ness shares and those of French people who collaborated with them—for 
instance, the automobile company Renault and the Havas news agency—
5  By way of price regulation and monopolizing warehousing and export/import 
activities, the Board tried to protect small farmers from the abuse of trusts’/big 
mills’ dominant position (Bajomi 1938).
6  The reform of the central bank changed the composition of the General Assem-
bly. Unlike earlier, when it had been the privilege of the 200 largest shareholders 
to be present, all shareholders with French citizenship became entitled to partici-
pate in it, and each had one vote, irrespective of the number of shares he or she 
held (Banque de France 2016 online, 207).
7  “The means of production incorporated in sources of energy, treasures of earth, 
banks and insurance companies must return to the Nation.” In the text of the 
program, because of fears of dividing the movement, expressions of nationaliza-
tion/socialization of the means of production had to be avoided (Andrieu 2014).
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were nationalized. The economic reasons behind nationalization could be 
explained by the enormous need for the reconstruction of infrastructure (like 
railroads, roads, energy, and pipelines) in the environment of general capital 
shortage. The political and economic motives behind the nationalization of 
most of the financial and insurance sector—that is, big saving banks, real 
estate, and agricultural lending—mutually reinforced each other as state 
ownership enabled savings to go towards the massive investment projects 
undertaken by the state companies operating infrastructure networks.
The duality of political and economic motives can also be found 
beyond the twentieth century’s third major wave of nationalizations initi-
ated by Mitterrand. By taking over 100 percent of all firms to be national-
ized, the Socialists sought to deprive the country’s industrial and financial 
elite (i.e., the heirs of Bank of France’s main shareholders) of their eco-
nomic power base, and curb the expansion of foreign capital in France. At 
the same time, at least in the case of industrial firms, nationalizations only 
concerned groups that were in need of urgent state aid (Cohen 1993, 794).
While post-World War II nationalizations had not yet involved com-
mercial banks, the Nationalization Act of February 11, 1982 transferred 
the entirety of thirty-nine registered banks and two important financial 
groups to the state, in addition to 100 percent of the shares of the above-
mentioned major industrial groups.8 The state also acquired a blocking 
minority stake in the giants of the steel industry and in French and for-
eign-owned companies in certain high-tech sectors (e.g., IT, telecommu-
nications, pharmaceuticals, aviation, aerospace, the nuclear and military 
industry) (Vessilier 1983, 467). Along with the already mentioned political 
and ideological motivations, the latter move may also have been justified 
on the grounds of national security.9
As a result of this third wave of nationalizations, the number of public 
companies rose to 3000, representing 23 percent of France’s GDP in 1982 
8  A financial group is a group of companies in the center of which there is a bank 
that combines traditional commercial banking and investment banking, holds 
a highly diversified portfolio in various sectors, and therefore is able to exert pres-
sure on a large part of the real economy (Harbula 1999, 246–48). In the case of 
three other banks, indirect state ownership was converted into direct (Loi 82-155 
du 11 février 1982 de nationalisation, Article 12).
9  Protecting strategic sectors is far from a French specialty. In the United States, 
the 1988 “Exon-Florio” amendment to “Defense Production Act” gave the presi-
dent a broad mandate to limit foreign investments in strategic sectors. Since nei-
ther France nor the EU has such legal instrument, state ownership continues 
to play an important role in protecting industries deemed strategic for national 
security (Cour des comptes 2013, 28).
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(Vie Publique 2018). A total of 670,000 jobs had been transferred from the 
private to the public sphere, and the total number of employees working 
in the public sector thus rose to a historic high of 2.3 million, representing 
more than 10 percent of the total workforce in the period between 1982 
and 1985.10
When assessing the waves of nationalization, on the positive side, one 
can mention that public companies contributed to the country’s post-
war modernization (e.g., the development of gas supply, high-speed rail 
networks, and nuclear power industry), and the effective organization of 
public services by the managers of nationalized companies, who shared an 
educational background in France’s top universities. Even if the 1981–82 
nationalizations ultimately proved to be short-lived, they, nevertheless, 
facilitated the timely restructuration of French industry.
On the negative side, anxieties about the expansion of the public 
sector stem from the double risks associated with first, the government’s 
intervention in day-to-day business operations (“manual control”), and 
second, the regulatory agency’s eventual domination by the state-owned 
company that needs to be regulated (“regulatory capture”).11
Crisis and Turning Point
After World War II, the state’s regular and substantial intervention typi-
cally concentrated on a few large, so-called crisis industries. Shipbuilding 
benefited from regular subsidies starting in 1951, as did coal mining 
10  The percentage share of the public sector rose from 6.1 to 18.6 in terms of 
industrial jobs, from 8.0 to 22.5 in value added, from 9.2 to 23.8 in investments, 
and from 12.2 to 32.1 in exports (Bizaguet 1983, 455). The credit sector in the 
strict sense of the word—that is, excluding broker and financial advisory activi-
ties—nearly became completely controlled by the government: 90 percent of the 
liquid assets, 84.7 percent of loans to the economy, and 89.9 percent of those 
employed in the sector (458).
11  Such capture has, in the literature, been typically linked to two major state-
owned companies in France. One of them is EDF, which, by virtue of its accu-
mulated knowledge concerning the sector, alone determines and executes the 
current French energy policy and defines the structure of energy production 
with the predominance of nuclear power (Kissler and Pautrat 2007, 33). The 
other company is SNCF, which, by pushing the concept of TGV (high-speed 
trains) to the extreme and thus contributing to the dereliction of regional rail-
ways, “captured” not only the regulator but also the infrastructure manager and 
the regional decision makers (Doumayrou 2007, 222).
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throughout the 1960s and the steel industry from 1966 onwards, although 
these subsidies were, by then, mostly based on industrial policy consider-
ations and emerged in the context of (or as quasi-catalysts for) territorial 
development policy. The period between 1974 and 1984, which was bur-
dened with oil and financial crises, did, however, bring strong constraints 
on structural change for French industry.12
While the crisis expanded to other segments of industry (textiles, 
printing, leather and footwear, machine tool manufacturing), the left-wing 
government that came to power in 1981 tried, if only for a couple of years, 
to return to previous voluntarist industrial policy. The old toolkit for res-
cuing companies had been significantly enhanced to incorporate some-
times even violent elements such as forced co-operation between banks 
and local authorities; the compulsory reorganization of management (that 
is, stuffing boards and filling leadership positions with political appoin-
tees); the imposition of special taxes on companies’ public customers, etc. 
The former “catalyst function” of government support was replaced by the 
“protecting state function”: economic rescue operations became increas-
ingly costly for the national budget (Cohen 2007, 10–12).
In France, the neoliberal turn had to be postponed until 1983. In 
addition to three consecutive minor devaluations of the Franc and the 
introduction of a  price and wage freeze in the public sector as of June 
1982, drastic austerity measures were announced in March 1983.13
12  In order to understand how harmful the crisis was, it is enough to remember 
that nearly one-third of French industrial jobs had been lost between 1978 and 
1985 (Cohen 2007, 20).
13  Apart from significant cuts in public expenditures, there were new taxes 
imposed, the wealthy were obliged to purchase state bonds, and restrictions were 
placed on foreign currency outflow (Souriac 1996, 141–42). Note: The three 
mini-devaluations may, at first glance, seem meaningless. It should, however, 
be remembered that within the framework of the European Monetary System 
(EMS), which has been in place since 1979, only minor exchange rate adjust-
ments were permitted if agreed upon with partners beforehand. The real choice 
was between leaving the EMS, thus permitting the Franc to depreciate, which 
would have slowed down imports and protected French industry and jobs, or 
remaining in the EMS and avoiding—by means of austerity (a policy so credible 
in the eyes of the mainstream elite)—the need for further devaluations, giving 
a chance to structural change and industrial modernization. And indeed, the 
policy of a “strong Franc” and low inflation has followed since 1983, and even-
tually led to low interest rates, structural consolidation, and sustained growth. 
The three “mini-devaluations” could ultimately be judged as the strong commit-
ment of France to European integration (Asselain 2002).
Szanyi - 00 könyv.indb   58 2019.11.15.   9:32
59Changing Role of the State in France
There were also radical changes made to economic rescue policy: 
the procedures for bankrupt companies were reorganized (reshaped) on 
a market basis (as opposed to a power politics basis) and their cases were 
assigned to commercial courts. The number of expensive state interven-
tions decreased substantially, providing space for consultative, professional 
advisers and analysts. In cases where interventions still did take place, it 
was the territorial administrative level that had increasingly been charged 
with footing the bill. Moreover, if a troubled company needed life breathed 
into it, central authorities were becoming less and less reluctant to solve 
the problem by turning to foreign investors.
Reprivatization
The quarter century following the left’s neoliberal shift in 1983 and lasting 
up to the 2008 crisis saw a continuous decrease in the economic role of 
the state. Regardless of their political affiliation, and on the basis of the 
growing inclination to implement neoliberal economic policies, all French 
governments have felt it their duty to continue reprivatization. As a result, 
the weight of SOEs14 in the French economy has decreased substantially. 
Since 1985, their share shrank to one-third in fixed capital, one-fourth in 
employment, and one-fifth in GVA (Figure 1).
14  State owned enterprises are defined as companies in which the public has major-
ity ownership (Vie Publique 2018).
Figure 1 
The changing importance of the public sector in the French economy (1985–2013)
Source: INSEE, 2016a. Note: The significant downturn in the public sector fixed capital share after 2005 was due to the privatization of 
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The fact that the public sector has been diminishing in importance can also 
be observed in the decline of the number of SOEs and employment in the 
state sector (Figure 2). Between 1986, the last year before the formal priva-
tization process began, and 2007, the last year before the global financial 
crisis had been felt fully, the number of SOEs fell by three-fourths, and the 
number of people employed by them fell by more than half. In the same 
period, the share of SOEs’ employees in the total employment figures fell 
from 10 to 3.5 percent.
Figure 2 
Number of SOEs (triangles, lhs), number of people employed in SOEs (spots, x1000, lhs), 
and their share of total employment (bars, percent, rhs)
Source: Author’s own compilation based on INSEE 2016b.
Note: Discontinuities in series for the bars and spots were due to the 1991 split of PTT, a former government department, into two 
public law corporations: La Poste and France Télécom, which caused an increase of 400,000, or 2 percent of SOEs’ employees. The 
discontinuity for the graph’s triangles in 1994 was due to a change in methodology.
As a result of the privatization process, French corporate structure (espe-
cially concerning the largest firms) has significantly changed and has been 
fortified. The incumbent government had actually been free to decide on 
the shareholder structure in companies slated for privatization. As a defen-
sive move against potential hostile takeovers, so-called “stable nuclei” 
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holders— i.e., institutional investors who were often slated for privatiza-
tion as well—who individually acquired between 0.5 and 5.0 percent of 
the corporation’s capital.
Although the Minister of Finance tried different combinations of large 
investors when preparing “stable nuclei” in order to prevent accusations of 
corruption, top managers and members of boards in the privatized firms 
were almost exclusively people from right-wing politicians’ and their friends’ 
and relatives’ circles, members of the French establishment who graduated 
from ENA15 or Polytechnique, the most prestigious and elitist high schools, 
or those who came straight out of the Grand Corps of the State.16
Because the big French companies purchased each other’s shares, 
even if in relatively broad circles, a complex network of cross ownership 
was established, which, by its mere existence, ruled out any possibility 
of hostile takeovers. This practice (common educational background 
plus cross-ownership) enabled a high level of coordination and protec-
tion of both business and political interests (Harbula 2007, 5). As a result, 
instead of creating a new economic system based, as originally planned, 
on masses of small shareholders and the primacy of market forces,17 the 
reprivatization process bolstered the system of “establishment solidarity,” 
a French tradition of “capitalism without capital” and a financial market 
without sanctions; in short, a sort of “capitalisme à la française” (Bauer 
1988, 59–60).
The process of privatization lasted so long not only because of the 
large number of companies to be privatized, but also because all along, 
the deregulation/privatization of certain sectors (e.g., telecommunication) 
was defined by two different approaches to public services that had been 
competing with each other: the American approach based on Anglo-Saxon 
legal traditions (focusing on the “product”), and the Latin-European tradi-
tion based on Roman law.18 Additionally, for the French, public services 
have traditionally been part of their history, culture, and rule of law; some-
thing connected to the elimination of feudalism; a sort of republican value. 
In French public services, the principle of equality prevails, and a system of 
15  École nationale d’administration (National School of Administration).
16  Already mentioned under the subheading Centralizations Traditions.
17  “Market forces were involved neither as an actor in the privatisations, nor as 
a regulator of the privatized groups” (Bauer 1988, 60).
18  With some simplification, the obvious differences in approaches are attributed 
to the assumption that while English common law was the product of judges, 
Roman private law was the work of jurists (Watson 1990, 249).
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differentiated tariffs allows transfers among social strata and geographical 
regions, which enhance social, economic and territorial cohesion.
In contrast, through deregulation, this enhanced (French) interpreta-
tion of public services has inevitably been restricted to an Anglo-Saxon 
concept of “universal service,” which has eventually come to mean nothing 
more than an obligation to provide everybody a certain minimum set of 
services (at decent prices). Collective utility and related positive externali-
ties were all ignored by this new concept of public services. By pushing 
back the role of the state, there was a limit placed on income redistribution 
through tariffs and equalization payments, which had long been a tradi-
tional element of French territorial cohesion.
Breaking up monopolies, taking apart segments of the market, sepa-
rating network infrastructure from services, all of this weakened the posi-
tions of both the state and historical service providers, while at the same 
time, under the pretext of competition, it provided global market actors 
with open access to national infrastructure, which had previously been 
built and operated with taxpayers’ money. The result was that instead of 
a monopoly, an oligopolic system emerged (Musso 2008, 15–18).
While on the eve of the global financial crisis, the scope of centrally 
managed financial institutions only included the CDC,19 the BPI,20 and the 
Banque Postale, some other sectors of the economy still remained under 
significant state control. In the case of operators of natural monopolies and 
some major public service providers (the post and railways)—fearing social 
conflicts and/or due to low profitability—as well as some businesses of 
strategic importance (e.g., Areva, the worldwide player in nuclear energy), 
Paris has continued to abstain from privatization (Fournier 2014).
19  The Caisse des dépôts et consignations [Deposits and Consignments Fund] is 
a special French public financial institution under parliamentary control that is 
responsible for collecting tax-free retail deposits (so-called Livret A) and financ-
ing social housing, local government investments, and especially those slow-
return economic development projects (in the field of infrastructure, urbaniza-
tion, and environment) that are of little interest to the private sector. Its role has 
recently been questioned because of the archaic monopoly it enjoys concerning 
mandatory deposits of some regulated professions (like notaries, trustees, liqui-
dators, bailiffs), real estate deposits, and minor mannequins’ and actors’ salaries, 
which, because of economic inertia, present stable sources for its medium- and 
long-term investments and the opportunity to engage in risky financial market 
transactions (Generationlibre 2016 online).
20  The Banque publique d’investissement [Public Investment Bank] is a public invest-
ment bank aimed at supporting national and regional development policies and 
the participation of small and medium-sized enterprises in them.
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Crisis = Change?
In France, the 2008 global financial crisis cannot be considered a  land-
mark for the role of the state in the economy. There was neither a break 
nor a change in the prevailing paradigm. There have, of course, been pros 
and cons to increasing or decreasing the scope of public intervention, but 
there was no major change in the overall trend. The privatization process 
already slowed down well before the crisis, and in the life of the biggest 
SOEs, 2004, the year the Government Shareholdings Agency (APE21) was 
established, was more important than 2008.
There is, however, a relationship between the crisis on one hand, and 
public thinking about the role of the state—or rather the changing role 
of the state—in the economy on the other. As a matter of fact, the crisis, 
which caused millions of people to lose their jobs and homes, has given 
further impetus to the trend of implementing increasingly stringent (i.e., 
private-sector-style) management practices in public companies.
French Banks and the Financial Crisis
The 2008 global financial crisis hit the banking system in France much 
less severely than in other European countries with similarly sized econo-
mies, because, due to various reasons such as regulatory and structural 
features to be explored later in this chapter, it was relatively less exposed 
to shocks from abroad. The French have indeed spent comparatively little 
on bailing out their financial institutions—5.6 percent of GDP (i.e., €119 
billion) between 2008 and 2014, which was a very low level in the EU, 
especially among the old member states. Out of the EU’s six largest econo-
mies, France ranks last (Figure 3). Of this amount, 21.1 percent went to 
recapitalize banks, and 1 percent went to finance impaired asset measures. 
The remaining 77.9 percent consisted of de facto state guarantees given to 
cover part of the liabilities, originally amounting to EUR 319.8 billion, of 
which only €92.7 billion was used.22
21  Agence des participations de l’Etat.
22  A significant part of the support was given to the two banks that suffered the most 
from the U.S. subprime mortgage crisis: Natixis, a bank formed through the coop-
eration of Banque Populaire and Caisse d’Épargne set up in 2006, and the French-
Belgian Dexia. Both of them got into trouble because of their subsidiaries (FSA 
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Figure 3 
State aid to financial institutions between 2008–14 in the EU’s six largest economies 
(percent of GDP)
Source: author’s own compilation based on data from EC, DG Competition (2016 online).
Eventually, French taxpayers were fairly content with the relatively low 
costs incurred by them when facing the consequences of the global financial 
crisis on their banking system. Also, public subsidies, most of which were 
concentrated in the early years of the crisis, did not need to be significantly 
increased later.23 
and CIFG respectively) were two of the biggest American “monoline” insurance 
companies. The latter institutions were originally narrowly focused on providing 
financial guarantees to municipal bond investors—that is why they were called 
“monolines”: to distinguish them from “multi-line” insurance companies, which 
also offer life or property and casualty insurance. After 1985, however, in a search 
of higher profit, the “monolines” began to diversify themselves by taking on lucra-
tive RMBS (residential mortgage-backed securities) and other structured prod-
ucts, which, because they were heavily leveraged through the U.S. housing boom 
(2002–2006), put their whole business model at risk (Lautier and Simon 2008).
23  At the same time, it should not be forgotten that French banks were heavily 
exposed—both at home and, via their subsidiaries, abroad (especially in South 
Europe)—to the secondary effects of the global financial crisis, i.e., the slow-
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When examining the background of the above events, it is important 
to be clear about the significant changes in the French financial system 
triggered by the neoliberal turn and the subsequent privatization pro-
cess starting in the mid-1980s. The dominance of state (public) owner-
ship ended quickly, when the largest commercial banks were listed on the 
stock exchange. All French banks, which were covered by the same (uni-
fied) legal framework starting in 1984, were allowed to become universal 
banks: this made it possible for them to diversify in ways that moved them 
away from their former core activities towards more profitable ones. The 
stock market was flourishing, and the MATIF24 began trading futures in 
1986. The removal of credit market restrictions spurred competition in 
the internal market. Links between French banks and non-financial firms, 
which had never been as tight as in Germany, became even looser, espe-
cially for CAC40’s blue chips, which relied increasingly on the financial 
market. The French economy had “moved from a  financial network to 
a financial market form of capitalism” (Hardie–Howarth 2009, 1020). But 
this change was not unreasonably fast. The “built-in brakes” of the old 
model worked, and they eventually helped shelter the French financial 
system from suffering as much as its British or German counterparts from 
the global financial crisis.
What were the ‘built-in brakes’ mentioned above? First, it was the very 
structure of the financial system. As a  result of the privatization process 
in France, a highly concentrated financial system emerged around a small 
number of giant banks: these banks were interconnected in a complex cross-
ownership network together with large corporations in other sectors of the 
economy. And although in the decade preceding the crisis—parallel to the 
growing internationalization of French economy and stock exchange—the 
extensive network of cross-ownership had begun to unravel, the economic 
model based on financial networks continued to exist in many respects. On 
the one hand, financial institutions, like most of the giant corporations, con-
tinued to have large shareholders with (in most cases) blocking minority con-
trol (Harbula 2007, 448). On the other hand, there was still the overrepresen-
tation of people from the Ministry of Finance or bank supervision authority 
and other senior officials of major state bodies —that is, the so-called elite 
network—on the companies’ boards, all of whom had pursued relatively stan-
dard careers and all knew each other from school (Schmidt 2003, 542).
24  Marché à terme international de France [International futures market of France] 
(now Euronext Paris S.A.).
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Managers’ common “cultural” background (in public administration) 
prevented financial companies from engaging in overly risky transactions, 
or at least gaining too much importance from them in their business turn-
over. In this respect, it is typical that when financial liberalization broad-
ened the scope of activities, French banks began to establish strongholds 
in retail banking services, especially in Southern Europe, since these same 
countries had long been France’s financial hunting grounds.25 In contrast 
to the British and German examples where the internationalization of 
financial activities was almost exclusively in corporate lending and invest-
ment banking, the French banking sector gained international prominence 
by investing in retail banking, which was deemed to be a relatively low-risk 
business line. Undoubtedly, the strong retail component (both domestic 
and international) of the French banks helped lessen the overall impact of 
the global financial crisis (Hardie and Howarth 2009, 1023).
A similar cautiousness with regard to the use of derivatives in trading 
activities can also be observed. French banks mostly specialized in equity, 
interest, and exchange rate derivatives, from which record earnings miti-
gated the impulse to extend into more risky credit derivatives.
On the whole, for their size, and thus their ability to resist market tur-
moil, French banks:
a.)  invested little in assets that later became toxic (notably products 
based on American subprime mortgages);
b.)  were less involved in setting up off-balance sheet vehicles (OBSV, 
like SPVs/SPEs),26 securitizing property-based financial prod-
ucts (especially billions of dollars’ worth of risky U.S. subprime 
mortgages), i.e. wrapping them and selling them to investors in 
tranches;
c.)  were, in general, less engaged in the securitization of lending; and
d.)  were less reliant on short-term interbank lending (Howarth 2013, 
376–77).
The above listed features of the French financial system may partly be 
explained in terms of banking strategy. But this uniformity of all or most of 
the largest French banks could also be described as systemic, and as such, 
ultimately linked to some permanent elements of French economic policy. 
25  As a result of their rapid expansion in Italy, both BNP Paribas and the Crédit 
Agricole counted the country as their second “domestic” market by 2006–7 
(CECEI 2007, 127).
26  Special Purpose Vehicles or Special Purpose Entities.
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It is no wonder that the state action to boost investments and replace tra-
ditional funding sources for NFCs (such as retail deposit and commer-
cial papers) through encouraging banks to engage in securitization was 
unsuccessful, if on the other hand, laws and regulations like those limiting 
the type of assets to be securitized or the maintenance of red tape sur-
rounding the creation of OBSVs endured. Furthermore, in order to create 
and strengthen big banks as market leaders (so-called national champions), 
a number of laws and regulations remained in place for decades—such as 
the limitation on the distribution of certain types of accounts (like Livret 
A) with fiscal advantages for their holders to a  small number of finan-
cial institutions; the preservation of the privileged role of the CDC; and 
the strengthening of the regulation thwarting hostile takeovers of large 
national companies.27 The maintenance of those laws and regulations pro-
vided French banks with effective protection as well as a kind of guiding 
framework.
Although the French financial system has become extremely open, the 
“internationalization” of the market did not lead to a significant expansion 
of foreign banks in France. In fact, the opposite happened. In response 
to increased competitive pressure, there was strong concentration in the 
financial sector, with the ever-larger French banks expanding to foreign 
markets. This expansion could not even be stopped by the global financial 
crisis. The contemporary problem is that certain banks have grown too big, 
and four out of the five largest financial institutions in France have already 
appeared in the list of the FSB28. This list identifies the thirty Global Sys-
tematically Important Banks (G-SIB) which, by their problems, size, com-
plexity, and interconnections, pose systemic risk to the global financial 
system (FSB 2015, 2016).
The state has played a prominent role in the development, interna-
tionalization, and increasing market orientation of the French banking 
27  As of 1989, the former regulation about the requirement to notify the relevant 
(financial market) authority in case any person’s or entity’s shareholding reached 
a certain threshold (5 percent, 10 percent, 15 percent, 20 percent, 25 percent, 30 
percent, one-third, 50 percent, two-thirds, 90 percent or 95 percent) in a listed 
company, was supplemented by a new provision which has since proven to be 
most effective in the protection of big banks. According to the provision, beyond 
the threshold of 33.3 percent, there was an obligation to make a public bid of up 
to at least 66.6 percent, making it prohibitively expensive to venture into any hos-
tile takeovers against large French corporations (Borgomano et al. 2016 online).
28  The Financial Stability Board is a Swiss-based international body that monitors 
and makes recommendations about the global financial system.
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system, and has done a great deal to keep the sector afloat in the worst 
period of the global financial crisis, even without directly intervening in 
the market. As of the beginning of the 2000s, the preference for indirect 
tools of economic policy over direct ones has gained ground in other stra-
tegic sectors too. Successive governments made increasing use of market 
methods.
Government Asset Management
Although the (re)privatization process that started at the mid-1980s has, 
in several waves, substantially narrowed the government’s latitude to influ-
ence the economy, this did not mean that debates about how the remnants 
of the public sector should most effectively operate were over. The analyses 
forming the basis for these debates developed principles and recommenda-
tions, and also exposed the unsustainability of the situation. Let us start 
with the latter.
As markets became increasingly open to international competi-
tion; European competition policy became less and less permissive with 
regard to the finances of public-sector companies; the amount of profits 
available in the financial sector clearly rose to well above those in the 
real economy; and radical changes occurred in shareholders’ role and 
management methods of private companies —the state was unable to 
reconstruct itself at such a fast pace, and companies of the public sector 
remained partially regulated by rules and laws dating back to the 1950s 
(!) (Minefi 2003, 7).
As for the principles and recommendations contained in the analyses, 
it is worth mentioning the need for:
•  a clear separation of the state’s shareholder function from its other 
functions;
•  operational and contracting transparency;
•  the outsourcing of public services via a transparent and accountable 
concession contract administration process;
•  a clear distinction between public services and services of public in-
terest;
•  the separation of public sector activities from market sector activi-
ties;
•  opening up the latter for private investment by transforming utilities 
into joint-stock companies;
•  and finally, setting up a state wealth agency.
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All analyses agreed that the government must seek to establish policies and 
institutions by which it would able to pursue a responsible asset manage-
ment policy, thus promoting the development of the companies in its port-
folio (Minefi 2001, 2003; Barbier de la Serre et al. 2003).
Finally established by decree in 2004, the Government Shareholding 
Agency’s mission, main objectives, and guidelines concerning its opera-
tional functioning are as follows:
•  the APE acts as a  prudent and well advised long-term equity 
investor in companies deemed to be of strategic importance for the 
country;29
•  revenues generated by the APE should be reinvested in wealth man-
agement or used to pay down public debt30 (APE 2016 online/a,b);
•  for the APE, four main objectives are identified as necessities:
º  to maintain a sufficient level of control in strategic companies—
such as 100 percent in electricity grid management, 70 percent in 
gas and electricity service providers, and 50 percent in the Paris 
airports operator ADP (Aéroports de Paris) (Sénat 2016);
º  to preserve strong public services operators able to meet France’s 
basic needs;
º  to help consolidate and develop businesses in sectors driving eco-
nomic growth both in France and Europe;31
º  to proceed with ad hoc bailouts of companies whose failure could 
lead to systemic risk (APE, 2016 online/c).
29  Companies of strategic importance are, e.g., those that enjoy a natural or market 
monopoly, or operate in the field of security, defense or the nuclear industry, 
whose investments are to be financed by the state through capital increases (i.e., 
not by indebting them) in accordance with Article 107 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the EU relating to state aid (Boillon 2014, 41).
30  In 2015, €800 million of the proceeds of disposals was used in this way (APE 
2016).
31  In order to achieve this goal, it is not necessary for the state to be a majority 
owner. Depending on the shareholder structure, 5 to 30 percent of public own-
ership may generally be sufficient (APE 2016 online/c). Note, however, that 
although the success of companies and their value creation is dependent on the 
economic sector they are in rather than their shareholder structure, research 
shows that companies with controlling shareholders generally outperform their 
counterparts with fragmented ownership. Nevertheless, corporate performance 
improves with increases in controlling shareholders’ shares until the latter 
reaches an optimum level (at about 25 to 30 percent), and then it gets progres-
sively weaker (Harbula 2007, 449).
Szanyi - 00 könyv.indb   69 2019.11.15.   9:32
70 MIKLóS SOMAI
The APE 2014–15 annual report revealed that this small agency, which 
has a staff of slightly more than fifty, manages a portfolio worth €90 billion 
(including €60 billion in listed companies alone). The eighty-one busi-
nesses belonging to its portfolio generated an annual revenue of €147 bil-
lion and employed almost 1.7 million people in 2015. In that year, APE 
paid dividends worth €3.9 billion into the general budget. APE’s portfolio, 
which contains both direct and indirect shareholdings, is extremely diverse 
both in terms of the sectors covered—though with the prominence of aero-
space/defense, energy, transport, automobile manufacturing, services (par-
ticularly telecom, postal, and banking), and audio-visual—and the size of 
the government’s stake in the individual companies (for the main elements 
of the portfolio, see Figure 4).
Figure 4 
Main Government shareholdings
Source: author’s own computation based on APE 2015. Listed companies (circles) and non-listed companies (shadowed circles: SNCF, 
La Poste, RATP, DCNS, and France TV). The size of each circle is proportional to the Government’s equity stake (calculated on the basis 
of stock market value in the case of listed companies). In this figure, there are companies with more than 10,000 employees. X-axis: 
share of state ownership. Y-axis: annual turnover (€ billion)
As for the above-mentioned recommendations preceding the establish-
ment of the APE, most of them—for instance, the separation of share-
holding from other state functions; the contractualization of public services 
and their transformation into concessions; the separation of commercial 
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of SOEs’ capital to private investors—were taken into account and put 
into practice by the government. The one related to the transformation of 
state-owned entities was so widely supported that by mid-2014, the vast 
majority (68 percent) of the firms in the government’s portfolio (of which 
several symbolic ones like ADP, EDF or GDF since 2004–5) have oper-
ated as public limited companies32 (Boillon 2014, 46). The advantage of 
being a PLC resided in the fact that it was much easier for enterprises to 
raise funds, and they could more effectively mitigate risks and losses asso-
ciated with business cycle volatility and market fluctuations than if they 
remained in their former legal form.
At the same time, recommendations concerning transparency of oper-
ation and contracting have not been fully implemented yet, or more pre-
cisely, there has been some controversy surrounding government intentions 
and actions. On the one hand, legal changes (a law from January 2014 and 
a decree from August 2014) have taken effect, which simplify life for public 
companies, making it similar to that of private companies by relaxing the 
rules on the composition of both management and supervisory boards.33 
On the other hand, apart from the remnants of French protectionism 
present in some out-of-date laws and regulations, a new wave of economic 
patriotism has recently arisen and been institutionalized in a  law from 
March 2014, the so-called Law Aimed at Recapturing the Real Economy. 
This law initially made it more difficult to shut down factories and ini-
tiate mass layoffs in companies employing over 1,000 people in France by 
slowing down and rendering the process more expensive. Second, through 
the generalization of double voting rights in listed companies34 for those 
32  The portfolio also encompasses other legal forms: government-funded industrial 
and commercial institutions (e.g., RATP, SNCF network), government-funded 
administrative institutions (e.g., National Highway Authority), government-
funded institutions (mainly sea ports), and semi-public companies (e.g., Sem-
maris, the operator of Paris-Rungis, the world’s largest wholesale food (fresh 
produce) market) (APE 2016).
33  In the wake of the changes—as board members, instead of being appointed from 
a limited group of senior civil servants, could be drawn from a larger pool of 
experts, a method more suited to companies’ interests—the number of political 
nominees reduced substantially. While in 2013, the state still participated in the 
nomination of 936 administrators, of which 366 represented the state directly, in 
2015 these numbers fell to 765 and 272 respectively (APE 2016 online/c; APE 
2013, 7; APE 2016, 17).
34  More than half of the CAC 40 companies have as yet introduced double vot-
ing rights. The French government now has double voting rights in Renault, 
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holding their shares for at least two years, it strengthened the state’s con-
trolling role.35
Certainly, there were one or two cases when the law helped to preserve 
jobs.36 But the law was more about the Socialist Party’s (governing France 
between 2012 and 2017) desire to expand its electoral base by appealing to 
voters receptive to the idea of economic patriotism. Experience shows, how-
ever, that the pursuit of consensus or the implementation of methods bor-
rowed from the private sector, like APE’s asset management, can be more 
effective than pushing through laws in the interests of domestic players.
An example of the consensus-seeking approach was when Peugeot SA 
(or PSA), Europe’s second largest carmaker, Dongfeng Motors, its Chinese 
partner, and the French government agreed to collectively invest €3 bil-
lion in capital increases—providing €1.4, 0.8, and 0.8 billion respectively, 
much-needed cash to keep PSA afloat—in return for each receiving a 14 
percent stake in the company.37 The agreement made it possible to simulta-
neously avoid factory shutdowns, keep three quarters of research and devel-
opment activity in France, and help the company expand internationally.
The efficiency of APE’s asset management can be confirmed through 
the post-2009 expansion of both EDF and SNCF (as shown in Figure 2), 
which was made possible by the introduction of modern corporate gov-
ernance methods borrowed from the private sector. Because of its exten-
sive subsidiary network, the acquisition of Dalkia alone by EDF in 2014 
increased the number of SOEs by almost 200.38
Air France, Safran, Thales, PSA Peugeot Citroën, Orange, Aéroports de Paris, 
CNP, Areva, EDF and ENGIE (APE 2016, 22).
35  The legislators’ proclaimed intention with the law was to protect companies 
against speculative attacks, but in practice, it made possible for the state—in 
order to reduce general debt or finance other investments—to sell its shares 
without having to reduce its influence in those companies (Errard 2015).
36  See e.g. the capital increase in Renault, by which the influence of the state has grown 
so that it will certainly be able to prevent plans for endangering jobs in France. (Le 
Monde 2015) At the same time, the deal was rated differently by the stock market: 
Renault shares dropped by a third in the short term, and have been since then fluc-
tuating approximately 10–15 percent below their former value (Euronext 2016 online 
http://www.boursedeparis.fr/products/equities/FR0000131906-XPAR).
37  Before the savings deal, the Peugeot family had 25.4 percent of the capital and 
38.1 percent of the voting rights (HuffPost 2014).
38  If the number of employees seems not to keep up with the increase in the num-
ber of state-owned companies (in Figure 2), this is due to the continuous “ratio-
nalization” of staff at the major public sector employers (e.g. railways, post and 
energy) (INSEE 2016b).
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Final Remarks
Regarding the economic role of the state through state-owned enterprises, 
today’s France does not provide much of a contrast to its main partners 
anymore.39 If it still seems to be different, this comes partly from the 
common educational and cultural background of the French elite (see 
French banks’ effective crisis resistance) and partly from the efforts of the 
Socialist government (in power from 2012 to 2017) to maintain at least the 
semblance of its commitment to economic patriotism in order to enlarge 
its electoral basis. But against the reality of globalized competitive markets, 
all of those efforts are worthless. If the prospects for return on capital are 
higher outside of France, investments will take place abroad.
What is positive (or promising) is that two-thirds of SOEs in France 
already operate as plc, in conditions increasingly similar to those of private 
companies. Several SOEs have even changed their names to separate them-
selves from the old-fashioned, paternalistic culture their former names con-
noted.40 However, in companies that have not yet been transformed, there 
is still the risk of “manual control,” that is, the intervention of the “owner 
state” in day-to-day business operations.41
Although the global financial crisis did not cause a  paradigm shift 
regarding the role of the state in the economy, the ideological foundations 
of the previous (re-privatization) policy have been shaken. In certain func-
tions, state (public) ownership proved to be viable and crisis resistant, 
thereby justifying its existence. The privatization process did not come to 
a halt—currently the sale of the airports is on the agenda—but the time 
of the state’s continuous withdrawal from the economy is over. Some of 
the ongoing processes—e.g., challenges related to climate change, to be 
39  According to data from the French statistical office (INSEE), at the end of 
2014, 1,632 French companies were under state control, with a total of work-
force of 795,000 people. 85 percent of employees worked in the field of trans-
port, transportation, or warehousing (60.7 percent), power generation and sup-
ply (16.7 percent) or science (7.6 percent) (INSEE 2016b). In 2012, the book 
value of equity of SOEs relative to GDP was lower in France than in the Neth-
erlands, Sweden, Finland, Italy, the Baltics, Czechia, Poland, or Ireland (EC 
2015, 25).
40  That’s how Gaz de France became Engie, and France Télécom became Orange.
41  Boillon raises several examples including when the already heavily indebted 
SNFC was forced into the purchase of 40 TGV trains from Alstom to preserve 
jobs in the latter’s factories (Boillon 2014, 67–68).
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addressed as a major priority for the coming decades—already suggest that 
demand for public intervention in certain sectors of the economy may be 
rising (Fournier 2015).
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CHAPTER 3
The Involvement of the State in the 
German Economy
zsófia naszádos
The Birth of the Unified German Nation State and Its Economic System
As is well known, modern Germany had a significantly different path of 
development than its Western neighbors both politically and economi-
cally. The first detailed studies and plans to comprehensively improve the 
economy of the considerably fragmented German-speaking areas, which 
were divided into a number of principalities and duchies, and help them 
catch up with contemporary centralized states (Great Britain and France) 
were completed in the 1840s and 1850s. Scientific discourse evolving 
around this topic was strongly related to nationalist movements, which 
emerged at the time and sought to create a unified German (nation) state. 
Several different paths and aims were widely known, and they resulted in 
a series of political and military conflicts.1
Until the creation of the unified German Empire in 1871, several 
states at different levels of development competed and coexisted with each 
other while Prussia gradually became dominant. Cooperation among states 
had already started in 1834, when the German Customs Union (Zoll-
1  Those dedicated to a smaller Germany imagined the nation-state as the unification 
of the Northern and Western principalities with the leadership of Prussia, while 
the Habsburg Empire would be excluded. As opposed to this, a greater Germany 
favored by Austria would include the multiethnic Habsburg Empire.
As a result of the firm policy of Otto von Bismarck, in the end, the first 
version was realized. Following the short Austro-Prussian war in 1866, which 
brought about an overwhelming Prussian victory, the German Confederation that 
had been in existence since 1815 ceased, and it was replaced by the North Ger-
man Confederation which was the “anteroom” of the united German Empire, 
which was declared in 1871 after the Franco-Prussian War and also included 
Alsace-Lorraine.
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verein), which included the northern and western states of the German 
Confederation, was established (Mátyás 2003). However, only in the last 
third of the century onwards can we talk of a modern German economic 
system that can be investigated in a systematic way.
Economists and politicians of the era came to the conclusion that the 
principles of the classical Anglo-Saxon economy should not necessarily be 
the model for the young German state’s economic policy. While its produc-
tive capacity lagged behind, the country had to compete with other states 
in a more advanced phase of capitalist development. The contemporary 
German economy was characterized by the coexistence of a premodern 
system of semi-feudal large landownership, the world of the Prussian 
Junkers, and a few more developed “capitalistic islands.” Representatives 
of early German economics, among them Friedrich List, who developed 
serious theoretical work, believed that in such circumstances, realizing 
Adam Smith’s night-watchman state—that is, leaving the players of the 
economy at the mercy of the invisible hand of the market and dismantling 
the outer customs borders—would result in the suicidal retreat of Germany 
in the global competition over commerce, manufacturing, and coloniza-
tion, which was becoming stiffer and stiffer (Fukuyama 1997).
In works such as the notable “The National System of Political 
Economy” published in 1841, List explains that the individualist approach 
(enterprises following their self-interest) does not necessarily create 
common good; rather, the state has to shepherd the market players to 
achieve the above (Mátyás 2003). The Bismarck era’s economic policy 
is based on this early model of the developmental state. It was successful 
because it built on the targeted development of industry; the subordination 
of industrial production to national interest (pre-eminently increasing the 
capacity of the army); and it also generously subsidized scientific research. 
German economic thought and economic policy intended to give the 
state a  significant role as the managing authority and—in some areas—
also as owner. According to the concept supported by the governance of 
the Empire, instead of joining the increasingly fierce competition over 
colonies, Germany was to become the global leader in industries utilizing 
state-of-the-art scientific inventions: for example the chemical, electronics, 
machine, and heavy machinery industries.
Research and development, which was heavily emphasized, was 
mainly related to a few corporations led by iconic business people (e.g., 
Werner Siemens, Alfred Krupp, Wilhelm Cuno and Emil Kirdorf). Car-
telization and the development of oligopoly structures could be viewed as 
one of the major characteristics of the era, and—especially after the Panic 
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of 1873—they were regarded as beacons of stability against the “swings” of 
the market. Even corporate law was modified to provide greater protection 
to private investors via various state guarantees.
Increasing investment also provided an incentive for the develop-
ment of the modern German banking system, since the improvement of 
new industries was characterized by an intense hunger for capital. Before 
the birth of the unified nation state, lending was mainly restricted to some 
shipping and mainland commercial centers (Hamburg, Frankfurt), but the 
financial institutions operating there could not and were not willing to par-
ticipate in lending to and financing the emerging industries, which were 
risky for a number reasons (ziegler 2000).
In the 1870s, however, new financial centers were also created as 
the hubs of economic activity (Cologne, Berlin) shifted, because cap-
ital markets were underdeveloped, and the purchase and sale of stocks 
and state bonds was performed via banks. In the very beginning of the 
1870s, many privately owned large banks specializing in financing large 
scale investments were established; Commerz- und Disconto Bank and 
Deutsche Bank, established at the same time, were the first, and then came 
Dresdner Bank in 1872. The foundations of the banking system, which 
to date, had been operating in a  three-pillar structure, were fixed at the 
time. Besides privately owned large banks, numerous savings banks (Spar-
kasse) operating under the ownership of federal states and federal state 
banks (Landesbank) also came into existence to serve smaller depositors. 
Additionally, a few so-called credit unions operated under state ownership 
(Genossenschaftsbank, Volksbank) (ziegler 2000).
The predominance of state ownership (imperial or constituent terri-
tories) was visible in two main areas: in public service sectors—with the 
purpose of serving the needs of civilians and private investors in possibly 
the most effective and most predictable way; and in specific corporations 
utilizing natural resources and exploiting the country’s mineral deposits.
The overwhelming majority of all large firms constructing and oper-
ating railroads and public roads and those related to mining and agricul-
ture were state-owned in the period between 1871 and 1914. In 1906, 
a total of thirty-nine mines, among them all the coal mines, five salt mines, 
three quarries, and, in the Ruhr, twelve ironworks, operated under state-
ownership (Henderson 1975). These corporations served the needs of 
the German economy. Furthermore, they had such a  remarkable export 
capacity that by 1890, Germany became the second largest exporter of 
coal after Great Britain. Another sign of the success of Bismarckian state 
capitalism is that from 1871 onwards, the German Empire increased its 
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national product by 21.6 percent every decade (the same indicator was 
12.5 percent for Great Britain), and between 1879 and 1921 the gross 
annual income of German companies grew from 79 million marks to 712 
million marks (Henderson 1975). The economic and subsequent mili-
tary-political power of the country had become oppressive for rival Great 
Powers, and thus the European balance of power was reconfigured in new 
ways, which contributed to the outbreak of World War I.
The Consequences of World War I and the Economic Policy of the Third 
Reich
World War I brought about even more centralized industrial  production 
and tighter state control in Germany. More than two hundred special war 
corporations, so-called Kriegsgesellschaften, were established, and in some 
industries—for example in aluminum production—a state monopoly was 
maintained. The huge devastation resulting from the lost war, combined 
with the consequences of the Versailles Peace Treaty (e.g., the payment 
of reparations, the annexation of a  crucial area of industrial produc-
tion, i.e., Alsace-Lorraine, to France) produced a  dire recession in the 
country. As a  result of strengthening socialist movements, the idea of 
a social economy (Gemeinwirtschaft) became popular towards the end of 
the war. It represented a kind of compromise between a market economy 
and a planned economy. This form of economy did actually work at the 
regional level in a  few places though its success was not, however, long 
lasting (Peterson 2005).
From 1919 onwards, following the formation of the Weimar Republic, 
the consolidation of state-owned enterprises was finalized relatively 
quickly, while at the same time, the state urged the establishment of those 
private enterprises that had some benefit for society as a whole. This was 
because the obligation to pay reparations burdened only state-owned 
enterprises. After the shock caused by the Great Depression, which began 
in 1929, another wave of nationalization began: masses of enterprises were 
organized into groups where the state tried to effect consolidation as the 
majority owner. This process, however, did not prove permanent.
After their full takeover of power in 1933, the Nazi administration 
aimed to create a  stable welfare state with a  series of state investments 
(e.g., the construction industry and road construction), and it achieved sig-
nificant success. Contrary to official propaganda and the NSDAP program, 
not only did the Nazi regime not commence expansive nationalization, but 
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in the second half of the 1930s, a previously unseen wave of privatization 
began even in those areas where the dominance of state-ownership had 
been fundamental earlier. In 1934–35, the German state sold its block of 
shares in Deutsche Reichsbahn (the German Imperial Railway) for 224 
million Reichsmarks, which secured strategic control over the Reichs-
bahn (Bel 2003). A major wave of privatization began in mining, the steel 
industry, shipbuilding, and in shipping as well. The proportion of state-
owned shares in the second largest steel industry trust, the Vereinigte 
Stahlwerke AG, fell from 52 percent in 1932 to 25 percent in 1934. In 
1936, private investors gained majority ownership of two major shipping 
and shipbuilding companies (namely, Deutsche Schiff- und Maschinenbau 
AG and Hamburg-Südamerika Dampfschiffarts Gesellschaft) and the four 
largest banks (Bel 2003).
There was a complex web of reasons motivating this massive privati-
zation. To finance monumental investments, the state needed resources, 
which could be best raised this way. Additionally, Hitler’s purpose was to 
create a loyal economic elite and gain the sympathy of the factory-owning 
stratum, which had been against the NSDAP earlier. Selling state-owned 
share blocks proved to be a good means for Hitler to achieve these goals. 
Several sources prove that Hitler did not regard nationalization to be a nec-
essary condition for securing total control over the economy; rather, the 
peculiar repressive oligarchic structure he created was perfect for this.2
Going Different Ways after World War II: The Public Sector in the 
Economy of the FRG.
In the period following the collapse of the Third Reich and World War 
II, the western part of Germany (liberated by the western Allied powers) 
and the eastern part integrated into the Soviet sphere of influence went in 
radically different directions. In the German Democratic Republic (GDR), 
established in 1949, the complete nationalization of the means of produc-
tion started simultaneously with the dismantling of important large indus-
trial concerns and the movement of their remaining exploitable productive 
2  Some statements of Hitler regarding his views on this remained. “Why should 
I use halfway measures such as nationalization, when much more effective means 
are at hand? We don’t nationalize corporations or banks, but people.” My own 
translation. As quoted in Bel (2003, 17).
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capacities to the Soviet Union in exchange for war reparations; and, finally, 
with the formation of the socialist planned economy.3
In the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) that was formed contem-
poraneously, the direction of economic development was influenced by the 
following: the requirements of the Allied Control Council; the conditions 
of Marshall Plan aid; and also the obligation to consolidate and operate 
those factories and groups of factories “inherited” from the National 
Socialist era, which then came under the control of the West German state.
Although the FRG—based on a  social market economy—produced 
economic development resulting in previously unseen prosperity, groups 
that had earlier constituted the engine of the German economy played 
a smaller role. This happened partially due to changes in global economic 
circumstances and the overhaul of the ownership structure of the above 
groups of factories. In the Federal Republic, one of the strictest competi-
tion laws of Europe during the period came into force in 1958 (which is 
still in effect today with minor modifications). The law forbade every form 
of cartelization.4 The newly framed economic system favored the establish-
ment and development of SMBs (Mittelstand), which became the engine 
of the FRG economy, especially in the fields of services, light industry, and 
agriculture. This did not mean, however, that decentralization became pre-
dominant in every field immediately.
Under strict state supervision, the reorganization of large enterprises 
showed considerable concentration, especially in the first half of the 1950s. 
Six of the older imperial large-scale enterprises deemed suitable for consoli-
dation were reorganized in the form of joint-stock companies in the FRG, 
and they equated to two-thirds of the country’s entire industrial property. 
The state (even with a gradually decreasing share) was a majority owner in 
3  The study does not aim to analyze the economic system of the German Demo-
cratic Republic, because as a socialist country, a comparative analysis of the role 
of the state and state-owned enterprises there would require a different frame-
work of interpretation.
4  The creation of this law has several roots. At the Potsdam Conference, leaders of 
the Allied Powers had already established that the main course of action in con-
solidation after the war would be the decentralization and division of the mam-
moth groups, which played key roles in the operation of the German war econ-
omy and secured the economic operability of the Third Reich. Accordingly, the 
British-American-French military control accepted the statute of decartelization 
in 1947 which, among others, was also the basis of the 1958 the law. The law, its 
amendments, and modifications are available at http://www.gesetze-im-internet.
de/gwb/BJNR252110998.html#BJNR252110998BJNG000103360.
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these until the 1980s. These six companies were the following: Salzgitter 
AG5 (earlier Hermann Göring Imperial Works), Vereinigte Industrieun-
ternehmungen (VIAG), Vereinigte Elektrizitäts und Bergwerks AG (VEBA), 
Volkswagenwerke, Saarbergwerke, and Lufthansa (Toninelli 2000).
The proportion and form of state ownership varied according to sec-
tors, and it was different among states, the federal government, and local 
governments. In the case of air navigation for example, the state owned 
100 percent of Lufthansa, while some inland airports were operated by 
state-owned companies (Toninelli 2000). The central state had 100 per-
cent ownership of four out of nine electricity groups, and in another four 
it had over 50 percent ownership, and in one, it held a 30 percent stake 
(namely Rheinisch-Westfalisches Elektrizitätswerk or RWE AG). Nev-
ertheless, starting in the 1960s, a slow privatization process began in the 
electricity sector. Besides RWE AG, the two largest partially state-owned 
enterprises, VIAG-Bayernwerk and VEBA-Preusswerkelektra, were also 
gradually privatized (Toninelli 2000).
Coal mining and enterprises related to the Saar and Ruhr regions had 
a radically different path. These suffered heavily from the global transfor-
mation of the energy market (namely, the rapid surge of nuclear power). 
Contrary to decentralization, the federal government tried to consoli-
date firms individually sustaining losses and depleting coal mines under 
an umbrella enterprise (Ruhrkohle AG), of which it owned 25 percent 
of shares (Wengenroth 2000). Dependency on the state and its influ-
ence, however, remained strong even in companies with the most pri-
vately owned member shares, because the group continued suffering losses 
despite centralization, and therefore needed continuous state subsidies. 
Between 1949 and 1967, six out of seven billion marks invested in coal 
mining came in the form of budgetary state subsidies (Wengenroth 2000).
The financial sector was the third area (besides public services and 
heavy industries) in which state ownership and influence was impor-
tant, since the modern form of the system of federal member state banks 
(Landesbanks) was constructed at that time. It formed the most impor-
tant segment of enterprises owned regionally and by federal member states. 
The main purpose of Landesbanks was to credit the SMBs, the Mittel-
stand, which had an exceptional role in economic growth. Even though the 
principles of neutrality in competition and views of the state as a regula-
tory body rather than owner were priorities in the economic policy of the 
5  AG: Aktiengesellschaft, that is, a share company.
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FRG, in case of the Landesbanks, these principles were disregarded. For 
example, when needed in the case of losses, the federal government was 
always ready to generously subsidize these unique “hybrid” banks, which 
stood on the border between the state and private economy.
Accelerating Privatization: The Kohl Era (1982–98)
Except for subsidies for the industrial centers of the Rhine region, which 
burned significant budgetary resources, in the economy of the FRG as 
a whole, it could be said that no such proportion of the excessive growth of 
state-ownership and state subsidies began that would markedly distort the 
competitiveness of the country, as in the example of Great Britain, where 
the above caused great tension by the 1970s. As for the desirable struc-
ture of the economy, there was a relatively stable consensus among succes-
sive governments and individual parties themselves with minor differences 
in emphasis. In this consensus, instead of having ideological foundations, 
both the right and the left had a rather practical approach to the propor-
tion of state ownership and intervention. It could be briefly summed up by 
saying that the state remained present in certain fields either as a majority 
or sole owner. Such fields were primarily transport, public services, and 
the regional banking sector, which was related to federal member states. In 
the rest of the sectors of the economy, however, mixed forms of ownership 
were favored. (See the previous section.)
From the beginning of the 1980s onwards, the global transformation 
of the energy market and acute problems with competitiveness did not 
leave the FRG untouched. Therefore, reform and restructuring became 
inevitable.
In 1982, the coalition of Social Democrats and Liberals was suc-
ceeded by Helmut Kohl’s Christian Democrat and Liberal coalition, and 
the new Chancellor made “returning to [a] real social market economy” 
his main aim. Besides introducing a series of reforms “traditionally” used 
to increase competitiveness (raising the retirement age, more flexible labor 
market regulation, etc.), the government initiated a serious wave of priva-
tization. The goal was not to upset the status quo between the state and 
the private sector in the Thatcheresque way, but rather to boost mod-
ernization and structural change primarily in the centers of the coal and 
steel industry and a number of other fields of heavy industry. Another vital 
aspect was that the federal government generated substantial revenue for 
the budget by selling its share blocks. While the first wave of privatization 
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(1983–89) in the Kohl Era cannot be regarded as “shock therapy,” it still 
caused numerous labor code conflicts with unions that were traditionally 
powerful in Germany. Such conflicts were caused by situations in which 
employment conditions were drastically transformed in companies that fell 
into the hands of private owners (Leaman 2009).
Between 1983 and 1989, as a first step two main groups (VEBA AG, 
VIAG) were partly or fully privatized, though state-owned shares for these 
groups had been partly sold by Germany earlier in the 1960s and 1970s. 
The proportion of share ownership by the state in VEBA AG, which spe-
cialized in supplying electricity and coal mining, dropped from 43.8 per-
cent to 30 percent in 1984, and in 1985, it further decreased to 25.5 per-
cent in another wave of privatization (Leaman, 2009). In the case of the 
holding company VIAG, which also brought together mining and energy 
firms, the changes were even more dramatic: state ownership first plum-
meted from 87.4 percent to 47.4 percent in 1986, followed by its full priva-
tization in 1988. The remains of both companies, which had long histories, 
merged into the E-ON group later on (Leaman 2009).
At the end of the decade, the waves of privatization and restructuring 
also reached some fields of transport and the telecom industry. In 1988, 
Volkswagen was fully placed in the hands of private investors when the 
state sold its share block of 16 percent ownership. Next, in the same year, 
the ownership structure of Lufthansa was also transformed. In the case 
of the latter, state ownership fell from 65 percent to 51.6 percent, which 
could be seen as a bold move since the airline was regarded as a national 
champion in the FRG, and it was thought to be important that the state 
preserve its portion of ownership to secure strategic control. In 1989, the 
German Federal Post Office was broken up, and its shares were put on 
the market. Owned by KfW Bank (which, in turn, was partially owned by 
the state), three new joint-stock companies were set up: Deutsche Post 
AG, Postbank AG, and Deutsche Telekom AG (http://www.privatization-
barometer.com/database.php) 
One peculiarity of the privatization process was that enterprises 
issued large volumes of so-called residential shares (Volksaktien) so as to 
make owners of the broader middle class. This, however, did not prove to 
be a popular form of investment, because the population was extremely 
suspicious of stock exchange transactions because they were regarded as 
too risky.
The volume of privatization did not decrease from the 1990s to the 
2000s, and thus, the German state gave up all its shares in enterprises 
which became partially privately owned in the 1980s (e.g., Lufthansa, 
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Deutsche Post AG, and Postbank AG) (http://www.privatizationbarometer.
com/database.php)
From Imperial Symbol to Listed Group Undertaking: 
The Transformation of Deutsche Post
Throughout its 150-year-long existence, changes in the operation of 
Deutsche Post—the symbol of modern German telecommunications—
provide us with a good example of how technological development, con-
sumer behavior and demand, and changes in the market can force large 
enterprises (enterprises that once started out as state monopolies) to adapt.
In the second half of the nineteenth century, Reichspost (Imperial 
Mail) became one of the main symbols of national sovereignty and 
control, when in 1876 the telegraph service and the system of post 
offices were placed under unified state control, and even a separate min-
istry was established for this purpose. This significantly sped up com-
munications and the news, which promoted swift economic develop-
ment. Reichspost operated as an independent state-owned enterprise, 
and after World War II in 1950, it was reorganized under the name 
Deutsche Bundespost. Still state-owned, it expanded its range of services 
with savings-banking and tour operations to meet new demands. Its first 
step towards participating in global business life was its gradual fusion 
with the package service DHL, which was established in 1969. Since 
the 1970s, DHL has been present in the global market: Europe and the 
United States were followed by China, Singapore, and Latin America.
Legislation reacted to the changing market environment in two 
steps. The first postal reform bill initiated by the Kohl government pro-
vided for the division of Deutsche Bundespost into three parts. Thus, 
besides Postdienst—the pillar providing traditional postal services—
Deutsche Post Postbank and Deutsche Post Telekom were created. This 
way, the management of the different fields of activity became indepen-
dent on both the professional and the business side of their respective 
divisions. Major policy and strategic decisions were brought about by 
the directory composed of the executives of the three companies. Parallel 
to these developments, the three companies’ client contracts were trans-
formed into private contracts.
The second postal reform law in 1995 laid down the foundations 
for the privatization of the three enterprises by transforming them into 
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share companies: Deutsche Post AG, Deutsche Postbank AG, Deutsche 
Telekom AG. The law provided for a five-year transitional period, during 
which the shares had to remain in the ownership of the state. As a result 
of the first public offering of equity shares in November 2000, 29 percent 
of Deutsche Post shares went into private ownership, and 6 percent of 
private shareholders were employees of the enterprise. Fusion with 
DHL was completed in 2002; in the first step, 75 percent, and then the 
remaining 25 percent of its shares were bought up by Lufthansa Cargo. 
Cross ownership among the three enterprises was created at that time, as 
Deutsche Post DHL Group held 52 percent of Deutsche Postbank AG 
shares. Later, in 2009, Deutsche Post DHL Group sold this share block 
to Deutsche Bank, and thus it ceased to be an investor in the financial 
sector. According to data for 2015, the Federation has a  remaining 21 
percent indirect ownership in Deutsche Post DHL Group through KfW 
Bank. (https://www.dpdhl.com/en/about-us/history.html)
The other members of the group also remained crucial operators in 
the German economy. Deutsche Telekom, whose development was very 
similar to that of Deutsche Post, is a significant enterprise in the global 
telecom sector. After Eastern and Central Europe, it aimed to win new 
markets in the Far East, especially in China. The German state owns 
31.7 percent of Deutsche Post shares either directly or indirectly. The 
remainder of it is owned by institutional and private investors (https://
www.telekom.com/de/investor-relations/unternehmen/aktionaersstruktur) 
Even though the German state is not a majority shareholder in any of 
the three enterprises anymore, the influence and lobbying power of these 
in German (economic) diplomacy is probably the second largest after 
automotive enterprises. Deutsche Postbank, whose majority of shares was 
purchased by Deutsche Bank in 2009, has become a critical market oper-
ator in the German banking structure, and in 2003, it had the highest 
number of clients in Germany. Instead of becoming a  global operator 
like its two siblings, it is still a local one, and as a subsidiary of Deutsche 
Bank, it remains primarily active in the insurance and private banking 
businesses. (Adapted from “The history of Deutsche Post DHL Group: 
500 Years of Postal History from the Founding of the Modern Postal 
System to the Establishment of the World’s Leading Logistics Group.” 
https://www.dpdhl.com/en/about-us/history.html)
Changing the ownership structure of savings banks and banks owned by 
federal states, and partially or fully privatizing them was already on the 
Szanyi - 00 könyv.indb   89 2019.11.15.   9:32
90 zSóFIA NASzÁDOS
agenda in the Kohl Era. But, in the end, the Chancellor himself dismissed 
these possibilities (zopp 1999). The following two challenges to this plan 
were discussed at that time: state support for the Landesbanks, which went 
against the neutrality of competition; and, in times of crisis, increasing 
their capital, which devoured significant budgetary resources.
The risks of privatization were, however, deemed to be bigger than 
the potential benefits (increasing market competition for financial institu-
tions; the improvement of services; and liberation from the burden of state 
financing). One challenge was transforming the contracts of depositors into 
private contracts without causing potentially years-long disputes, which 
might have ended up as costly litigations in the case of both private persons 
and businesses. Another important argument against privatization was that 
the shares offered might be bought up by a few well-capitalized big banks, 
which would gain a quasi-monopoly (zopp 1999). However, this would 
have broken competition and anti-trust laws which were pivotal in the eco-
nomic policy of the FRG.
The strongest reason, however, was probably that the banks owned by 
federal states had an especially important role in the economic growth of 
postwar West Germany. Lending to small and medium-sized enterprises, 
which had the most important role in the economy of the FRG, was almost 
exclusively done via Landesbanks. Additionally, the stability and predictability 
provided by Landesbanks was of utmost importance to their clients (zopp 
1999). Therefore, it was feared that some sectors that periodically performed 
weakly or ones that would likely fall into recession would have extremely lim-
ited growth opportunities if the operation of this unique group of banks was 
radically transformed. It also needs to be mentioned that the Landesbanks 
and the savings banks were strongly intertwined with politics—especially at 
the regional and federal state levels. Those who insisted on privatization were 
often accused of wanting to be beneficiaries of a possible privatization. In 
summary, it could be said that the privatization of Landesbanks would have 
signaled such a serious disregard for both the economic and the political status 
quo that the political elite was not willing to carry it out.
The Way to a Market Economy: The Challenges of Privatization and 
Economic Transition in the GDR
The introduction of a socialist planned economy essentially changed the 
development path of East German federal states, which belonged to the 
Soviet sphere of influence after the end of World War II. Gradually, the 
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German Democratic Republic separated from the western part of the 
country, and its economic and commercial relationships with the FRG 
were demolished.
The Soviet Union confiscated most of the remaining productive 
capacities as part of war reparations, dismantling and removing them from 
the territory of the GDR, which significantly thwarted economic recovery. 
At the same time, the process of total nationalization in the economy 
started under Soviet inspection, similarly to other states within the Eastern 
Bloc. Consequently, the country severely lagged behind its western 
neighbor regarding economic growth, innovation, and the optimal redis-
tribution of the wealth produced there. It is important to note here that 
no considerable attempt at a “mixed economy” could be realized in the 
GDR—unlike in Hungary, for instance—due to the more radically oppres-
sive nature of dictatorship, so there were no “capitalist islands” or subsis-
tence agriculture.
In an economy built exclusively on state ownership and on central 
planning governed by the “Politbüro,” the relationships between economic 
actors had very different features than their counterparts in the FRG 
system of “democratic corporatism” and social partnership. Instead of 
free cooperation between enterprises and employees, their trade unions, 
and the system of negotiations and agreements based on equal rank, in 
the GDR, a hierarchical relationship formed in which the system of pro-
duction and the operation of enterprises were defined by political dictates 
(Koch 1998).
Consequently, the main challenges of the unification of the two coun-
tries included, on the one hand, privatization that terminated exclusive 
state ownership, and, on the other, the creation of optimal conditions for 
a social market economy. The difficulties of the economic transition and 
the burden of reaching economic cohesion for the eastern German federal 
states remained the primary challenges for Germany until the end of the 
1990s. This also involved a decline in the country’s economic performance. 
One of the first steps of economic unification was the establishment of 
the German Economic, Social and Monetary Union in 1990, and then the 
so-called Treuhandanstalt. The task of the latter authority was directing 
and monitoring the process of privatization. According to the principle of 
privatization, previously nationalized properties and companies “owned 
by the people” (“Volkseigene Betriebe”) had to be returned to their original 
owners if possible. Between 1990 and 1994, approximately 13,000 com-
panies were returned to private owners, the process of which influenced 
about four million employees.
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Basically, three types of companies could be distinguished during 
the economic transition of the former East German market. The first 
category included enterprises that were founded as pioneers right after 
the transition, mostly with significant financial support from the FRG or 
the European Community. Firms belonging to the second type tended 
to be small and medium-sized companies producing goods for the local 
market. Many of these were purchased by Western concerns because 
they had difficulties weathering the challenges of the transition. Finally, 
the third category contained firms operating in a specific “niche” sector, 
which enabled them to maintain their market positions (Tribe 1992). 
The number of companies radically increased between 1991 and 1995, 
growing from 178,000 to 353,000 in the industrial and service sector 
alone (Koch 1998).
The economic transition and especially privatization were, of course, 
accompanied by major difficulties and abuses regarding competitiveness, 
social issues, and productivity, which shed an unfavorable light on the 
managers of the process and the employees of Treuhandanstalt as well. 
In course of setting the agenda for the economic transition, the decision 
was made that a one-to-one rate of exchange between the Eastern and 
Western German Mark would be guaranteed, and a radical devaluation 
of the currency should be avoided. There were primarily political reasons 
for the decision: a  substantial devaluation of the currency would have 
definitely meant a social crisis, mass dissatisfaction, and increasing unem-
ployment in the short run, which could have easily turned citizens of the 
former GDR against reunification. Certainly, the productivity and devel-
opment of the eastern federal states were far below the FRG’s standards, 
and the over-valued currency seriously hindered the start of development.
The program for Building Up Eastern Germany (Aufbau Ost) 
remained in focus in German domestic politics, and it is not over yet as 
the transfers between the federal states and the reduction of inequali-
ties among regions regarding development are still important objectives. 
According to the original plans, the system of cohesion transfers was to 
be maintained as long as the per capita GDP in the eastern federal states 
reached at least 70% of the Western average. The accomplishment of this 
was estimated to happen by the turn of the millennium. However, the 
fund established for this purpose (Fonds Deutsche Einheit) was already 
replaced in 1995 by different, more general monetary resources (Solidar-
pakt) aimed at the reduction of regional inequalities in every region.
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The Structure of the German Economy in the New Millennium
Germany became a  country fighting increasing economic challenges 
in the middle of the 1990s, and, as a result, was labeled the “Sick man 
of Europe” by journalists at the time. The reunification of the country 
entailed significant costs paid for by the former West German federal 
states, and reform of the welfare state was becoming increasingly urgent. 
There was pragmatism and foresight in many fields, which—through 
the use of continuous, gradual and flexible privatization from the 1960s 
onwards—prevented overgrowth and deficits in the state sector. For a long 
time, however, this attitude did not apply to the areas of social services and 
welfare expenditure. This considerably endangered the competitiveness of 
the country, its leading role within Europe, and the productivity of the cor-
porate sector.
The central issue of economic policy debates was therefore not priva-
tization, but rather the methods of accomplishing the reform of the welfare 
state. Eventually, the coalition of the Social Democrats and Greens led by 
Gerhard Schröder launched reforms by announcing the program Agenda 
2010. It aimed to reestablish a pattern of growth through labor market lib-
eralization and cuts to social expenditures.6
Naturally, in the meantime, privatization continued in many fields in 
accordance with the spirit of the age. By the millennium, the German state 
had practically given up its predominant ownership in every field of the 
economy. Furthermore, private investors appeared in such fields, where, 
for reasons of state interest or because of mercantile traditions, private 
investment had been avoided earlier. There were exceptions, of course, 
and one of them is rail transport: Deutsche Bahn AG is still exclusively 
state owned. Yet in 2015, the government established an expert com-
mittee to investigate whether partial privatization could further improve 
the efficiency of operations. No consensus has yet been reached regarding 
this question, thus privatization is not yet on the agenda. Even though the 
6  The most important part of the reform package, the so-called Hartz reforms, 
were carried out under the Schröder government between 2002 and 2003. The 
package was a series of actions carried out in four stages (Hartz I, II, III, and 
IV). It aimed to make the labor market more flexible. Part-time and alternative 
employment was encouraged in this framework, and unemployment benefits 
were lowered altogether by merging a number of former types of aid. However, 
the resources allocated for training and job placement were increased.
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enterprise operates under state ownership, in 2001, three track sections 
(Düsseldorf, Bielefeld, Solingen) were operated jointly with private enter-
prises (https://www.deutschebahn.com/de/konzern/geschichte/sammlungen/
unternehmenshistorisches_archiv-1187860) 
The table below includes the most important German enterprises in 
which—based on data going up to 2007—the German state either directly 
or indirectly held shares.
Table 1 
The twenty largest enterprises with partial state ownership (2015)







Landesbank Berlin Holding AG 98.6
MVV Energie AG 66.2





Norddeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale 65.6
Helaba Landesbank Hessen-Thüringen Girozentrale 100
Salzgitter AG 26.5
Deutsche Bahn AG 100
GAG Immobilien AG 68.8
AG Bad Neuenahr 27
Bochum-Gelsenkirchener Strassenbahnen AG 3
Flughafen Köln/Bonn GmbH 30.9
Source: http://www.privatizationbarometer.com/database.php
Currently, 90 percent of the companies remaining in state ownership are 
local enterprises or local government enterprises, 8 percent of them are 
owned by federal states, and a mere 2 percent are owned by the federal 
government (OECD 2012). This ownership structure in itself implies that 
the areas of operation and the activities of the state-owned enterprises have 
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changed. Large-scale industrial holding groups have been replaced by com-
panies specifically serving local and regional needs. Forty-one percent of all 
state-owned enterprises operate in the fields of water and energy supply; 
11.9 percent are related to inland transport operations; and virtually the 
same proportion, 11.8 percent, are state-owned enterprises providing social 
and health services. According to OECD data, in 2012, 15,127 enterprises 
were in some sort of public ownership, and this is 0.4 percent of all 3.6 mil-
lion companies registered in Germany (OECD 2012). The federal govern-
ment is a partial or full owner of 111 enterprises which are mostly linked 
to transportation, logistics and freight, and culture and science. Deutsche 
Bahn’s 100 percent state ownership and Deutsche Telekom with 31.7 per-
cent state ownership can be regarded as the two most significant and most 
serious consortiums with the most international lobbying power among 
those companies that are federally owned (OECD 2012).
It is important to emphasize that since the beginning of the 2000s, 
the greatest challenge has been posed by the operation and reform of fed-
eral state banks belonging to the regional pillar of the state sector. This 
challenge was further complicated by the economic crisis of 2008. Despite 
the fact that Landesbanks gained a reputation for conservatism and were 
the main financiers of small and medium-sized enterprises based on the 
experiences of the post-war decades, the number of anomalies had been 
increasing since the beginning of the new millennium. The crisis and the 
period leading up to it shed light on their serious weaknesses, and both 
individual federal member states and the federation as a whole had to con-
front conflicts because of them. Landesbanks had been receiving generous 
subsidies in various forms, and their management and owners were heavily 
intertwined with local political elites as well. Their profits were the result of 
subsidies rather than their competitiveness (The Economist 2014).
First, starting in 2001 and on a number of other occasions—because 
of concerns about the neutrality of competition—the European Committee 
criticized some of the Landesbanks’ methods of raising capital and state 
guarantee programs aimed at preserving stability and remaining competi-
tive with globally well performing big banks. In 2005 following one of the 
largest federal guarantee programs, many Landesbanks bought up a sig-
nificant amount of toxic American securities from banks that crashed in 
2008. Even though the German economy was not hit as hard by the crisis 
as its European neighbors (as a result of the above investments), the fed-
eral government had to allocate significant resources to save the Landes-
banks. Crisis management cannot be viewed as a complete success in this 
field: five out of seven federal state banks were saved, and these five are 
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still fighting for survival. A good example of this is HSH Nordbank, which 
is owned by the federal states of Hamburg and Schleswig-Holstein and 
could barely pass the ECB stress test (The Economist, 2014). Based on the 
above experiences, it is possible that the federal banking sector will be the 
next segment of the German economy in which the state will withdraw and 
enterprises will be restructured.
The focal point of political and scientific discourse from the 2000s 
onwards is no longer the comparison between the advantages and disad-
vantages of privatization and nationalization, but rather making the per-
formance and transparence of state-owned enterprises more similar to 
those of market economy companies. The OECD among others has inves-
tigated how to make the competitiveness of state-owned enterprises and 
the quality of their services sustainable in the long term. Monitoring these 
enterprises, auditing their operations, and adjusting them to market stan-
dards could, in principle, improve the efficiency of the fight against corrup-
tion and the waste of state resources. Opponents of extensive state owner-
ship mention this argument in favor of privatization.7
Germany, too, seeks to guarantee the effective and transparent opera-
tion of publicly- owned enterprises with a number of regulations, most 
of which came into effect after 2008. These regulations are collected in 
the Public Corporate Governance Kodex. The Federal Ministry of Finance 
is obliged to annually report on all state-owned enterprises whose direct 
or indirect state ownership is at least 25 percent and its nominal capital 
share is more than €50,000. Furthermore, the reports investigate whether 
these enterprises have complied with complex social, environmental, and 
sustainability rules explicated by the Code. A specific example would be 
the 2015 report, which focuses on equal opportunities for female execu-
tives. It details the number of female executives, their distribution in 
different sectors, and the steps taken to support promotion within their 
enterprises.8
7  See, among others, OECD (2015) “Coherence for Development. State-owned 
Enterprises: Good Governance as a Facilitator for Development,” available at 
https://www.oecd.org/pcd/State-owned%20enterprises_CfD_Ebook.pdf.
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Conclusions
Numerous fault lines cut through the history of the modern German 
economy, but the aptitude of the state for gaining economic property could 
not be viewed as a characteristic that could dominate eras. On the contrary, 
the influence of the state as owner was predominant in basically two areas: 
in public services and transportation (mostly for social reasons), and in the 
exploitation of natural resources, specifically in mining.
Although the continental and especially the German economic system 
is often labeled state centered in Anglo-American scholarship, it is impor-
tant to note that there has not been a  single era since the birth of the 
modern German state when the state aimed to guarantee its influence on 
the economy by amassing property, except for the GDR, which, however, 
was excluded from this study. Much more significant was the role of strict 
regulatory regimes, which were enacted as mercantile duties, commerce 
policies, and rigid rules of the stock exchange in the early Wilhelmine–Bis-
marckian era. Then came the payment of reparations related to the Peace 
Treaty of Versailles after World War II and the limitation of the operation 
of German conglomerations. After 1945, several characteristics of the West 
German economic regime were a result of the shock of World War II: the 
consequences felt by the new political elite; and the expectations of occu-
pying powers. The cartel law, which sought to prevent the reorganization 
of group-holding monopolies (that used to be the economic basis of the 
nationalist war machine), might be regarded as especially relevant for the 
topic of this study.
The government of the Third Reich did not exercise total control of 
the economy through nationalization, but rather by a peculiar oligarchic 
system through which it intended, on the one hand, to bind the German 
economic elite loyal to the Reich in every possible way to itself, and on the 
other, to expel big businesses labeled as alien and against the Reich (mostly 
Jewish, naturally), and redeploy their resources to the above loyalists.
Due to the revival of strong Christian Democratic and revisionist 
Social Democratic traditions, massive nationalization was never really sup-
ported by the politics of the FRG after World War II. This would have 
been alien to the ordoliberal system regardless of the partisanship of the 
governing political elite. Several large industrial holdings and mining trusts 
came to be owned by the German federal state as part of the postwar con-
solidation in the 1950s. Privatization of these, however, was advocated in 
the 1960s: the first public offer of shares took place at this time.
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Privatization gained impetus in the 1980s and 1990s, but it did not 
cause such a wavering of public trust and peace as in other European coun-
tries with more or less successful liberalization revolutions. The image 
change of the Social Democratic Party partially restructured the party, and 
its good relations with the unions deteriorated. The latter effect, however, 
was more likely a result of general labor market forces aimed at deregulation.
The economic crisis of 2008 did not greatly affect Germany, as it was 
and is relatively isolated from Anglo-American capital markets, and thus 
it did not result in a significant transformation of the relationship between 
the state and the private sectors. Federal state-owned banks are an excep-
tion to this, as many of them were pushed to the brink of bankruptcy as 
a consequence of the crisis, and they could survive only with substantial 
state subsidies. Because they still perform badly in stress tests, serious 
debates continue as to how their operation should be reformed.
On the whole, it could be ascertained that since important traditions 
of practical levels of market regulation were predominant earlier in the 
country, the discourse on the alleged failure of neoliberal capitalism never 
had a central role in Germany.
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CHAPTER 4
The Relationship between State and 
Private Enterprise in the Austrian Economy
istván kőrösi
Introduction: An Overview of Macroeconomic Data
Austria is one of the countries in European Union that is growing in 
terms of its population, economic performance, job creation, and also its 
increasing standard of living. In 2018, the population of the country was 
8,795,000, or 1.7 percent of the EU’s total population. Between 1990 
and 2018, the population grew by 1.1 million, mostly because of immi-
gration. The country generated 2.4 percent of the EU’s GDP, which it 
the tenth largest economy in the EU. Austria generates a GDP more than 
three times that of Hungary and twice as large as Czechia’s. The Alpine 
country achieved a modest but internationally significant pace of growth: 
1.7 percent adjusted annually between 2000 and 2005, and annually 1.4 
percent adjusted between 2005 and 2010. The number stagnated in 2013, 
and thereafter, the yearly growth rate increased to 3 percent.1
Presently, Austria is the sixth wealthiest member country of the Euro-
pean Union with an annual per capita GDP of 42,020 Euros, which is 
about 30 percent higher than the EU average. It surpasses Sweden, Den-
mark and Finland. Austria is a net contributor to Brussels’ budget, paying 
in 400 million Euros annually. Each year, every Austrian citizen pays 50 
Euros for EU membership.
This is a very meager sum compared to the fact that the annual tax 
burden per person is 900 Euros in Austria. Being an EU member is obvi-
ously well worth the expense, as profits from foreign trade, capital con-
nections, and cooperation are so much higher, and thus integration in fact 
yields financial profits for Austria.
1  From the 2018 data of Eurostat Brussels.
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The Characteristics of State Participation in the Austrian Economy
The state has a significant role in economic redistribution and improve-
ment. The rate of public expenditure is 51.2 percent of GDP, which ranks 
Austria sixth in the EU. (We can find larger state budget expenditure rates 
in Denmark, France, Finland, Belgium, and Sweden.) Social expenditures 
are 30.4 percent of GDP, which equals the average of the Eurozone, but 
it is significantly higher than that of the EU 27. Between 2000 and 2010, 
the rate of social expenditures in relation to GDP has grown everywhere in 
the EU without exception. In Austria, it grew by more than 2 percentage 
points over ten years. All this required levying a significant earnings with-
holding rate: it reached 44.1 percent including taxes and contributions. In 
2007, before the crisis, the rate of withholdings was 43.2 percent, so the 
growth of the burden resulting from the crisis is relatively low. (Austrians 
wish they had low Swiss taxes and contribution burdens. They do so for 
a reason: withholdings in Switzerland are a mere 28.6 percent altogether.) 
Tax burdens in Austria are consolidated in general, but they are higher 
than the average of the EU 27, and by far larger than those in Hungary.2 
Tax policies are highly balanced in this Alpine country, and even small 
changes are rarely and carefully made for the sake of predictability.
The Austrian state participates widely and significantly in the 
economy, applying a combination of direct and indirect financial instru-
ments. The main forms of direct intervention are capital injections into 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs) (by raising share capital), public and 
infrastructural investments, and public commissions. In the past, direct 
intervention often went together with an inefficient use of assets. Several 
large projects proved to be failed designs (the AKH hospital investment, 
the zwentendorf nuclear power plant), and for a long time direct interven-
tion inadvertently resulted in the congelation of the production structure 
in much of the public sector; it also concealed the consequences on behalf 
of the loss-making management (especially in Voest-Alpine). The fact that 
public projects often dragged on and exceeded appropriations also signaled 
inefficiency.
An overall successful area of state intervention was public infrastruc-
ture development programs, which, having built up the regional operation 
2  Eurostat Brussels, 2015, and data from the Österreichische Nationalbank avai-
lable at http://www.oenb.at.
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framework of the economy, had a role in establishing and supporting sig-
nificant and continuous growth. Regional infrastructure programs gener-
ated direct industrial improvements by establishing production infrastruc-
ture. The efforts of state commissions stimulated regional production and 
employment and prepared the ground for private investment.
Weighing the proportion of state intervention instruments, it can be 
safely said that between direct and indirect instruments, the latter unequiv-
ocally have a decisive role. Stimulating private investment is carried out 
with a comprehensive and extensive set of instruments. We must empha-
size the role of the state and its subsidized institutions, providing informa-
tion, assisting with organization, giving advice, stabilizing the credit guar-
antee and credit insurance system, and helping new investments overcome 
initial hardships.3
The central and intertwined areas of state intervention are regional 
policy, restructuring industries in crisis, and stimulating investment and 
employment. In the framework of regional policy, the federal government 
grants substantial funds as part of budgetary redistribution. The over-
whelming majority of regional development programs are designed by the 
states themselves. Most of these include major infrastructural and com-
munal investments. According to central directives, both the suppliers and 
the workforce needed for these projects should be recruited from with a 50 
square km area (if they are available and competitive).
In restructuring industries in crisis, the focal point is maintaining the 
highest possible rate of employment, primarily within the framework of 
corporate employment plans as they relate to modernization, and in cases 
where this is not possible, comprehensive retraining programs are initiated. 
Furthermore, stimulating regional job creation is a priority. The compre-
hensive national credit and credit guarantee system of investment subsi-
dies is complemented by subsidies granted by regional investment funds; 
building production infrastructure or taking over a  portion of building 
costs; and, in specific cases, by direct subsidies related to employment 
(e.g., when employing long-term unemployed or disabled workers).
Heavy polarization is a distinctive dimension of the structure of Aus-
trian industry: the very small, mostly family-owned businesses (under ten 
employees) make up 95 percent of all factories, while on the other end 
of the spectrum, less than 1 percent of all factories are large enterprises 
3  On state participation in the economy and instruments of intervention, see Gál 
(1984).
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(employing more than one thousand persons), and these play a crucial part 
in industrial production and exports. The heavy subvention of small busi-
nesses is among the main elements of Austrian industrial, investment, and 
regional economic policies.4
Austria has had positive results in stabilizing small businesses. The 
main elements of this subvention policy are: professional support for estab-
lishing companies; clear and predictable subvention conditions, despite 
their complexity; and the long term validity of these conditions. Subven-
tions are provided mostly in the form of credits and guarantees. Sufficient 
capital share is one of the main conditions for taking these subventions. 
Thus, private risk taking and capitalization are factors that improve sta-
bility. Credit subvention and guarantees granted to an individual small 
business are rather limited, which, on the one hand, enables the simul-
taneous subvention of many small businesses, while on the other hand, if 
some of fail, the losses are small.5
The state-owned large enterprise sector had been operating rigidly and 
often inefficiently for a long time, though it reliably supplied the processing 
industry with raw materials and energy. The downsides of the sector were 
maintaining the production of non-profitable products, the exacerbation 
organizational and management problems, flawed investment allocations, 
and subventions that paid for losses, which became the norm. Neverthe-
less, large enterprises have always played an important role in balancing 
out economic booms, employment stabilization and regional economic 
growth. However, restructuring the sector became necessary.6
Since its accession to the EU in 1995, major changes have taken 
place in economic policy and the management of the public sector. Loss 
financing schemes and market problems connected to “solutions” have 
been abolished. In order to regain competitiveness, there has been a man-
aged, coordinated, and controlled transition and reorganization of compa-
nies (based on profit-centers); the strictly selective transformation of the 
product structure based on rentability; and the introduction of new enter-
prise resource systems selected through investments concerning modern-
4  Key figures for Austrian companies by size of company https://news.wko.at/news/
oesterreich/unternehmen-in-oesterreich-nach-groessenklassen.html
5  An overview of the role and activities of small and medium-sized enterprises with 
current data and facts https://news.wko.at/news/oesterreich/wirtschaftskraft-kmu-
summary.pdf
6  On the Austrian structure of industry and the role of the state-owned large enter-
prise sector in the development of economic policy, see Kőrösi (2005).
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ization. The main successes that resulted from these changes were invest-
ments based on preliminary rentability studies, the development of modern 
enterprises, production management systems, and complex packaging 
plans connected to customers’ individual expectations.
The experiences of modernization, stabilization, and partial privatiza-
tion in recent years, have led to a new pragmatism in Austrian economic 
policy. Consequently, the main negative aspects of previous state subsidies, 
that is the rigidity of production and product structures, have been largely 
eliminated, and the restructuring of employment has been accomplished 
with a much lower social and economic cost than in most other countries. 
Small companies, which are considered to be Austrian specialties, offer 
solutions that are a good mixture of regional, industrial, and employment 
policies. The refundable but preferential interest rates, guarantees, and 
credit insurance; the conditional rules and clearly oriented investment 
incentives (tax preferences, accelerated favorability descriptions); and the 
preference for savings combined with tax incentives for innovation effec-
tively serve the Austrian regional and industrial policy objectives.
The above mentioned impacts have had comparatively positive results 
internationally regarding (i) the favorable economic conjuncture in recent 
years; (ii) the avoidance of potential conflicts surrounding the employment 
problem despite accelerated structural transformation; (iii) the observ-
able decrease in regional differences; (iv) the halting of Austrian industrial 
space losses in several niche markets; and (v) the comparatively low socio-
economic costs of restructuring the state-owned industry.
Historical Milestones of Austrian Nationalized Industry
The history of post-World War II nationalization in Austria began on 
July 26, 1946, when the National Council (Nationalrat) of the Parlia-
ment issued the first comprehensive nationalization act. This took place 
in order to prevent the Soviet Union from taking ownership of “German-
owned” companies. German-owned companies were not just companies 
founded by German Nazi Party members—among them the Hermann 
Göring Works in Linz—but also former Austrian state-owned com-
panies, such as the First Danube Steamship Company (Erste Donau 
Dampf-Schiffahrts-Gesellschaft).
Before 1983, the Austrian state-owned corporate sector was extensive. 
It represented one-fifth of Austrian GDP, which included the three largest 
banks, the entire coal mining industry, every significant factory involved 
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in the production and refinement of crude oil, and every major factory 
involved in heavy industry. These renationalized industries came directly 
under the authority of the Austrian government and its ministries7.
Regarding the management of Austrian state-owned industry, a major 
shift occurred at the end of 1966, following the adaptation of the ÖIG Act 
and the launch of the ÖIG (Österreichische Industrieverwaltungs-Gesellschaft 
[Austrian Industry Association]) by the Josef Klaus government in 1967. 
Following the amendment of the ÖIG Act of 1969, companies were trans-
formed into Ltds. (GmbH) in 1970. In July 1970, the ÖIG became the 
ÖIAG (Österreichische Industrieverwaltungs-Aktiengesellschaft [Austrian Indus-
trial Management Company]), and in 1972, the Viennese Electric Power 
Plants Ltd. (Wiener Schwachstromwerke, GmbH) was merged into the ÖIAG.
The next turning point occurred in 1989, when the Austrian Indus-
tries Conglomeration was founded, which was 100 percent owned by the 
ÖIAG. The conglomeration consisted of chemical, electrical, electronics, 
machinery, and equipment manufacturing companies, the ÖMV and 
VOEST-ALPINE were also members of the group. The partial privatization 
of the Austrian Industries Group was designed to retain the influential, con-
trolling role of the state. This privatization did not take place, however, and 
in March 1994, the Austrian Industries Concern re-merged with the ÖIAG.8
After 1987, multiple privatization waves occurred in Austria. The first 
major period lasted from 1987 to 1999. In 2000, a new shift took place. 
With the passage of Gesetzes 2000, the ÖIAG was transformed into a priva-
tization agency. Beyond the industrial ownership of the Austrian state, in 
May 2000, the Post und Telekombeteiligungsverwaltungs-Gesellschaft and 
Post und Telekom Austria Aktiengesellschaft also merged into the ÖIAG. 
An important feature of the ÖIAG 2000 law was that the management of 
the ÖIAG received significant independence from its owner, the Austrian 
state. An independent and continuously expanded Supervisory Board was 
also institutionalized with the co-option law. Two-thirds of the members 
of the Supervisory Board could have been elected by the state, but instead 
the members of the Supervisory Board could independently select new 
supervisory board members. However, the government delegated elected 
members of the board. Employees’ representation authority elected the 
7  On the nature of the stated-owned sector in the Austrian economy and on the 
operation of the ÖIAG from World War II until the 1980s, see Richter and 
Székffy (1987).
8  On the history of the operation and the multiple reorganizations of the company, 
see https://www.voestalpine.com/group/en/group/history/
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remaining third of members. Insider operations remained fundamental 
to the supervisory board. Later on, the “self-service” method prevailed 
instead of “self-renewal” (Selbstbedienung statt Selbsterneuerung).
In 2000, the Schüssel government decided to launch a  new major 
privatization wave. Telekom Austria AG, the Vienna Airport (Flughafen 
Wien AG), the Postal Savings Bank (Österreichische Postsparkasse AG), 
Austria Tabak, Print Media Austria, which is the printing house of the 
state (Österreichische Staatsdruckerei GmbH), and the Dorotheum Auc-
tion House were selected for privatization. According to the Privatization 
Act, the aim was to achieve the highest possible revenues while simulta-
neously enforcing the interests of companies and the Austrian state. The 
simultaneous implementation of the different interests of the companies 
and the state mentioned seldom occurred and had a limited effect during 
this wave of Austrian privatization. However, the outcome of the privatiza-
tions managed by the Schüssel government was positive overall, primarily 
due to the fact that after the sale of those large companies, they performed 
well on the stock exchange and saw some appreciation and an increase 
in their values. However, this process stopped in the mid-2000s. Several 
anomalies occurred concerning the privatization of Austrian Telekom, 
and in 2011, a major scandal broke out. Following the financial crisis in 
November 2008, the Austrian state founded a company to coordinate state 
capital injections to banks. This institution, the FIMBAG, was headed by 
Hannes Androsch, the former minister of finance.
In 2011, the Austrian Telekom scandal broke out. Several executives of 
Telekom Austria were acquitted in December 2014 for their roles in various 
shady economic transactions. Within the ÖIAG, serious debates occurred. 
The CEO of the ÖMV was dismissed soon after expanding his mandate. 
Many professional criticisms followed concerning the alleged unfavorable 
privatization conditions—from the standpoint of the state—of Austrian Air-
lines and the Dorotheum Auction House, as well as other companies.
The Reorganization of the ÖIAG in 2015 and the Birth of the ÖBIB
In February 2015, the National Council of the Austrian Parliament 
decided to reform the ÖIAG, and in March 2015, it was reorganized with 
ÖBIB Ltd. (Österreichische Bundes- und Industriebeteiligungen [Aus-
trian State and Industrial Holding Limited]). The main motivation behind 
this action was to reaffirm the ownership and direct control of the state. 
The ÖIAG operated as a form of joint-stock company, so its management 
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made decisions legally free from external instructions, while its successor, 
the ÖBIB, operates as a Ltd., which means that its management needs to 
directly follow its owners’ instructions. At ÖBIB, the state’s ownership’s 
legal mandate was assigned to and executed by the Austrian finance min-
ister. The ÖIAG Supervisory Board’s previous co-option powers and indi-
viduals’ decision-making powers were terminated. The ÖBIB Act made an 
important exception to the general rules of the Ltd. Act: the members of 
the Supervisory Board of the ÖBIB shall not be nominated by the Execu-
tive Directors of the ÖBIB, but shall be nominated by a separate nomina-
tion committee composed of two secretaries of state and two private com-
pany directors (currently Chairman of Andritz AG and Chairman of the 
Supervisory Board of the Vienna Insurance Group). Starting in July 2015, 
Martha Oberndorfer, the former head of the Bundesfinanzagentur (Fed-
eral Fiscal Agency), manages the ÖBIB. The creation and operation of the 
ÖBIB clearly shows that the Austrian State has, once again, succeeded in 
directly managing the companies under its full and partial ownership. (The 
Austrian state possess over 50 percent of shares in the ÖBIB). Following 
the 1985–6 crisis in the state-owned sector, the Austrian authorities tried 
to introduce some parts of the ÖAIG into the stock exchange and reorga-
nize the concern into a composite group for a long time, but all this effort 
was later removed from the agenda. With the new status quo in 2015, it 
became clear that the Austrian state, because of its ownership rights and 
management, tends to define the roadmap and strategies of development 
and implement it via the state’s development policy instruments.9
Special Austrian Characteristics of the Relationship between State-owned 
and Private Companies
The separation of state and private investments—as international standards 
describe—in the Austrian economy, especially in infrastructure, is practi-
cally impossible because they are so interconnected. Major private invest-
ments in infrastructure are implemented by fully and partially state-owned 
companies, but the private sector’s share investment performance is not 
clearly defined. Austria never wanted to discard its public sector, and the 
state, provinces, and municipalities exert major influence on infrastruc-
ture investments. Private companies separated from the public sector still 
9  On the foundation and operation of ÖBIB, see http://www.obib.co.at/.
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maintain a close relationship with the state and, in a functional sense, take 
part in public sector activity. Exclusive private property practically does not 
exist in the Austrian infrastructure sector. For example, although energy 
companies have spread ownership of stock, the state and provinces have 
majority ownership, usually at least 51 percent. The role of state-owned 
companies is dominant in water supply and wastewater treatment. Invest-
ments in transport companies, ICT infrastructure, education, and health-
care are funded mostly by the public sector.10
The transformation of the Austrian public sector is primarily focused 
on increasing performance. On the other hand, they want comply with the 
provisions of the Maastricht Treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact in 
order to improve the financial position of the public sector by outsourcing 
part of its finances.
According to the European System of National Accounts (“Europäi-
sches System Volkwirtschaftlicher Gesamtrechnungen” or ESA 95) stan-
dards, the state may provide private companies with up to 50 percent of 
the total cost of production, while maintaining their classification in private 
sector ratings. The transformation of the electricity market has not led to 
genuine competition. However, in the telecommunications sector, there was 
a spectacular improvement in performance due to improved service quality, 
interconnectivity systems, and price decreases. Railroad development has 
not led to substantial productivity growth or specific cost savings, but the 
high quality of service has further improved through speed, comfort, and 
accessibility, which greatly contribute to the rise in living standards. The 
ESA 95 separates the market producer from the non-market producer by 
the following definition: if more than 50 percent of the cost of production 
comes from market sales (sales, subscription fees, etc.), it is considered to 
be a private company; in less than 50 percent, it is a non-market player.
There are several outsourced companies in the sector of Austrian 
infrastructure. Since its foundation in 1982, the Autobahnen und Schnell-
strassen-Finanzierungs-Aktiengesellschaft (Autobahn and high way 
financing stock corporation; or ASFINAG) has been responsible for the 
construction and maintenance of motorways and expressways. Since 1997, 
it has been fundamentally financed by vignette revenues, and ASFINAG is 
classified as a private sector company.
10  For key structural data on Austrian companies, see: Structural Business Sta-
tistics, https://www.statistik.at/web_en/statistics/Economy/enterprises/structural_
business_statistics/index.html.
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The Österreichische Bundesbahnen (Austrian Federal Railways or 
ÖBB) used to be a public (federal) property (Bundesbetrieb) and it was the 
part of the Austrian fiscal budget until 1993. Since 1993, ÖBB has been 
a concern, and its group members were reclassified as private sector com-
panies according to the national accounts system.
The Communal Supply- and Waste Management Company (Kom-
munale Versorgung- und Entsorgungsbetriebe) was reclassified as a private 
sector company with its own legal identity in 1997.
In 1992, the Federal Property Management Company (Bundesimmo-
biliengesellschaft or BIG) was established as a public company to manage 
federally owned properties, and their maintenance, infrastructure-related 
public investments, and the merchandising of unused properties.
Since 1997, provincial hospitals—Hospital Operations of Federal 
Provinces (Krankenanstaltenbetriebsgesellschaften der Bundesländer)—
have gradually been reclassified in the corporate sector because of the 
modality of financing (clearing system). Consequently, most hospital con-
struction projects and equipment purchases do not appear as public gross 
fixed capital investments. (As a result, the balance of the latter is improved 
as the expenditure side decreases according to accounting principals).
From 2014 onwards, the calculation of national accounts (Volk-
swirtschaftliche Gesamtrechnungen) modify the public and private sector’s 
classification criteria to provide a  clearer and more transparent picture, 
which is required by law.
Holding companies usually are classified as NACE 64s in terms of their 
financial services and are, therefore, not included in the infrastructure group.
The Austrian state, provinces, and municipalities claim some owner-
ship in approximately 3500 companies. Out of those, approximately 140 
function explicitly in the public sector; the rest might be found in the pri-
vate sector. Public ownership occurs in 100 state-owned companies and 
approximately 1850 private companies engaged in infrastructure. Private 
companies that regularly supply at least one public enterprise are consid-
ered to be state-related companies. In total, 91 percent of communal units 
(cities, municipalities) have shares in at least one private company and 
approximately 2200 private companies are considered to be state-related.11
The term “state-related” requires a proper definition, which is not 
easy given that the term is filled with different content from case to case. 
11  Regarding the public sector of the Austrian economy, see www.statistik.tuwien.
ac.at/oezstat/ausg011/papers/franz.doc.
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This concept often means a mixed property, and may mean a majority or 
minority state, or an indirect form of state ownership. State-relatedness 
often occurs when it gains access to public orders and a  connection to 
state development strategies. Through the size, scale, and conditions of 
the development sources share, major public development policy objectives 
are realized. Cross-ownership is also a considerable measure, especially in 
state, provincial, and communal companies’ networks.
The Austrian Steel Giant, voestalpine Plc.
Voestalpine Plc. (voestalpine is the correct spelling of the company since 
2003) was founded in May 1938 as a subsidiary of Reichswerke Aktieng-
esellschaft für Erzbergbau und Eisenhütten “Hermann Göring” Berlin, 
which was founded in 1937 (its full name was Reichswerke Aktiengesell-
schaft für Erzbergbau und Eisenhütten Hermann Göring, Linz). The con-
cern owned two large companies: Eisenwerke Oberdonau GmbH for mili-
tary operations and Stahlbau GmbH (Engineering- und Montagebetrieb), 
which was in charge of the site’s creation and maintenance. They were 
merged with the former Österreichisch-Alpine Montangesellschaft in 1939, 
then Alpine Montan AG continued to operate as Hermann Göring, Linz. 
By 1944, four giant forges had been constructed.12
After World War II, the United States seized the Hermann Göring 
Werke, which was renamed VOEST (Vereinigte Österreichische Eisen- 
und Stahlwerke [United Austrian Iron and Steel Works]) and then Alpine 
Montan AG was spun off from it. The Americans turned over VOEST to 
Austria in July 1946. That same month, VOEST became property of the 
Austrian state under the 1946 nationalization law. Large-scale reconstruc-
tion began in 1947. First the power plant and then the forges and steel pro-
cessing plant were restored, and starting in 1947, a new Siemens-Martin 
oven produced the company’s high-grade steel.
VOEST was the anchor of nationalized industry and one of the main 
pillars of the ÖIAG. VOEST steel had been increasingly utilized for ship 
production, so the company founded its own shipping company, the Ister-
Reederei, which introduced Linzertorin Flensburg in 1958. VOEST also 
12  On the major eras defining Austrian economic history, see Eigner and Helige 
(1999).
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built ships at the Schiffswerft Korneuburg ship factory, including more 
than one hundred passenger ships that were sold to the Soviet Union.
Alpine Montan AG, which was separated from VOEST in 1946, oper-
ated independently for decades, but in 1973, it was facing a deep crisis, 
and as a  result, it remerged with VOEST following a political decision. 
Two other steel companies were also merged with the concern for the same 
reasons, Böhler and Schoeller-Bleckmann. This is how VOEST-Alpine 
AG (as it was spelled in 1973) was established via state planning, deci-
sion making, (re)organization, and financing. In the post-1973 years, the 
Austrian state tried to achieve progress in two areas of the concern. Invest-
ments were financed with state money. More and more investment sup-
port was needed for development. In the technological sense, high quality 
investments have been implemented, however these were not financially 
successful, especially with regard to profitability. This was largely because 
of the widespread European steel crisis of the 1970s, which led to the 
decline of the steel industry throughout Europe. However, the Austrians 
expected that via technological progress and the sale of high quality prod-
ucts they could effectively address the crisis.
The other significant area of state intervention was the extension and 
maintenance of employment in the steel industry. To avoid massive unem-
ployment as much as possible, Austrian public policy and economic policy 
have always paid particular attention to the job creation. The maintenance 
of steel jobs required more and more public support. Since the beginning 
of the 1980s, VOEST-Alpine has been constantly growing on an annual 
basis. In 1985, VOEST faced another deficit of 25 billion Schillings due 
to their loss-producing business manufacturing petroleum products. For 
this reason, in 1985, the concern had to be reorganized and the number of 
employees was reduced in several phases. Ferdinand Lacina, who was min-
ister of finance at the time, dismissed the entire management of VOEST. 
It was a major step in adopting a new law that ended, at least legally, the 
Proporz system, which had allowed the heads of public companies to be 
proportionate to the showing of two major parties, the ÖVP and the SPÖ, 
and thus appointed because of their political affiliation and not their suit-
able economic qualifications. As a result, when leadership positions were 
filled, the governing system and the influence of the governing parties con-
tinued to exist.
In September 1986, a  large-scale sanitation concept was initiated, 
and 9,400 workers were dismissed while state provided more than 21.5 
billion Schillings in subsidies up to 1990. In 1987, the Steel Foundation 
(Stahlstiftung) was introduced to support the reemployment of displaced 
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workers. The ÖIAG Group was largely restructured in 1988–9 and cre-
ated six large holding companies. Four out of the six took over VOEST-
Alpine plants. VOEST-Alpine Stahl Holding assembled all the steel manu-
facturing and processing plants. In 1989, the ÖIAG’s six divisions were 
merged into Industrie- und Beteiligungsverwaltungs GmbH, which was 
the ÖIAG’s possessed subsidiary (100 percent owned), and then restruc-
tured into Austrian Industries AG. A “Going public” bond was issued 
to prepare for an initial public offering. In 1993, a new privatization act 
was adopted, which resulted in the consolidation of the concern into 
three companies, which were partially privatized in 1995. VOEST-Alpine 
Stahl AG was introduced on the Austrian Stock Exchange in 1995. The 
Swedish Uddeholm steel mill was merged with Austrian Böhler. In 1995, 
it was listed on the Austrian Stock Exchange under the name Uddeholm-
Böhler. VOEST-Alpine Industrieanlagenbau was part of the newly 
founded VOEST-Alpine Technologie AG and was acquired by Siemens 
Industrial Solutions and Services in 2005.
VOEST-Alpine’s partial privatization began in 1995. The company 
was restructured into four divisions in 2001: steel, railway systems, motion 
(from 2005, automotive). In 2003 the Austrian government decided on 
full privatization, and the last state share was sold on the stock exchange. 
In 2007, the company decided to acquire the Böhler-Uddeholm steel 
company. The deal took place in three stages, and by 2009, the Böhler-
Uddeholm steel company was purchased by voestalpine.13
After the collapse of the Lehman Brothers on September 15, 2008, 
voestalpine’s orders dropped radically due to the crisis, and its economic 
condition decreased gradually. The concern implemented a comprehen-
sive crisis management strategy, group-wide cuts, and enhanced effec-
tiveness programs were launched. According to the Forbes’s so-called 
“The World’s Biggest Public Companies” list, voestalpine generally ranks 
around 900. Voestalpine recently has intensively turned toward the U.S. 
and China, enlarging its production in both countries. In 2014, the com-
pany invested €50 million ($70 million) for an automotive body parts sub-
sidiary company in Cartersville, Georgia. The company’s largest foreign 
investment was the construction of its reduction facility in Corpus Christi, 
Texas, for which it spent €550 million ($740 million). They are still plan-
ning major projects in China and the U.S. 
13  On the history of voestalpine, see “The history of voestalpine” on their website, 
https://www.voestalpine.com/group/en/group/history/.
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The share capital of voestalpine is currently €307.13 billion, which 
totals the price of 169.05 million shares. The main shareholders are the 
Oberösterreich Invest GmbH and Co. with 15 percent, voestalpine Mitar-
beiterbeteiligung Privatstiftung with 13 percent, Oberbank AG with 5 per-
cent, and the remaining 67 percent of shares belong to small shareholders. 
In 2015, voestalpine employed workers in fifty countries, in more than 
five hundred subsidiaries and locations, totaling more than fifty thousand 
people worldwide. Its revenue was €11.2 billion in 2014. Its main profile 
has changed from steel and raw materials metallurgy to more technolog-
ically-demanding and sophisticated metallurgy technology and industrial 
products.
The Austrian Banking Sector: The Transformation and Interconnectedness 
of Private and State Ownership
Austria has one of Europe’s densest banking networks with more than 
eight hundred financial institutions operating approximately 4,460 
branches. Baron Salomon Meyer von Rotschild funded a bank in Austria 
in 1820, which played a major role in the industrialization of the country, 
including the construction of Nordbahn and the extension of credit to 
Austro-Hungarian nobles. In 1855 under the auspices of the Rotschild 
bank, Meyer’s son funded the so-called Kaiserliche-königliche privilegi-
erte Österreichische Credit-Anstalt für Handel und Gewerbe bank, or the 
Creditandstalt, which was the largest bank during the Dualist period. Its 
biggest competitor was the Länderbank funded by French capital in 1880, 
which separated from its French parent bank to become independent.14
The Anglo-Österreichische Bank was funded in 1864 with English 
capital, which was acquired by the Creditanstalt in 1926. The Allgemeine 
Kaiserliche-königliche privilegierte Boden-Credit-Anstalt was funded in 
1863 with French capital, which got into trouble and was absorbed by the 
Creditanstalt by government decree.
In 1946, the large Austrian banks were nationalized. The Credi-
tanstalt and the Länderbank operated as state-owned banks, which meant 
that a further 15 to 20 percent of the Austrian economy was controlled 
14  A comprehensive picture of Austria banking history providees: Bank Austria 
Creditanstalt (2005): 150 Jahre österreichische Bankengeschichte im zentrum 
Europas. (Bank Austria Creditanstalt (2005): 150 years of Austrian banking his-
tory in the center of Europe).
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by the state. Thereafter, the state directly and indirectly—through actions 
made by the two large banks—controlled more than 40 percent of the 
Austrian economy as an owner. These two large banks were directly state-
owned until the 1980’s, when they privatized through offerings on the 
Austrian stock exchange. Their sale on the stock exchange was a major 
step because the two banks were capitalized, and due to strong perfor-
mance on the stock exchange, they became more solvent and their profits 
increased.
The Creditanstalt-Bankverein, Girozentrale, and the Länderbank were 
Austria’s three largest banks in 1990. Ten years later, in 2000 none of them 
remained as independent institutions. The 1990s was a period defined by 
mergers, acquisitions, major transformations, and privatization. The merger 
of zentralsparkasse and Länderbank in 1990 resulted in the establishment 
of the Bank of Austria. Giro-Credit emerged from the merger of Girozen-
trale and the ÖCI (Österreichisches Credit-Institut) in 1882. In 1997, the 
Bank Austria obtained a majority share in the Creditanstalt. That same 
year, Erste Österreichische Spar-Casse-Bank acquired Giro-Credit, and this 
is how Erste Bank der Österreichischen Sparkassen, or Erste for short, was 
born. In 1998, the Bank Austria bought all remaining shares of the Credi-
tanstalt, and since then, the bank is called Bank Austria Creditanstalt (BA-
CA). The Hypo Vereinsbank (HVB) bought the majority of shares in this 
new bank. However, not much later, the HVB experienced a crisis, and it 
had to sell its shares in BA-CA to ease its burdens. Finally, the HVG was 
acquired by the Italian Unicredit Bank in 2005.
The Raiffeisen Group was originally funded and operated on a coop-
erative basis. In 1978, a new law on loan banks was adopted in Austria, 
which re-regulated the operations, management, and supervision/over-
sight of cooperatives. Due to this law, the number of Raiffeisen branches 
decreased by half. The Raiffeisen zentralbank (RzB) played a major role 
in real estate financing. Under the Raiffeisen International (RI) name, 
a separate subsidiary that operates mostly in the Central and Eastern Euro-
pean region was funded. In 2010, parts of the RzB merged with RI and 
operates under the name Raiffeisen Bank International.
The Austrian Sparkassen (savings banks) also experienced major 
structural transformation. Erste obtained shares in several large Landess-
parkasse. Parallel with this, Erste built a large network of bank branches in 
Central and Eastern Europe. However, the number of Sparkasse branches 
managed by the Austrian provinces decreased to fifty-three. This happened 
through the acquisition of the former Gemeindesparkasse (community 
savings banks). An interesting and important detail is that “communities” 
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were not the actual owners of the Gemeindesparkasse, owners guaranteed 
their operations through warrants and largely without financial collateral.
The legal successor of the zentralsparkasse der Gemeinde Wien was 
also the Bank of Austria, but in 2004, it quit the savings bank business. 
Another large bank, the Bank für Arbeit und Wirtschaft (BAWAG), was 
owned by the ÖGB (Austrian Trade Union Federation) until 2006. It 
was transformed into a public limited liability company in 1997, and was 
partially privatized in 2000. BAWAG and ÖGB maintained their collab-
orative contract with the Austrian Post plc. and Post und Telekom Austria 
plc. The so-called BAWAF scandal, which involved the fraudulent misuse 
of funds, became known in 2005. The ÖGB was forced to sell BAWAG 
to cover its losses. The American fund management company Cerberus 
became the new majority owner. In 2007, Bayerische Landesbank (Bayern 
LB) obtained the majority of the Hypo Group Alpe-Adria shares.
During the financial crisis in 2008–9, banking in Austria took a new 
turn and nationalization began. In 2008, the Austrian state acquired Kom-
munalkredit. Due to a  lack of will and/or financial reserves, Bayerische 
Landesbank was not able to provide capital to the Hypo Group Alpe-
Adria, which consequently was fully nationalized by the state. In 2012, 
another major nationalization took place with the Volksbanken acquisi-
tion, when, after experiencing huge losses, the Austrian state purchased 
43.3 percent. These developments illustrate the Austrian bank sector’s fre-
quent, obligatory, and ad-hoc changes. Austrian finances are stable, but 
the country’s financial institutions change frequently; they are restructured 
in order to maintain and increase available capital. The normative tools of 
banking regulation and banking supervision are now used instead of ad hoc 
intervention. Waves of nationalization—privatization— re-nationalization 
have softened the effects of the constant and parallel reorganizations, sur-
vival struggles, and maneuvers. However, the above patter might actually 
sharpen those effects. (The expression durchwursteln, “to muddle through,” 
illustrates this situation).
The Impact of the State, the State Sector, and the Economic Policy on 
Companies
To analyze the nature of the Austrian market economy, it is very important 
to keep in mind that among western European countries, the proportion 
of fully and partially state-owned or indirectly controlled companies in the 
economy is the largest in Austria. Even after the end of the Monarchy, the 
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two largest Austrian banks, the Creditanstalt and the Länderbank operated 
under state ownership. After World War II and for much of the second half 
of the twentieth century, the situation largely remained the same. Those two 
banks represented a significant share of state ownership both in industry 
and infrastructure. The rate fluctuated around 20 percent. The state totally 
disposed of over two-fifths of Austrian capital stock through direct owner-
ship and indirectly through the control of state-owned banks.15
The nationalization act passed in July 1946 and the nationalizations 
that followed signaled, on the one hand, the country’s sovereignty. On 
the other hand, they showed the active role of the state in rebuilding the 
country. Nationalizations ensured the control and the direction of recon-
struction, but in legal terms, according to the Potsdam Treaty, the majority 
of the seventy largest companies came under the direction of the Allied 
occupation powers, and only reverted to Austria after the Austrian State 
Treaty in 1955.
Austria pragmatically repurchased the Schwechat Oil Refinery from 
the Soviet Union, and Austria paid for chemical product shipments for 
many years. During the 1950s and 1960s, essentially all of the largest com-
panies were owned by the state or were under state control in every major 
sector excluding hospitality and tourism.
The pillars of the banking sector were the nationalized Creditanstalt-
Bankverein and the Länderbank; in the mining industry, the largest com-
pany was Alpine, in the chemical industry, it was the successor of the 
Österreichische Stickstoffwerke from Linz, Chemie Linz; in the steel 
industry, VOEST; in the oil industry, the Schwechat Oil Refinery; and all 
the key companies involved in energy production were state owned. The 
state’s development and investment policy were implemented directly 
through the state-owned commercial banks’ financing, and borrowing on 
investments was adjusted to the expectations of the state.
State ownership was dominant in the most capital intensive indus-
tries with slow return rates, but the evolution of the production chain and 
the direction in which it moved was formed according to the goals of the 
Austrian state’s industrial policy. The dominance of state ownership in 
the second half of the twentieth century was decisive in the iron and steel 
industry, oil and gas drilling and refineries, and in the chemical industry. 
Austrian private equity was relatively widely distributed. Regarding levels 
15  For more information on the interconnectedness of the economic policy and 
policy with changes in the role of the state, see Sandgruber (1995).
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of accumulated capital stock, fully or partially state-owned large companies 
dominated small and medium private companies.
By the 1970’s, the Austrian state sector’s roles and functions had been 
transformed. Activities like restructuring, widening product ranges, and 
modernizing technological investment took place in order to maintain the 
viability of Austrian iron, steel, and chemical industries, which were strug-
gling. Besides structural and management changes, the state’s economic 
policy focused on achieving and maintaining high levels of employment.
From the 1960s, major concentration and centralization were exe-
cuted in the state sector. The “Re-concentration Act” was adopted in 
1960, which in most cases led to the reunification of companies that had 
previously been part of a single giant company that had been broken apart. 
Due to the concentration process, the new companies were more capital 
intensive and moved closer to the sizes of other western European com-
panies. State-owned companies’ organizational systems and operational 
conditions had been gradually transformed during the 1960s and 1970s. 
The main goal of the changes was that state-owned companies should be 
as profitable as privately-owned businesses. However, a fundamental dif-
ference remained: in state-owned companies, economic policy was imple-
mented more directly, and the investment decisions and financial supports 
influenced the operation of this sector and especially its investments.
A special Austrian-Keynesianism characterized Austrian economic 
policy in the decades after World War II, and after several modifications, 
it still does today. In effect, Austria implements the mechanisms and pre-
scriptions of Keynesian economic policy in a certain, constantly adaptive 
way. State orders, financial supports/subsidies, investment stimulations, 
and fiscal policies play a  special role in Austrian economic policy. Fol-
lowing government decisions, advantageous credits and investment sup-
ports are the key actors in credit policy. Contrary to the Keynesian model, 
regulation of the money supply had never been a top priority. In that sense, 
Austria substantially differs from Germany. Instead of the magical quad-
rangle, which is present in German economic policy, in Austria there is 
a magical pentagon. Austria tries to achieve its goals by adding a fifth ele-
ment: the fair distribution of income, to the priorities of the quadrangle, 
that is: financial stability, economic growth, high levels of employment, 
and balanced foreign trade accounts. Maintaining high employment was 
a priority during the crisis of 1974–5, in the period of structural transfor-
mation, and also in the management of the 2008-9 crisis. In times of crises 
and recession threats, the Austrian antidote was an expansive fiscal policy, 
and until 2002, the state was also especially focused on the stability of the 
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national currency. The Austrian Schilling rate was fixed to the Deutsch 
Mark, which was stable between 1973 and 2002 (1 DM = 7.04 ATS).16
An important characteristic of Austrian economic policy is its employ-
ment-oriented structural policy, which was announced in the 1970s. They 
simultaneously tried to save jobs and enforce the consequences of the 
structural alignment. Austrian-Keynesianism transformed over time, but 
since the 1980s it has waned in popularity. During consolidation, there 
were pressures to implement a “globally restrictive, but selectively expan-
sive” economic policy. Companies could have expected state supports 
if they could accomplish any of or exceeded the state’s goals regarding 
employment, structural policy, and foreign trade. Following accession to 
the European Union in 1995, FDI inflow increased because non-Austrian 
EU companies also applied for state supports if they, like Austrian compa-
nies, accomplished the above mentioned policy aims. Austrian economic 
policy and the state’s grant system is quite sophisticated in terms of the 
conditions it places on companies.
The maintenance of the low-level inflation and unemployment at the 
same major restricting took place time remains undoubtedly the great suc-
cess of the Austrian state’s economic policy. It is also important to empha-
size the well-functioning social partnership (Soziale Partnerschaft) and 
the effective parity committee system. I do not address macroeconomic 
questions concerning the social partnership, I only highlight that the social 
partnership’s core is the price and wage issues parity committee, which by 
analyzing the evolution of the prices has also made a major contribution to 
companies’ price policy implementation. Aligned with wage policy agree-
ments, this system has provided firms with a higher level of security and 
stability for decades, including today. Regarding price implementation, the 
parity committee’s influence decreased due to Austria’s EU membership, 
because in the single internal market, there is a high level of balancing.
Austria’s Relationship with the European Union
Austria has experienced a high level of economic integration and cooper-
ation with the European Union and transnational large companies, and 
this has had a significant impact on Austrian economic policy. Established 
16  On the nature of the Austrian-Keynesianism economic policy, see Schulmeister 
(2005) and Richter and Székffy (1987).
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ownership, production, and sales relationships have majorly influenced the 
nexus between the state and private companies, especially through Aus-
tria’s close market connection with the German economy, the presence of 
German large corporations in Austria, and Germany’s role in the Austrian 
economy. I will briefly summarize this relationship below.
For decades, Austria and Germany have maintained very close eco-
nomic and trade cooperation. Since Austria became a member of the Euro-
pean Union in January 1995, this relationship has further strengthened over 
the past twenty-one years. Approximately 68 percent of its imports are from 
the EU and the 66 percent of its exports’ are sold within the EU. (Only 7 
percent of Austria’s imports come from EFTA countries and 9 percent of its 
exports head to these states.) The country’s largest foreign trade and cooper-
ation partner is Germany. Around 40 percent of Austrian exports are deliv-
ered to Germany, and 43 percent of Austria’s imports come from Germany. 
Approximately 70 percent of the economy depends heavily on German ship-
ments and orders. Austria has traditionally carried a deficit in its foreign 
trade with its largest partner, Germany, and with the EU. The consolidated 
balance of Austrian foreign trade also regularly shows a deficit.17
Austria’s economic concentration on the EU market is multifaceted. 
In addition to commercial and capital relations, research and development, 
technical imports, tourism, and transportation and transit-related ship-
ments are also significant.
One-third of Austrian industry is foreign-owned. Germany is the main 
source of foreign capital holdings, technology, and also know-how. Of 
the former EFTA countries, Austria is the second largest foreign trading 
partner in the EU after Switzerland. Austrian working-capital exporters 
increasingly focus on the European Union.
The decisive economic factors that shaped Austria’s EU accession 
were mergers in the real economy, its foreign trade and capital relations, 
its technical development impulses, tourism, transportation and shipping, 
and the transformation of its currency and banking. The political aspects 
of Austria’s alignment with German currency and exchange rate policies, 
and later the EMU’s monetary and interest rate policy, played a  stimu-
lating role. There were a number of important arguments in favor of acces-
sion. Joining the EU offered promising opportunities for Austria’s political 
engagement on the continent, because its policy of neutrality has lost its 
17  On the Austrian foreign trade and inward and outward direct investments, see: 
https://www.oenb.at/Statistik/Standardisierte-Tabellen/auszenwirtschaft.
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usefulness following the disappearance of the East-West conflict. Further-
more, economic growth and prosperity are much more secure within the 
EU than outside of it. A small, developed country can substantially benefit 
from one large integrated market, while staying out would have disadvan-
taged Austria by making them less competitive.18
Austria has high levels of economic openness, dependence on foreign 
trade, and concentration with respect to the German and other EU mar-
kets. Per capita export value in Austria is about $6,500, which is more than 
three times larger than that of Japan. 
EU accession has provided a major stimulus to the modernization of 
Austria’s economic structure and institutional system. The state’s eco-
nomic interventions have decreased due to the adoption of EU rules, and 
in many sectors of the economy, a number of state-public quasi-monopo-
listic positions have been eliminated.19
In agriculture, despite some adaptation burdens, overall, there have 
been positive effects. The prices of food products have fallen by about 14 
percent as a whole due to accession. About 200,000 Austrian employees 
work in EU countries, and are treated as equals in their respective local 
workforces.
Austrian companies enjoy anti-discrimination protections when they 
apply for investments within the EU. However, around 90 percent of state-
public investments in the EU go to domestic companies, and the market 
for state orders remains national even today.
Regarding transportation and environmental policy, it is clear that 
effective solutions are impossible within a national framework. However, 
EU-level coordination over the past twenty years has not led to the genuine 
internationalization of these challenges.
Economic Policy and the Adaptation of the Economic Structure
Staying within in the framework of this study of Austrian economic policy 
and its structural adjustments, I  will explain the characteristics of the 
Austrian economic policy-making process and describe how the Austrian 
18  Breuss (2010) has analyzed the main effects of Austria’s EU accession for the 
period from 1995 to 2010.
19  Foreign affiliates of Austrian companies: main results by economic activity (2016) 
http://www.statistik.at/web_de/statistiken/wirtschaft/unternehmen_arbeitsstaetten/
auslandsunternehmenseinheiten/index.html.
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decision-making process differs from other EU member states. Then I will 
review the impact of Austrian industrial policy, and briefly summarize site-
level development factors and the effects of the corporate sector’s response. 
I will show that as companies adapt, some of them focus on marketing and 
sales cooperation, while in other cases, the formation of strategic packages 
(clusters) plays an important role.
Austrian economic policy is defined by a number of characteristics: 
the highest priority is achieving full employment, even if monetary sta-
bilization policy (fiscal consolidation, a  hard currency course) appears 
to occupy this primary position. Stabilization policy is only one tool for 
achieving employment targets. In order to ensure long-term competitive-
ness (and employment), all tasks are subordinated to urgent budgetary 
problems. In principle, the growth, stability, and cohesion targets are 
complementary. However, the preparations for an economic and finan-
cial union (EMU) have led to the prioritization of stabilization over full 
employment.20
The EU exercises the most significant influence on the Austrian 
budget. Unlike monetary and currency policy, fiscal policy is not linked 
to EMU, however, the Maastricht criteria must be met. Austria’s budget 
deficit resulted from an economic recession and structural problems. Only 
through the pressure exerted by EU membership and the EMU did fiscal 
discipline increase to such an extent that fiscal consolidation could no 
longer be postponed.
Creating a long-term competitive advantage by employing a traditional 
(direct benefits to domestic companies) industrial policy is no longer pos-
sible. In order to strengthen the national economy, horizontal measures 
have been implemented over the past twenty years. This includes every-
thing that improves human capital, promotes research and development, 
modernizes financial infrastructure, makes the commodity and labor 
market more flexible, and increases the attractiveness of the economic area 
through the deregulation of legal and administrative procedures. Favorable 
legal and fiscal environments and better material and intellectual infra-
structure leads to an increasingly competitive site. In Austria in particular, 
this led to a necessary reevaluation of the various economic supports, orga-
nizational systems, legal pricing instruments, and the privatization goals 
and income policies at both the federal and provincial level. Despite its 
high level of development, EU accession put a great deal of pressure on 
20  Economic Policy in Austria: https://english.bmf.gv.at/budget-economic-policy.
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Austria to adapt the country’s economic policies, so substantial adjust-
ments have been made over the past two decades. 
The sector that experienced perhaps the most painful adjustment 
was agriculture. In Austria, the structure and extent of subsidization of 
this sector is much higher and different than in the European Union as 
a whole. The Austrian system of guaranteed purchase prices had to be 
changed, and the EU’s common agricultural policy had to be imple-
mented. The main result has been that the rate of income supports 
have increased, while the rate of the set-price purchases of products has 
decreased. The importation of cheaper EU agricultural products has 
increased competition on the market, and food prices have decreased. 
Small agricultural entities’ position has deteriorated, while larger agricul-
tural concerns have grown and expanded their exports to the EU.
The adaptation process in the industrial sector has also created sev-
eral specific problems. In Austrian industry, raw material processing and 
production was strongly subsidized by the state. For decades, the Austrian 
state focused on strengthening the supply base of domestic manufacturing, 
but it was costly and challenging. Following EU accession, Austria was 
forced to give up its subsidization policy in mineral production and coal 
mining, as well as the traditional state monopoly of salt mining. Import 
restrictions on brown coal also had to be abolished. As a result, imports 
of raw materials have grown and their prices have decreased. Because 
of German capital, acquisitions, and restructuring, the Austrian mining 
industry is exposed to German interests.
The current Austrian energy system is regulated, and depends on 
the close relationship between suppliers and users. Large consumers 
(an annual consumption of 100 gigawatts or more) are free to choose 
their energy supplier partner. The state was forced to relinquish its sales 
monopoly on fuel, and the prohibition of nuclear power production 
remained in effect.
Before accession, the construction industry enjoyed strong, de facto 
national protections. Austrian and German cement factories were barely 
present in each other’s markets. Over the past twenty years, this situation 
has changed significantly, and a mutual interconnection has evolved. Aus-
trian building materials were more expensive than the EU average, but 
prices for construction were much lower. Austrian construction companies 
are effectively involved in the EU’s public procurement market. Most Aus-
trian bridge and road construction firms are internationally competitive. 
However, with the creation of the European Economic Area, the Austrian 
public procurement markets had to be opened up to foreign companies.
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The Austrian automobile market is based on imports. Over the 
past twenty years, the market for cars manufactured in the EU has 
expanded, as prices for cars decreased. By adopting the EU’s external 
customs duties, the price of Japanese cars has increased. Former gen-
eral importers’ rights have ceased to exist, and competition in the EU 
automobile market has become more intense. An important rule is that 
a car license issued in any EU country is valid everywhere. The Austrian 
state subsidization of foreign-owned sites in Austria is hotly debated. 
The Austrian state paid one-third of the investment costs of the Amer-
ican Chrysler site in Graz. The EU insisted on reducing the subsidy rate 
below 20 percent. The only solution was that U.S. and Austrian private 
investors (Steyr) raised their capital investments and reduced the state’s 
share to the desired level.
There are two major effects in the electronics industry. In the EU, 
Austrian companies that produce electronic equipment can use external 
imports without authentication certificates (as well as producers in other 
industries), thus making it possible to include cheaper Southeast Asian 
inputs into export-oriented products. With the significant reduction of 
external tariffs on electronic products, the competition in the electronic 
products market has increased substantially.
Strengthening competitiveness requires national economic policy, 
regional development, and corporate strategic measures. Austrian eco-
nomic policy is very successful in achieving required macroeconomic and 
financial indicators, but fails to provide the necessary framework for con-
tinuous structural change and a favorable economic climate.
Austria was forced dismantle its former direct subsidies of industry, 
individual project supports, and transport cost supports when it joined the 
EU. The role of the state in the creation of individual mega projects and in 
the case-by-case subsidization of foreign investors could not go unchanged. 
The main direction of the change was that individual and case-by-case 
subsidies had to be replaced by a regional development policy, and direct 
job-creation subsidies had to be replaced by normative systems of general 
labor market incentives.
A relatively strong intra-industrial division of labor characterizes 
Austrian foreign trade. The Grubel-Lloyd coefficient (the ratio of intra-
industry foreign trade to total foreign trade) is 69 percent for the total 
foreign trade of Austria and 68 percent for its foreign trade with the EU. 
In comparison with other EU-15 countries, this proportion is higher in 
France (83 percent), Belgium, Great Britain, Germany and the Nether-
Szanyi - 00 könyv.indb   124 2019.11.15.   9:32
125The Relationship between State and Private Enterprise
lands (76–77 percent). The value of other countries in the index is lower 
than that of Austria.21
The sectors that are highly exposed to external competition and are 
sensitive to competition have a major impact on the Austrian economy as 
a whole. Those sectors are: iron and steel production, the fine ceramics 
industry, chemical raw materials, fertilizer manufacturing, pharmaceu-
ticals, other chemical products, automotive rubber manufacturing, most 
of the agriculture and food industry, the shoe industry, the textile and 
clothing industry, the paper and printing industry, office machines manu-
facturing, agricultural machinery manufacturing, shipbuilding, railway car 
manufacturing, the sports and toy industry, and the manufacture of elec-
trical household appliances.
Companies in these sectors are forced to permanently adapt to recent 
market actions. The facilitation of this adaptation pressure might explain 
many major Austrian industrial policy interventions.
According to critics of the Austrian industrial policy strategy, between 
2010 and 2020, a  further major restructuring of subsidies is necessary. 
Former corporate supports should be replaced by site development. Com-
petition policy will have a greater role in increasing competition. Competi-
tion pressures will be particularly strengthened in sensitive sectors. This 
trend is also enhanced by the wave of corporate mergers in the EU, which 
also significantly affects Austria.22
The improvement of site conditions will be a future key factor in the 
realization of structural transformation investments and in attracting cap-
ital and job creation. This requires a new concept and strategy in relevant 
sub-policies. At the core of those Austrian economic policies there will be 
infrastructure programs, communal investments to improve some regional 
sites, research and development subsidies, and state-sponsored public and 
infrastructure services. Although the direction of these strategies seems to 
correct, it might be criticized for the lack of concretization of the above-
mentioned goals. Concretization and implementation of Austrian eco-
nomic policy requires much effort over the next decades.
21  Österreichs Wirtschaft im Überblick. Die österreichische Wirtschaft und ihre 
internationale Position 2014/2015, Statistik Austria, Wien.
22  For details on Austrian start-ups and liquidations, see https://www.statistik.at/
web_en/statistics/Economy/enterprises/business_demography_since_2015/index.
html.
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The success of Austrian adaptation, its external trade performance, 
and the improvement of its competitiveness depend mainly on the corpo-
rate sector’s reaction to changes. Some companies seek to improve their 
position through marketing and sales cooperation. For example, some 
companies cooperate to sell their products and services because without 
this relationship, it would cost much more and would be less efficient to 
manage an individual sales strategy. However, these same companies can 
separately focus their corporate development strategies and capital invest-
ments on production.
Another group of Austrian companies form strategic packages (clus-
ters) to streamline to production chain of products. The user prefers 
complex solutions to problems. For example, telecommunications equip-
ment manufacturers cooperate with the manufacturers of control systems 
and measuring instruments, as well as investors and software engineers. 
This road promises to increase competitiveness in several areas. However, 
it should be noted that this is not recommended way for companies to 
operate, especially those that are deeply embedded in local markets and 
lack special competitive know-how.23
One segment of Austria’s problematic industrial sectors produces 
solely for domestic markets with significant foreign capital. These include 
the electrical industry, the chemical industry, the textile industry, and the 
food industry. Subsidiaries operating in these sectors have already estab-
lished their sales and purchasing relations with foreign partners, often with 
their EU counterparts, and consider their Austrian market position to be 
internationally significant. That Austrian subsidiaries often cannot mean-
ingfully influence the development strategy of their foreign mother com-
panies is a serious disadvantage. Regarding the electrical industry, the high 
foreign capital ratio limits the formulation and implementation of domestic 
industrial strategy.
This survey of Austrian economic policy as it has changed and 
adapted over time, has led us to further investigate Austria’s status as 
a production site and the position of the country and Austrian companies 
on the EU market?
23  Wissensfabrik—Unternehmen für Österreich https://www.wissensfabrik.at/
DieWissensfabrik.
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Austria as a Production Site: The Position(s) of the Austrian Economy in 
the European Union
Austria’s economic policy regarding European politics assumes that 
without the EU, Austria would not be “the second Switzerland,” but an 
economic dwarf. The country lagged far behind Switzerland in terms of 
development, export, and competitiveness indicators before EU accession 
in 1995, but since then, Austria has been steadily catching up. Since EU 
membership, the Austrian economy has grown by about 2 percent annu-
ally, which is a  faster pace of growth than in Germany and Switzerland. 
This was largely due to EU integration. Nearly one-third (.06 percent) 
of Austria’s 2 percent annual growth rate is due to EU membership. The 
financial impact of integration is also positive; every Austrian citizen gains 
€800 annually from EU participation, which is roughly the cost of a nice 
dinner out every month. In the long run, Austria has developed better than 
Switzerland, has achieved higher growth rates and greater increases in 
employment rates.24
Competition on the labor market has increased significantly over 
the past twenty years. Due to the concept of the free movement of per-
sons, the number of foreign workers and foreign students has substantially 
increased in Austria. Labor costs did not increase as a result of integration, 
and in some professions, the competitiveness of East-Central European 
workers even intensified. Austrian job creation strategies, in large part, 
generated 12,600 new jobs annually due to integration. However, trends 
in the Austrian labor market are mainly influenced by the automation of 
industrial production and the rapid spread of imports from Asia. Better-
educated Austrian workers, however, are in a better position in both the 
national and international labor markets. Austrian productivity levels are 
the fourth highest in the EU following Luxemburg, Ireland, and Belgium. 
The number of those self-employed is significant; in 2012, it was 483,000 
people. Employment in Austria between 2009 and 2013 increased by 4 
percent, while in the rest of the EU, it decreased on average. The prof-
itability of employment is facilitated by the fact that unit labor costs in 
2012 were below 2000 levels. Profitability is mainly achieved by increasing 
output through higher productivity. (With the exception of Luxemburg 
24  Kőrösi (2013 and 2015) analyzes the position of the Austrian economy in the 
European Union and the characteristics of Austrian development policy.
Szanyi - 00 könyv.indb   127 2019.11.15.   9:32
128 ISTVÁN KőRÖSI
and the Scandinavian countries, this is exceptionally remarkable among 
EU countries.) Real wages constantly increased until 2009, but decreased 
in 2010 and 2011 by 0.6 and 1.2 percent respectively, which had not 
occurred in Austria for decades. Then, in 2012 and 2013, real wages per 
capita stagnated.25
As a production site Austria has become more competitive, and its 
regional development has accelerated. The share of fixed capital invest-
ments is 21 to 23 percent of the annual GDP. There is generally a higher 
investment rate in Austria than in the EU, and especially in the EU-27, 
where it is not more than 18 percent on average. The opening of the 
internal market has strengthened competition. At the same time, competi-
tiveness was increased through the use of EU funds. Research and develop-
ment expenditures from abroad have increased from €190 million in 1995 
to €1.13 billion in 2012, mainly due to the country’s participation in the 
research and development framework of EU programs and due to activi-
ties of large EU—mainly German—companies in Austria. The catching 
up process is the most remarkable in Burgenland and Lower Austria (Nie-
derösterreich). Lower Austria received three times more money than it 
paid into the budget due EU supports for border regions. The introduc-
tion of the Euro also strengthened the Austrian economy. Having been 
a  member of the European Monetary Union for sixteen years, Austria 
has not had to fear the exchange rate fluctuations of its competitors. The 
Austrian range of goods has continued to expand and price competition 
has also increased. A number of durable consumer goods have become 
cheaper over the past fifteen years in Austria, where the prices on washing 
machines, electronics, and computers have declined even in nominal 
terms. Without EU membership, the Austrian annual inflation rate would 
have been 1 percent higher annually.
The free movement of goods and persons has increased intra-EU 
trade and services. The opening of the Austrian border due to EU mem-
bership has saved costs and additional benefits of €4.2 billion annually. 
By 2012, the value of exported goods per capita increased to €15,400 and 
the value of imported goods increased to €16,500.26 The Austrian com-
modities market opened more to foreigners and Austrians in foreign coun-
25  Regarding the labor market data used here, see Arbeitsmarkt, http://www.statistik.
at/web_de/statistiken/menschen_und_gesellschaft/arbeitsmarkt/index.html.
26  For the source of Austrian foreign trade data, see Österreichische Nationalbank 
https://www.oenb.at/Statistik/Standardisierte-Tabellen/auszenwirtschaft/
Auszenhandel/auszenhandel.html.
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tries. Austrian FDI abroad increased to €153.56 billion in 2012, while 
FDI in Austria amounted to €118.30 billion, making the country a net-
FDI exporter.27 These processes led to a major internationalization of the 
Austrian economy. Austrian industry has benefitted significantly from the 
introduction of European norms and also from the full or partial standard-
ization of those norms.
Austrian companies benefited from their competitive advantages in the 
domestic and EU markets. Currently, approximately 70 percent of Austrian 
exports go to other EU countries. Between 1995 and 2013, Austrian exports 
to the EU tripled. Most export growth has been the result of the positive 
effects of Central European systemic changes. Consequently, since 1989, the 
Austrian economy has been growing faster than the EU-15 average.
Austria did not play an important role in the origin of the European 
financial crisis. The European financial crisis would have occurred without 
the Euro due to financial imbalances. The introduction of the Euro meant 
much cheaper lending terms for Mediterranean countries, and these coun-
tries did take on some irresponsible debt. However, large Western Euro-
pean banks mismanaged lending (mainly French and German banks that 
provided credits to Greece). Austria went through the Eurozone crisis 
more smoothly; the external shock in the previous Schilling regime might 
had been more severe.28
Austrian capital investments grew considerably from 1995 until the 
crisis, primarily due to the activities of Austrian banks in Central and 
Eastern Europe. Until the crisis, more than €300 billion of capital invest-
ment was made in Central Europe, reaching more than 110 percent of 
Austrian GDP. At present (in 2019) the share of Austrian invested capital 
in foreign countries is higher than 140 percent of GDP. On the one hand, 
this demonstrates the strength and the capitalization of the Austrian finan-
cial sector, but on the other, it majorly exposes the country because of the 
risks associated with repayment.
Without EMU membership, international credit rating agencies might 
have downgraded Austria’s creditworthiness due to the absence of coopera-
tion. For Austria, the integrated capital market has a lower cost. Austrian 
financial policy and its professional role in EMU fit well in the country’s 
European policy, and it has been relatively successful in the aftermath of 
27  For more information on the flow of Austrian foreign direct investment, see https://
www.oenb.at/en/Statistics/Standardized-Tables/external-sector/foreign-direct-
investment.html.
28  Kőrösi (2009) has analyzed the impact of the 2008–2009 crisis on Austria.
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the crisis. However, Austrian European policy’s communications strategy 
is not very professional, particularly regarding financial policy, where the 
majority of media outlets provide tabloid and sensational press on economic 
problems. Most Austrian citizens are barely involved in financial matters, 
especially their deeper contexts. The Austrian state failed to adequately 
communicate the complexity and background of its strategy to the public.
Research and development and tourism are among the sectors in 
which the country has achieved significant benefits due to European inte-
gration. The share of research and development in the broader economy 
has doubled since 1995. Every year, more than 800,000 tourists travel to 
Austria from the Visegrád countries alone, and spend over € 250 million 
annually year, which support 70,000 jobs.
The full impact of the benefits of EU membership over the last 20 
years can be found in the additional growth results, the potential growth-
enhancement effect, increased research and development efficiency, and 
increased consumption, which is due to prosperity and increased tax 
revenue.29
Summary and Conclusions
In Austria, the state’s role in ownership, economic development, and redis-
tribution is very important. Public expenditures add up to more than 50 
percent of GDP, which makes Austria sixth in the EU rankings. Already 
prior to 1938, a  large public sector emerged, representing around one-
fifth of the production value of the Austrian economy. The Nationaliza-
tion Act of July 1946 focused on avoiding the expropriation of “German-
owned” companies by the Allies. Ownership, control and supervision are 
key aspects of the steel industry, heavy industry, and oil production and 
refinery, and these are also crucial for maintaining the full or part state-
ownership and strategic control of the banking system.
In this paper, I presented the historical milestones of the transforma-
tion of Austrian state property, state and private business relations, and 
the waves of privatization. In the spring of 2015, ÖBIB (Österreichische 
Bundes- und Industriebeteiligungen) was established as a  limited trade 
company that controls Austrian federal and industrial shares. By estab-
29  On the Austrian economic position and its European policy, see Kőrösi (2013) 
and Kőrösi (2015).
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lishing the ÖBIB, the Austrian state once again put full and partially 
owned companies under direct state control. The Austrian state, prov-
inces, and municipalities have ownership stakes in over approximately 
3,500 companies, in particular in infrastructure and public services. 
Through developments in the operation, ownership, and management 
of voestalpine, an Austrian steel company, the transformation of motiva-
tions for state intervention is well illustrated. Based on the ownership and 
regulation of the Austrian banking sector, it is also clear that the goal was 
to ensure the state’s strategic control role and to implement the state’s 
strategy through investment and capital allocation.
Austrian economic policy is commonly characterized by an “employ-
ment-oriented structural policy,” which has led to major industrial policy 
interventions. Significant transformations have occurred in the economic 
policy of Austria during the period between 2010 and 2015, and the main 
direction of those transformations was the replacement previous corpo-
rate subsidies with complex aspects of site development. By improving site 
conditions, comprehensive efforts were made in order to promote invest-
ment incentives, lending with favorable interest rates, and job creation all 
at once. The overall ownership share of the Austrian government is about 
20 percent, but through the partly state-owned banking system, there is 
additional indirect state influence in the economy.
The waves of centralization-decentralization-recentralization show that 
the symbiosis of the state and the market was characterized by the special 
amalgamation and concentration of Austrian-Keynesianism and pragma-
tism. This concentration appears in complex ownership, part-ownership, 
investment relationships, and profit sharing, and this makes analysis of this 
symbiosis particularly difficult. Mainly through flexible conflict manage-
ment in the Austrian economy, this symbiosis has proved to be efficient 
during constant transformations and adaptations over the past decades.
An important factor in Austrian economic stability is the exceptionally 
high proportion of family businesses. More than 95 percent of all Austrian 
private companies are family businesses. The majority of those companies 
operate in tourism, hospitality, and local services, which plays a vital role in 
the utilization of local factors and the stability of employment.
The economic operations of the large corporate and banking sectors 
under state and mixed ownership have long been associated with politics. 
For decades, the main characteristic of the Proporz system was the pro-
portional division of appointees to boards of directors and supervisory 
boards between the two large parties, the Austrian People’s Party (ÖVP) 
and the Austrian Socialist Party (SPÖ) on the basis of their performance 
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in elections. The two parties’ coalition ceased to exist in 2017 due to their 
fundamentally conflicting views. A  new situation has evolved since the 
2017 elections. The Austrian People’s Party and the Austrian Freedom 
Party (FPÖ) organized a new government with Sebastian Kurz as Prime 
Minister. The Austrian Socialist Party went into opposition. The main 
emphasis of Kurz’s government is on two basic issues, which he explicitly 
promotes as vital for the Austrian economy and society: tax reduction and 
the suppression of illegal immigration.
The Kurz government prepared a detailed, 182 page program for the 
2017–2022 period based on the shared views of ÖVP and FPÖ. The Kurz 
program mirrors a definite shift in both parties’ preferences and a policy 
trend that supports entrepreneurship prevailed. Specific preference is given 
to the reduction of the central state redistribution share. The total tax- and 
contribution rate should be reduced from 45–50 percent (the level between 
2010 and 2017) to 40 percent in the long term. This reduction should be 
achieved mainly through corporate tax reductions. Currently, Austrian cor-
porate tax rates are higher than in any of the neighboring countries except 
Italy. The tax reform plan intends to change this situation by altering the 
tax structure through the reduction of corporate taxes and wage-related 
contributions so as to improve the corporate sector’s position. The goal 
is to enhance corporate competitiveness mainly through a  reduction of 
the corporate income tax rate. Tourism is supported through lower taxes 
paid after accommodations are provided. The VAT (Mehrwertsteuer) is 
applied to all online purchases from extra-EU countries and is strictly con-
trolled. Also, there will be stricter monitoring of multinational companies’ 
taxes. All companies should pay taxes on activities carried out in Austria. 
Pre-tax income transfers abroad are to be curtailed. The applicability of 
this measure is questionable considering the EU principle of free capital 
movement and income transfers through multinational corporations’ 
transfer pricing practices.
The government program also prioritizes support for investment 
activity, corporate financing, and the development of capital markets. This 
means increasing the influence of venture capital and investments that pro-
mote corporate expansion and the extension of credit guarantees for the 
corporate sector. 
Bolstering Austrian firms’ competitiveness is expected in three main 
areas: 1) an increase in large companies’ exports based on improvements in 
productivity and labor market changes that favor companies over workers. 
Further, state support is provided for the establishment of new research-
intensive jobs and job training programs. 2. Maintaining the stability of 
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family businesses and the improvement of their income-generating poten-
tial. Income from tourism and hospitality, as well as sales of local products 
and services should increase. Related taxes will be reduced, and a higher 
share of promotional costs will be deductible from income generated 
through tourism while state-sponsored promotional costs will increase. 
3. The development of a special knowledge-generating sector will be pro-
moted mainly through SMEs in the ICT sector.
The main priorities of development policy in the state-owned sector 
are incorporated in environmental protections and climate and energy 
strategy. By 2030, all of the Austrian electrical energy supply is to be based 
on renewable energy. The achievement of this goal is realistic given that 70 
percent of the electricity supply in Austria is already provided by renew-
able sources, mainly hydroelectric power stations. The share of renewable 
energy in the total energy supply was 33 percent in 2018. The develop-
ment of traffic and transport infrastructure is also prioritized. Research and 
development in this sector will be carried out by the state. Maintenance 
and operation costs will be covered using current revenues. The associ-
ated services should, however, be provided by market-oriented agents. The 
development of railways is financed by the state, and losses from personal 
travel are covered through cross financing with cargo transport profits. 
Stations’ shops are given to concessions through tenders oriented toward 
profit maximization. 
As is seen in the program’s targets, the state intends to strengthen 
business support policies. But at the same time, the government would 
like to maintain or increase its popularity by promoting its achievements in 
welfare. This maneuvering (Durchwursteln) is a lot more difficult today than 
it was previously.
Austria intends to simultaneously maintain the social welfare achieve-
ments of the social market economy and increase corporate competitive-
ness. The difficulties of this policy have become increasingly evident over 
the past few years (2013 to 2018). Compared to Germany, three main 
problems in the performance of the Austrian economy worth highlighting 
are: first, Austria’s rate of economic growth did not reach that of Germany 
between 2013 and 2018, although it used to surpass it. Second, unem-
ployment used to be traditionally lower than in Germany, but it rose in 
2018 (5.5 percent in Austria and 3.6 percent in Germany in summer 2018 
according to Eurostat data). Third, state debt surpassed 80 percent during 
the mid-2010s, and in 2018, it is still much higher than state debt in Hun-
gary or Germany, which is a reversal of earlier patterns.
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To conclude, Austria has a special position in the Varieties of Capi-
talism literature. Austro-Keynesianism was based on consolidation begin-
ning in the early 1950s and was most effective from 1955 to the 1973 
crisis. Austro-Keynesianism failed several times during crises, as shown 
in the analysis of crisis management. Therefore it cannot be treated as 
a panacea. However, pragmatic economic policy, the consensus-oriented 
cooperation of employers’ chambers and unions, and the high number and 
significance of family businesses enhanced Austria’s economic stability. Per 
capita GDP as well as average wages are still higher in Austria than in Ger-
many. With the successful implementation of the Kurz program, Austro-
Keynesianism may be replaced by a new policy paradigm, which would 
increase the role of the markets and strengthen the competition-related 
aspects of Austria’s economic strategy.
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CHAPTER 5




The topic of this chapter is deeply influenced by the complicated web of 
transition policies in Central and Eastern Europe. We focus on East Cen-
tral Europe (ECE), but more precisely on the Visegrád countries (Poland, 
Czechia, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Hungary). However, occasionally we com-
pare some aspects of transition with those of (western) Balkan countries 
or with patterns in countries that emerged from the former Soviet Union 
(fSU). Many scholars from the varieties of capitalism (VoC) literature state 
that Central European capitalist development is markedly different, espe-
cially from the model in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) 
countries (Lane 2007; Csaba 2007; Szanyi 2012; Bohle and Greskovits 2007; 
Bohle and Greskovits 2013). Nölke and Vliegenhart (2009) began their 
work with a positive description of the Central European capitalist model 
and highlighted positive and negative features of multinational companies’ 
strong influence, a kind of new dependence for these countries (the depen-
dent market economies—DME—model). In an earlier paper, I  suggested 
adding the role of the state to the list of features of the DME model, espe-
cially direct state intervention in the form of state-owned companies (Szanyi 
2012). Further research on the East Central European capitalist model also 
highlighted corruption as a  factor that is more dominant in ECE than in 
other European capitalist models (Szanyi 2012, 22–23). Corruption is also 
linked to the strong role of the state, which can be misused by politicians 
because of weak institutions (political, social, and market institutions alike).
This chapter is based on an earlier paper published in Acta Oeconomica (Szanyi 
2016).
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State property management of transition economies began with priva-
tization. Once on the trail of transition, the post-communist countries of 
East Central Europe began to de-nationalize state property. It is important 
to see that the period (the 1980s and 1990s) was deeply influenced by 
neoliberal economic thought. This was expressed in the practice of inter-
national organizations participating in the transition process, but also in 
the solid conviction of many influential local personalities, “reformers” 
like Václav Klaus, Leszek Balcerowicz, and Yegor Gaidar. Nevertheless, 
the transition process evolved as a mix of conflicting economic principles. 
In most countries, the pro-market drivers of the neoliberal thought and 
local pressure groups’ expectations simultaneously shaped transition poli-
cies, including the privatization process. In the case of Hungary, there has 
been a general consensus about the necessity of reducing the size of the 
state sector. However, there have always been interest groups lobbying 
against the privatization of certain firms or sectors. For example, the sale 
of Hungarian Electricity Works was discussed, and finally only some seg-
ments of the business (including fossil fuel power plants and local distribu-
tion networks) were privatized, but not the entire nationwide transmission 
system and the Paks nuclear power station (Mihályi and Sztankó 2015). In 
other cases, the privatization process was not blocked but rather influenced 
by stakeholders (Szanyi 1996). Clashes between multinational businesses 
and local interest groups’ representative networks in Hungary have been 
described (Szanyi 2016) and, in the case of Poland, thoroughly analyzed 
(Kozarzewski and Baltowski 2015).
State and public ownership is present in every established market 
economies. Corrections for many types of market failures can be most 
easily achieved by the public provision of certain services. Furthermore, 
one of the main instruments of the developmental state is the SOE. If we 
look at the ownership structure of coordinated market economies like Aus-
tria or Germany, or mixed market economies (France and Italy), we find 
a large number SOEs in all of these countries. Although de-nationalization 
of the state-owned sector was on the agenda in several European countries 
(the UK and France) and in the Americas (Mexico and Chile), especially 
during the 1980s, these privatization deals concerned individual companies 
and not national economies. The former were not part of broader systemic 
changes unlike privatization in the transition economies.
Privatization in transition economies, on the other hand, was always 
regarded as a key element of the transition process. The usual tasks and 
properties of SOEs were largely replaced by the political and institutional 
goals of transition policies. They were determined by the mainstream 
neoliberal ideology, which was spread by international financial institu-
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tions and development agencies. Privatization was regarded as a tool for 
increasing the popularity of the transition process too (Appel 2004), either 
through the implementation of giveaway-style privatization methods, and/
or by supporting ideological and political (anticommunist, nationalist) 
arguments. In Hungary, economic reform traditions provided very fertile 
soil for pro-market arguments. In Poland, the privatization process was 
based on stakeholder consensus rooted in the strong self-management 
desire of the Solidarity movement. Variations in the privatization policies of 
ECE countries were reflected in the well-known gradualism versus shock 
therapy debate,1 which was mostly about the social acceptance of transition 
measures and the potential threat of reversal by a resistant “nomenclature” 
and incumbent communist political forces.
The strong political charge of privatization and the equally strong neo-
liberal influence on the transition process resulted in a high emphasis on the 
speed and depth of privatization in ECE, regardless of the actual technical 
solutions (voucher schemes, insider buyout or sales methods). Not surpris-
ingly, according to EBRD transition reports, over two-thirds of GDP pro-
duction in all ECE countries was private by the end of the 1990s, regardless 
of the substantial differences in privatization policies (Schoenman 2014). 
Similarities continued, when after 2000 disappointment in the results of 
transition process swept over the ECE transition economies. Privatization 
was then a major area of debate, and public opinion in general regarded it 
as “organized theft” (Appel 2004). More serious, albeit not quite nuanced, 
were critics’ characterizations of the 1990s transition process as a period 
when free market ideology had been aggressively pushed on post-commu-
nist governments (Stiglitz 1999). Appel (2004) argued that the role of ide-
ology in post-communist economic policy making was much more nuanced 
than what is reflected in earlier debates and later critics. She called for the 
consideration of individual and group interests arguing, “the beliefs and 
preferences of actors on the ground deserve much more recognition than 
Stiglitz allows for” (6). Thus, while the overall attitude toward transition 
policies had a heavy ideological charge, local personnel and group interests 
always influenced the actual implementation of policies.2
1  For a good summary see, among others, Roland (2000).
2  Mihályi and Sztankó (2015) recalled the case of the privatization attempts of 
MVM, the Hungarian electric company, which was effectively opposed by the 
incumbent management regardless of the ideological orientation (liberal, nation-
alist) of various succeeding governments. In Poland, the Solidarity movement 
could never be neglected, and this led to a slower, but socially grounded, consen-
sus-based privatization policy.
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Based on Kopecky (2006), Schoenman (2014) stated that because 
political parties in ECE had weak ideological underpinnings, voters 
switched parties frequently. It seems that ideological values were barely 
transmitted to the general public. However, in the early phase of transition, 
the values of the “international adviser community,” in cooperation with 
local political leaders, and officials were transmitted to the population. The 
political leaders’ role was to gain public support from various groups. In 
doing so, they could use ideological argumentation to legitimize political 
decisions. But more frequently they used either coercive mechanisms (the 
threat or actual use of force) or remunerative measures (economic incen-
tives). Naczyk (2014) interpreted the most recent (ideological) changes in 
Polish and Hungarian economic policy as simple shifts in the content of 
“economic patriotism.” He argued that, during the 1990s, the most impor-
tant national goal was the quick departure from communism and central 
planning, which was supported most enthusiastically by the neoliberal idea. 
During the late 2000s, when these earlier goals were effectively achieved, 
new content was added to economic patriotism: the strengthening of 
national businesses’ presence and preventing further internationalization of 
ECE economies. Both the Hungarian and the Polish histories of transition 
provide many examples of similar changes in policy preferences.3
From the above discussion, an important conclusion can be drawn, 
which will be developed in this chapter. The relationship between ECE 
political parties to economic issues is less ideological and more pragmatic 
than in case of more established market economies. The actual implemen-
tation of economic policies is determined by several factors. First, there is 
the ideologically based, “mainstream” influence of the international adviser 
community (which was broadly supported during the 1990s but rejected in 
many cases after the 2008–9 crisis). Second, the implementation of poli-
cies was always strongly influenced by domestic pressure groups including 
business groups (local and international), individual entrepreneurs, and 
3  Naczyk (2014) mentioned, among others, Krzysztof Bielecki, who was Prime 
Minister in 1991 during the period of Polish shock therapy. Later, in 2014, he 
called himself a “pragmatic liberal,” and as a member of the Council of Eco-
nomic Advisers he supported the Tusk government’s promotion of national 
champions and other steps reflecting increasing economic patriotism in Poland. 
In the case of Hungary, the political career of the current Prime Minister Vik-
tor Orbán and his party reflects a similar flexibility in ideological underpinnings 
ranging from liberal ideas during the first half of the 1990s to economic patriot-
ism and the vision of the illiberal state in contemporary Hungary.
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social organizations like trade unions, and less by civil society. Third, poli-
cies were influenced by the (self) interests of political parties and even their 
strong leaders.
In this chapter, I will argue that changes in economic policies were 
increasingly initiated by this later factor, the polity, after the crisis, because 
the first two factors lost much of their influence. The international adviser 
community lost influence because the underlying mainstream economic 
ideas they represented were largely discredited during the crisis. Unions 
and other social groups were also weakened by the hardships of the crisis 
and had to comply with government policies. Finally, in the new member 
states of the EU, European controls were weakened largely because polit-
ical attention shifted away from new members to the Euro crisis and the 
Mediterranean economies. In such cases, when the legitimation of govern-
ments does not come from ideologically supported and well tested prin-
ciples (as was demonstrated previously), policies may fall victim to indi-
vidual or group (party) interests.4 Thus, one of the main messages of this 
chapter is that this type of “pragmatic” economic policy seriously under-
mines market economic institutions because of its arbitrary nature. The 
lack of or weakening normative policy measures threatens the rule of law.
Privatization and State Asset Management in ECE Transition Policy
The role of state ownership in established market economies is described 
mainly as a policy tool to correct market failures, and debate largely cen-
ters on the optimal size and efficiency of the state sector. In the case of 
transition economies, state property is usually regarded as a  substantial 
part of the economic system of the previous political regime that should be 
reduced in order to make way for the institutions and players of the new 
market-based economic system. Therefore, the issue of state ownership 
is complex and involves not only business considerations and the usual 
aspects of correcting market failures, but also the larger challenge of sys-
temic change.
4  Of course party and individual interests always play a role in modern societies. 
As Drahokoupil (2008) described, the central European transition economies of 
the 1990s were characterized by the emergence of a new political elite, the “com-
prador service sector,” which effectively supported and complemented the spread 
of multinational business in the region. Thus, the economic regime of neoliberal 
economic thought also served certain individual and party interests.
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As Frydman and Rapaczinsky (1994) stated long ago, privatization 
was a significant issue from a political perspective, since it could contribute 
to eliminating the economic power of the previous political regime’s elite. 
This specific effect of the systemic change together with the, by then, 
dominant neoliberal theory put considerable pressure on policy makers to 
privatize as much and as quickly as possible. The campaign-like expec-
tations of international institutions were repeatedly and insistently articu-
lated and expressed in formats such as the EBRD’s Transition Index.
Privatization was treated not only as politically important but also as 
a tool of economic restructuring. In this sense, two main issues came to the 
fore. One was the improvement of corporate performance as the inherited 
state-owned companies suffered from a variety of serious weaknesses. The 
importance of privatization for strengthening corporate performance was 
highlighted mainly by scholars of the gradualist approach (Kornai, Roland, 
Portes, Aghion, and others). The other issue was the general support for 
institution building, which included strengthening capital markets and sup-
porting plans to make various social strata the new owners of productive 
property. The desire to improve corporate efficiency dominated the Hun-
garian privatization process; capital market development and the mainte-
nance of social consensus prevailed in Poland; and the creation of a strong 
new bourgeoisie was the aim of the Czech voucher privatization scheme. 
The fierce activity of various interest groups could be observed in the back-
ground of different privatization policies. They all wanted to shape the 
details of policies in ways that would benefit them.
The primary neoliberal logic of privatization purports to decrease state 
intervention in the economy. In particular, direct state involvement was 
regarded as avoidable. Privatization was treated as the primary method 
of strengthening private businesses. State property was to be distributed 
among private stakeholders in order to create a strong capital owner and 
entrepreneurial strata in ECE societies that was expected to support the 
new post-communist political elite. This consideration was the most 
important factor in the design of the Czechoslovak voucher privatization 
scheme. Privatization supported many of the newly established market eco-
nomic institutions. For example, virtually all ECE countries introduced 
privatization methods that included the establishment of stock exchanges. 
Initial public offerings (IPO) of SOEs were among the first corporate 
shares traded. Here again we can see that initial high expectations became 
only partially effectual. It seems that only the Warsaw stock exchange 
gained momentum and became sizeable after the early years of transition 
(Ozsvald 2014). The growth of all of the other stock exchanges stopped; 
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no important new IPOs were launched; and moreover, the securities of 
former SOEs were largely withdrawn from the exchanges.
It was not only foreign advisers who stressed the importance of priva-
tization in ECE. There were also numerous practical reasons for giving 
away SOEs. Pre-transition SOE’s activity was organized with no respect 
for market economic principles according to the logic of the command 
economy, which was to be abolished completely. The typical SOE pos-
sessed outdated products (sold only for large discounts on Western mar-
kets, if at all), old-fashioned technologies, and limited engineering capacity 
that focused on the redesign of existing technical solutions. They did not 
possess managerial knowledge applicable in a competitive market environ-
ment, nor did they have marketing acumen, or capital for investments in 
new technologies or the development of new products and markets (firms 
had no right to withhold and accumulate reserves from their own sales 
revenue). Not all of these problems were foreseen at the beginning of the 
transition process. 
Transformational recession occurred because of the huge drop in 
SOEs’ sales revenue at the beginning of the 1990s (Kornai 1994), and 
privatization was seen as a major tool for making firms more efficient and 
competitive. The second rationale for privatization was the need for restruc-
turing, the introduction of new products, technologies, markets, manage-
rial know-how, and large-scale investments. This was the business rationale 
for privatization. A third rationale for privatization was formulated by the 
leading political forces behind the transition process. The new political elite 
urged de-nationalization in order to undermine the economic power of the 
previous regime’s exponents. The total destruction of the hated communist 
party was only possible if the economic basis of SOEs was transferred to 
new owners (Frydman and Rapaczynski 1994). This argument was based 
on the fact that SOE managers had close ties with communist party leaders 
who acted as the chief executive officers of the command economy. The 
ambition to eliminate the economic power of communist party members 
was not successful in any of the ECE economies. The second tier com-
munist party leaders and corporate managers became the new owners of 
former state assets in one or another way. The successor parties of the 
former communist parties also maintained political influence.
The interplay of the three main drivers of privatization changed over 
time in all ECE transition economies. The role of international advisers 
remained important throughout the period up to EU accession, but espe-
cially during the 1990s. Pressure stemming from business considerations 
was also rather strong, especially in the period of the transitional crisis. In 
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fact, the interplay of liberalization (increased competition), effective bank-
ruptcy regulation, and privatization through the sales method could be also 
used to cure the old behavioral problem of ECE economies: state pater-
nalism. Under socialism, the bargaining process over available resources 
and expected output created fertile soil for rent seeking. The process itself 
was characterized by cozy relationships among company management, 
state officials, and party leaders. This kind of state paternalism repeat-
edly resulted in major bail out programs for inefficient SOEs. This type of 
paternalistic behavior by the state and the expectations it generated among 
SOE managers had to be eliminated in order to address SOEs’ restruc-
turing ambitions (Szanyi 2002).
Breaking these paternalistic ties was also important with regard to 
the third driver of privatization: politics. Since company managers could 
not be easily replaced (in the short run, there was a  limited supply of 
economists and managers), privatization was an effective tool to control 
them. Certainly, some forms of privatization resulted in insider deals (on 
a  mass scale in the post-Soviet region, but to a  more limited extent in 
ECE). Insider privatization cannot be regarded as efficient from the busi-
ness standpoint because SOE managers’ capabilities did not improve. The 
emergence of oligarchs was financed by state loans obtained with the help 
of federal or local politicians, as was usual in the previous regime. The 
old style of paternalism survived in the form of the crony capitalism that 
spread quickly in the former Soviet Union during the Yeltsin era. Altered 
forms of state paternalism also survived in ECE economies. Privatization 
was used as a  tool for transferring economic power to the new political 
elite. However, this did not mean the end of state paternalism or the elimi-
nation of the channels of crony capitalism, but rather the establishment of 
new forms and channels. The new political elite also strengthened its eco-
nomic power and entered the arena of crony capitalism.
The political condition of privatization was therefore largely fulfilled, 
though not in the sense that former communist leaders were excluded from 
the economy. Rather privatization balanced the economic power of the 
old and new elites. Therefore, the threat of reversing the political tran-
sition was lifted. Old and new elites became equally integrated into the 
new market economic system. Thus, instead of reversing political transi-
tion, what emerged was a new type of paternalistic relationship between 
business and government, a form of crony capitalism, that may bring new 
threats to the efficient economic development of ECE.
Privatization tendencies in the ECE region are well known. Hungary 
effectively completed the process by the end of the 1990s using mainly 
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the sales method with a preference for foreign direct investments (FDI) in 
the process. The Czech Republic and Slovakia maintained a higher share 
of state property during the 1990s, but continuous SOE management 
problems and slow restructuring forced the governments to sell compa-
nies by the turn of the millennium. The Polish privatization process was 
more sluggish, mainly because of the need for complex social negotiations 
with stakeholders and the effective blocking of many SOEs’ privatization 
by their employees and the Solidarity movement. Hence, the volume of 
state assets remained relatively high in Poland, and government agencies 
together with SOE managers were forced to pursue effective adjustment 
policies. Polish governments repeatedly launched privatization programs to 
sell remaining assets until quite recently. The last such program launched 
in 2012–13, however, it was not completed.
The Political Economy of Privatization and State Asset Management
Many dimensions of the political context of privatization have been dis-
cussed, but below I will focus on two that may help us better understand 
the changing attitude of governments toward the status of publicly held 
assets. The first thread of scholarship deals with the impacts of political 
influence on corporate restructuring in public and private companies. 
The other highlights the role of privatization in strengthening private 
property and the rule of law in a broader sense. These two dimensions 
strongly determined the privatization process in ECE but also influenced 
the development of market economic institutions, thus contributing to the 
basic systemic elements of the capitalist model in ECE. The turn in state 
asset policy can also be explained by changes in these aspects of the priva-
tization process.
The first politically motivated argument in favor of privatization, 
which was the typical approach during the 1990’s, was described in a fairly 
sophisticated way in the seminal paper by Boycko et al. (1996). This paper 
collected empirical survey results on the inferior business performance of 
SOEs and provided a  theoretical explanation of the phenomenon.5 The 
starting point of the paper was the commonplace observation that public 
5  The survey of empirical results has been referred to in studies carried out in some 
developed market economies including the United States and many developing 
countries. No transition economies were included at that time.
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enterprises are inefficient because they address the objectives of politicians 
rather than maximize efficiency. For example, one of politicians’ key objec-
tives is employment: they care about votes of the people whose jobs are in 
danger and, in many cases, unions have significant influence on political 
parties. The “average voter” argument in the explanation of various features 
of business-polity interplay is often used, albeit the conditions of its use 
are hardly controlled (this is outside the scope of modeling). Based on the 
discussion included earlier in this chapter, it is likely that excess employ-
ment was a strong determinant in the Polish and possibly also in the Czech 
and Slovak transition stories, but it was much less relevant in Hungary, 
especially in the privatization process. In Hungary, political influence was 
directed more toward various, more direct forms of political rent seeking.
The argument of Boycko et al. (1996) continues with the comparison 
of direct state ownership and private ownership in terms of their options 
for responding excess employment, and the cost of maintaining it. In the 
case of a SOE, excess employment deteriorates corporate efficiency and 
therefore limits profitability. The price of maintaining the level of employ-
ment for a firm is lost profits. Politicians can easily move SOE managers to 
give preference to employment over profitability. SOE managers remained 
executors of the political will just as before the transition. They were nomi-
nated and withdrawn by the same political formation that also directed 
them. In my view, this could have contributed to the survival of state 
paternalism. Politicians kept on trying to influence business to achieve 
their political goals. In the case of private (privatized) firms however, this 
proved to be more difficult and expensive: control over management often 
weakens or disappears; new shareholders’ interests must also be respected, 
and this group is mainly interested in profits.6 Thus, excessive employment 
can be financed through state subsidies from the treasury rather than by 
sacrificed profits. The main question of Boycko et al. (1996) is why a poli-
tician would fail to buy his way to high labor spending through subsidies? 
This is because subsidies are financed by excess taxes or inflation, both of 
which are extremely unpopular. 
The public and the reformers may not be aware of the potential profits 
that a state firm is wasting, but they are keenly aware of the alternative 
6  In cases where the new owners are independent. However, new owners may be 
clients of politicians, and firms may become partisan. In this case, the use of 
them for political rent seeking may be similar as in the case of SOEs.
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uses of tax revenues, and would not wish to spend public money to sub-
sidize private firms not to restructure. This difference between the polit-
ical costs of foregone profits of state firms and of subsidies to private 
firms is the channel through which privatization works…. (Boycko et al. 
1996, 311)
This paper’s arguments and its conclusions strongly influenced how 
advisers and reformers from ECE thought about privatization, especially 
the elimination of the close ties between business and polity.7 The paper 
also highlighted the difficulties of privatization especially in the presence 
of strong unions (Poland). The suggested solution of selling to strategic 
investors was the dominant privatization method in Hungary, where 
business rationale rather than political considerations drove privatiza-
tion during the 1990s. Simultaneously, privatization to independent new 
owners also contributed to the withering away of paternalistic links to the 
state and to the hardening firms’ budget constraints.
The second highlighted aspect of this section is the role of privatiza-
tion in strengthening private property and the rule of law. Rapaczynski 
(1996) provided important comments on the changing attitude of govern-
ments toward state-owned assets. He directed attention to the fact that in 
ECE, the state itself might be the most significant threat to the security 
of property rights. “The role of the state in securing property rights from 
encroachments by third parties is probably much less significant than its 
ability to precommit credibility to respect these rights itself” (93). The 
first such encroachment possibility is outright confiscation by the state. 
Relatively speaking, this rarely happens, but the legislative guarantees 
against such expropriations “are usually quite fuzzy at the edges” and this 
is not accidental. The state routinely engages in economic regulation in 
cases that result in encroachments on property that are not considered 
compensable seizures. But general protection from the spread of such 
expropriations should be provided by the political system together with 
economic and social pressure groups “that ensure that the state does not 
go ‘too far’ in interfering with the owner’s control over assets. This polit-
ically determined thin line may be understood as the real definition of 
property rights conferred by the state… In fact, without a significant his-
torical record of state forbearance from excessive and redistributive regu-
7  Or perhaps the paper reflected and conceptualized the mainstream way of think-
ing and practices.
Szanyi - 00 könyv.indb   147 2019.11.15.   9:32
148 MIKLóS SzANYI
lation, it is hard to make the state’s commitment credible… The threat 
posed by the state to the security of broadly defined property rights is 
particularly severe when the state also happens to own a significant pro-
portion of national assets” (93).
Rapaczynski’s 1996 argument supported the efficient privatization 
policies of the time. But his statement on the dangers the state poses to the 
security of property rights, which intensify with significant state asset own-
ership is still valid. Achievements in establishing market institutions may 
be easily broken if the “politically determined thin line” of the definition 
of property rights changes. Governments may establish both positive and 
negative historical records over time that promote or weaken social trust in 
the enforcement of property rights. As was emphasized earlier, a solitary 
economic measure and its enforcement may have a bigger influence on the 
evolving soft social institutions in ECE than a series of new laws. If priva-
tization is stopped or even reversed, if governments carry out unusually 
excessive expropriations as was the case with private pension funds’ assets 
in both Hungary and Poland, such steps demolish much of the weak and 
nascent social institutions and undermine trust in the rule of law.
The complex role of privatization in the transition process increased 
the impact of the methods and also determined the outcome of current 
economic developments in the countries of East Central Europe. The 
three decades of ownership changes contributed to the establishment 
of a general business and investment climate and norms of government 
policy practice. In Hungary, for example, there were two influential sys-
temic components: foreign company ownership and integration into mul-
tinational value chains on the one hand, and the crony capitalism of local 
politicians and capital owners on the other. The two components were 
not separated, but they existed as two poles of a dual economy. Succes-
sive Hungarian governments often pursued policies that favored one or 
the other poles. The activity of foreign companies was usually influenced 
by indirect legal measures (taxes, license conditions, and the like), which 
often contradicted the principle of equal treatment by favoring or pun-
ishing them. Local business was more often treated informally, creating 
a space for the emergence of crony capitalism.
In my understanding, crony capitalism means a  legally uncontrolled 
(badly controlled) interaction between the polity and businesses that works 
against the principles of free enterprise and fair competition. Policy makers 
and influential business people cooperate to create preferential treatment 
for “friendly businesses” in exchange for the material support of par-
ties, politicians, and election campaigns. This type of cooperation is not 
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unknown in developed economies, though a more developed institutional 
background and strong civil society control may limit the harmful impacts 
of cronyism on market economic institutions. If party financing is trans-
parent and lobbying for industry (corporate) interests is institutionalized, 
then cronyism is under control. Of course, this does not mean that markets 
are free of marginal interest enforcement. But in cases where cronyism is 
not transparent and not controlled, it may lead to very high social losses 
and even illegal transactions. A major difference between most of the estab-
lished market and transition economies lies in the level of institutional 
and social control of polity-business interactions. Loose control in transi-
tion economies deteriorates investment and the business climate, which is 
expressed in low rankings in competitiveness reports and high finance costs. 
Interaction between polity and business has been surveyed in the ECE 
region by many scholars. Well known contributions by Stark (1996), Stark 
and Bruszt (1998), McDermott (2002) have shown that privatization and 
the establishment of the new ownership structure in ECE was marred by 
cronyism and favoritism and established new interest groups. These groups 
incorporated representatives of the political sphere as well. Papers from the 
1990s expressed fears about the reestablishment of the economic power of 
the “nomenclature.” This argument is present in the mainstream literature 
(for example, Boycko et al. 1996). Nevertheless, as time passed, the fears 
of a reversion to pre-transition communist rule proved to be unfounded. 
However, instead of a political retreat to communism, increasing cronyism 
posed new threats to the development and efficiency of market economic 
institutions.
Schoenman (2014) has made a new contribution to the above schol-
arship on the role that networks and interest groups have gained in the 
post-transition decades. His book differentiated ECE economies according 
to the type and strength of their polity-business interactions. The intensity 
and main values of the relationship were determined by the levels of uncer-
tainty in politics and business (political changes, regulatory environment, 
macroeconomic policies, etc.) and the structure of business networks. 
Broad networks link cross-sector coalitions and facilitate collective action. 
The role of networks is especially strong in societies with weak institutions. 
Instead of institutions, networks may become even more important chan-
nels for representing interests. Business networks tend to develop mutually 
beneficial political ties in cases where there is political competition and 
politicians and parties in need of (financial) support. Political and eco-
nomic uncertainty accelerate the process. Referring to Kitschelt (2000), 
Schoenman also states that when there are strong business networks, state 
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institutions are more likely to become “broadly distributive,” providing for 
a larger group of businesses (i.e., independent from agents’ political sym-
pathies and support). In contrast, “selective advantage” institutions dis-
tribute benefits to targeted recipients who are among the supporters of the 
ruling political party.
Under high levels of uncertainty, collective action evolves in the pres-
ence of broad networks. This is because of efficient information flow, 
which increases the threat to corporate reputations in cases of selective 
agreements. High levels of uncertainty and small networks make cooper-
ation between business and polity unlikely because the value of political 
promises is low due to the lack of support by businesses. Furthermore, 
cooperation does not spread due to inefficient information flows. Con-
sequently, businesses lean directly on the state and not in a  concerted 
manner. In cases of low uncertainty levels and small business networks, the 
polity is not afraid of political competition and can exploit atomized firms. 
Under low levels of uncertainty and broad networks, the state is likely to 
enter into collusive relations with firms. The four types of relationship are 
summarized as follows:
Table 1 






Broad Embedded corporatist Concertation
Source: Schoenman (2014, 50).
Different consequences result from the distinct settings of polity (state)–
business relationships. In high uncertainty environments, broad business 
networks tend to establish regular cooperation with the polity and the state 
that broadly favor the business community. In exchange, the networks pro-
vide political parties with necessary financial support. The state develops 
mutually beneficial institutions for collusion in the long run. The state gen-
erally functions as a coordinating agent; it channels information and medi-
ates conflicts of interest. When networks are small (business elites do not 
cooperate) and uncertainty is low, and the political structure is solid and 
monolithic and there is a solid economic environment, the state applies 
“selective advantage”-style institutional solutions and selects the winners. 
This setting is called patronage. Where there is both high uncertainty and 
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small business networks, economic elites dominate political elites, which 
potentially leads to state capture. Finally, low uncertainty and broad net-
works describe the embedded corporatist state. In this case, well estab-
lished political elites do not face uncertainty and cooperate with business 
networks. In Schoenman’s opinion, this particular set up is unlikely to 
happen in competitive election systems.
Schoenman (2014) runs a  factor analysis using various proxy mea-
sures of uncertainty and network densities for ECE economies. While 
the indicators and the actual relevance of the results may be of nominal 
interest, the typology is remarkable (Table 2). Patronage and captured 
states corroborate the concept of state and business capture (Yakovlev 
2006). The typology he produces can also be used in the explanation of 
recent changes of polity-business relationships in Poland and Hungary.
Table 2 






Patronage states: Czech Rep., 
Latvia, Estonia, Slovakia, 
Slovenia, Romania
Captured states: Albania, 
Bulgaria
Broad Embedded corporatist
Concentration states: Hungary, 
Lithuania, Poland
Source: Schoenman (2014, 174).
The Imprint of Cronyism in Changing Ownership Patterns
Hungary was considered a highly successful transition economy during the 
1990s with the successful implementation of the sales method of privati-
zation. Not much state property remained, and the privatization process 
was supposed to be completed in 2008. This not only meant that a fur-
ther reduction in state property was not foreseen, but that eventually an 
increase could be also proposed. And indeed this happened sporadically 
up to 2010 and on a larger scale since then under the right-wing govern-
ments of Viktor Orbán and Fidesz. In terms of asset volume, the amount 
of property re-nationalized after 2010 was smaller than that of privatized 
assets after 1990 (Mihályi 2015). The importance of state property policies 
thus did not decline. The state still has an important and complex role in 
enforcing property rights, including the need for occasional nationaliza-
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tions. Such actions must not go too far in interfering with owners’ control 
over assets. The “politically determined thin line” in this implicit defini-
tion of property rights (Rapaczynski, 1996) must be considered by govern-
ments, otherwise the historical record of state forbearance from excessive 
and redistributive regulation gets lost together with political credibility.
Voszka (2013) and Mihályi (2015) compiled a comprehensive list of 
re-nationalizations in Hungary after 2010. Based on this information, it 
is possible to describe the main reasons for the transactions and identify 
beneficiaries and political aims. The first major nationalization transac-
tion took place in 2010, when the second pillar of the pension system was 
nationalized. Due mainly to demographics, financing the pension system 
became difficult. The problems were exacerbated by redirecting a consid-
erable part of pension contributions from the pay-as-you-go system (first 
pillar) to the second pillar (privately held accounts), while actual pay-
ment obligations from the first pillar remained unchanged. The govern-
ment, however, argued differently and called for the security of accumu-
lated pension funds to be taken out of the hands of private pension funds 
that failed to bring the expected returns. The government also applied the 
“opting out” trick, which meant that those who wanted to keep their pen-
sions untouched had to face the threat of losing their first pillar services. 
The size of this nationalization transaction was equivalent to 10 percent of 
Hungary’s GDP. The transaction brought the valuable liquid assets of the 
state budget together with a rather substantial and diversified portfolio of 
various kinds of securities including corporate shares and bonds.
A second major, politically motivated series of transactions and reg-
ulatory changes were undertaken with the political aim of cutting utility 
costs. The promise of savings on utility costs was a  major campaign 
promise during the 2010 and 2014 Hungarian election campaigns. The 
most efficient implementation method was the nationalization of the ser-
vice providers. As a  first step, the price regulations on services markets 
were changed. When private companies could not cover their costs with 
operational revenues, most of them sold their equity to the state. In most 
cases, the Hungarian government paid generously (e.g., to German multi-
nationals in the electricity sector). A third major aim of re-nationalization 
transactions was the support of political clients or simple personal rent 
seeking. Favoritism can take place if market regulation is altered so as to 
favor some actors over others, or when re-nationalized assets are resold to 
clients (as in the case of the Hungarian banking sector). In some cases, the 
loss-producing companies of clients were bailed out by the state through 
the generous acquisition of assets. Clientism was labeled economic patrio-
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tism, because it supported loyal domestic businesses over selfish multina-
tional corporations. Another form of clientism is filling the boards of SOEs 
with party officials who need positions and cash. The simplest form of rent 
seeking is thus bound to sizeable state-ownership.
In the case of Poland, state property management practices have not 
yet been reversed as of 2018. Privatization in Poland was always slower 
than in other ECE countries mainly due to the continuous search for social 
consensus and the necessary approval of stakeholders in every case. After 
the rather sluggish practice of the 1990s, 1999 and 2000 witnessed sky-
rocketing privatization activity in Poland. This was due to the direct sale 
method, which was favored at the time, and the denationalization of some 
large banks and service providers. However, this momentum stopped in 
2001, when the previous sluggish insider-oriented methods continued. 
Privatization sales were revived under the Tusk government. After neces-
sary preparations, privatization revenues began to grow in 2009, reached 
their zenith of $6 billion in 2010, and then fell to half that level in 2011. 
The net privatization income of the Tusk government between 2008 and 
2012 reached $15.5 billion (The Wall Street Journal 2012). The same 
source also heralded a change approach: large firms regarded “strategic” 
were not to be privatized. This meant that the new, still rather ambitious 
privatization program of the years 2012–13 was not enforced with the 
enthusiasm of previous years. The Economist observed a peculiar halt in 
the sale of controlling shares of some “flagship companies” mainly in the 
financial sector,8 which was already visible during the otherwise successful 
privatization campaign of the period from 2008 to 2011. The Polish gov-
ernment seemed to pull the privatization train’s emergency break. In this 
context, maintaining state assets is quite similar to the conceptual changes 
of state asset policies in Hungary.
Instead of systemic dimensions, fiscal aspects gained importance 
in the Polish government’s state property policy after 2011. While only 
minority shares were sold, which, in most cases, did not eliminate effec-
tive state control, the fiscal revenues of the central budget were increased 
by dividend payments from state-owned companies (Kozarzewski 2015; 
Blaszczyk and Patena 2015). The growing importance of budget revenues 
from the profits of running SOEs demonstrates an important departure 
from the systemic aspects of privatization and state property management 
8  “Privatization in Poland. Overcoming Miner Obstacles.” The Economist, 6 July, 
2011.
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in Poland. Naczyk (2014) analyzed a series of steps taken by the different 
Polish governments toward strengthening state control over mixed own-
ership firms. The governance structures of these firms were transformed, 
and “poison pills” that gave the state extra veto rights even in the case of 
minority state ownership were incorporated into the statutes of the compa-
nies. This meant that the Polish government also put a long-term emphasis 
on maintaining and using SOEs for various policy purposes.
Reasons for Reversing the Privatization Logic
Boycko et al. (1996) calls excessive employment the most typical political 
pressure forced on companies that reduces their efficiency. At the same 
time, there is the potential for other forms of political opportunism and 
rent seeking. They mention an article that describes the perverse credit 
policy of the French state-owned bank Credit Lyonnais, which favored cli-
ents from the ruling party. Although this case was discussed as exceptional, 
in ECE, this type of rent seeking has always been more important than 
employment issues for voter appeal. When I talk about the reversal of the 
privatization logic, I mean that steps were taken in ECE countries to target 
political and personal interests rather than the interests of broader societies 
concerning state property policies. Privatization and the dominance of pri-
vate property were once regarded as safeguards against this type of rent 
seeking. The increasing economic role of the state sector can be regarded 
as a deliberate attempt to create more potential for abuse.
I distinguish various types of actual cash transfers from the economy 
to politicians and their clients. One of them is outright corruption and 
bribing (i.e., moral hazard). In this case, bribes go from the business to 
the politician and the bureaucrats to buy preferential treatment or simply 
a business license. The corrupt politician and the bureaucrat may expand 
this activity to its extremes with business capture, as was conceptualized by 
Yakovlev (2006), and corporate raiding (Viktorov 2013). ECE’s conditions 
are, of course, not nearly as bad as those in Russia, but corruption also 
exists in ECE. High level scandals that involved government officials and 
other high-ranked party politicians or their clients revealed that countries 
like Hungary, Poland, Slovenia, and the Czech Republic are not immune 
from these dangers (EU transfers to Bulgaria and Romania were effectively 
stopped due to high levels of corruption).
Corruption, especially of highly ranked officials, is punishable by law. 
But there are other, not necessarily illegal albeit seriously unethical oppor-
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tunities for financial transfers from businesses to the polity. State owner-
ship is the most relevant of these. The clients of politicians regularly fill top 
management and board positions in SOEs.9 This practice, on one hand, 
eliminates conflicts between the management and politicians. But this also 
creates an opportunity for milking SOEs for funds through various chan-
nels. SOEs are useful for this purpose regardless of their potential efficiency. 
The social cost of this practice is no longer just lost profits, but the con-
tinuous flow of cash from various state institutions (the state budget) trans-
ferred through the SOE to private persons or enterprises. SOEs may finance 
various social and cultural events, give politicians the red carpet treatment, 
donate to charity organizations, or sponsor any number of activities on 
behalf of the government and politicians. SOEs are also used to reward the 
clients of the politicians by paying them consulting fees, for example.
Of course, the usage of SOEs for these purposes is not new nor is 
it unique to the transition economies of ECE. However, current poli-
cies designed to maintain state ownership are aimed at widening the rent 
seeking activity of political parties and governments. The latter is made 
possible precisely because of the low levels of transparency and social con-
trol. Furthermore, this new rent seeking causes the same types of prob-
lems described in papers on privatization published in the 1990s, and is 
therefore very harmful for the future of market institutions in ECE. The 
reasons for intensive rent seeking in ECE are manifold. Apart from per-
sonal enrichment, the lack of regulated party financing is also important. 
Political parties’ budgets are very meager, and parties spend far more on 
election campaigns and other advocacy work than what is legally allowed.
There have been some changes to methods of milking state assets 
during the thirty years of transition in ECE. Initially, the main source of 
cash revenue was privatization. Even more important than corruption was 
the support of clients in obtaining valuable state assets at rock bottom 
prices. The process was well documented in the case of Russia, and there 
is some anecdotal evidence for Slovakia as well. However, this practice was 
not unprecedented in other Visegrád countries either. In some recent Hun-
garian cases, the potential redistribution of assets re-emerged when the 
government declared it was ready to re-privatize some firms.10 Neverthe-
less, opportunities for privatization are quite rare today in Hungary. In the 
9  Skuhrovec (2014) reported peeks of personnel changes in Czech SOEs’ supervi-
sion bodies in national election years.
10  For example, MKB bank, once a German-owned large commercial bank, was 
purchased by the state in 2015. After several changes in ownership, including 
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case of Poland, rent seeking during the privatization process was perhaps 
less widespread due to more transparent privatization transactions.
Today, one reason for less privatization and more state ownership 
may be the changing structure of rent seeking activities by politicians. Of 
course, the decline of available state assets has also contributed to this: 
most of the remaining assets are notoriously loss-producing companies 
(like mines in Poland) and it is not financially worthwhile to own them. 
Another issue is that several large service providers cannot be easily trans-
ferred to rent seeking private hands but are SOEs well suited for exploita-
tion on a mass scale. Another reason for maintaining state assets may be 
the changing domestic and international environment. International orga-
nizations are no longer as concerned about privatization as they were in the 
1990s. Therefore, international pressure for privatization declined.
The same applies to the European Union and its role as a moderniza-
tion anchor for CEE countries. In 2004, the Visegrád countries became 
members of the EU. Attention was directed rather to fiscal deficits and not 
to the condition of market institutions or levels of state ownership. The 
status of the state budget is also influenced by the performance of SOEs 
and their state subsidies, but this is an indirect link. The importance of 
the business rationale for privatization diminished in the meantime. On the 
one hand, the overall condition of all transition economies improved (prob-
ably not because of improving SOE performance but mainly due to the 
increased activity of multinational companies and de novo private firms), 
and the presence of a number of loss-producing SOEs could be more easily 
tolerated also by EU offices. Consequently, the third political rationale for 
the redistribution of assets, or more recently controls on cash flow, became 
the strongest factor in decisions about maintaining or selling state property.
The reversal of the privatization logic creates the danger of the 
increased obscurity and arbitrariness of economic policy. It also can lead 
to an overall decline in the effect of market institutions against politically 
determined influences. This may be expressed in the growing impact of 
“selective advantage” measures against “broadly distributive” institutions, 
or if using the categories of Schoenman (2014), the shift away from a coop-
erative relationship and effective institutions toward state patronage and 
less effective market institutions. Some government declarations expressed 
a deliberate shift in Hungary and the failure of the markets, calling for more 
various offshore companies, the main owners at the time of writing this paper 
have become investors who are regarded as clients of the ruling political elite.
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government intervention in the economy. This increased government inter-
vention seems to have pushed the polity-business relationship toward the 
patronage state, and has already weakened established market institutions.
Changes in state property management in Hungary were comple-
mented by a series of other steps exhibiting state favoritism ranging from 
public procurement to market regulation. Many of these steps seriously 
contradicted normative regulations and violated the principle of equal 
treatment and EU competition laws. Selective advantages have been 
provided to clients, and simultaneously, competitors of clients were fre-
quently punished by unfavorable regulation. This is most clearly visible 
in the example of the punishment of multinational business with selective 
disadvantages (extra taxes, exclusive regulation), while other members 
of the same community were rewarded and included in the close circle 
of the Hungarian government’s strategic partners. Simultaneous steps in 
the opposite direction can be interpreted as a deliberate policy aimed at 
breaking apart established business networks (those of foreign compa-
nies/multinational business). Using Schoenman’s typology, this is a move 
toward narrow networks and the patronage state (business capture), since 
political uncertainty is perceived as very low by the government. This is 
understandable given that the ruling party won three successive elections 
with a two-thirds majority in Parliament.
These cases illustrate the withdrawal from the “competition state” 
(Drahokoupil 2008). The concept of the illiberal state attacks the free 
market system and democratic institutions. The above case, as well as the 
broader departure from Western values, have been conceptualized by the 
government as parts of a sovereign decision to establish a new economic 
system in Hungary. Populist followers of the Hungarian agenda can also be 
found in Poland. The Law and Justice Party (PiS) leader openly declared 
his appreciation for the concept, declaring that hopefully the actions taken 
in Budapest will spread to Warsaw. But the general opinion of Polish 
observers is that the concept of economic patriotism has already been 
introduced in Poland. This is reflected in the changes to state ownership 
policies, among other things.
Conclusions
What does this analysis contribute to the concept of the ECE model of 
capitalism? I argue that changes in political attitudes have an important 
role in the model. Increasing direct state intervention in the economy 
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changes the rules of the game very quickly and in the ways described in 
this chapter. Weaker social institutions and deliberate government poli-
cies aimed at increasing discretional decisions and limiting transparency 
will also limit the rule of law. Uncertain and increasingly arbitrary business 
conditions will influence not only the domestic but also foreign owners of 
operations in ECE. Foreign firms’ role as the anchors of the economy may 
decline as they either change their operations or leave the region if they 
are not willing to adjust to the new market and political conditions. Con-
trary to the assumption of the DME model, governments may also influ-
ence multinational firms’ activities for good or ill, as was evidenced by the 
Hungarian case. Governments may try to use the uncertainty of conditions 
to rule in their favor, even at the risk of foreign corporations’ withdrawal. 
This policy is easily sold to the broader population through populist state-
ments made by the government.
The populist argument frequently refers to the fact that there are good 
examples of successful and efficient SOEs. The idea of incorporating SOEs 
into the economic system is, indeed, not ridiculous. I do not think, how-
ever, that SOEs’ role in ECE models is identical with those in other Euro-
pean capitalist models. We should not forget the conditions for adequate 
SOE activity, which is effective social, political, and economic control. 
Moreover, state companies must support economic policies in deliberate 
ways. However, in ECE, politicians use SOEs for political and personal 
rent seeking. This threatens the social acceptance of basic market eco-
nomic institutions and the rule of law. Strengthening control institutions 
over public policies in general is a  precondition for maintaining demo-
cratic values and preventing the pendulum from swinging further toward 
autocracy. Controlled direct state intervention in the economy should serve 
public welfare and not private interests.
A further lesson for the ECE model is therefore the outstanding 
importance of social and political control institutions. ECE models implic-
itly assumed that foreign control has the capacity to prevent governments 
from flirting with illiberal political and economic solutions. It seems that 
this control lost all validity after 2004. The loosening of democratic con-
trols tempted ambitious politicians to move the economic and political 
system away from traditional Western norms toward an authoritarian 
model more typical in the East. In fact, this type of shuttling between East 
and West and democracy and autocracy has always been characteristic 
of the countries of the region. The shuttling itself causes the most harm, 
because it is always bound to result in sizeable institutional changes that 
are always very costly. But even more damage is caused by the unreliable, 
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permanently fluctuating environment that makes long-term business plan-
ning impossible. Consequently, from the business standpoint, the main-
tenance of some secure institutions (e.g., the security of property rights), 
even in autocracy, are still highly valued.
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CHAPTER 6
Listed Companies with State Ownership:  
The Case of Poland
Éva ozsvald
Introduction: The State as Shareholder
State ownership of companies is a subject that can be approached from 
a  variety of angles, as this volume of essays clearly demonstrates. This 
chapter focuses on an important though less frequently analyzed issue of 
state ownership: the activity of the state as a majority or minority share-
holder in public companies. Poland was chosen as a case study since this 
country is the home of one of the largest groups of such companies in the 
OECD area.
The first decade of the new millennium brought about fascinating 
developments on global stock exchanges, including the significantly 
increased activity of numerous national states as majority shareholders. 
Today around one-fifth of the total value of the world’s exchanges is 
accounted for by state-owned companies (SOEs); this amount has doubled 
since the early 2000s. The increase is heavily concentrated in a few large 
emerging economies, mostly those in the BRIC group, with China in the 
lead. The ownership structure of the Fortune Global 500 companies has 
also undergone a significant change between 2005 and 2014. The share of 
SOEs jumped from 9 percent to 23 percent in this period. Again, China 
accounts for the lion’s share of this increase.
As far as the OECD countries are concerned, the state presence on 
most stock exchanges has remained rather modest. In the majority of the 
OECD member states, the number of public companies with state owner-
ship is just a few or zero. There are, however, a few significant exceptions, 
including France, Italy, Norway, South Korea, and, prominently, Poland. 
The Polish state has a stake in twelve (seven majority and five minority) 
of its twenty-five largest companies. Among Central Eastern Europe’s ten 
largest companies, seven are Polish (Pekao, PGNIG, PKO, PKN Orlen, 
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PZU, PGE),1 and the Polish state has either majority or minority control 
over each of them.
Dozens of books and studies raise the question of how, to what extent 
and in which sectors it is useful or dysfunctional for fully state-owned com-
panies to operate in normal markets. The privatization wave in developed 
western countries during the last two decades of the twentieth century and 
in Eastern Europe’s economic transformation, demonstrated that market-
based rationality won over arguments related to statist-paternalist-protec-
tionist economic policies. Issues at this level of abstraction, however, are 
not the subject of this paper. Nor do we deal with closed state-owned com-
panies. Our research focuses on the intriguing phenomenon of the joint 
functioning of public and private ownership in publicly traded companies.
The stock market is a quintessential institution of a market economy. 
Stock market players are basically private actors that are guided by the 
profit motive. From this perspective, the first question is why the state 
remains a  player on the stock exchange and, in particular, what are its 
long-term goals there. The next question concerns whether and how state 
assets, if invested for purposes other than profit maximization, conflict with 
the business interests of the other shareholders of the company.
It is reasonable to assume that the state’s business decisions are 
embedded in politics. When it comes to the question of whether state own-
ership in public companies is justified, many argue that the state’s role 
includes solving and managing broader social issues beyond private cor-
porate interests. Such tasks belong to the realm of the so-called national 
economic interest, strategic foresight, workplace protection, etc. In terms 
of public companies, however, the state’s pursuit of these objectives must 
be carried out in such a way that it keeps a close eye on the company’s 
attractiveness to private investors.
In order to switch from general considerations to the assessment of 
the real situation in Poland, we have rephrased these questions. We seek 
to find what advantages and disadvantages have arisen from the Polish 
state’s sale of only a part of SOE assets to stock market investors during 
privatization, while maintaining a  long-term position as either a majority 
or minority shareholder in various large corporations. One official justifica-
tion for the enduring state ownership of public companies in Poland is that 
the dictates of national interest—the strategic importance of specific large 
1  Deloitte: Central Europe Top 500. https://www2.deloitte.com/ce/en/pages/about- 
deloitte/articles/central-europe-top500.html.
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companies—necessitate long-term statist control through ownership stakes. 
Another explanation relates to the fiscal balance of the country, namely, 
that regular dividends coming from well-managed state assets are an 
important source of the central budget’s revenue. One should add to these 
explanations the findings of some politico-sociological research indicating 
that various interests of politicians, bureaucrats, and influential groups also 
contributed to the deceleration the privatization process and the mainte-
nance of state control through ownership.
The literature offers diverging approaches concerning the role of state-
owned entrepreneurial assets. Based on experiences from the past as well as 
ideological grounds, liberal-minded scholars do not see the benefits deriving 
from the direct involvement of the state in business ownership. On the other 
hand, a growing number of experts point out that the business environment 
for the “new generation” of entrepreneurial SOEs has changed to such an 
extent that the differences in the market behavior of private and public 
owners have become smaller, especially when both are exposed to the trans-
parency of the stock market and more stringent corporate governance rules.
The empirical literature is rather inconclusive on the question of 
whether the value of a given company is enhanced or reduced by the state 
having an ownership stake. Recent large studies, however, offer convincing 
results. For example, Beuselinck et al. (2016) analyzed the performance 
of 4,737 public companies from twenty-eight European countries for the 
period from 2005 to 2009. This research showed that during the 2008 
financial crisis—in contrast with the previous period—state ownership 
had a positive effect on company values, but only in those countries with 
a good institutional environment. According to the indicators used in the 
study, institutional quality is strong when investor interests are well pro-
tected and corruption is perceived as low. Obviously, the implications of 
institutional quality pertain to the Polish context as well.
The Structure of the Study
In all Eastern European postcommunist countries, including Poland, the 
activation of the stock market and the emergence of various models of 
state ownership and control were closely linked to the privatization pro-
cess during transition. This period is discussed in the second section of 
the present study. The third and fourth sections present the first years of 
the new millennium—the years marking the success of the Warsaw Stock 
Exchange on the one hand, and the slowing down of state withdrawal from 
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the economy on the other. This is followed by a review of developments 
taking place between 2008 and 2015, a period characterized by a renewed 
dynamism in privatization and the more active management of state assets. 
Section six discusses the major corporate governance issues of listed 
mixed-ownership companies. The seventh section deals with the recent 
(2016–17) developments in Poland: the paradigmatic shift towards illiber-
alism and its short-term impact on partially state-owned public companies. 
The chapter concludes with a summary of its main findings.
Table 1 
State ownership in companies on the stock exchange and their value according to market prices 
(January 18, 2014)
Name of the company















Groupa Azoty 33.00 1900
KGHM 31.79 7,240
PKO BP 31.39 15,800
Tauron 30.06 2,220
PKN Orlen 27.52 4,960
BOS 56.62 577
RAFAMET 47.28 31
Polimex-Mostostal 22.48 39 
Interferie 66.81 46
AB SA  5.50 28
EC Bedzin 14.88 10
Bogdanka  9.76 415
Paged  8.37 48
Total market value 103,106
Source: Patena (2014).
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Privatization during Transition
To understand the unique features of the current ownership structure of 
Poland’s biggest companies, we have to look back on the history of privati-
zation in Poland during the transition period. 
The privatization strategy was a cornerstone of the reform program 
of the first Polish government after transition. Privatization was primarily 
important for political-ideological reasons and for making the transition 
to a market economy irreversible. In thinking about economic rationality, 
the majority of experts took the axiomatic stance that state-owned large 
companies could not operate effectively in any political system. As for the 
implementation and the success of the privatization policy, it was under-
stood that, in time, the whole process must start with the creation of 
a strong legal framework and the appropriate institutions of legal enforce-
ment, regulation, and supervision. Polish economic policy makers also 
made the sound decision to create an economic environment conducive for 
the restructuring of large companies before privatization.
With the introduction of the Balcerowicz plan, which has been praised 
as a milestone in the early transition, the operational milieu of companies 
indeed changed dramatically. Suffice it to say, there were three dimensions 
to the plan: 1) liberalization that opened up markets and boosted compe-
tition 2) the robust reduction of subsidies; 3) the enhancement of bank-
ruptcy proceedings against insolvent companies initiated by banks and sup-
plier companies (Tamowicz and Dzierzanowski 2002). 
At the beginning of transition, Poland faced serious economic prob-
lems, including the almost unmanageably high external debt and hyperin-
flation. However, the country has been surprisingly successful in stabilizing 
the economy within a relatively short time and establishing the fundamen-
tals for rapid economic growth, the dynamism of which is still above the 
international average a quarter century later. Important factors is this suc-
cess story were the fast adjustment of many state-owned companies to the 
market and the new regulatory environment and the resulting restructuring 
that had taken place before their official privatization. Brian Pinto (2014) 
provides a  comprehensive account of the process. The author worked 
as a representative of the World Bank in Poland and described the rapid 
transformation of a major part of large former socialist companies using 
case studies and first-hand information.
With regard to the golden age of privatization, Pinto recalls that 
the majority of renowned economists emphasized the importance of the 
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speed of the privatization. He referred to authors such as Roman  Fry-
dman, Stanislaw  Wellisz, and others who, like most experts, had pre-
dicted that state-owned companies would become unviable if they were 
to pay a positive real interest rate on their bank loans or if they had to 
face competition induced by liberalized imports. The weaknesses of state-
owned companies’ corporate governance practices, together with the lack 
of incentives to accumulate corporate assets, were also used as arguments 
for fast-paced privatization. In reality, however, what happened was that 
numerous large SOEs were willing and able to adjust to the new rules of 
the evolving market economy. There were three main reasons why—con-
trary to expectations—this positive outcome occurred. The first reason 
was the hard budget constraints, which replaced the former “soft” oper-
ating conditions thanks to the uncompromising reform policy of the Min-
istry of Finance. The ministry tried to resist the bargaining attempts of 
many SOEs, blocked the flow of production subsidies, and placed limits 
on the bank loans granted to loss-making state-owned companies. The 
second reason was related to the beneficial effects of trade liberalization. 
By lifting import restrictions, a new competitive environment had been cre-
ated, which pushed the previously protected actors of the domestic market 
toward more prudent and efficient management. The third reason was 
that the managers of state-owned companies strove to build up their own 
business reputations. Since they were aware of the forthcoming large-scale 
privatization program, they wanted to demonstrate their preparedness for 
the new business environment.
In the early transition period, 8,453 state-owned companies were 
designated for privatization. The chief methods of Polish privatization 
included: 1) direct privatization aimed at small and medium-sized com-
panies, 2) liquidation privatization in the legal sense 3) indirect or capital 
privatization. From here we shall follow in detail the third method, since 
this was what was mostly applied to the privatization of large companies, 
including the nascent public mixed-ownership corporations, which are the 
focus of this chapter.
The indirect privatization process for state enterprises took place in 
two stages. In the first, so-called commercialization phase, SOEs were 
transformed into joint-stock (or limited liability) companies. In this stage, 
an administrative body representing the state—between 1966 and 2017 it 
was the Ministry of Treasury (MoT)—was the sole owner of the companies. 
The next step was to decide on the proportion of the company’s shares 
to be transferred into private hands and the method of selling. Here, the 
applied techniques were public tender, negotiations undertaken by invita-
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tion, and public offerings. This last method was the one that linked the 
privatization process to the rebirth and development of the capital market.
The privatization process of small and medium-sized companies had 
already been completed swiftly during the first few years of transition. The 
privatization of large state-owned companies, however, happened gradu-
ally, often in successive waves, over decades. In particular, the privatization 
of companies of “strategic importance” has been slow. These included oil 
refineries, coal mines, power plants, utilities, railways, chemical companies, 
pharmaceutical companies, and the large institutions of the financial sector 
(Błaszczyk and Patena 2015). The sluggishness of privatization in Poland 
is partly explained by the prudence of preparations and the long procedure 
of consensus seeking between political and social partners. In addition, as 
time passed, the privatization of large state-owned companies encountered 
more and more political hurdles. Behind-the-scene deals and rampant cor-
ruption that came to light in political battles threw cold water on citizens’ 
initial enthusiasm. There was an observable connection between the fluc-
tuation in the pace of privatization of large state companies and political 
campaigns during general elections. Capitalizing on the changing public 
opinion on privatization, either the opposition or the governing party (with 
strong interest groups behind each) stepped up or blocked the privatization 
process from time to time (Błaszczyk et al. 2005).2
Linking Privatization and the Development of the Capital Market
Among the transition countries in Central and Eastern Europe, Poland 
was, by far, the most successful in linking privatization with the fostering 
of the capital market. The privatization of large state companies through 
the stock market had many benefits that offset the higher transaction costs 
when compared to other methods of privatization. Being listed on a stock 
exchange provided companies with new sources of funds and helped them 
2  An example of the variablity described here is the new right-wing government’s 
1998 plan, which put the privatization of the so-called strategic sectors on 
the agenda again. The plan was very ambitious in terms of both the sectors 
(infrastructure, large banks, telecommunications) and the deadlines for the 
completion of deals. The privatization boom was also reflected in the spectacular 
surge in budget revenues. Three years later, however,with the fall of the 
government coalition, privatization lost momentum, and a sluggish period of 
privatization followed.
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enhance their good (business) reputations. A further benefit was that the 
transformation into a listed company automatically implied an upgrade in 
corporate governance standards as well. In the case of Poland, it was par-
ticularly important that the stock market provided a unique opportunity to 
combine state and private ownership. In such mixed setups, the state could 
preserve its influence on companies that it regarded as strategically signifi-
cant while letting the market signals and disciplinary power of the market 
function.
Depending on whether the companies entered the equity market for 
the first time or went through second and third rounds of privatization, we 
distinguish between privatization-induced initial public offerings (PIPO), 
initial public offerings (IPO), and secondary public offerings (SPO). At the 
beginning of transition, PIPOs helped launch the Warsaw Stock Exchange 
(abbreviated GPW from the Polish name), which was established by the 
state treasury. In November 1990, five major state-owned companies were 
introduced to the GPW. In three of them, a minority stake (not more than 
30 percent) was retained by the state. At the same time, the regulations on 
foreign investors limited their ownership shares to between 25 to 40 per-
cent. As a result of the political weight of trade unions, the employees of 
the respective state companies were granted 15 percent of the company’s 
shares for free.
The successful launch of the GPW and the effective monitoring 
applied by the Polish Securities Commission were widely acknowledged 
already in the 1990s. According to experts’ opinion, the regulations and 
the rigorous supervision of the Warsaw Stock Exchange were well above 
the standards elsewhere in the region. A  quarter of the 207 large-scale 
privatization projects earmarked for the first decade of transition were 
implemented through the capital market. One-third of the total privatiza-
tion income in the period between 1990 and 1999 was obtained through 
these fifty-five privatization-induced initial public offerings. In most cases, 
share packages were sold in successive installments via the stock exchange. 
In the case of PIPOs, on the average two-thirds of the shares of a given 
company were sold. 
In 1998, 165 companies were listed on the main GPW market and 
market capitalization reached $20 billion (15 percent of GDP in 1998). 
That year, the telecommunication industry with the IPOs of Telecomuni-
kacija Polska (TPSA) was the driver of the GPW’s dynamism. TPSA alone 
raised the capitalization of the Warsaw Stock Market by almost one-third. 
In terms of market shares, the financial sector came in second with one-
fifth of the GPW’s capitalization.
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Preserving higher shares of state ownership was mainly decided on the 
basis of a company’s character, in other words, whether they were consid-
ered of “strategic importance” or not. Enterprises in low priority sectors 
(such as the food industry) were privatized almost fully within a relatively 
short time. The privatization of companies in “sensitive” sectors (e.g., 
financial institutions), however, were frequently delayed, and, in many 
cases, the state remained a majority owner. Most of the companies in the 
heavy industry group were treated as strategic. Slow and only partial priva-
tization was the rule in these industries, too, as illustrated by the fact that 
less than half of the twenty-five Polish steel companies were privatized by 
the beginning of the new century (Nachtigal 2014). 
The first privatization wave of transition culminated in the 1999 pen-
sion reform, which gave a new impetus to the development of the Warsaw 
Stock Exchange. The new laws prescribed mandatory contributions to pri-
vate pension funds, which, in turn, were obliged to invest up to 50 percent 
in stocks, 95 percent of which had to be invested in companies listed on 
the GPW.
Although the pace of privatization slowed down starting in the begin-
ning of the 2000s, there still remained huge interest in IPOs on the 
Warsaw Stock Exchange. In 2004, PKO Bank (the largest domestic com-
mercial bank) was partially privatized. The state followed the established 
strategy as it retained share ownership of 50 percent plus 1. Through var-
ious measures, it also encouraged domestic small investors to participate 
in the privatization process. In 2005, the main attraction for investors was 
the partial privatization of PGNiG, the largest domestic gas company. In 
this case, the need for ensuring the security of energy supply was the main 
justification for maintaining majority state ownership in the company. In 
the first round, only 15 percent of PGNiG was sold through the stock 
market. This could only partially satisfy the strong demand for the com-
pany’s shares, which persisted in spite of the fact that the likely winner of 
the upcoming elections, the Law and Justice Party (PiS) led by Jarosław 
Kaczyński, pledged to suspend the privatization of PGNiG.
The Slowdown of Privatization
The incoming Kaczynski government blocked the sale of several large 
companies already designated for privatization (including companies 
that belonged to politically sensitive sectors such as shipbuilding and coal 
mining), and secondary public offerings on the stock market also came to 
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a halt. (The privatization of the aforementioned PGNiG, nevertheless, con-
tinued). In 2005, there were still around one thousand state-owned enter-
prises on the registry of the Ministry of the Treasury. The government’s 
negative stance towards privatization was partially ideological, but it was 
also connected to the scandals that had accompanied some earlier privati-
zation deals. Since Poland ranked poorly on international corruption lists, 
the government was determined to fight corruption on all fronts, including 
all transactions related to SOEs.
The analyses of Bałtowski, Kozarzewski, and Senderski are useful for 
studying the fluctuations of privatization, including the mid-2000 slow-
down. Bałtowski and Kozarzewski (2016) wrote about influential rent 
seekers who had an interest in maintaining a relatively large state sector 
and had the power to hinder market reforms on several fronts. Illustrating 
his work with concrete examples, Senderski (2015) came to a similar con-
clusion. Walecki (2007) analyzed party financing and political corruption 
and shed light on the channels through which money flowed from SOEs 
to party coffers. Bałtowski and Kozarzewski (2016) also drew attention to 
the controversial situation that stemmed from the Ministry of Treasury’s 
dual role as a privatization agency on the one hand, and as an owner and 
manager of the state’s assets on the other. The conflict arose from the fact 
that with the shrinkage of state ownership, the political weight of the min-
istry was obviously diminishing together with the potential benefits (e.g., 
supervisory board seats in SOEs) that could be drawn from state asset 
management.
Bałtowski and Kozarzewski (2016) examined the slowdown of priva-
tization from the point of view of fiscal policy as well. They summa-
rized changes that began in the mid-2000s with the switch from privati-
zation revenues to dividend incomes. According to fiscal statistics, from 
2005 onwards, earnings from state assets showed a steady upward trend. 
Between 2006 and 2009, each year dividend income exceeded privatization 
revenues in the state budget.
The New Wave of Market Reforms
After the parliamentary elections of October 2007, which were held two 
years ahead of schedule, the center-right Civic Platform (Platforma Oby-
watelska, PO) led by Donald Tusk, took power. The prime minister vowed 
to implement liberal economic policies coupled with solidaristic social 
policy. Following Polish liberal traditions, the government introduced 
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several market-oriented reforms, including the reduction of the share of 
state ownership in SOEs. In the background of the commitment to reduce 
the state’s influence on the economy, there were ideological presump-
tions as well as pragmatic considerations aimed at increasing national 
competitiveness.
In the second half of the 2000s, the Polish economy performed 
rather well. Nevertheless, some criticisms concerning the functioning of 
the economy arose primarily from international organizations (the World 
Bank, OECD, EBRD). One often repeated negative comment took aim 
at the persistent weight of the state in the Polish economy, pointing out 
that the private sector’s share of GDP was lagging behind that of the other 
new EU member states. Thus, a new chapter in the Polish privatization 
program was drafted, but this time, it coincided with the beginning of the 
global financial crisis. One year later, when the impact of the crisis reached 
Poland, the pressing need to increase budget revenues appeared as an 
additional impetus for the acceleration of privatization.
Civic Platform’s privatization policy prevailed for two election cycles. 
The eight-year-long privatization story can be divided into two, clearly dis-
tinguishable periods. Between 2008 and 2011 the goal to reduce the state’s 
ownership role as much as possible was unambiguous. By emphasizing 
the importance of a free and private economy, Civic Platform politicians 
wanted to demonstrate their dedication to the completion of the transition, 
as well the final break with the “communist past.” The prime minister also 
referred to the need to protect the economy from political influence when 
he said, “There is no better protection against politicians interfering in the 
management of companies than a real increase in the competitiveness of 
Polish companies and the Polish economy. This is achievable by wise, fast 
and dynamic privatisation” (Tusk 2007).
Mainly as a  result of its successful economic policy, Civic Platform 
was reelected for a second term. From that time on, however, the enthu-
siasm for privatization started to wane. The influence of those who argued 
for maintaining state control—primarily, but not exclusively, in the energy 
sector—was strengthened. SPOs on the Warsaw Stock Exchange slowed 
down, which meant that the share of state ownership in public companies 
remained the same or only marginally decreased. In a number of listed 
companies, the maintenance of mixed ownership was re-considered as an 
optimal solution in the long term. 
Next, we shall examine the privatization history of the Civic Platform-
led government in detail. “‘Everything is for sale,’ this is what Polish news-
papers advertise on their front pages,” reported the June 2, 2008 issue of 
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the Hungarian economic weekly Figyelő in its coverage on privatization in 
Poland. The article included a quote from a representative of the largest 
Polish opposition party, PiS, who called the adoption of the law which per-
mitted the sale of 740 state-owned companies, “the darkest day of Polish 
legislation” and a primary example of squandering national wealth.
 At the beginning of the new privatization wave, 1,237 companies 
belonged to the Ministry of Treasury and more than a quarter of them was 
under liquidation or close to bankruptcy as of March 2008. In the “actively 
operating” category, 887 public companies were registered, and among 
those, the 2008–2011 plan designated 740 for privatization. The eventual 
completion of the plan was heralded as the final act of transition privati-
zation. As far as the revenue from the sale of state-owned companies is 
concerned, the treasury calculated it brought in an amount of five to seven 
billion złoty (€1.43 to 2.0 billion) on average per year. The privatization 
record of the Tusk Cabinet between 2008 and 2011 was considered suc-
cessful by most professional measures. The Ministry of Treasury also made 
efforts to fulfill the promise of the ruling party’s election campaign: the 
pledge that this round of privatization would be more transparent, honest, 
and less bureaucratic than ever before. The Ministry of Treasury published 
both privatization plans (2008–2011 and 2012–2013), as well as the details 
of their implementation on its website. In three years, approximately 80 
percent of the privatization program was completed, both in terms of the 
number of companies and the revenue received by the treasury (Błaszczyk 
and Patena 2015). Further quantifiable results of the 2008-2011 privatiza-
tion include the reduction of the public sector’s ratio of GDP to below 20 
percent and the lowering of the proportion of public sector employees in 
overall employment figures to about 16 percent.
The state’s ownership activity and control, however, remained quite 
different across the sectors. Like other Eastern European countries, it 
was almost negligible in manufacturing industries but remained relatively 
strong in the extractive and infrastructure sectors. The state’s presence also 
depended on the size of the given corporation: the larger a company was 
(is), the more likely it belonged (belongs) to a group in which the state 
had (has) majority ownership. The state remained present as an owner 
in twenty out of the one hundred largest Polish companies and in almost 
half (twelve) of the twenty-five largest companies. These twelve companies 
accounted for two-thirds of the group’s sales and employed 68 percent of 
its employees.
In mid-2014, the Ministry of Treasury published a document (“Pri-
orities in the management of the portfolio of entities supervised by the 
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Minister of Treasury up to 2015”)3, which included the principles of the 
privatization and asset management of the wholly or partly state-owned 
companies. The Polish Government presented the list of twenty-two com-
panies regarded as strategically most crucial for the national economy:
Industrial Development Agency, Bank Gospodarstwa Krajowego, Azoty 
Group, Lotos Group, KGHM, PGE, Polska Wytwornia Papierow 
Wartosciowych, Polska Grupa zbrojeniowa, Orlen, PGNiG, Polskie 
Inwestycje Rozwojowe, Polish Radio, PKO BP, PzU, Przedsiebiorstwo 
Eksploatacji Rurociagow Naftowych Przyjazn, Przedsiebiorstwo 
Przeladunku Paliw Plynnych “Naftoport,” Tauron, Telewizja Polska, 
Totalizator Sportowy, Szczecin and Swinoujscie Harbour, Gdansk 
Harbour and Gdynia Harbour.
As can be seen, the list is varied as it includes large seaports, public ser-
vice media companies, the gambling industry, and also a few from the the 
twenty largest companies on the Warsaw Stock Exchange. In the “stra-
tegic” companies the Ministry of Treasury had full or majority owner-
ship and was firm on maintaining its stake in the long run. The man-
agement of these companies is closely monitored by state authorities, 
and a number of them are key players in government-initiated programs 
such as “Poland’s Energy Policy 2030” or “The Petroleum Sector Policy 
of the Government of the Republic of Poland.” Financial institutions 
also featured heavily on the list, and they included Bank Gospodarstwa 
Krajowego (the bank responsible for—among other things—financing 
regional development and the management of EU funds) and Polskie 
Inwestycje Rozwojowe (PIR.S.A.), which mainly financed long-term 
infrastructure investments. 
As discussed before, in the years of the global financial crisis, the 
Warsaw Stock Exchange performed very well, and it overtook most Euro-
pean exchanges in terms of the number of new listings. However, in 2014 
only thirteen IPOs were registered on the GPW’s main market, repre-
senting a 72 percent fall in the overall value as compared with 2013, which 
resulted in the GPW’s fall to eleventh in the European rankings. The 
modest results of the Warsaw Stock Exchange in 2014 were closely related 
to the slowdown in the privatization of large companies, including SPOs. 
The dynamics of the stock market were also hampered by the nationaliza-
3  Ministerstwo Skarbu Panstwa (2014), Warsaw.
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tion of half of private pension fund assets in 2013, as Polish pension funds 
used to be the most important investors in the GPW. 
Corporate Governance Regulation and Practice
To what extent the long-term state’s ownership share affects the efficiency 
of listed companies? On the basis of the mixed results derived from var-
ious empirical papers no simple answer can be given to this question. The 
general opinion regarding the role of the state as an active owner—based 
on decades of experience and common knowledge—however, is mostly 
negative. In 2015, the renowned international consulting firm, Pricewa-
terhouseCoopers (PwC) conducted a survey on state-owned enterprises. 
According to their results, 86 percent of top managers sampled opined 
that state ownership often entails politically motivated engagement in busi-
nesses, while 83 percent stated that it distorts competition. Moreover, the 
ratio of those with negative opinions rose by at least 10 percentage points 
compared to 2010. Focusing on the Polish case, several other studies point 
to the fact that depending on the strength of the given political party in 
power, state ownership frequently serves parties’ or influential groups’ 
interests at the expense of the company’s and/or other shareholders’ busi-
ness interests (Kozarzewski and Bałtowski 2015; Senderski 2015).
Ideally, the state as shareholder, together with the other owners of the 
company, considers maximizing shareholder value as its main task. Moving 
away from this ideal primarily depends on the quality of corporate gover-
nance mechanisms. In assessing the corporate governance (CG) strengths 
and weaknesses of listed companies, the most commonly considered issues 
include the criteria and procedure of electing board members; the compe-
tence of senior management; leadership aptitude and integrity; compliance 
with legal obligations; transparency; availability and reliability of the data 
required for the decision-making process; and regulation and practices 
related to fair relations between majority and minority shareholders. In the 
case of joint public-private corporations, it is especially important to ensure 
high quality CG as a safeguard against the abuse of state power.
By the 2000s, the international best practices in corporate governance 
of state-owned companies were already established. The OECD was at the 
forefront of formulating these guiding norms. In 2005, the “Guidelines 
on Corporate Governance of State-Owned Enterprises” was published 
(OECD, 2005), with recommendations for an effective and transparent 
operation of state-owned companies in the member states. The acknowl-
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edged aims of the “Guidelines” were the following: a) the professionaliza-
tion of the state as an owner; b) making SOEs operate with similar effi-
ciency, transparency, and accountability as private enterprises following 
best practices; and c) guarantees that competition between SOEs and pri-
vate enterprises is conducted on a  level playing field4. According to the 
document, both government ownership passivity and excessive interference 
in businesses should be avoided.
Poland revised its corporate law in several phases following transi-
tion and after becoming a member of the OECD. These modernized laws, 
unlike their predecessors, make explicit references to the rules of corpo-
rate governance and make a sharper distinction between private and public 
companies. Poland has adopted corporate governance solutions based on 
the “best practices” principle proposed by the OECD and incorporated 
them into its corporate governance codes for stock exhange listing require-
ments and governance rules of public companies.
The evolution of CG characteristics showed a close correlation with 
the development of the Warsaw Stock Exchange. For the GPW to build 
its currently outstanding reputation, it was necessary to adopt formal 
rules corresponding to European standards, which Poland accomplished 
well. Laws and rules on the book, however, were just one part of the story. 
Research (Pistor, Raiser, and Gelfer 2000) has drawn attention to the fact 
that the harder tasks in the creation of an efficient business environment 
and capital markets in emerging economies, including Poland, lie in legal 
enforcement, the actual implementation of regulations.
The ownership structure of publicly traded companies is one of the 
most important internal corporate governance elements. For outside inves-
tors and stakeholders too, it matters whether a corporation is widely held 
or dominated by blockholders and which categories of owners prevail. Sim-
ilar to most EU countries, the ownership structure of listed companies in 
Poland is typically concentrated. Quantifying the degree of concentration, 
relying on the average of data from 2004 to 2008, we find that the average 
share of the largest shareholder in GPW-listed companies was 41 percent, 
while the three largest shareholders accounted for 56.9 percent. In interna-
tional comparison, these figures indicate that the ownership concentration 
of companies listed on the Warsaw Stock Exchange is high, but lower than 
those of on other Central and Eastern European stock exchanges.
4  OECD. 2005. “Guidelines on Corporate Governance of State-Owned Enterpri-
ses.”
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Poland is even more different from its Eastern European neighbors if 
we compare the weight of various ownership categories. The most impor-
tant difference is that in Poland many companies (30 percent of all listed 
corporations) were founded after the transition in the 1990s, and their 
main owner is a natural person and/or a  single family. (Such ownership 
groups cannot be found, for example, on the Budapest or Prague stock 
exchanges). The share of foreign owners (investment funds and commer-
cial banks), however, is relatively low at 21.9 percent. Another differenti-
ating factor is the ownership role of the state which is only strong on the 
Warsaw Stock Exchange. Here the state is the largest shareholder in seven 
of the thirty largest companies.
The state as owner may appear in centralized or decentralized organi-
zations. In most OECD countries, the centralized model is typical, and this 
applies to Poland too, where the Ministry of Treasury represents the state. 
The centralized model has many advantages. Probably this model offers 
the easiest way to separate the ownership role of the state from its other 
functions, first of all, regulation.
The change of government in 2008 brought not only the accelera-
tion of privatization but also a new wave of corporate governance reforms. 
Increasing the transparency of the privatization process and the opera-
tion and management of existing SOEs was one of the goals emphasized 
in the reforms. The guidelines published on the website of the Ministry 
of Treasury show that in principle there cannot be a difference between 
the CG practices of state-owned companies and privately-owned entities. 
State-owned assets should be managed so that they generate profits and 
dividends and the state must refrain from non-business type of interven-
tions in listed companies. In the case of the so-called strategic companies, 
however, the state is entitled for a broader scope of direct intervention.
One of the most important corporate governance mechanism is the 
composition and authority of supervisory committees. Shareholders of 
companies listed on the GPW are represented on the supervisory com-
mittees in proportion to their ownership share. The Ministry of Treasury 
as a  shareholder delegates its representatives to supervisory boards, and 
these are responsible for appointing members of the executive board and 
monitoring the management. More than half (53 percent) of the supervi-
sory board members of the eighteen mixed public-private companies are 
either employed by the Ministry of Treasury or are other state nominees. 
In addition to positions on the supervisory boards, mixed companies may 
employ two to three other people who “represent” the Ministry of Trea-
sury. For some companies, the Ministry of Treasury has a special right to 
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appoint the members of supervisory and of management boards. In such 
cases, the right of appointment is not proportional to the ownership ratio. 
For example, in the case of PKO PB, the largest commercial bank, it is up 
to the Ministry of Treasury to decide how many supervisory board mem-
bers it wants to assign, and the Ministry also has the right to appoint the 
chairman and the deputy chairman of the board of directors.
In order to be a  candidate for supervisory board membership, the 
Ministry of the Treasury’s nominee has to demonstrate her or his compre-
hensive legal and business expertise in a preliminary examination. Those 
who successfully pass the examination will be listed as potential supervi-
sory candidates in the database of the Ministry of Treasury.
During the last round of CG reforms, Poland made efforts to comply 
with OECD Guidelines when selecting members of the supervisory boards. 
As of 2012, in the case of companies of strategic importance, a nomination 
committee with ten independent members has to be formed, and mem-
bers are appointed by the Prime Minister. This nomination body then 
makes its recommendations to the Ministry of Treasury for openings on 
supervisory committees. The representatives of the Ministry have stated 
on several occasions that a new approach to the supervision of state-owned 
companies is envisaged, which includes the selection of top executives on 
the basis of professional skills and a promise that political connections are 
given less consideration. As opposed to this optimistic rhetoric, Kozarze-
wski and Baltowski (2016), along with others, prove that political profi-
teering as a motivation in state property management has remained fre-
quent, and political aspects still prevail during the selection of supervisory 
board members of both pure SOEs and mixed ownership corporations. In 
the next section, we shall demonstrate that these findings have been fully 
confirmed by events that have unfolded starting in late 2015.
The Illiberal Turn
After the elections in October 2015, a significant reversal occurred both 
in the economic role of the state and the prospects of wholly or partially 
state-owned companies. After eight years of governance based on liberal 
ideology and practice, Polish voters brought the rightist-conservative Law 
and Justice Party (PiS) to power. This conservative-nationalist party turned 
against a number of important economic policy issues promoted by the 
preceding government and launched the second illiberal turn in the region 
after Hungary’s in 2010.
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Analysis of the failure of the previous government and the emergence 
of right-wing populism in Poland is beyond the scope of this paper. One 
point, however, should be emphasized: the performance of the economy 
hardly features on the list of explanatory factors. The Polish economy 
achieved remarkably good results in the previous two decades and also 
performed well in international comparison during the global financial 
crisis. Between 2007 and 2014, Poland’s GDP expanded by 4 percent. 
(According to Eurostat, the same figure was 0.3 for Hungary and 0.7 
percent for the European Union as a whole). The indicators of income 
inequality have remained around the European average, and macroeco-
nomic imbalances were not a matter of grave concern either. The uninter-
rupted flow of credits in the peak crisis years and the stability of the whole 
financial system have also won widespread appreciation. In the competi-
tiveness rankings of the Institute for Management Development (IMD), 
Poland has moved from the 52nd place in 1997 to the 33rd in 2013, while 
UNCTAD’s “World Investment Prospects Survey 2013–2015” regarded 
Poland as Europe’s fourth, and globally the fourteenth, most attractive 
destination for foreign direct investment.
The first steps taken by the PiS administration included a  series of 
high-level personnel changes based on political proximity and perceived 
loyalty. The Szydlo government had already started work on personnel 
changes in the top management of state-owned enterprises5 in the first 
weeks after coming into power. In November 2015, the media6 was awash 
with reports on the dismissals of members of the supervisory boards and 
boards of directors of the largest Polish companies and the appointment of 
loyal cadres (including well-known personalities from the previous PiS gov-
ernment). All the former chief executive officers of the thirty-two largest 
state-owned companies (with the exception of PKO BP) were removed 
5  “A bill authored by Poland’s governing party Law and Justice (PiS) . . . opens the 
door to dismissing some 1,600 executives in various public offices. Candidates for 
the vacated posts will no longer be selected through competitions, but appointed. 
They will be allowed to be active party members and won’t have to take part in 
the, so far mandatory, preparatory training. Assuming the bill is passed into law 
before Christmas, the governing party may have full control over key offices as 
soon as in February.”  Source: http://www.warsawvoice.pl/WVpage/pages/article.
php/33993/news 02.12.2015. 
6  The Warsaw Voice Newsletter, an online news service, provided regular reports on 
such events in English.
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and replaced by leaders who the ruling party considered trustworthy.7 The 
political motives behind the purges were obvious. David Jackiewicz, the 
new government’s Minister of Treasury, made a statement during a parlia-
mentary debate that the support of and the commitment to the new polit-
ical course was one of the main considerations to be taken into account 
when appointing the management of large companies. According to him, 
the leaders of these companies had to be unquestionable supporters of 
the government’s new economic program and were expected to place the 
nation’s interests higher than the “narrow” interest of the companies they 
helmed.
Basing top personnel changes on loyalty to the governing party was 
a common practice of former Polish governments too. With the new PiS 
regime, however, the extremely high number of posts involved and the 
speed of implementation was shocking for many observers. According to 
the Polish daily Rzeczpospolita (April 14, 2016), the tempo of cadre change 
during the first months of 2016 was the fastest since the year 2000.
In thirteen of the fourteen state-controlled companies of the WIG-30 
group listed on the Warsaw Stock Exchange, new candidates were nomi-
nated and approved for chief executive posts by the Ministry of Treasury. 
The market reaction to the political appointments and to the possibility 
of an implied expansion of interventionist policies appeared quickly. The 
stock index already began to fall during the first month after the elections 
mainly due to the growing sense of uncertainty among investors. After 
a  few months of the Szydlo cabinet, credit rating agencies downgraded 
their—then high-level—country ratings for Poland. Moody’s was one of 
the credit agencies that drew attention to the increased risk concerning 
the prospects of the Polish economy. Analysts believed that changes in the 
legal and institutional environment were likely to result in a loss of business 
confidence that could lead to the decline in growth dynamics.
With the benefit of hindsight, however, it must be acknowledged that 
the gloomy predictions proved wrong. After a short, temporary setback, 
the Polish economy grew again by impressive rates, and the Warsaw Stock 
7  The following are two concrete examples from the largest companies: the chief 
executive officer position of PKN Orlen Oil company was given to W. Jasinski, 
a member of parliament as well as the inner circle of Jaroslaw Kaczynski. P. 
Wozniak, the Minister of Economy of the previous PiS government took over as 
the head of the largest gas industry. company. In early 2016, the positions of the 
president of the Warsaw Stock Exchange as well as several members of the super-
visory board were also replaced.
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Exchange moved up in the ranks of best performing exchanges. Inves-
tors’ sentiments seemed to be no longer affected by political upheaval. 
The GPW saw a large increase in the capitalization of local companies and 
boasted the third largest number of IPOs of any European stock exchange 
in 2017.8
Let us return to the determination of the PiS government to over-
haul the whole concept of privatization and establish a new attitude toward 
SOEs. The strategy included the push for investigating the allegedly cor-
rupt privatization transactions of the previous government between 2007 
and 2015, concentrating on the media and energy sectors. D. Jackiewicz, 
in his interview with Dziennik Gazeta Prawna (May 18, 2016), evaluated 
the privatization of several energy companies as a  mistaken policy and 
envisaged their partial or full re-nationalization. The minister accused 
the previous government of initiating irresponsible sales transactions in 
order to increase privatization revenues at all costs. The Supreme Audit 
Office placed some of the suspected cases of corruption under investiga-
tion. According to the Office’s report, during the previous government, 
the Ministry of Treasury privatized several large companies, including the 
Ciech Chemical Trust, in a non-transparent way and possibly for unjustifi-
ably low prices.
The new government not only harshly criticized the previous govern-
ments’ privatization practices but also emphasised the discontinuity in SOE 
policies and introduced a series of regulatory and institutional changes. It 
has publicly announced the end of privatization and liquidated the former 
main institution of state asset management, the Ministry of Treasury.
The new SOE governance law was implemented in 2017. After disman-
tling the MoT, one group of companies was directly subordinated to the 
Prime Minister’s Office, while other SOEs were transferred to the control of 
the ministries corresponding to their sectoral classification. The Act on Rules 
of State Asset Management set forward provisions that concerned large com-
panies of strategic importance. At present, there are thirty such companies, 
and they are placed under the special supervision of the Prime Minister. The 
Act also forbids the practice of direct privatization.9 According to the former 
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strengthen the competitive power of companies by realizing synergy effects 
from cooperation among them. By contrast, opposition parties saw the liq-
uidation of the Ministry of the Treasury and the new legislation on SOEs as 
more proof of the rising statist approach to managing the economy.
The state’s more active involvement in the economy has become a de 
facto part of its development plans. In March 2016, the “Responsible 
Development Plan”10 championed by the Minister of Development11 and 
Deputy Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki (since December 2017, the 
prime minister of Poland) was published. According to the guidelines of 
the plan, state companies have a key role to play in the reindustrialization 
of Poland, in innovation-driven growth, as well as in breaking out of the 
middle-income trap. In the vision of the “new Poland,” beyond strength-
ening public control, the next important pillar was the concept of “re-pol-
onization.” One slogan of the plan repeatedly announced by the former 
Prime Minister was: “more Polish economy in Poland’s economy” (więcej 
polskiej gospodarki w polskiej gospodarce).
The Morawiecki plan pointed out that the development of the Polish 
economy was negatively affected by a  lack of balance between foreign 
and domestic capital during the previous two decades. While, on a gen-
eral level, the positive contributions of foreign direct investments were 
acknowledged, measures to reduce perceived over-dependence on foreign 
investment were planned. A Development Ministry official explained in an 
interview: “We need to become less dependent on foreign capital, espe-
cially in such crucial, strategic sectors like media, banks or energy. There-
fore we need to support and mobilise national investments.”12 
10  According to the goals of the plan, the government wants to achieve the fol-
lowing by 2020: a rise in investment to above 25 percent of GDP; spending 
on research and development to reach 2 percent of GDP; the number of Pol-
ish-owned medium and large companies to be increased to over 22,000; the 
outward Polish FDI to be increased by 70 percent; the growth rate of industrial 
production to exceed GDP growth; Poland’s GDP per capita to reach 79 per-
cent of the EU average.
11  The Ministry of Development, responsible for developing economic develop-
ment strategies, was established in November 2015 after the reorganization of 
the Ministry of Economy and the Ministry of Infrastructure and Development. 
To facilitate the more effective coordination between the agencies, the Economic 
Committee of the Prime Minister’s Council was formed. The Council, which is 
also managed by Morawiecki, supervises all the economic ministries.
12  Paulina Pacula, “Poland seeks to boost state control of economy,” EU Observer, 
Feb. 24, 2016, https://euobserver.com/beyond-brussels/132421.
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At the time when the PiS government started office 60 percent of 
bank capital was foreign owned which was indeed well above the OECD 
average. The negative evaluation of this fact, however, was not new: The 
high ratio of foreign banks was a concern for the previous administration, 
too. The first significant measure to raise the share of domestic ownership 
was taken already in the first half of 2015, when PzU S.A., Poland’s lar-
gest insurer (a listed company under government control) purchased a sub-
stantial stake in Alior Bank.13
After the elections the PiS government continued the repolonization 
of the financial sector with increased vigour. The plan was to initiate and 
support buyouts so that the share of foreign lending institutions would fall 
below 50 percent. The applied strategy for strengthening Polish capital in 
the financial sector and simultaneously creating a strong state-controlled 
banking group was to continue the acquisition of controlling stakes in fore-
ign-owned banks. In 2017 in a major buyout deal, Unicredit, the giant 
Italian bank sold its 33 percent stake in Bank Pekao (Poland second-largest 
bank) to PzU S.A. and the Polish Development Fund (PFR). Previously, 
the share of Unicredit in Pekao was the biggest equity stake held by an 
international lender in a Polish bank.14
The above-described transactions fulfilled the twin goals of the PiS 
government: In relatively short time the share of domestic ownership in 
the banking sector grew to 55 percent and one third of banking assets got 
directly and indirectly under state control. The two biggest Polish banks 
(in terms of assets), PKO Bank Polski and Bank Pekao are public compa-
nies yet both are under the strong ownership control by the state.
Opinions are divided concerning the expected benefits from the 
changes. The Polish Financial Supervision Authority e.g. considers the 
new structure of the banking sector to be optimal.15 On the other hand, 
a number of experts warn of the inherent risk of the increased presence of 
the government in the financial industry.They talk about the danger of dis-
torting competion, the tendency for and the concrete examples of directed 





15  https://thelawreviews.co.uk/edition/the-banking-regulation-review-edition- 
10/1190893/poland.
16  https://euobserver.com/beyond-brussels/13.
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The idea of repolonization is envisaged be applied to other sectors 
as well. This is justified by the fact that at present more than 60 percent 
of Polish exports are produced by companies financed by foreign capital. 
Here too, development plans promise changes in the balance between 
domestic and foreign interests. There is also determination to increase the 
number of Polish “national champions,” whose number is still below ten. 
The Morawiecki plan requires $250 billion for development purposes over 
the next twenty-five years. As for the sources of these investments, half of 
the amount is calculated to come from European Union funds, while the 
other half is expected to be covered by domestic funding, including signifi-
cant contributions from state-owned companies.
Summary
This study has been built on the observation that the state is permanently 
present as a minority or majority owner of Polish companies listed on the 
Warsaw Stock Exchange, Central Europe’s largest exchange. From the 
beginning of Polish economic transition, the privatization of large SOEs 
was linked to the development of the domestic capital market. In sectors 
that were considered strategic or politically sensitive, stock market privati-
zation was carried out in several phases, and the state still (as of summer 
2018) maintains its majority or minority control in fourteen large public 
companies. Theoretically and occasionally, the mixed private and state 
ownership in public companies has the potential to be an efficient combi-
nation. The exposure to competition on the capital market helps increase 
efficiency and transparency, which, under optimal conditions, places limits 
on the enforcement of non-business, including political objectives arising 
from state ownership. In Poland, however, the interdependence of politics 
and the economy has remained strong, thus creating space for rent-seeking 
behaviors and various forms of corruption. 
In Poland, the latest major wave of privatization began in 2008, when 
the center-right, market-oriented Civic Platform came to power. The Tusk 
government, with its large-scale privatization program, accomplished 
several goals simultaneously. It strengthened the commitment to market 
reforms by giving the green light to further reductions in the state’s owner-
ship stakes in strategically important large companies. Because the majority 
of shares were sold on the capital market, the Warsaw Stock Exchange 
became a European top performer in the field of IPOs, even during the 
worst years of the global financial crisis. The sale of hundreds of millions-
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of-dollars-worth share packages also added considerable revenue to the 
tight state budget. Meanwhile, however, various forms of state control 
(with concomitant examples of mismanagement) persisted, even in cases 
when the state was only in the position of a minority shareholder.
In October 2015, a  significant reversal in the economic role of the 
state and in the prospects of wholly or partially state-owned companies 
took place after the anti-liberal Law and Justice Party (PiS) came to power. 
The Szydlo government started making changes to top personnel right 
after its inauguration, and this affected almost all mixed and state-owned 
companies. The goal was to put politically engaged and trustworthy cadres 
into key positions. As for the future of state-owned companies, the end of 
privatization was openly declared together with a commitment to the more 
active and responsible involvement of state agencies in the economy.
The main ideological pillars of the economic policy of the new polit-
ical regime are patriotism (which includes the concept of “re-poloniza-
tion”) and the greater centralization of and control over state assets. The 
mobilization of state-owned companies’ funds to achieve national develop-
ment goals has also been taking place. Measures were applied to increase 
the domestic ownership ratio in the financial sector. The recent buyout 
transactions serve as a good example of how the structure of the financial 
sector has been changing in line with the new economic policy: the share 
of domestic ownership is increasing together with the stronger direct and 
indirect control of the state.
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CHAPTER 7
The Changing Role of the State in Slovenia: 
Privatization and Bank Consolidation
Miklós soMai
Introduction
In the period between the end of World War II and its declaration of inde-
pendence, Slovenia was part of the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugo-
slavia (SFRY). As part of the SFRY, the transformation of Slovenia’s own-
ership structure had already begun during the war: 80 percent of banking 
and industrial properties were nationalized via confiscation (in the case of 
collaborators) or lockouts (for foreign owners) in 1945. In agriculture, the 
Law of August 23, 1945 called for the expropriation of holdings above 
45 hectares and church lands in order to subdivide and redistribute small 
plots to the people, and also to establish state farms (Gulyás 2009, 159).
But the Soviet-style state-socialist economic model ended rather 
quickly. Central planning was replaced by the so-called self-management 
socialist economic system, introduced more as a byproduct of the con-
flict between Tito and Stalin than as a result of the conscious struggle of 
the workers’ movement.1 Workers’ councils, which lasted for forty years 
and formed a core element of this unique Yugoslav experience, gradually 
gained importance, transforming from a consultative body into an organ 
of workers’ management. However, even at the peak of their influence in 
the mid-1970s—they gained the right to elect firms’ executives, enact eco-
nomic policy, and determine income distribution—they remained in the 
shadow of management, 76 percent of which belonged to the League of 
Communists and retained authority over day-to-day affairs. Interestingly, 
1  In agriculture, from 1953 on, farm cooperatives turned into self-governing agri-
cultural organizations, from which members were free to withdraw and start their 
own business (Gulyás 2009, 160).
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although the 1965 reform, by further liberalizing and decentralizing the 
system, did in principle intend to develop self-management and enable 
workers’ councils to become more independent, in practice benefited 
mainly the managers to grab some of the decision-making power back from 
the state. While strengthening the managers as the real decision-makers 
in enterprises, the introduction of elements of a market economy caused 
strong social differentiation, a rise in unemployment and regional inequali-
ties, and contributed to a growing general perception that the whole model 
of self-management was unjust. As the system proved unable to persuade 
less developed republics not to regard themselves as exploited by the more 
developed, the legitimacy of workers’ self-management gradually weak-
ened, and allowed nationalism to take its place as the dominant ideology 
(Marković 2011).
Transformation and Stabilization
When it gained independence, Slovenia was in a  much better position 
than almost all the other postcommunist countries in Central and Eastern 
Europe. Due to its favorable geographic location, only high or middle-
income countries surrounded it, and its economy could draw on a skilled 
and qualified workforce and extant trade relations with the West. Slovenia 
was, at the time, the most developed republic of the former Yugoslavia, 
and, together with the future Czechia, it took the lead in terms of real 
GDP per capita among the would-be EU-member states of the region.2
The independent Slovenia faced a threefold transition: from socialism to 
a market economy; from a regional to a national economy; and, most impor-
tantly, from a republic of Yugoslavia to an independent state that became 
a full member of the European Union in 2004 (Mrak et al. 2004, ix).
Interestingly, just as the Yugoslav self-management system had been 
a sort of moderate version of a socialist planned economy—with the busi-
ness sector enjoying ample freedom in their investment, production, and 
pricing decisions, independent Slovenia adopted the mildest possible ver-
sion of capitalism. It opted for the region’s least radical strategy of marketi-
zation based on legally enforced negotiated management-labor, so-called 
neocorporatist social partnership, coupled with a generous (transforma-
2  Economic Research Service. 2015. “Real Per Capita GDP (2010 dollars) Histori-
cal.”
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tion cost) compensation policy and welfare state. This strategy, which was 
made possible through the high level of the state’s administrative capacity, 
high quality governance, and especially trust in the capacity and credibility 
of the state, resulted in a high degree of social cohesion and low levels of 
income inequality. The country also became a  top spender on pensions 
and education in East Central Europe. Its ability to build the region’s most 
stable and efficient state institution made Slovenia the most Westernized 
postcommunist country. Early on in its transition, it exhibited all the attri-
butes of Western European small states because of its economic openness, 
capitalist accumulation (namely high level outward FDI), “protective and 
efficiency-enhancing compensatory policies, macroeconomic stability, and 
governance by established democratic and neocorporatist institutions” 
(Böhle and Greskovits 2012, 182).
The success of this socio-economic model, which was built on con-
sensus, gradualism, and pragmatism, not only enabled Slovenia to gain 
membership in the most important international institutions (EU, NATO, 
OECD), but also contributed to the transformation of this small country 
into one of the fastest growing economies in Europe, and the first new EU 
member from the former Eastern bloc to introduce the Euro.
Undoubtedly, the most important component of this transformation 
process, which was also the guarantee of its success, had been the gradual, 
decentralized, and distributive character of the so-called first wave of priva-
tization, which lasted from the late 1980s until 1999.3 The characteristics 
of the process constituted a compromise between the interests of new and 
old elites: a decentralized process enabled old elites to maintain control, 
and the free distribution of shares legitimated new elites.4
The Slovenian privatization concept, apart from transforming more 
than 1,300 self-managed enterprises into private companies, also included 
3  The process was gradual in the sense that initial privatization allowed not only 
full, but also partial ownership transfers; it was also decentralized as far as self-
managed enterprises were given the right to initiate their own transformation into 
private companies; and finally, it was distributive, since there was the free distri-
bution of shares to citizens (Mencinger 2006, 6–8).
4  Squeezing the managers out of the privatization process could have had drastic 
consequences. Due to information asymmetry, managers might have found “a 
way of taking possession of the corporate liquidity flow” (Prašnikar et al. 1999, 
3), unless decision makers took into account both their central role in initiating 
the transformation process, as well as their de facto economic ownership position 
within the companies. So it seemed to be wiser to strengthen their property rights 
rather than weaken or destroy them (Mencinger 2006, 5).
Szanyi - 00 könyv.indb   191 2019.11.15.   9:32
192 MIKLóS SOMAI
the sale of approximately 100,000 council dwellings to their occupants, the 
restitution of assets that had been nationalized between 1945 and 1958, 
and the assignment of 40 percent of shares in food processing companies 
to farmers’ cooperatives. It was a  mixture of free distribution, internal 
buy-outs at discount rates and the possibility of deferred payment to 
employees, and commercial privatization. Apart from large, unprofitable 
companies, which were set to be placed under the control of the so-called 
Development Fund and sold after refurbishment, and strategic firms (e.g., 
steel mills, utilities) to be maintained under state ownership, shares of the 
companies identified by the 1992 Privatization Law were to be distributed 
through the following scheme: 10 percent were to be transferred to the 
Pension Fund (KAD); another 10 percent to the Restitution Fund (SOD); 
a further 20 percent to the Development Fund; 20 percent of shares were 
sold to employees (in exchange for their vouchers); and the remaining 40 
percent remained in the hands of companies to decide on their distribu-
tion. In profitable small and medium-sized labor-intensive firms (i.e., more 
than 60 percent of companies identified by the law), workers and managers 
acquired majority ownership. The second most popular method of priva-
tization (in more than 10 percent of cases) was applied to profitable large 
firms—in fact, firms that were too large for insiders to acquire a majority 
stake—where managers tried to maintain their influence by combining 
the internal distribution of shares with public auctions, thus opting for 
a dispersed shareholder structure rather than strategic and/or institutional 
owners (Simoneti et al. 1998, 95; Mencinger 2006, 7–11).
The first wave of privatization was followed by a  non-transparent 
domestic consolidation of ownership, as transactions were mostly made on 
informal markets with limited competition and transparency. At the end 
of the process, managers, domestic companies, as well as state and pri-
vate funds had become the key economic players (Simoneti et al., 2001, 
31–32). This model enabled the state to maintain significant ownership 
in privatized firms through the distribution of shares to quasi-govern-
mental funds (KAD, SOD).5 Foreign and/or strategic investors played 
5  There are several names for these two funds in the literature. They are called 
state-owned, state-controlled, and even quasi-governmental funds. The latter 
name comes from the Slovenian literature and relates to the fact that the pro-
ceeds from the sale of their assets were not transferred to the state but were dedi-
cated to cover the claims of the former owners of national assets (SOD) and co-
finance the obligatory pay-as-you-go pension system on an annual basis (KAD) 
(Simoneti, Marko. 2016. Consultation via email, 16 June 2016).
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a much smaller role in the privatization process.6 Nevertheless, the first 
wave of privatization was still an organic one, as managers, who played an 
important role in preparing the transition process in the communist era, 
remained heavily involved in the lives of corporations.
The Financial Sector
Prior to transition, commercial banks were organized on a regional basis 
and virtually owned by the self-governing firms they served. When these 
companies were converted into public limited liability companies, banks 
were not treated as separate entities, so they were automatically privatized 
together with their clients-companies (Mencinger 2006, 20). Consequently, 
like their clients, the ownership structure for most of these banks became 
highly fragmented. Additionally, many new banks were established and for-
eign capital was allowed to enter the banking sector—partly through acqui-
sition, partly through the creation of new units (World Bank 1999, 63).
At the beginning of transition, due to the disintegration of Yugoslavia 
and the ensuing financial hardships in the corporate sector, banks retained 
30 to 40 percent of non-performing loans and a significant amount of lia-
bilities largely due to London Club creditors. By 1993, a huge bank con-
solidation and nationalization program became inevitable. Because 45 
percent of their loans were classified as non-performing, the three largest 
banks: Ljubljanska Banka (LB), Kreditna Banka Maribor (KBM), and 
Kommercialna Banka Nova Gorica (KBNG), which together represented 
53 percent of the Slovenian banking sector, had two-thirds of their toxic 
assets swapped for government bonds issued by the newly established 
Bank Rehabilitation Agency (BRÜ). The total consolidation amounted 
to approximately DEM 1.9 billion, an amount just under 5 percent of 
the country’s 1993 GDP. Later, KBNG merged with KBM, and the two 
remaining banks were split into two: the old banks took over all claims 
and liabilities against the former SFR Yugoslavia, and the new ones—100 
percent state owned Nova Ljubljanska Banka (NLB) and Nova Kreditna 
Banka Maribor (NKBM)—retaining the rest. As a result of this successful 
program, by early 1997, both banks satisfied the conditions set by the Bank 
6  At the end of 1999, strategic investors held less than half (10.92%), while foreign 
ones less than one-fifth (i.e., 1.2%) of shares compared to what was considered 
to be optimal for the ownership structure of privatized Slovenian firms (Simoneti 
and Gregoric 2004, 225).
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of Slovenia and were excluded from the consolidation process by mid-
1997. Paradoxically, during the country’s transition to a market economy, 
public ownership did not decrease but rather significantly increased in the 
Slovenian financial sector and stood at least at 50 percent by the end of 
1990s (World Bank 1999, 62–64).
This excessive state involvement coincided with the relatively weak 
presence of foreign capital in the Slovenian financial sector. In 2001, the 
penetration ratio of majority-owned foreign bank affiliates stood at 20.6 
percent, a fraction of what it was in other countries in the region soon to 
become members of the EU (Figure 1).
Figure 1 
Penetration ratio of majority-owned foreign bank affiliates in CEECs (2001)
Source: UNCTAD 2004. Penetration ratio: the ratios of assets of majority-owned foreign bank affiliates to host countries’ total bank 
assets. CEECs: Central and East European countries.
The 2002 privatization program attempted to change this situation, when 
the government tried to include private capital in two of the largest state-
owned banks: NLB and NKBM. While the privatization of the latter 
proved to be a total failure, that of the former was a temporary success. 
In 2002, the Belgian KBC bought 34 percent of NLB’s capital with the 
goal of using it as a  springboard to enter ex-Yugoslav markets, and the 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (hereafter EBRD) 
acquired another 5 percent. Nevertheless, the Belgians failed to reach an 
agreement with the main owner of the bank, the Slovenian government, 
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divested their ownership share in two steps; in 2006, they reduced it to 22 
percent and in 2012 to 0 percent (Smith and Norman 2012). 
Overheating the Economy
Despite its unprecedented prosperity since 1993,7 Slovenia has been 
increasingly under pressure to move closer to Western standards and 
reduce the public sector’s stake in corporate ownership. This pressure 
paralleled the deepening of Slovenia’s integration into the European and 
world economy.
In line with both Western expectations and the objectives of the 
Lisbon Strategy, which was renewed in spring 2005, gradualism was put to 
a halt. A so-called Reform Strategy was put into action by the new center-
right government that returned to power after twelve years in the oppo-
sition. With a goal to boost the efficiency of public administration—and 
thereby economic competitiveness—the Reform Strategy outlined sixty-
seven economic policy measures in a wide range of areas (e.g., health care, 
education, the tax and pension systems, labor market, social transfers, 
public utilities, infrastructure, research and development, the use of EU 
funds, etc.), covering practically every aspect of life in which the state had 
a say. Measures 19–23 were designed to deal with privatization and the 
development of the financial system.8 
The second wave of privatization, which began in 2005, was received 
in diverse ways. On one hand, the government thought it was a transparent 
process that was open to foreign investors, and which provided opportu-
nity for the domestic financial market to develop further, and therefore rec-
onciled both big and small shareholders’ interests, resulting in the gradual 
withdrawal of the state (represented by KAD and SOD) from the econ-
7  If we compare the performance in the years between 2001 and 2005 with the 
five-year pre-transition period (1986–1990), we can see that Slovenia came the 
closest to the EU15 average in the region. Out of the CEECs, only three coun-
tries were able to reduce the gap with old member states in terms of real GDP 
per capita: Estonia by 0.4 percentage points, Poland by 4.0 percentage points, 
and Slovenia by 7.4 percentage points (ERS 2015).
8  Slovenian Government. 2005. “The Framework of Economic and Social 
Reforms for Increasing the Welfare in Slovenia, adopted by Slovenia’s Govern-
ment on 3 November 2005.” (pp. 66-75) http://www.slovenijajutri.gov.si/filead-
min/urednik/dokumenti/The_Framework_of_Economic_and_Social_Reforms_
for_Increasing_the_Welfare_in_Slovenia.pdf. 
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omy.9 On the other hand, the opposition thought it to be a non-transparent 
process in which the government embraced the strategy of Spanish con-
quistadors (Damijan 2012). Their criticism focused on appointments of 
the government’s men to board positions in both state-owned banks and 
companies and that the state-owned banks were then forced to finance 
management buy-outs (hereafter MBOs) in those state-owned companies. 
By doing so, the government exposed both the banks and companies to 
extreme risks and overheated the economy in cyclically sensitive sectors like 
real estate, construction, and financial mediation. Neutral experts called the 
process insider privatization (Ivers 2014, 29), and even the OECD drew 
attention to the fact that the weak framework of governance in state-owned 
banks was likely to have contributed to poor credit standards, excessive risk 
taking, and the misallocation of credits (OECD 2013, 9). 
Apart from a handful of widely publicized success stories—the sale 
of 55.3 percent of SIJ (Slovenian steel group) to Russian KOKS and 48.1 
percent of the second largest bank (NKBM) via an initial public offering 
(IPO)—counterbalanced by some notable failures (like the aborted priva-
tization of Triglav or Telekom Slovenije), the aims of the second wave of 
privatization: to consolidate ownership interests and increase the role of 
strategic investors, have not been met. Although between 2004 and 2007, 
the number of companies owned by the state through KAD and SOD 
declined from 492 to 198 (Slovenian Government 2008, 13), in reality, 
the risk of potential political interference in the economy did not diminish. 
By 2007, the two funds, initially designed to become portfolio investors 
through various swaps of shares, managed to concentrate their control 
over Slovenian blue chips: they acquired at least a blocking minority (a 
25 percent +1 voting share) in ten out of the twenty-eight most important 
companies listed on the Ljubljana Stock Exchange.10 Thus their role went 
beyond what had been initially projected, and they established the capacity 
9  The two state-controlled funds (KAD and SOD), which disposed of dispersed hold-
ings in a large number of companies, were to be transformed into regular portfo-
lio investors with an obligation to reduce their combined ownership in every single 
company under a threshold of 10 percent within two years in the case of listed com-
panies or two and a half years in non-listed ones. No time limit had been set for 
eighteen investments of strategic importance and four companies of special national 
interest—i.e., the two major banks (NLB and NBKM), the biggest insurance com-
pany (Triglav), and Telekom Slovenije (Slovenian Government 2007, 12).
10  Gorenje (home appliances), Krka (pharmaceutical), Petrol, Mercator (the lead-
ing food retailer), Luka Koper (the only seaport), Aerodrom Ljubjana (the main 
airport), Delo (the leading newspaper), etc. (Mencinger 2006, 27).
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to formulate corporate strategies. Given the predominance of internal 
owners and state-controlled funds in the process, just as in the first wave, 
the second wave of privatization failed to attract enough strategic or foreign 
investors—a scenario that could have led to some restructuring in under-
capitalized Slovenian companies (Georgieva and Riquelme 2013, 7).
The Roots of Trouble
In order to understand the motivations of the third wave of privatization 
that took place from the last quarter of 2013 onwards, it is necessary to 
consider the circumstances that led to the Slovenian crisis, which primarily 
manifested as a banking crisis. 
When businessmen from the old elite realized they were being system-
atically squeezed out of leading positions in companies, they took up the 
struggle and began to buy state assets on the stock market. In the increasingly 
divided political atmosphere, the banks financed both sides of the conflict, 
that is, both the new and old elites (Damijan 2012). The growing demand 
pushed up prices, but because the country was on the threshold of Eurozone 
membership,11 the gradually decreasing real interest rates created good con-
ditions for privatization to continue throughout the 2004 to 2008 period. 
Another factor in the Slovenian banking crisis was the introduction of 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) in early 2005, which, 
by replacing the previous conservative regulations with more permissive 
ones, had an impact on banks’ business behavior and encouraged them to 
further expand their lending activity.12 
Credit expansion was further bolstered by growing competition among 
the banks in Slovenia, reflected in a reduction of both effective interest rates 
and loan standards (e.g., through lower collateral requirements). Majority 
foreign-owned banks in particular proved to be very aggressive in their 
efforts to expand their market share; on the basis of their financially sound 
11  Slovenia joined the European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM-II) at the end 
of June 2004, whereby restrictions on movements of capital were lifted and the 
Bank of Slovenia lost control of the amount of money in circulation (Bank of 
Slovenia 2015, 7).
12  Bank lending is by its very nature pro-cyclical, and this change in account-
ing standards entailed a reduction in the need for provisioning. So the banks 
obtained a part of the capital they needed for the intensive growth of lending 
indirectly (Bank of Slovenia 2015, 18; 41–44).
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parent banks, they offered highly favorable terms and raised their loan to 
deposit (LTD) ratio to much riskier heights than did domestic banks.13
Among factors on the supply side, that is, those that enabled the high 
growth in lending, undoubtedly the most important was the large supply 
of assets on international financial markets. In the period from 2004 to 
2008, Slovenian banks borrowed massively from the interbank market and 
provided domestic companies with cheap loans. And it is here, at the inter-
section of the supply side (more financing) and demand side (more invest-
ment) that the circumstances referred to in the title of this chapter, the 
“roots of trouble,” come into the picture: 
•  Slovenian banks faced increasing exposure to risks arising from 
a maturity mismatch (i.e., short-term liabilities outweighing short-
term assets), as interbank credit had historically been, and, with the 
crisis looming, was becoming even more short-term, whereas loans 
issued to the private sector were typically “generous” (Bertelsman 
Stiftung 2014, 19) and long-term (Arnesen 2014, 81);
•  a substantial part of the above-mentioned loans financed corrupt 
insider privatisations—i.e., consisted of soft funding for buy-outs 
by politically connected managers (Ivers 2014, 30) and the often 
irresponsible expansion policy of the new owners. Thus the banks 
complied with the latter’s desire to “obtain ownership influence over 
as much of the economy as possible” (Bank of Slovenia 2015, 20);
•  probably the most dangerous aspect of the credit expansion was the 
very way in which banks provided loans for this “conquest” (i.e., 
totally inconsistent with the principle of risk minimization). As com-
panies actively invested beyond their core business, thereby creating 
a real estate boom, the banks allowed an exceptionally high propor-
tion of loans to be tied to the value of properties pledged as collat-
eral, and therefore exposed themselves to excessive risks. Moreover, 
they committed similar errors by financing companies carrying out 
leveraged buy-outs (LBOs14).
In the period from 2004 to 2008, Slovenian banks’ exposure to interna-
tional financial markets (i.e., their liabilities to foreign banks) increased by 
13  As a result of their aggressive market strategy, foreign banks managed to increase 
their market share in Slovenia from 20.6 percent in 2001 to 29.74 percent in 
2012 (UNCTAD 2004, 321).
14  An LBO is the acquisition, with borrowed money, of another company, the 
assets of which are used as collateral.
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almost four times, from €4.25 billion to €16.1 billion. At the same time, 
loans to corporations grew twice as fast as non-banking sector deposits, at 
a rate of around 20 percent versus 10 percent annually, which raised the 
LTD ratio for banks from less than 100 percent (in 2004) to more than 
160 percent by the onset of the financial crisis. The fast-growing indebted-
ness based on foreign borrowing increased the vulnerability of the Slove-
nian economy to financial shocks abroad, which became apparent after the 
fall of Lehman Brothers in 2008 (Bank of Slovenia 2015, 14–15).
Almost Bailed Out
With the onset of the global crisis in September 2008 and the drying up 
of the interbank market (credit crunch), the banks found themselves in an 
entirely new situation. The loans they had borrowed from the wholesale 
market were not renewed, so they had to pass the pressure on to their cli-
ents. The latter, excessively indebted companies, were unable to withstand 
this pressure and meet their liabilities to the banks, and the number of 
those defaulting on their commitments began to grow. Hence, the funda-
mental problem for banks—especially state-owned institutions involved in 
the finances of the MBOs of the new elite—came from the rapidly rising 
proportion of non-performing loans, implying a deterioration of their asset 
quality and a limitation of the volume of credit they could extend to new 
clients (Arnesen 2014, 81–82).
The simultaneous effects of insider privatization, the denial of the 
severity of the crisis for a while (Kickert et al. 2015, 18) by the center-left 
government, which returned to power at the end of 2008 to early 2012, 
and some other factors like the W-shaped growth path of the country’s 
main export markets (like Italy and Croatia, but also to a lesser extent Ger-
many, Austria, and France) made the crisis in Slovenia one of the deepest 
and the most long-lasting in both the region and the Eurozone.15
15  Indeed, it took time for the center-left government to realize the magnitude and 
the long-lasting nature of the crisis and take effective measures to overcome it. 
First, they favored mild measures, such as pay freezes, instead of painful cuts and 
mass layoffs, and they did not substantially reduce welfare spending or increase 
taxes other than excise duties (Pevcin 2014, 86). The same hesitation prevailed 
in regard to supporting banks through the mobilization of only half the money (in 
terms of GDP) that the EU did on average up to the end of 2010, when such sup-
port could still be exempted from EU state aid rules (Bank of Slovenia 2015, 33).
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Partly having learned from the negative experiences of the outgoing 
government, and partly due to growing external pressure (from interna-
tional financial markets and institutions) to implement real structural 
reforms that would restore the sustainability of public finances, the new 
center-right government, having returned to power in February 2012, fol-
lowed the six directions set forth by the Commission in their 2011 recom-
mendations almost step-by-step.16 It had a much more holistic approach to 
reform than did their predecessor and, already in March 2012, took radical 
austerity measures. Practically the whole of 2012 was entirely devoted to 
fiscal consolidation.17
The center-right government first prioritized the consolidation of 
public finances in the coalition agreement (i.e., shored themselves against 
the desertion of their political allies), and ensured the involvement and 
consultation of social partners to the fullest possible extent. The country’s 
economic situation began to significantly deteriorate in the last quarter of 
2012, when the negative impact of austerity policy on the economy had 
already been fully felt—with the worst year-on-year GDP growth data (-3.5 
percent). The government was nearing an announcement of further cuts in 
public sector wages together with additional austerity measures for 2013 
and 2014.18
16  Slovenia was advised to contain public expenditure to achieve the deficit tar-
get; ensure the sustainability of the pension system; help clear balance sheets 
across the banking sector; tackle labor market problems (the difference between 
permanent and temporary contracts, parallelism resulting from student work); 
enhance matching between skills and jobs; and boost the business environment 
and attract investment (Commission 2011, 6).
17  The main measures were introduced in an omnibus act named the Balancing of 
Public Finances Act passed in May 2012. It applied to all areas, but especially 
to the remuneration of civil servants (cuts and freezes), welfare benefits (cuts), 
pension system (an increase of retirement age, end of indexation, incentives 
for prolonged employment), the labor market (flexicurity), and the tax system 
(increase/introduction of taxes with no direct impact on competitiveness) (Can-
kar and Petkovšek 2014, 100–102; Pevcin 2014, 86).
18  Moreover, the government failed to forge national unity behind two important 
issues: the stabilization of the banking sector by way of the establishment of 
a bad bank, named Bank Assets Management Company (BAMC)— designed 
to help banks in their efforts to clean up their balance sheets and start lending to 
businesses again—and the stabilization of public finances through a centralized 
system for managing state-owned assets under the auspices of the renewed Slo-
venia Sovereign Holding (SSH). Opponents to the BAMC warned that it would 
create serious a moral hazard by transferring—through an exchange of banks’ 
bad assets and non-performing loans against state guaranteed bonds—the mis-
guided past decisions of bank managers and supervisors onto taxpayers (Slovenia 
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While speculations had been wild regarding the would-be anti-crisis 
measures, the situation became even worse due to a corruption scandal in 
Maribor on November 2, 2012. It spread over the whole country in just 
a few weeks, provoking a storm of street protests calling for the resignation 
and/or prosecution of the politicians, other political functionaries, and busi-
nessmen accused of corruption. Although it started peacefully, the move-
ment soon turned violent and led to clashes between the police and pro-
testers. There was wide coverage of the “Slovenian uprising” in the global 
media, so everyone could see that the country ceased to be what it used to 
be: the relatively stable democracy of the Balkans (Kirn 2014, 12–13).
By the time the “Slovenian uprising” came to a  definitive halt in 
March 2013, it had already succeeded in destabilizing and breaking apart 
the ruling coalition, as well as ousting several prominent elite figures from 
their leadership positions. What first seemed to be a historic victory, how-
ever, soon proved to be rather pyrrhic, as the newly constituted (once again 
center-left) government was exclusively made up of old parties (Kirn 2014).
Although austerity remained at the fore of economic policy discus-
sions, both financial markets and international institutions surely had 
some reason to think they could start worrying about whether reforms 
(i.e., austerity policy) and privatization in Slovenia would continue.19 The 
three biggest credit rating agencies downgraded the ratings for all main 
state-owned banks as well as the country’s sovereign debt in several waves. 
Slovenia, which had already been under the excessive deficit procedure 
since 2009—a deficit to be corrected by the end of 2013, but with no real 
chance targets to be met—found itself, in April 2013, in a situation where 
its macroeconomic imbalances were considered excessive.20 
Times 2012). As for the SSH, there was a fear the government would sell state 
property without parliamentary approval (Majnardi 2012).
19  First, because the new cabinet thought the Slovenian welfare model could survive 
and a more inclusive policy would even help mitigate the crisis (Haček et al. 2014, 
4); and second, because delays and sluggishness characterized the privatization 
process. Although BAMC was formally set up in March 2013, the act establishing 
SSH was not yet implemented, as political parties could not agree on asset quali-
fications consisting of the definition and categorization of public assets, the deter-
mination of targets for their efficiency/profitability, and working out of methods 
for how to sell them (Bank of Slovenia 2015, 102). Moreover, the new coalition 
agreement, also signed in March, was “silent on bank privatization,” a fact that 
did not escape the attention of EU rapporteurs (Commission 2013a, 38).
20  In extremis, at the end of an “Excessive Imbalance Procedure,” the country in 
question could even face sanctions (an interest-bearing deposit or fine) of up to 
0.1 percent of GDP (EU Regulation No 1176/2011 on the prevention and cor-
rection of macroeconomic imbalances).
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In the spring of 2013, open speculation about Slovenia as the next 
to be bailed out, that is, after Greece, Portugal, and others, became even 
stronger. European institutions (the European Commission and European 
Central Bank), together with international ones (IMF, OECD), and credit 
rating agencies, especially Moody’s (Figure 2), pushed Slovenia towards 
advancing privatization and further opening its domestic market to foreign 
investors. Finally, in the early days of May 2013, the Slovenian govern-
ment, unable to withstand the growing pressure, relented and fulfilled the 
requirements of both markets and institutions. 
Figure 2 
Government debt credit rating for Slovenia
Source: Slovenia Credit Rating: http://www.tradingeconomics.com/slovenia/rating .
Capitulation
On May 9, 2013, a new austerity program of approximately €1.4 billion 
was announced. On the revenue side, it consisted of tax hikes (in court 
fees, VAT, and CIT rates) and several new taxes (e.g., on the lottery and 
non-alcoholic beverages) annually worth €650 million, while on the expen-
diture side, spending cuts (to public sector wages and investments, social 
transfers, and health insurance) amounting to a yearly €716.5 million were 
introduced (Slovenia Times 2013a).
On the very same day, Slovenia pledged to sell fifteen SOEs—including 
the second largest bank, the largest telecom operator, and its national air-
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gram to the Commission. In the latter, the government reported on the 
strengthening of the institutional and regulatory framework of the bad bank 
(BAMC) and presented a detailed plan for the transfer of the three largest 
banks’ non-performing claims to it (Bank of Slovenia 2015, 70–71). More-
over, the Commission stuck to the view that the entire Slovenian banking 
system should be reassessed through a new, third-party, system-wide asset 
quality review (AQR) and new comprehensive stress tests21 (Commission 
2013b, 37).
In exchange for all of these “concessions,” Slovenia was granted a two-
year extension of the deadline (i.e., until the end of 2015) to bring its 
budget deficit under 3 percent of GDP and shore up fiscal consolidation 
with comprehensive structural reforms—including the further adjustment 
of the pension and social security systems to contain age-related expendi-
ture growth (Council of EU 2013, 12–13).
The AQRs were performed in the second half of 2013, and their 
results, as well as those of the stress tests, were published on December 
12, 2013. The stress tests identified, under the adverse scenario, a poten-
tial shortfall of €4.8 billion in the capital of the Slovenian banking system, 
but also proved that the country had the ability to recover from the crisis 
without being bailed out by European funds.22 Furthermore, banks were 
allowed to write off €505 million of subordinated debt in a move that has 
been debated by those who lost ever since. Commitments were made to 
the European Commission that banks receiving state aid were to be priva-
tized. Finally, it is important to mention that a  couple days earlier, on 
December 7, 2013, the coalition partners came to an agreement on the 
21  An AQR consists of an assessment of data quality, the adequacy of the classifica-
tion of a bank’s claims (non-performing exposures included), collateral valua-
tion and provisions, i.e., considers the key attributes of the bank’s different asset 
portfolios in order to evaluate the quality of the assets. Based on the results of 
an AQR, stress tests are performed to reveal future losses in baseline and adverse 
macroeconomic scenarios, the latter serving to quantify the need for recapitaliza-
tion (Bank of Slovenia 2015, 72–73).
22  Apart from the recapitalization of state-owned banks to cover the losses due to 
NPL’s provisions—amounting to €3.6 billion and causing, as a one-off impact, 
an approximate 11 percent increase (in GDP terms) in both the general deficit 
(from -4.0 percent to -14.7 percent) and general government spending (up from 
48.5 percent to 59.5 percent) in 2013—the government decided on the transfer 
of the majority of the banks’ lowest quality claims to BAMC in exchange for the 
latter’s bonds and cash. The transfer of NPLs was conducted at their fair market 
value (~ €1.53 billion), equal to 30 percent of their nominal value (Commission 
2016, 1–2).
Szanyi - 00 könyv.indb   203 2019.11.15.   9:32
204 MIKLóS SOMAI
guiding principles of the Slovenian Sovereign Holding (SSH) which, by 
the related act (zSDH-1)23 entering into force in April 2014, opened the 
way for both the concentrated management of state-owned assets and their 
regulated, gradual privatization (The Slovenia Times 2013b; Bank of Slo-
venia 2015, 102).
The Third Wave of Privatization
With a slight exaggeration, we can say that in Slovenia, the third wave of 
privatization started with large-scale nationalizations in the financial sector. 
As a result of the recapitalization/cleaning up (of banks’ balance sheets) 
process, three major institutions (NLB, NKBM, Abanka) passed into full 
state ownership. Of course, already when the results of the stress tests were 
announced, it was clearly stated that full state ownership would not last 
long. NKBM and Abanka were to be completely sold, while in the case of 
NLB, the government was to reduce its participating interest to no more 
than 25 percent plus one share.24
Already by April 2016, NKBM was sold to the U.S. equity funds 
Apollo Management (80 percent) and EBRD (20 percent) for a price of 
€250 million (SSH online 2016).25 The privatization of NLB had initially 
been planned to be completed by August 2017,26 but it was postponed 
23  The law provided for the establishment of an institution (SSH) focused on the 
management of state assets and the orderly disengagement of the state from 
business. By virtue of the law, the SOD was to be transformed into the SSH, the 
latter of which would become not only the owner and manager of its own assets 
(formerly SOD assets), but also the manager (but not the owner) of the capital 
assets directly and indirectly owned by the Republic of Slovenia. Other funds 
(e.g., DSU and PDP) were to gradually merge into the SSH, the only exception 
being KAD (the pension fund), which remained an independent entity within 
the framework of the holding (Slovenian Sovereign Holding Act (zSDH-1) 
https://www.zdruzenje-ns.si/db/doc/upl/ssha_1.pdf).
24  Ministry of Finance and Bank of Slovenia. 2013. “Bank of Slovenia and Slovenian 
government announce results of stress tests.” Press Release. December 12, 2013.
25  At the beginning of December 2015, Apollo continued to expand into the Slo-
venian market, taking over Raiffeisen’s local branches. According to media 
reports, Apollo is interested in creating the largest bank in the country through 
the acquisitions of both private and state-owned banks (Slovenia Times 2015).
26  Ministry of Finance, Slovenia. 2015. “Ordinance on State Assets Management 
Strategy,” July 13, 2015, 70. https://www.sdh.si/Data/Documents/asset-
management/State%20Assets%20Management%20Strategy.pdf.
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several times.27 Finally, at the end of 2018, 65 percent of its shares have 
been sold in an initial public offering (IPO) process on Ljubljana Stock 
Exchange and on London Stock Exchange for a price of €670 million—to 
be compared to €1.56bn state aid for the bank in late 2013. The remaining 
proportion of shares of up to 75% minus one share will be sold by the end 
of 2019.28 As for Abanka, the 3rd largest banking group in Slovenia, BNP 
Paribas has, at the end of 2018, been appointed to act as sole financial 
advisor to conduct a multi-stage sale process of 100 percent of its shares by 
end 2019.29
As NLB, Abanka and NKBM combined share accounts for around 
45% of total banking system assets, the above privatization steps will sub-
stantially reduce the level of state ownership in the Slovenian banking 
sector and, in general, significantly reduce the book value of enterprises 
owned by the state. The partial privatization of NLB in 2018 and the on-
going privatization of Abanka are necessary steps to remove uncertainty 
related to a possible demand from the European Commission that the state 
aid provided in 2013 be repaid. Naturally, all this could have been avoided 
had the bail-outs occurred up to the end of 2010, when such support could 
still be exempted from EU state aid rules (see footnote 13).
As for the list of the fifteen SOEs to be privatized—decided upon 
during the most difficult period in mid-2013, and constantly updated with 
other SOEs since then—successful sales, as well as processes in progress 
or with no transactions, can be followed and checked on at the SSH web-
site. As far as details are concerned, what immediately strikes the observer 
is that all the companies that have been sold passed into foreign hands. 
The Ljubljana Airport was taken over by German Fraport; Adria Airways 
27  To clarify the reasons, let us quote two resources dating from 2015 and 2018 
respectively. “The main reason for the slow reduction of the state ownership 
share in businesses and financial institutions continues to be the lack of political 
consensus on the withdrawal of the state from ownership of companies” (IMAD 
2015, 51). “The privatization of NLB has long been a polarizing issue, with the 
right calling for a prompt sale of the bank and the left insisting the government 
should do everything it can to delay or suspend the sale” (Slovenia Times 2018).
28  See “First phase of NLB privatisation successfully closed by SSH.” SSH 
website, News, Nov. 14, 2018. https://www.sdh.si/en-gb/news/1708/first-phase-
of-nlb-privatization-successfully-closed-by-ssh. 
29  See “Public invitation to submit an expression of interest for the acquisition 
of 100 percent of the share capital of Abanka.” SSH webiste, News, Oct. 11, 
2018. https://www.sdh.si/en-gb/news/1687/slovenian-sovereign-holding-acting-
on-behalf-of-the-republic-of-slovenia-the-seller-hereby-issues-a- 
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was purchased by the Luxemburg investment fund 4K Invest through its 
Munich-based subsidiary (AA International Aviation Holding GmbH); 
and the airline maintenance company (Adria Airways Tehnika) was bought 
up by the Polish Linetech. The paint manufacturer Helios was bought by 
the Austrian company Remho Beteiligungs, (owned, in turn, by Viennese 
Ring International Holding), Elan sporting goods manufacturer was pur-
chased by the Cyprus-based Wiltan Enterprises Ltd. (owned by Russian 
VR Global Partners) and American Merrill Lynch International, while the 
laser systems developer Fotona was purchased by American Gores Laser 
Holdings. In the car parts industry, Cimos was sold to TCH (part of Italy’s 
investment firm Palladio Holding Group), while Letrika was purchased 
by Mahle Holding Austria GmbH (directly owned by Mahle GmbH Ger-
many). Finally, food processor Žito became part of Croatian Podravka 
(known for its internationally famous condiment Vegeta), and hygienic 
paper products manufacturer Paloma was taken over by Czech Eco-Invest-
ment and its Slovakian subsidiary (Eco Invest SVK). 
Size, Structure, and National Strategy for the Public Sector
It is not easy to evaluate the role of the state in the Slovenian economy, 
as this role is in permanent motion. As a consequence of the compulsory 
settlements and bankruptcies during the crisis, which forced banks to swap 
loans for equity, the share of SOEs’ equity capital vis-à-vis Slovenia’s total 
corporate sector capital increased from 16.4 percent in 2008 to 23.2 per-
cent in 2012.30 These figures include shares that were bound to rise even 
further after the aforementioned bank bailouts in 2013–2014 (IMAD 
2015, 51).
At the end of 2014, 642 SOEs/SCEs, representing about 1 percent 
of the total number of companies in Slovenia, were linked to the state via 
a complex cross-ownership structure (Figure 3). Excluding banks, finan-
cial services, insurance companies, insolvent and newly (in 2014) estab-
lished firms, the remaining 561 NFCs31 accounted for 24.8 percent of net 
sales, 34.2 percent of assets, 41.8 percent of equity, and 18.8 percent of 
employees. Based on sectoral value added, state involvement was particu-
30  30.0 percent if SCEs—state-controlled enterprises in which the state has at least 
a controlling minority ownership of 25 percent plus one vote—are also taken 
into account. 
31  Non-financial corporations.
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larly strong (i.e., above 50 percent) in transport, energy, public utilities, 
postal services and ICT, tourism, chemicals, and pharmaceuticals, as well 
as in some manufacturing and repair. The state appeared as the largest cor-
porate debt holder, as we already mentioned, due to its ownership in the 
financial sector, and was also the manager of 88 percent of pension assets 
and 60 percent of all insurance liabilities (Commission 2015, 24–25).
Figure 3 
State ownership network in Slovenia 
(percent in terms of book value of assets)
Source: Commission 2015, 23-4.
As a  final step in the process forcing Slovenia to harmonize itself with 
OECD standards on state involvement in the economy, the adoption of 
the State Assets Management Strategy (hereinafter Strategy) in July 2015 
provided a legal and institutional framework for the withdrawal of the state 
from company ownership. It also filled a gap: although zSDH-1 created 
categories (strategic, important, or portfolio) for the classification of state 
assets, it did not assign companies to categories or define performance-
related expectations (like the return on equity or assets, EBITDA margin, 
NPL, or combined ratio) to individual companies (Slovenian Government 
2015, 51). The Strategy considered twenty-four companies to be strategic 
(allowing the maintenance of majority state ownership) as they were car-
rying out key infrastructural duties (e.g., network utilities in energy, trans-
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Twenty-one companies were classified as important (i.e., with controlling 
state ownership to be maintained), as they were vital for Slovenia’s broader 
economic development or played an important role in the integration 
of companies into supply chains, or the internalization of the economy. 
Finally, forty-six companies were categorized as portfolio assets (i.e., 
serving only economic objectives).32
Final Remarks
In Slovenia, the first wave of privatization ensured a  certain degree of 
continuity and resulted in balanced macroeconomic development, which 
allowed the old elite to remain involved in the lives of their respective com-
panies. The situation began to go wrong when, during the second wave of 
privatization, the new elite tried to “complete” their political power with 
economic strength. This “conquest” came to a head and played a crucial 
role in causing the Slovenian economy to suffer the deepest slump in the 
Eurozone since the outbreak of the global crisis. The prolonged, W-shaped 
recession coupled with political instability strengthened the pressure placed 
on the Slovenian government by international (including European) insti-
tutions to bail-out the largest state-owned banks and undertake the third 
wave of privatization. The latter process is still ongoing, and—particularly 
for some banks and the telecom company—the “plans for privatization 
have been implemented slowly” (Council of the EU 2018, 10). During 
2014–15, new laws and ordinances regarding the status and operations of 
the Slovenian Sovereign Holding company and the adoption of the State 
Assets Management Strategy were implemented. They can be consid-
ered fundamental to a clear and consistent ownership policy that ensures 
the governance of SOEs in a  transparent and accountable manner (i.e., 
upgraded to OECD standards). They also serve as a legal and institutional 
framework for the withdrawal of the state from the economy.
32  In the strategy, there was an additional ban on ownership concentration for 
five “important” companies (NLB, Petrol, Krka, Pozavarovalnica Sava, and 
Sava),which prohibited private owners from acquiring a stake in a company in 
excess to that of the state (Ordinance on State Assets Management Strategy 
(OdSUKND) 2015).
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CHAPTER 8
The Role of State Ownership in and 
after Hungary’s Transition to a Market 
Economy
Miklós szanyi
Introduction: The Historical Background of State Economic Intervention in 
Hungary
The discussion of direct state engagement in the Hungarian economy 
should begin with the classic industrialization policies of the Hungarian 
state after gaining independence from Austrian dominance in terms of 
its economic development policies after 1867. Prior to 1867, within the 
Habsburg Empire, Hungary’s role was reduced to supplying food and raw 
material to the industrialized Austrian and Czech lands. This involuntary 
division of labor was reinforced by Habsburg monarchs and supported 
by administrative regulations like the double customs decree enacted in 
1754, which practically banned deliveries of Hungarian industrial goods 
to other regions of the empire outside of this historic Hungarian Kingdom 
and supported food supplies instead. Prohibitions were lifted only in 1850. 
In 1867 also, when the political structure of the Habsburg empire changed, 
and the “Dualist” system was established. Political and economic repres-
sions of the Hungarian parts of the empire were eliminated.
Soon after the transformation of the previous centralization efforts of 
the Habsburgs, Hungarian industrial development gained momentum. Of 
course the period was characterized by strong economic growth; neverthe-
less, the elimination of prohibitions enabled the owners of Hungarian cap-
ital to participate in economic development and progress. Parallel with the 
techno-economic paradigm of the time, major development was underway 
in railway construction, the production of railway equipment, mining and 
metallurgy, as well as in agriculture and the production of agricultural 
machinery. Industrial development was coupled with progress in banking 
and reforms in education and public administration. The Hungarian part 
of the Dual Monarchy converged with the traditionally industrialized 
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western provinces. The “golden age” of Hungarian economic development 
came to an end with its defeat in World War I.1
State intervention supporting economic progress was substantial, but 
it was mainly in the realm of public procurements. Due to dynamic institu-
tional developments, huge construction projects were launched on both the 
national and local levels, including canalization and river control, railway 
construction, and the establishment of schools and other public institu-
tions. Many of these large-scale developments were financed by tax reve-
nues from booming agribusiness. But by the end of the nineteenth century, 
the state intervened more directly through fiscal incentives (tax holidays for 
industrial investments) and public enterprises, for example railway services 
and local public services. Over time, the number of state-owned compa-
nies increased and their activities expanded to various services and support 
industries like railway equipment maintenance (Berend and Szuhay 1978).
In the interwar period, the importance of state intervention increased 
further. This was partly reinforced by the 1920 peace treaty, which 
required Hungary to cede two-thirds of its historic territory; these lands 
had been important markets for Hungarian foodstuffs and these terri-
tories had also been the center of Hungary’s prewar mining and metal-
lurgy industry. A fundamental restructuring as well as the re-creation of 
vital capacities that had been lost to the Habsburg successor states had 
to be carried out with significant direct state support, especially in heavy 
industry and engineering. Huge industrial complexes were constructed in 
some industrial hot spots. Besides Budapest, Győr and Miskolc became 
important centers of heavy industry. The process was accelerated after 
the Bled treaty (1938), which lifted restrictions on the number of Hun-
garian armed forces and military equipment production. In the process of 
war preparations, the Hungarian state invested heavily in military equip-
ment production in state-owned firms (e.g., MÁVAG in Győr for air-
plane and truck production; Diósgyőr Steelworks for guns), but private 
firms’ involvement in military production efforts was also promoted (e.g., 
the Weiss Manfred Works in Budapest for aircraft, armored vehicles, and 
1  Tomka (2011) used more recent GDP figures from the Maddison data base and 
concluded that the period of the Dual Monarchy was less remarkable, especially 
in comparison with the interwar period. The relative level of economic devel-
opment measured by per capita GDP was the highest around 1910 reaching 60 
percent of developed nations’ average. This was achieved again in 1939 despite 
the huge economic shocks of loosing World War I and the Great Depression. 
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ammunition). During World War II, like all belligerents, state control over 
private firms increased to efficiently support the Hungarian war effort.
State intervention was aimed at promoting the development of the 
high-tech industries of the time. It is difficult to measure the success of this 
activity. Since the interwar period was defined by strong protectionism and 
isolationism, comparing the technological sophistication of products has 
generally only been possible through the study of armed conflict. During 
World War I, the technological equipment of the Austro-Hungarian Mon-
archy was not inferior to its rivals; in some areas, it was a “market leader” 
(river gunboats, heavy howitzers), although the mass production of inno-
vative products like airplanes and armored vehicles (tanks) was not well 
developed, and, in some cases was missing altogether. In the aftermath of 
World War I, Hungarian military equipment production as a whole was 
vastly inferior to most countries, including smaller states like Romania and 
Czechoslovakia. Nevertheless, Hungarian industry was capable of applying 
for German licenses that were readily available only after Allied bombing 
forced the relocation of production from Germany to Hungary in 1944. 
For example, the leading German fighter aircraft models were produced 
in Győr and Budapest according to a bilateral agreement signed in 1942. 
Thus, the technological competence of specific sectors of Hungarian 
industry developed significantly, albeit firms had no time to successfully 
design their own products (Berend and Szuhay 1978).
Given the main focus of this analysis, an important turning point was 
the end of World War II, when Hungary once again found itself on the 
losing side. Moreover, Hungary was occupied by Soviet military forces 
and was transformed into a communist regime by 1948. Between 1945 
and 1948, the country paid substantial compensation to the Soviet Union 
partly in form of deployed manufacturing equipment; after 1948, equip-
ment delivered by the Soviets was used to respond to the losses of equip-
ment and the massive damage caused by the war. In other words, the 
reconstruction of Hungarian industry was based on Soviet technology. This 
reconstruction took place in a country that already nationalized all of its 
major industries, and thus new equipment was delivered through bilateral 
state agreements to companies owned by the Hungarian state, which was, 
by then, fully controlled by the communist party.
During the first half of the socialist era, that is from 1948 till the 
1960s, Hungarian economic development was relatively similar to that 
of other Central and Eastern European countries in the Soviet bloc. Eco-
nomic growth was relatively fast, and new industries based on Soviet 
technology were also created in the countryside. Development was rather 
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extensive and based on the massive reallocation of the labor force from 
agriculture to heavy industry. The development of consumer-oriented pro-
duction and services was neglected. Consequently, the economic structure 
of Hungary reflected political needs, specifically the production of military 
supplies in the political conditions of the Cold War. The development of 
heavy industry was reinforced at the expense of higher living standards and 
because meeting consumer demand was placed on the back burner. Cen-
tral planning also preferred large production units; hence another struc-
tural feature was the high share of large companies and lack of small and 
medium-sized ones.
Both structural and systemic problems emerged due to the drive for 
extensive economic growth. Firm managers and central planners were iso-
lated from market information. They continued to use technologies and 
prices that had been typical when the system was introduced in 1948. 
Changes in relative prices on the global markets were not considered at all. 
The drive for autarchy and the embargo on imports of modern technology 
from the capitalist world (COCOM) limited the ability of the country to 
follow changes in technology. In fact, the rigidity of the system of central 
planning was highlighted in systemic critiques as early as the 1930s (von 
Mises, Hayek). Also the practice of planning was regarded as necessarily inef-
ficient given the limited computing capacity and lack of detailed overviews 
of economic processes by bureaucrats. This leads us to the next systemic 
problem: the lack of proper incentives that resulted in low levels of produc-
tivity and waste, as well as low rates of utilization of all production inputs.
Hungarian economists and party and state leaders discovered the 
shortcomings of the system and made efforts to reform it. Starting in 1968, 
several waves of reform were introduced under the “New Economic Mech-
anism.” The most important and successful steps were those involving the 
reintroduction of functioning incentive systems in the economy. On the 
one hand, firms were allowed to initiate their own production activities 
provided they had fulfilled their planned deliveries. Revenues from this 
extra activity were not collected by the state but could be used by firms 
for a variety of things, including financing additional wages for workers. 
On the other hand, small-scale private business was permitted again, first 
for families, but later for an increasing number of regular employees. The 
independent activity of firms and Hungarian entrepreneurs supported the 
accumulation of business experience, which proved useful at the start of 
the economic transition process after 1990.
Another set of measures attempted to deliver market signals in form 
of global economic prices. Thus, central planners created pricing mecha-
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nisms that reflected (with substantial limits) changing price relationships. 
The period was earmarked by high inflation globally, but central plan-
ners did not want to import inflation. However, Hungary did not avoid 
the oil price shock, and consequently, the authority responsible for setting 
prices had the difficult task of creating prices that delivered market signals 
but ignored inflation. In fact, this attempt was largely unsuccessful. The 
enhanced decision-making freedom of firms included more direct links 
to foreign markets. As a result, foreign (Western) partners’ influence and 
information delivered market signals on the level of products.
There were also other areas of economic reform that nevertheless 
could not fundamentally improve the efficiency of the system. This was 
partly because the measures were always taken half-heartedly, and partly 
because big businesses were largely exempt from the impact of reforms.2 
Belatedly, during the second half of the 1980s, even a partial introduc-
tion of market economic institutions began in Hungary. A new Company 
Law that envisioned the transformation of state owned enterprises (SOEs) 
into corporations was enacted. A new, comprehensive tax system was intro-
duced in 1988, which included a VAT, personal income tax, and a corpo-
rate tax. Branches of the Hungarian National Bank (the bank fully respon-
sible for maintaining company accounts) were separated and transformed 
into (state-owned) commercial banks, and a two-tier banking system was 
created. These later measures formed the legal background of the compre-
hensive market economic transition that began in 1990 along with the first 
freely elected Hungarian government after communist rule.
State Ownership and Privatization in the Transition Process: The 1990s
One of the most important postulates of economic transition was privatiza-
tion along with stabilization, liberalization, and institution building (SLIP). 
The existence of widespread state ownership was regarded as an essential 
2  Tomka (2011) found, based on the Maddison database, that there was no real 
convergence between Hungary and the developed world even in the 1950s: West 
European postwar reconstruction produced higher growth than forced industria-
lization. When the problems of central planning prevailed and the sources of ext-
ensive growth were exhausted, economic decline started even in absolute terms. 
Therefore, by the eve of the political and economic transition, Hungary’s relative 
development level was less than 40 percent of the developed world (measured by 
per capita GDP figures).
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element of the command economy that was to be replaced with a market 
economy. The simple logic in the political discourse of the time regarded 
private ownership as the opposite of state ownership just as a  market 
economy was the antithesis of central planning. The political content of 
privatization was further increased by the strong political and personal rela-
tionships between company managers (especially directors) and political/
party leaders. The elimination of the Communist Party’s political power 
was to be accompanied by the destruction of its economic basis, and this 
was carried out through the privatization of state-owned companies (Fry-
dman and Rapaczynski 1994).
The reform legacy of the Hungarian economy concentrating on effi-
ciency improvements as well as institution building also shaped privati-
zation policies. The need for “real, responsible owners” required priva-
tization options that produced new active and competent owners and 
concentrated ownership. The need to reorganize and modernize company 
activity (which proved to be inefficient due to serious structural problems) 
required new owners who possessed enough capital to be invested. As was 
shown by some empirical surveys, quick and substantial reorganization 
and modernization were key elements of the plans to make Hungarian 
businesses more competitive (Szanyi 1996). SOEs could not afford this 
due to the lack of capital. They did not accumulate sufficient capital 
during the years of central planning, and their state owner battled large 
state debts and could not afford financial supports. Although like most 
other Central European transition countries, in Hungary several alterna-
tive methods of privatization were used, the most important SOEs were 
sold to foreign investors through open tenders. Privatization was the most 
important avenue of foreign direct investments (FDI) in the early phase of 
transition.
Asset transfers started well before the privatization policy took shape 
in Hungary mainly after 1992. Before that, “spontaneous privatization,” 
or “tunneling,” took place, especially between 1989 and 1991. The 1988 
Company Law and Company Transformation Law obliged SOEs to trans-
form their legal form into modern corporate forms, and also creating the 
necessary internal organizational structure. However, the legal form they 
adopted was not filled with properly functioning actors: the separation of 
ownership and control rights took place without the nomination or effec-
tive presence of the state owner, and controlling managers worked without 
the effective supervision of the state owner. Ownership rights were spread 
among various state organs, ministries, and local councils, which could not 
organize themselves effectively. Until the establishment of the State Priva-
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tization Agency in 1992, the state’s ownership rights had been hardly rep-
resented in SOEs.
Using the lack of supervision, many companies’ management took 
action to strip companies of their valuable assets. Due to the loose and 
unclear regulations, this practice could not be prevented. According to 
Laki (2002), many important Hungarian entrepreneurs began their 
careers as SOE managers and gathered assets through the “spontaneous 
privatization” process. Others obtained permissions from the foreign trade 
authority to import necessary goods for the Hungarian market. These 
entrepreneurs held a quasi-monopolistic position. Laki and Szalai (2013) 
showed that most of the enterprises that were established on the basis of 
tunneled assets or monopoly licenses did not survive 1990s. They served 
market niches and created windows of opportunity that closed after the 
liberalization of trade and economic activities in Hungary during the 
1990’s. The owners of these firms possessed special skills for finding loop-
holes in regulation or had enjoyed useful networking capital to obtain 
licenses. These skills lost their value during the 1990s with the establish-
ment of the “competition state.” As a result, the most viable parts of state 
assets proved to be those items that were sold to foreign investors through 
open tenders.
Spontaneous privatization and the early emergence of quasi entre-
preneurs during the late 1980s and early 1990s could potentially open 
up avenues for incumbent managers and party leaders to transform their 
pre-transition political positions into business opportunities. This could 
threaten the political goals of privatization (the completion of political 
transition). However, empirical surveys of Hungarian large-scale entrepre-
neurs revealed that this did not happen (Laki 2002; Kolosi and Szelényi 
2010). The new Hungarian entrepreneurial class and the new business 
elite that emerged was recruited from the younger generation. Those who 
used the transition environment to establish themselves in large businesses 
usually could not maintain their positions after the consolidation of the 
Hungarian economy (Laki and Szalay 2013). This was not a  very sur-
prising outcome in a transition environment in which “capitalism should 
be created without capitalists” (Kolosi and Szelényi 2010, 10). However, 
the younger generation’s new business elite consisted of various strata. 
Two of them stood out: genuine entrepreneurs, new business owners, and 
a new managerial class serving in multinational business. The managerial 
class can be also treated as a new elite due to its significant influence in 
business and in politics. Drahokoupil (2008) called it the “comprador ser-
vice sector,” which meant that local elites served interests of multinational 
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corporations. Later, these multinational elites clashed with the local busi-
ness elite in the Hungarian political arena.
The results of the privatization process can be seen in the data fea-
tured in Figure 1. As is clear, the privatization process directly affected 
a  large number of companies. However, due to organizational changes 
(mainly the splitting up of large conglomerates into smaller firms with 
more homogenous activity structures or service providers with defined 
regional markets), the number of firms and their asset value can only be 
estimated. The valuation of state assets is problematic even today (see 
Voszka 2013), let alone in the 1990s when the asset value of firms was 
influenced by uncertainty. SOE’s asset value heavily depended on the 
actual (financial) performance of the company and its relationship to tran-
sition policies that largely determined their future market potential and 
financial position. Typically an SOE accumulated some debt in the period 
between 1990 and 1992, i.e., the transitional crisis, due to the survival 
of soft budget constraints inherited from the communist period (Kornai 
1993). Despite of the collapse of traditional markets (the trade organiza-
tion of the Soviet block was dissolved in 1992; trade was liberalized in 
many commodity groups and international competition grew; public pro-
curements declined due to the debt problems of the Hungarian govern-
ment), SOEs usually continued production in order to maintain activity 
and employment (Laki 1994). Sales figures did not improve quickly, 
product sales could not be transferred to Western markets, and adjustment 
and modernization efforts were slow due to the lack of a developmental 
paradigm and a lack of capital to be invested. As a consequence, huge defi-
cits appeared in the economy. Without sales revenues at the top of the 
value chain, SOEs could not pay for their supplies, and the payment of 
taxes and social security contributions was also on hold. Debts mounted, 
and by early 1992, they were as high as 21–22 percent of the GDP (Szanyi 
2002). This amount was considered dangerously high (Kornai 1993).
Under such circumstances, the collapse of the Hungarian banking 
sector was looming, and cash payments were preferred over bank trans-
fers because of the garnishment measures placed on business accounts. 
In 1992, a  harsh bankruptcy regulation was introduced in Hungary. 
According to this regulation, unlike in traditional bankruptcy regulations 
where creditors initiate the procedure debtors had to file for bankruptcy 
(either reorganization or liquidation). Managers of debtor firms had to do 
this under the threat of legal punishment on their person provided they 
had any payment obligation overdue by more than 90 days against any-
body. Individual CEOs were personally responsible for reporting. The 
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automatic trigger was in use until 1993, and during the twenty-one months 
it was in use, over 20,000 bankruptcy cases were filed, among them filings 
by more than 500 SOEs.3 There were rather heated debates over the utility 
of the automatic trigger.
Critics of the automatic trigger argued that defaults on debt were not 
dangerously high (Bonin and Schaffer 1995; Schaffer 1997) and could 
have been addressed with other, less radical means. In fact, other anal-
yses proved that the level of intercompany debt was indeed high and was 
still increasing in 1992. In the following months, the further accumulation 
of debt was successfully stopped, and the non-performing assets of com-
mercial banks were liquidated and purged. Many claimed that with more 
patience, many bankrupted firms could have avoided liquidation. Yet the 
reorganization option was still present, and this procedure could provide 
3  The total number of SOEs in 1993 increased from the original 2200 due to the 
practice of splitting larger entities to more homogenous and easily transferred 
units (mainly factories). Therefore, we can only roughly estimate that approxi-
mately 30 percent of SOEs and state assets underwent either reorganization or, 
more typically, liquidation procedures.
Figure 1 
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necessary leeway with the consent of creditors.4 Therefore, I can conclude 
that the bankruptcy episode of the state-owned sector during the first half 
of the 1990s eliminated approximately 15 to 20 percent of SOEs and state 
assets. Still, the overwhelming majority of this “loss” was due to the inher-
ited structural and systemic problems of firms that could not be repaired 
due to the lack of market demand. The assets sold through liquidation 
sales were mainly real estate and were repurposed as other companies’ 
assets. For this reason, the liquidation of SOEs can be regarded as a special 
form of privatization (Szanyi 2000).
Intertwined policies of the transition process created the specific tran-
sition pattern of Central European countries. During the transition crisis 
in the first half of the 1990s, macroeconomic imbalances, microeconomic 
adjustment and modernization, the establishment of market economic 
institutions, and the change in company behavior (hardening firms’ budget 
constraints) were all urgent economic policy targets that also influenced 
each other. Debates about the sequence and speed of reform was fierce at 
the time (Roland 2000). Based on the institutional legacy of the reform 
communist period, the Hungarian government decided to tackle all these 
issues at once. Some of them were addressed quickly and others more 
gradually.
The hardening of corporate and also budgetary institutions’ financial 
constraints was an important task that was rapidly addressed because of 
the rather serious internal and external indebtedness of the government 
and the country. Unlike Poland, Hungary did not ask international credi-
tors to reschedule debt, hoping that the credibility of the country and gov-
ernment could best be sustained in this way. Income from privatization as 
well as the temporary introduction of an import surcharge in 1995 would 
reduce the debt burden. Concern for the credibility of the country paid off 
with increased foreign direct investments mainly through the privatization 
process. The massive inflow of FDI effectively helped reduce debt and also 
relieved the balance of payments. Unlike the Czech Republic, Hungary did 
not devalue its currency and did not accommodate the transition shocks 
of exporting firms. The powerful effects of bankruptcy procedures soon 
separated viable from non-viable parts of the economy, leaving the latter 
4  In fact, creditor passivity decreased first on the side of fiscal institutions, the tax 
authority, and social security institutions several years after the introduction of 
the automatic trigger.
Szanyi - 00 könyv.indb   222 2019.11.15.   9:32
223The Role of State Ownership in and after Hungary’s Transition
behind with huge accumulated deficits, although further increases in debt 
was stopped, and budget constraints were hardened.
The harsh bankruptcy regulation was coupled with the tightening of 
regulations on commercial banks which would separate liquid assets from 
non-performing ones and create adequate risk reserves. At this time, most 
major commercial banks were state owned, and their business policy still 
reflected some inherited clumsiness and paternalism. Therefore, tighter 
banking regulations also served the goal of business development on finan-
cial markets: the development of banks’ market-conforming behavior, 
especially in their lending policy. The main policy elements of the con-
solidation of Hungary’s economy after transition got underway were bank-
ruptcy, changing the lending policies of banks (less rolling over of overdue 
debt), as well as a firm commitment from the Hungarian government not 
to accommodate shocks by financial instruments (in part because of the 
high level of state debt). The government eventually made exceptions in 
a  limited number of cases. Fourteen large companies were restructured 
with government assistance with mixed results: half of the bailed-out com-
panies could be at least partially saved and half later went bankrupt. The 
Hungarian case also proved that shock accommodations mainly served to 
postpone the SOE exit in most cases. The limited leeway time of compa-
nies usually did not trigger effective restructuring efforts in the early transi-
tion period, which was still strongly affected by inherited paternalistic rela-
tionships and expectations of state bailouts (Szanyi 2002).
During the treatment of both sound and ailing parts of the economy, 
the Hungarian government’s direct economic involvement increased. The 
State Privatization Agency (later State Property Management Plc.) began 
to work actively as the representative of the state as owner. The agency 
necessarily dealt with privatization issues and also controlled the stra-
tegic decisions of companies’ management, but selling off SOEs to the 
highest bidders through public auctions remained the chief aim. In order 
to achieve this, however, the state’s asset portfolio had to be improved. 
Because of the government’s firm commitment to hardening budget con-
straints and preventing the re-emergence of paternalism, only a few SOEs 
received state support for restructuring.
As a consequence of these complex institutional and policy develop-
ments, by the mid-1990s, roughly one-third of SOEs and state assets were 
bankrupt. Accumulated bad debt was consolidated together with private 
debts in three steps. First, large parts of the accumulated intercompany 
debt were transferred to a newly established state owned-bank, the Hun-
garian Development Bank (MFB) for further management (debt consoli-
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dation). MFB took over the debt and the role of creditors in the bank-
ruptcy process and started reorganization in a large number of bankruptcy 
cases (debtor consolidation). Second, the portfolio of the largest commer-
cial banks was purged of remaining non-performing loans: government 
bonds helped with their recapitalization (bank consolidation). These loans 
were basically written off, and not much of these debts could be recov-
ered through bankruptcy procedures. These untainted state-owned com-
mercial banks were then sold to foreign financial institutions through the 
privatization process. It is difficult to estimate the total cost of the various 
consolidation programs due to their long-term effects and the involvement 
of many different agents and practices. Nevertheless, the total amount of 
consolidated non-performing loans in the banking sector (including pri-
vate sector debt) is estimated at 350 billion Hungarian Forint (HUF) or 
7 per cent of GDP in 1995. State authorities (the tax and customs offices 
and social security system) recorded a similarly high rate of unpaid obliga-
tions that was largely written off (Szanyi 2002). According to the report of 
the Hungarian State Audit Office, the consolidation of the most troubled 
institution, Postabank, alone cost 174.5 billion HUF.5 Therefore, the total 
cost of debt accumulation during the transition crisis period was very high. 
However, some of this cost was not the real social cost. The avalanche of 
bankruptcies created good opportunities for rent seeking SOE managers 
and cooperating bailiffs to engage in a new form of asset tunneling, which 
took advantage of the limited control of bankruptcy courts (the shortage 
of judges) and creditor passivity (Szanyi 1996). Bankrupted state assets 
were de facto “privatized” in this way, that is transferred to private owners 
through uncontrolled channels.
Parallel with the privatization campaign of financial institutions, in the 
second half of the 1990s, many public service providers were also priva-
tized and basically sold to foreign investors. Privatizations in this field were 
especially complex transactions. These companies operated in regulated 
markets where active state policies determined many important elements 
of the activity ranging from technical standards, through the regulation of 
cooperation contracts, to setting price controls. Selling service providers 
had to serve the specific interests of several stakeholders: the public (ser-
vice users), the government (revenues), and investors (adequate profits 
5  “174,5 milliárd forintba került a Postabank konszolidációja” [Postabank’s con so li-
da tion cost 174, 5 bn. HUF]. 17 May 2003. http://www.ma.hu/tart/rcikk/c/0/ 
37058/1.
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after modernization investments). Due to the complex nature of the trans-
actions, their success can be measured only with due consideration of the 
various goals. These transactions later provided ample fodder for criticism 
concentrating only on specific dimensions of the deals (e.g., the relatively 
high and guaranteed profits for investors).
State Property Management after 2000
In 2008, the Hungarian government reported that the privatization process 
was complete (Hungarian Government 2009). Indeed, the frequency and 
magnitude of changes in state-owned property declined substantially (see 
data in Figure 1). Privatization as a systemic part of the transition process 
(the creation of market economy fundamentals) was over. This did not 
mean, however, that SOEs disappeared completely. Their role changed and 
was subordinated to the more stable policies of established market econo-
mies like competition policy, employment, and in some specific cases, fiscal 
policy. Some companies were regarded as firms of strategic importance. 
Active state property management policy was evident in the largest firms 
with mixed ownership (joint-stock companies), which often became sub-
ject to government intervention. For example, the Hungarian government 
repeatedly blocked attempts by various (mainly foreign) owners to increase 
or use their ownership rights in large, partly state-owned companies (e.g., 
MOL, the national oil company, and MVM, the national electric power sup-
plier). Ownership changes in these firms was strongly influenced by the gov-
ernment during the 2000s. A law was modified in order to block the owner-
ship rights of some block share owners who were regarded as unfriendly to 
Hungarian state interests in other cases, ownership transfers were prevented 
with claims that they attempted at a hostile takeover. Clearly, the state made 
efforts to maintain not only its interests, but also its control over these firms. 
In some cases, assets were sold (eighteen cases reported between 2003 and 
2005), but frequently, government control was maintained or even strength-
ened. The emphasis of state property management shifted from privatization 
and revenue generation (typical for the 1990s) to asset management (typ-
ical after 2000). In this period, both privatization and, in some cases, also 
nationalization occurred. In some failed privatization deals, the Hungarian 
state bought back a few companies’ shares (e.g., the Hungarian airline com-
pany MALÉV) already during the 1990s. Nevertheless, the decline of priva-
tization actions automatically shifted the focus of State Asset Holding plc’s 
(later the Treasury’s) activity to active asset management (Voszka 2013).
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The shift in focus away from transition-related policies (mainly priva-
tization) to more regular tasks took place gradually during the 2000s. After 
2010, the Hungarian government changed its attitude toward foreign-
owned businesses and the role of the state was also reconsidered. In some 
cases, these changes interacted. For example, the government declared the 
political goal of reducing excessive foreign ownership in the Hungarian 
banking sector. This goal was achieved by massive renationalization in the 
sector mainly through government buy-outs of foreign owners in major 
commercial banks. Some of these assets were then reprivatized to Hun-
garian capital owners, but in other cases, the state retained these assets 
(Szanyi 2016). In order to understand the new policies, the main drivers of 
renationalization and asset management practices must first be analyzed.
The first driver was the traditional argument claiming market failures: 
important services are either not provided by private firms due to market 
imperfections or are only in limited scope due to high costs. These vital 
services (railway transport, public utilities) could be provided by both pri-
vate and state companies, and during the 1980s and 1990s, the worldwide 
tendency in this regard was a clear shift from public companies toward 
private firms. This shift created the most important asset volume for priva-
tization in some of the more developed market economies (e.g., in France 
and Britain). Also, in transition economies, the prevailing attitude favored 
the privatization of SOEs in these sectors. Hungary was pioneering in this 
regard with large-scale sales of various service companies mainly to foreign 
owners during the 1990s. Nevertheless, the privatization of utility services 
has never taken place without contradictions. The impact of privatization 
on the quality or cost of services was not always positive. In Hungary, the 
situation was also very complex, since privatization and market regulation 
was carried out simultaneously. Utility firms were sold in packages together 
with market regulation solutions that had to take into account the con-
flicting interests of various stakeholders. The modernization of infrastruc-
ture required large-scale investments that could be carried out with long-
term guarantees of adequate levels of return on investment. This meant 
relatively high service prices, especially if we consider the middle-income 
status of Hungary. Thus, the complex issues related to public utility ser-
vices and financial services could become politically important.
Efficient and cheap public services were also important issues from 
the economic and social development standpoint. Efficient transport net-
works were already crucial for increasing mobility during the industrial 
revolutions of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The creation of 
adequate infrastructure for economic development was considered a pri-
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mary interest of the state. As such, this ambition can also be regarded 
as the first appearance of the developmental state. State ambitions to 
establish new, high-tech industries appeared on the scene almost simul-
taneously in the global peripheries. The state played a significant role in 
the establishment of the railway network and the organization of railway 
services. It also supported high-tech industries like iron and steel, and 
railway machinery, construction, and maintenance. Through public pro-
curements, shipbuilding, aviation, and military equipment were also pro-
moted. The state played an important direct economic role in shaping 
economic structures and increasing the technological sophistication of 
production. Thus, a  second motivation for establishing state control in 
the economy (mainly in industry) was the ambition of the developmental 
state. In this regard, the post-transition Hungarian governments did not 
heavily interfere in market processes. Technological development has not 
been a strong priority, which is also reflected in the fact that no technology 
ministry or equivalent organization has existed in Hungary between 1996 
and 2018. State ownership could secure some research and development 
capacity in very few cases.
A selected list of asset management transactions further highlights 
some of the other political goals and preferences that influenced govern-
ment decisions. Voszka (2013) and Mihályi (2015) compiled a compre-
hensive list of renationalizations in Hungary after 2010. Using this infor-
mation, we would like to describe the primary and typical reasons for, the 
potential beneficiaries of, and possible political aims of these transactions. 
Each transaction was explained in some kind of government communi-
cation. The explanations shed light on the core elements of state prop-
erty management policy, which has not been described conceptually up 
to now. It seems that various, sometimes only loosely connected reasons 
and considerations supported the most important nationalizations. They fit 
together only on a very high level of abstraction of the government’s gen-
eral (rather populist) attitudes toward its economic clients, multinational 
firms and associated businesses—government relationships, the overall 
desire for ad-hoc, arbitrary decisions instead of normative accountable reg-
ulation. Instead of a general policy concept, we can rely on the statements 
of politicians. Hungarian government officials repeatedly stated that the 
new economic policy required that at least 50 percent of the Hungarian 
banking sector to be under national (not necessarily state) ownership, and 
public utility firms must operate on a non-profit basis. The repeated anti-
globalization attacks mainly targeted the largest multinational companies 
in various service industries. A  reduction of Hungary’s dependence on 
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the globalized world economy is needed to place financial institutions in 
national hands (if public, all the better).
When looking over a list of renationalizations (Mihályi 2015, 17), the 
overall picture shows that between 2010 and 2014, 209 companies were 
affected, and the total value of transactions was slightly over 1573 billion 
HUF (approximately €5 billion). This amount included the sales prices 
paid to previous owners, the increase of share capital, and other commit-
ments as well. The numbers and amounts seem to be very high, espe-
cially if we consider that successive Hungarian governments had already 
accumulated public debt in excess of the Maastricht criteria prior to the 
2008–9 crisis. However, as Mihályi (2015) explains, these transactions did 
not increase state gross debt since they represented a simple change in the 
asset structure, a kind of securities swap of more liquid assets. However, if 
we look at the list of transactions, we can discover that the overwhelming 
majority of the financial commitments stemmed from transactions in the 
energy and banking sectors (1366 billion HUF). Moreover, the number of 
affected companies was boosted by a large number of small saving banks 
(137 financial institutions altogether).
Among the reasons for renationalization, various political aims can 
be detected. The first outstanding transaction was the nationalization 
of the second pillar of the pension system at the turn of 2010–11. The 
official explanation called for accumulated pension funds to be taken out 
of the hands of private pension funds, which failed to yield the expected 
returns (“played with hazardous securities”). Account holders of private 
pension funds were called to withdraw and channel their savings to the 
state pension system at the risk of losing their pension rights in the pay-
as-you-go state pension system. The government applied the “opting out” 
trick, meaning that those who wanted to keep their pensions untouched 
had to face the threat, and furthermore, they were required to go through 
a  complicated administrative procedure. Those who accepted the gov-
ernment policies did not have to do anything. Consequently, in the end, 
2.8 million account holders channeled their savings back into the state 
pension system at a value of approximately 3 trillion HUF (€10 billion), 
which was equivalent to 10 percent of GDP. Most observers believe that 
the “voluntary” nationalization of private pension funds aimed at using 
the new assets for debt relief (debt that was partially accumulated by 
the social security system). The transaction brought in valuable liquid 
assets to the state budget together with a  rather substantial and diver-
sified portfolio of various kinds of securities including corporate shares 
and bonds. This campaign was the first major, albeit unintended, step 
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toward increasing state ownership in a significant number of commercial 
companies.
In 2013, the method of regulatory capture was applied in the case 
of mutual savings banks. First, the state increased the level of required 
funding capital. Since these small banks could not meet the new obliga-
tions overnight, the state itself provided them with the necessary capital 
and connected this transaction to the acquisition of a controlling owner-
ship share. Owners of the small banks were not asked beforehand but were 
given an ultimatum in case they rejected the initial generous offer. In 2014, 
the Hungarian state acquired MKB Bank from its German owners. The 
German parent bank was unwilling to run its Hungarian child at a  loss 
and sold it to the only serious buyer: the Hungarian state. The losses were, 
however, caused by various negative changes in the business environment 
initiated by the Hungarian government (extra taxes on banks’ profits, taxes 
on financial transactions), and losses due to the government-initiated debt 
relief program offered for the accommodation of increased debt burdens 
on the foreign currency loans of Hungarian citizens. The achievement of 
50 percent national ownership in the banking sector was announced soon 
after. GE-owned Budapest Bank was purchased by the Hungarian state in 
2015, when the American owner decided to abandon this line of business 
altogether. Later that year, a 15 percent stake in Erste Bank was purchased, 
increasing the national ownership share in the financial sector to over 60 
percent of bank assets. MKB and Takarékbank were soon reprivatized to 
partisan financial investors (Király 2016). The strong partisan presence in 
the banking sector may enhance the selective distribution of credits and 
development aid (e.g., money from EU structural funds).
A larger number of transactions and regulatory changes over a longer 
period of time were undertaken under the umbrella of cutting utility costs. 
The promise of savings on utility costs was a major campaign tool of the 
2010 and 2014 election campaigns. The government soon prohibited 
price increases of the public utilities. Later on, prices were set by govern-
ment agencies at significantly lower levels than before, thereby eliminating 
profits from this sector. This was the first measure that directly affected 
the profitability of private businesses. Later, new taxes were implemented 
on financial transactions, mobile telephone calls, ATM cash withdrawals, 
advertisement revenues of the media (over certain threshold6), among 
6  The advertisement tax targeted the large revenues of the German media group 
RTL. Government communication explained the measure as a reaction to the 
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others. Limiting utility costs through price decreases resulted in compa-
nies moving into the red. Owners soon felt encouraged to sell their loss-
producing assets. This process can be called regulatory seizure: company 
revenues dry up because of unfavorable changes in market regulations or 
excessive taxes. As a result, many utility firms were sold to national or local 
public bodies. Some of them received generous compensation (for example 
German RWE). The purchase of utility firms can be explained by the 
utility cost reduction policy of the government.7
Nationalized utility firms were under foreign ownership, and the reg-
ulatory capture and their resulting encroachment by the state indicated 
a  third consideration: unfriendly relationships to selected foreign com-
panies. The Hungarian governments repeatedly enacted market regula-
tions and changed the tax system to capture more of the cash revenues of 
large multinational firms in order to create more favorable conditions for 
domestic capital owners. Nevertheless, this sentiment was targeted toward 
certain types of companies: financial institutions, media firms, large retail 
chains, and telecom companies. Governmental communications argued 
that their negative treatment was the result of their failure to contribute 
to the material (real economic) production platform of the Hungarian 
economy. This kind of populist confrontation of various economic branches 
has not been asserted since the beginning of the transition process.
A further important consideration behind renationalization is sup-
porting clients or personal rent seeking. This can take place if market regu-
lations change in favor of the domestic market players. Another possibility 
is selling (privatizing) acquired assets to clients. In some cases, loss-making 
companies of clients were bailed out by the state through generous asset 
acquisitions. The most striking example of this type of transaction was the 
redistribution of tobacco sales licenses. Tobacco sales were limited to spe-
cial shops (normal retail stores were deprived of the right to sell tobacco 
products), and local authorities distributed the new sales concessionary 
licenses. In several cases, there was evidence that the tenders were not 
competitive. The political importance of supporting loyal domestic busi-
suspected tax evasion of the company. Yet, it was never explained why, if there 
was something illegal about RTL’s taxation, was this not repaired by the respon-
sible state institution or the tax office?
7  It is, of course, another question if today’s sales revenues are sufficiently high for 
the necessary investments? Observers state that public utility companies are still 
in extremely bad financial conditions and they do not make further investments, 
which may threaten the quality of their basic services.
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ness people was emphasized several times by the Prime Minister (Mihályi 
2015, 19). In addition to loyal capital owners, a wider range of state and 
party officials who need positions and revenues from the boards of com-
panies are supported. This is the simplest way to reward clients. The right 
to appoint loyal persons to positions is not necessarily bound to dominant 
state ownership, but this makes it easier. Rewarding clients is perhaps the 
most commonly used, secondary (rent seeking) aim of nationalization.
SOEs as Sources of Cash for Political Elites
Material rents stemming from positions of political power occur in all 
political systems. The extent of rents as well as the number of channels 
for rent seeking depends on the efficiency of political and social control 
and democratic institutions. Nevertheless, we should not forget about the 
major driving force behind the establishment of modern political democ-
racy: curtailing prevailing private (or closed group) interests over the 
needs of society as a whole. Strong regulatory institutions are important 
because they limit opportunities for rent seeking; political competition 
increases the risk of rent seeking. However, this does not mean the elimi-
nation of the drivers of corruption. The transition process in CEE could 
be also interpreted as a competition over the redistribution of economic 
power. In the case of privatization, this meant the redistribution of existing 
valuable assets, a  process which was, of course, designed and executed 
by state institutions. The privatization process was the first main field of 
competition for personal wealth generated by state agencies in transition 
economies.
There were various political goals to be achieved through privatization 
including eliminating the business background of communist party mem-
bers (Frydman and Rapaczynski 1994); the establishment of basic market 
institutions like the stock exchange; and strengthening the enforcement 
of property rights (Rapaczynski 1996). Contributions to this thread of lit-
erature were influenced much by the activity of the World Bank and the 
“global advising community” (Appel 2004). They usually took on the posi-
tion of neutral observer or reformist politician, both of which were charac-
terized by theory-based principles in the process of policy making (in this 
case, the neoliberal paradigm). Two decades on, we may conclude that this 
was a rather naïve approach: self-interest has always played a significant 
role, especially in those areas, like privatization policy, that were directly 
attached to the acquisition of property.
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In this “competition state,” the “comprador elite’s” material well-
being and enrichment was based on the existence and strong influence of 
multinational companies in the V4 countries. Salaried positions on boards 
and in the management of firms and advisory institutions as well as banks 
were filled by ruling party members and their clients. Business and admin-
istrative positions were frequently passed around and there was regular 
personal exchange between administrative and business positions (Drahok-
oupil 2008). The main beneficiaries of this setting were segments of the 
elite who supported multinational businesses in order to gain influence in 
the V4 countries. From the ideological perspective, mainly liberal parties 
took on this role, but they were frequently the allies of other larger parties 
that also supported liberal policies. The other main party group, the con-
servative-nationalist and Christian democratic parties, preferred strength-
ening a national bourgeoisie and typically did not enter the “comprador 
elite.” “Business firm” parties of the V4 countries usually supported the 
nationalist agenda.
There is some empirical evidence showing the occupation of corporate 
boards and advisory committees by politicians and clients in various coun-
tries. Of course it is much easier to take up controlling positions in state-
owned companies. It can be regarded as a general practice to change not 
only the supervision but the complete management of SOEs after changes 
in the government. Most of the empirical evidence is based on this group 
of companies. Skuhrovec (2014), for example, reported peaks of personnel 
changes in Czech SOE supervisory boards after election years. This prac-
tice eliminates conflicts between the management and the politician, but 
this also creates the opportunity for milking the SOE in various ways. 
SOEs can be used for this purpose regardless of their financial position. 
They are able to provide a continuous cash flow to private hands even from 
the state budget (in form of subsidies covering SOE financial losses). More 
typical benefits are bound to various positions in management. SOEs can 
transfer public revenues to private hands also through payments such as 
“expert” fees covered by fabricated agency contracts.
Unlike during the heyday of privatization during the 1990s, the 
main areas of rent seeking shifted from property acquisition, tunneling, 
and entrance into the sphere of interest of multinational business toward 
controlling and running enterprises. As was shown by Szanyi (2016), the 
privatization logic was reversed during the 2000s. Slowing privatization 
in Poland and nationalizations in Hungary aimed the maintenance and 
expansion of party-controlled state influence and rent seeking by SOEs. In 
this period, state ownership served to enrich elites that previously had not 
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joined the “comprador elite group.” Of course the decline of available state 
assets to be privatized also contributed to this. By the 2000s, remaining 
state property consisted of either notoriously loss-generating companies 
(the state railways or the Hungarian Post) that were not worth possessing, 
or they were large service providers that could not be easily transferred to 
rent seeking private hands but were instead used directly by the state for 
large-scale rent seeking.
An interesting and detailed empirical study intended to elaborate 
party-dominated companies’ external networks in Hungary (Stark and 
Vedres 2012). In earlier papers, Stark called attention to the possibility of 
previous SOEs’ incumbent managements’ survival and the transfer of their 
economic power into new business forms using informal networks (Stark 
1996; Stark and Bruszt 1998). This conceptualization changed in light 
of new empirical findings: the dominant networks of the 2000s did not 
threaten a systemic reversal. The new networks, even if they are controlled 
by former SOE’s managers or Communist Party members, effectively work 
in the new economic environment. What is new, however, is the spread of 
partisan firms, in which politicians and their clients control very significant 
parts of private business beyond SOEs that are also used for rent seeking.
According to Stark and Vedres’ (2012) survey, which was conducted 
with the data on 1,696 large and medium sized companies in Hungary for 
the period 1987–2001, party members and clients took controlling posi-
tions in less than 10 percent of firms on the eve of systemic transforma-
tion (1989), but this number steadily grew to almost 20 percent by 2001. 
Moreover, in terms of capitalization, the share of politicized firms grew 
from less than 10 percent in 1989 to over 40 percent in 2001. The authors 
differentiated between the political influence of the two competing main 
coalitions (right and left) and found that after elections, winning parties’ 
influence accelerated and losers’ declined. However, the magnitude of 
the fluctuation declined and influence became less dependent on govern-
ment changes. In my interpretation, this meant a marked shift from control 
over SOEs toward privately owned companies, the management of which 
remained largely immune to political change.
Summary and Conclusions
Economic development and modernization of Hungary has been histori-
cally bound to the presence of foreign capital and the active role of the 
developmental state. The intensity of the impact of these two driving 
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forces changed over time with the dominance of state policies during the 
two world wars and under state socialism. The systemic changes of the 
1990s put significant emphasis on the creation of market economic insti-
tutions and the establishment of tangible private property rights through 
the process of privatization. The reduction of state property was seen as 
essential from economic, institutional and also political standpoint. The 
process overlapped with the overall neoliberal-minded current of the time 
and favored private property over state ownership even in cases like public 
service provision, where ownership patterns have always been the subject 
of discussions. By the end of the 1990s, the overwhelming majority of state 
assets were privatized; to large extent they had been sold to foreign capital 
owners. Besides privatization, various types of asset tunneling also played 
a role in transforming state property into private property. Loose owner 
control in the initial phase of the transition process created space for this. 
Later, it was mainly in connection to the liquidation of bankrupted state 
assets that concerns about fraud were articulated by some experts.
During the 2000s, the emphasis of state property policies shifted 
from privatization to asset management. State assets were treated as valu-
able tools to achieve certain political goals that could increase the repu-
tation of incumbent governments, most importantly, cutting utility costs 
through state-owned service providers. But governments also used SOEs 
to increase fiscal revenues, increase employment, and limit dependence 
on multinational businesses. This later ambition was reinforced through 
rather populist, anti-globalization arguments and was coupled with other 
administrative measures intended to curtail the activity of foreign compa-
nies in Hungary.
A further component of increased interest in state asset management 
was personal and party-based rent seeking. Rents coming from the opera-
tion of SOEs is not uncommon in any market economy. The most obvious 
forms are filling companies’ leadership ranks with party members or loyal 
personnel to be rewarded. SOEs are also suitable tools for channeling bud-
getary resources to politically determined private uses through outsourcing 
contracts or sponsorship activities. Empirical evidence indicates that this 
role and politically controlled businesses in general increased in size starting 
in the 1990s thereby creating the economic foundations of political par-
ties. During the 2000s, SOEs’ role in this did not increase because political 
parties successfully developed partisan businesses that could directly access 
public monies mainly through public procurement tenders.
Szanyi - 00 könyv.indb   234 2019.11.15.   9:32
235The Role of State Ownership in and after Hungary’s Transition
REFERENCES
Appel, Hilary. 2004. A New Capitalist Order: Privatization and Ideology in Russia and 
Eastern Europe. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.
Berend, T. Iván, and Miklós Szuhay. 1978. A tőkés gazdaság története Magyarorszá-
gon 1848–1944 [Capitalist economic history in Hungary 1848–1944]. Budapest: 
Kossuth.
Bonin, John P., and Mark Schaffer. 1995. “Banks, Firms, Bad Debts and Bank ruptcy 
in Hungary 1991–94.” CEP Working Paper 657. Centre for Economic Performance, 
London School of Economics and Political Science.
Drahokoupil, Jan. 2008. “Who Won the Contest for a New Property Class? Struc-
tural Transformation of Elites in the Visegrád Four Region.” Journal for East 
European Management Studies 13 (4): 360–77.
Frydman, Roman, and Andrzej Rapaczynski. 1994. Privatization in Eastern Europe: 
Is the State Withering Away? Budapest–New York: CEU Press. 
Hungarian Government. 2009. J/8582. “Jelentés az ÁPV zrt. és jogelődei—mint 
a privatizáció lebonyolítására létrehozott célszervezetek—tevékenységéről és 
a teljes privatizációs folyamatról (1990–2007)” [Report about the activity of 
ÁPV RT and its predecessors: Organizations established for the conduct of 
privatization- and the entire privatization process (1990–2007)] http://www.
kozlonyok.hu/nkonline/MKPDF/hiteles/MK09036.pdf.
Király, Júlia. 2016. “A magyar bankrendszer tulajdonosi struktúrájának átalaku-
lása” [The transformation of the ownership structure of the Hungarian banking 
sector]. Közgazdasági Szemle 63 (7–8): 725–61.
Kolosi, Tamás, and Iván Szelényi. 2010. Hogyan legyünk milliárdosok? A neoliberális 
etika és a posztkommunista kapitalizmus szelleme [How to become billionaires? Neo-
liberal ethics and the spirit of post-communist capitalism]. Budapest: Corvina.
Kornai, János. 1993. “The Evolution of Financial Discipline under the Post-Social-
ist System.” Kyklos 46 (3): 315–36.
Laki, Mihály. 1994. “Firm behavior during a long transitional recession.” Acta 
Oeconomica 46 (3–4): 347–70
—. 2002. “A nagyvállalkozók tulajdonszerzési esélyeiről a szocializmus után” 
[About the chances of obtaining property by entrepreneurs after socialism] 
Közgazdasági Szemle 49 (1): 45–58.
Laki, Mihály, and Júlia Szalai. 2013. Tíz évvel később—a magyar nagyvállalkozók 
európai környezetben [Ten years later: Hungarian entrepreneurs in the European 
environment]. Budapest: Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány. 
Mihályi, Péter. 2015. “A privatizált vagyon visszaállamosítása Magyarországon 
2010–2014” [Renationalization of privatized assets in Hungary 2010–2014]. 
IE Discussion Paper. MT-DP-2015/7 Institute of Economics, HAS, Budapest. 
Rapaczynski, Andrzej. 1996. “The Roles of State Property and the Market in 
Establishing Property Rights.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 10 (2): 87–103.
Roland, Gérard. 2000. Transition and Economics, Politics, Markets and Firms. Cam-
bridge, MA; London: MIT Press.
Schaffer, Mark E. 1997. “Do Firms in Transition have Soft Budget Constraints? 
A Reconsideration of Concepts and Evidence.” Journal of Comparative Econom-
ics 26 (1): 80–103
Szanyi - 00 könyv.indb   235 2019.11.15.   9:32
236 Miklós Szanyi
Skuhrovec, Jiří. 2014. “The Unreasonable Lightness of Stuffing Czech Company 
Boards with Political Cronies.” Visegrad Revue, March 17. http://visegradrevue.
eu/the-unreasonable-lightness-of-stuffing-czech-company-boards-with-political-
cronies/. 
Stark, David. 1996. “Recombinant Property in East European Capitalism.” Ameri-
can Journal of Sociology 101 (4): 492–504.
Stark, David, and László Bruszt. 1998. Postsocialist Pathways: Transforming Politics 
and Property in East Central Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Stark, David, and Balázs Vedres. 2012. “Political Holes in the Economy: The Busi-
ness Network of Partisan Firms in Hungary.” American Sociological Review 77 
(5): 700–22.
Szanyi, Miklós. 1996. “Adaptive Steps by Hungary’s Industries during the Transi-
tion Crisis.” Eastern European Economics 34 (5): 59–77.
—. 2000. “Bankruptcy, Liquidation and Full Settlement as Methods of Priva-
tization.” In Privatisation in Hungary, edited by Ágota Erőss, 51–74. Budapest: 
Állami Privatizációs és Vagyonkezelő Rt.
—. 2002. “Bankruptcy Regulations, Policy Credibility and Asset Transfers 
in Hungary.” IWE Working Paper 130. Institute of World Economics, HAS, 
Budapest.
—. 2016. “The Reversal of the Privatization Logic in Central European Tran-
sition Economies.” Acta Oeconomica 66 (1): 33–55.
Tomka, Béla. 2011. Gazdasági növekedés, fogyasztás és életminőség: Magyarország 
nemzetközi összehasonlításban az első világháborútól napjainkig [Economic 
growth, consumption, and quality of life: Hungary in international comparison 
from World War I to today]. Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó.
Voszka, Éva. 2013. “Államosítás, privatizáció, államosítás” [Nationalization, priva-
tization, nationalization]. Közgazdasági Szemle 60 (12): 1289–317.
Szanyi - 00 könyv.indb   236 2019.11.15.   9:32
CHAPTER 9
The Changing Role of the State in 
Development in Emerging Economies:  
The Developmental State Perspective
Judit ricz
Introduction
Fifteen years have passed since the seminal work of Hall and Soskice 
(2001) on Varieties of Capitalism (VoC), and extensive literature has 
emerged since then, which can be structured into possibly four genera-
tions. The first, the classical school of VoC, mostly relates to Hall and Sos-
kice’s work (see also Amable 2003) and the differentiation of liberal market 
economies (LME) (e.g., the U.S., U.K., Canada, Australia, New zea-
land, Ireland) and coordinated market economies (CME) (e.g., Germany, 
Japan, Sweden, Austria). The second generation is generally labeled post-
VoC literature and aims at developing further types of capitalist models, 
mainly related to different regions or groups of countries. In this regard, 
the dependent market economy model (Nölke and Vliegenthart 2009) can 
be highlighted, but also the work of the Hungarian scholar Beáta Farkas 
(2011 and 2017), who analyzed Central and Eastern European (CEE) 
countries in this framework. The third generation of VoC literature is 
called critical comparative capitalism (CC), and it mainly deals with more 
critical, global approaches and most current issues such as international 
economic integration (e.g., the Eurozone crisis) and tries to incorporate 
the demand side of analysis (see e.g., Ebenau et al. 2015; Farkas 2016). 
A fourth generation of VoC research is currently emerging, although this 
differentiation is made on a rather speculative basis. There are some works 
and signs indicating that VoC analysis has recently (during the last two to 
three years) moved toward intertemporal (instead of international) com-
parisons attempting to define and characterize historical phases rather than 
simply building valid models for certain countries or world regions.1
1  Andreas Nölke drew attention to recent developments in VoC research in his 
presentation at the international conference on “The Role of State in Varieties 
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According to this theoretical structure, we see two entry points for 
our essay: first, emerging countries, even while gaining weight in the world 
economy and politics, have been generally left out by traditional VoC anal-
ysis (with some exceptions, such as Schneider 2009 and 2013; Nölke et al. 
2015). Second, intertemporal comparisons are also often missing. Thus, 
we argue that studying historical development success stories and defining 
historical role models and lessons are valid research objectives.
The following chapter in this volume focuses on emerging economies 
and analyzes some of their success stories and divergent paths of develop-
ment. Emerging countries have increased their share in the world economy 
substantially over the last decades. After the first2 and second3 generation 
of newly industrialized countries (NICs), more recently, we have witnessed 
the rise of large emerging economies, such as China, India and Brazil.4 
Despite annual fluctuations and some rather negative tendencies more 
recently (the crisis in Brazil starting in 2014, or the deceleration of eco-
nomic growth in China since 2010), there is no well-grounded reason to 
assume that the long-term rise of these large emerging economies will be 
reversed and their weight in the global economy will substantially diminish 
(May and Nölke 2014).
Looking at both historical and contemporary development success 
stories it is conspicuous that these have been rather neglected by VoC anal-
ysis until recently. Some more recent works have attempted to fill this gap, 
however, these are exceptional and do not follow the mainstream currents 
of Capitalism (SVOC): Achievements and challenges for Central and Eastern 
Europe and the emerging markets,” organized by the Institute of World Econom-
ics (IWE), Center for Economic and Regional Studies (Hungarian Academy of 
Sciences) and the Center for EU Enlargement Studies (CENS, Central Euro-
pean University) on November 26–27, 2015 in Budapest.
2  Besides Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore are generally 
referred to as the first generation of NICs. 
3  Mainly referring to Southeast Asian countries, such as Malaysia, Thailand, the 
Philippines, and Indonesia.
4  In line with the rise of economic power, geopolitical ambitions and institutional 
efforts have also appeared, as the large emerging economies of the Global South 
have begun to organize themselves and institutionalize their cooperation more 
recently. Examples are numerous: the IBSA Dialogue Forum (India, Brazil, and 
South Africa), the BASIC alliance (also including China), or the BRICS group-
ing (including Russia). Regarding the VoC approach and especially the role of 
state in development, we argue that South Africa and Russia are outliers, and 
the state-permeated variety of capitalism (state capitalism 3.0) is valid for China, 
India, and Brazil (see Nölke 2014).
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of political economy analysis. Nölke (2014) and his co-authors have ana-
lyzed large emerging economies, the BICS group (Brazil, India, China and 
South Africa), and constructed the model of state-permeated capitalism. 
Kurlantzick (2016) and Wylde (2017) speak about the rise of state capi-
talism and developmental regimes (respectively) in the twenty-first centu-
ry’s emerging markets, while Schneider (2013) focused on Latin America 
and proposed the hierarchical market economy model to describe the latino 
variety of capitalism.
However, we start our theoretical introduction a few decades earlier. 
As we will argue throughout this chapter, there is a distinct thread in devel-
opment economics, which can be regarded as the antecedent to VoC litera-
ture. Dating back to the 1980s and 1990s, the developmental state school has 
intensively analyzed a special variety of capitalism.
The first milestone in this line of inquiry was Chalmers Johnson’s 
(1982) book on the Japanese miracle, in which the Japanese model of 
development was described as a  capitalist plan-rational developmental 
state (DS). With this distinction, Johnson’s main aim was to go beyond 
the contemporary dichotomous thinking shaped by the confrontation of 
the American and Soviet economies, i.e., capitalist versus socialist devel-
opment. Johnson basically wanted to draw attention to the differences 
between the capitalist systems of the United States and Britain on the one 
hand, and Japan and its East Asian disciples on the other hand (Johnson 
1999, 32). In this vein we argue that Johnson’s work and that of his dis-
ciples in the revisionist school (developmental state literature) can be con-
sidered a quasi-forerunner of the Variety of Capitalism school.
There is also another argument to more thoroughly analyze the devel-
opmental state perspective, namely, the early VoC works have more often 
than not neglected to consider the role of state in development. Therefore, 
we are convinced that in order to better understand how state intervention 
may influence capitalist models currently, it is worth starting our theoret-
ical introduction by looking at the historical model of the Japanese devel-
opmental state and the analytical framework of the developmental state 
literature. Moreover, the economic and developmental role of the state has 
been moved back to the center of economic debate. Following the finan-
cial and economic crisis of 2008–9 and in light of the prolonged economic 
recovery afterwards, we can observe different types of active state interven-
tions and growing state involvement to reduce the effects of the crisis and 
to revive economic growth and development throughout the world. Simul-
taneous with this shift in the practice of economic policy-making, we can 
witness the renaissance of developmental state literature in economics. By 
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the end of this chapter, we will argue that this new scholarly current is not 
the revival of the old or classical paradigm of developmental states (Woo-
Cumings 1999), but the emergence of a new developmental state concept 
(though the breakthrough of a new paradigm has not yet occurred).
The chapter is divided into five sections: following the introduction, 
in the second part we define developmental states and then sum up main 
elements of the classical developmental state paradigm (DSP) based on 
Northeast Asian experiences, while embedding it in its global and regional 
context. In the third part, we argue that, due to substantial changes in the 
context, the classical DSP had run its course by the 1997–99 Asian Finan-
cial Crisis at the latest, and thus the theoretical concept has also collapsed. 
In the fourth part, we turn toward more recent changes: we provide an 
overview of the new challenges emerging (or intensifying) since the millen-
nium, and based on most recent developmental state literature, we high-
light the main elements of the new DS concept, which is still developing. 
Finally, we will present our conclusions.
Developmental States: A Special Variety of Capitalism
In the introduction we argued that the developmental state school should 
be considered a forerunner of VoC literature, with a special emphasis on 
emerging economies. We have also addressed the problems associated 
with the delineation of “emerging countries,” and the controversies con-
cerning BRICS and other acronyms. In reality, we can see that there is 
only a  handful of countries that have managed to historically catch up 
with more developed countries. Examining per capita real incomes and 
defining catching up as the move from the low to middle, or middle to 
high income category (as defined by the World Bank) the following figure 
shows that out of 101 middle-income economies in 1960, only 13 became 
high income by 2008. Among those countries catching up, we can find 
a number of countries often dubbed as developmental states: Hong Kong, 
Ireland, Israel, Japan, Mauritius, the Republic of Korea (South Korea), 
Singapore, Taiwan and China.5
5  We do not address the cases of the South European countries (Spain, Portugal, 
and Greece) here, and, for the rather obvious reason of resource (oil and gas-) 
dependency, we also leave out Equatorial Guinea.
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Figure 1 
Per Capita Incomes Relative to the United States, 1960 and 2008
Source: Reprinted from the World Bank (2012, 2)
Even though in the following sections we will argue that the developmental 
successes (miracle) of the classic developmental states of Northeast Asia 
went well beyond mere economic terms and GDP growth, this figure is 
indicative not only for those reaching outstanding performance, but also 
for those (countries of Latin America and Middle East) that remained 
trapped in the middle after initial success (World Bank 2012), such as 
Brazil or Turkey.
In the following, however, we concentrate on the success stories of 
the attractive emerging countries that became known in development eco-
nomics as developmental states. The classical paradigm of developmental 
states was based mainly on the experiences of North- (and later on also 
South-) east Asian countries. Therefore, our focus will be on the distinctive 
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Defining Developmental States
At the latest, by the millennium the term “developmental state” became 
a buzzword (Fine et al, 2013, 3; Routley 2014, 159), as it has become “a 
generic term to describe governments that try to actively “intervene” in eco-
nomic processes and direct the course of development rather than relying 
only on market forces” (Beeson 2007, 141). We are convinced, however, 
that in light of revived debates on the role of the state in development, the 
concept of developmental states is still a useful tool to promote clear and 
reasonable academic debate. It is necessary to stick to a clear definition,6 and 
for this reason the original formulation of Johnson is a good starting point.
Accordingly, the term developmental state refers to: 1. a  capitalist 
model: private property dominates the economy (no ideological commit-
ment to state ownership); 2. a state-led development model: bureaucratic 
coordination replaces market coordination, and the active (even pro-active) 
interventions of state reach all parts of economic life, while discretional and 
selective interventions dominate; 3. the central role of economic (develop-
ment) planning: medium and long term economic plans are formulated 
and implemented (though often in a pragmatic, rather flexible manner); 
4. a  long term commitment to a  development-oriented approach (not 
US-style regulation or a  Soviet-style socialist approach); 5. wide social 
consensus regarding both the central role of the state in promoting devel-
opment and the most important social and economic priorities (with high-
speed economic growth and catching up as the most important ones) 
(Johnson 1982, 19–23).
The archetype of classic developmental states was the Japanese model 
as described in Johnson’s (1982) famous book, even though he was not 
the first7 or the last attempt to describe and analyze developmental states. 
6  We have argued elsewhere (Ricz 2017a) that it is not justifiable to call any active, 
interventionist state (that relies on selective industrial policy measures) a develop-
mental state—as they often are by the media, in policy discourse, and even in some 
scholarship—as it is a much more complex institutional solution and policy concept.
7  Developmental states, of course, existed already well before Johnson wrote his 
seminal work and also in other regions of the world. Chibber (2005) and Bagchi 
(2004) consider, for example, the developmentalist experiments of Turkey, Bra-
zil, and India as the first (less successful) attempts to build developmental states. 
In Latin America, Cardoso and Faletto (1979, 143–48) made the first reference 
to “developmentalist states” in their very influential book, Dependency and Devel-
opment in Latin America.
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During the following decades, this concept has been applied and expanded 
to several other countries: first, to Northeast Asian countries such as South 
Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and as the only Southeast Asian country in 
this group, Singapore,8 (the first generation of newly industrializing coun-
tries—NICs), and then to other Southeast Asian countries, including 
Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines, and Indonesia (second-generation 
NICs). Later it became common to characterize the state-led develop-
mental approach of some European (such as France, Finland, Ireland) and 
emerging countries (such as Brazil—see Chapter Twelve in this volume—
India, Turkey—see Chapter Eleven in this volume—and Egypt) in this 
way, while more recently, it is also often associated with the Chinese case 
and to some fast-growing African economies (such as Rwanda, Ethiopia, 
or even South Africa).9
The Classical Paradigm of Developmental States
Vast literature on developmental states has emerged since the conceptu-
alization of the original idea of Chalmers Johnson’s (1982) plan-rational 
capitalist developmental state, the Japanese model. In this section, we aim 
to summarize the most important features of the classical model of devel-
opmental states based on the experiences of Northeast Asian countries 
(Japan, South-Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore).10 The most 
important elements of the model are relevant and applicable to the devel-
opment experiences of Southeast Asian countries, such as Malaysia, Thai-
land, the Philippines, and Indonesia.11
To establish the foundations of the classical model of DS, we rely on 
core DS literature, such as Johnson (1982), Amsden (1989), Wade (1990), 
8  See Chapter Ten in this volume. 
9  For a breakdown of states considered to be developmental in both historical and 
contemporary scholarship, see Routley (2012, 11–12).
10  The Japanese case is, in several aspects, unique, and the two city-states (Hong 
Kong and Singapore) deviate from the structuralist point of view. Yet it is still 
argued in literature that these Northeast Asian countries have relied on such 
a similar economic policy mix, that it makes them a unique group that is differ-
ent from most other regimes” (Pempel 1999, 160).
11  The main differences of North and Southeast Asian countries are highlighted by 
Booth (1999). For the specificities of Southeast Asian development models, see 
Raquiza (2012).
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Evans (1995), Leftwich (1995), and the synthetic works of Onis (1991) 
and Woo-Cumings (1999).
Below are the most important dimensions of the classical paradigm of 
developmental states, based on the experiences of Northeast Asian devel-
opmental states between 1965 and 1990, the so-called economic miracle 
period.12 This will serve as a reference point for the case studies presented 
in the following chapters.
The classical model of the developmental state contains the following 
elements:
1. Economic nationalism and social mobilization.
2. A strong, centralized and authoritarian state:
i. Relative autonomy from influence of social groups.
ii. A small and determined elite.
iii. The state’s power to discipline business.
iv. A developmental dictatorship.
3. Wide-ranging interventionism and the central role of indus-
trial policy (selective and discretionary measures and the practice of 
picking winners).
4. The central (economic, political, and social) role of large diversi-
fied business groups.
5. A meritocratic bureaucracy with embedded autonomy.
6. The primary role of the agricultural sector and land reform.
7. Export-oriented economic development strategy with state guid-
ance and market-conforming methods.
8. Financial repression 
i.  Based on high domestic savings, and fiscal and other incentives by 
the state, and state moves toward subsidized, strategic industries.
ii. Implicit and explicit state guarantees.
iii.  Bailout policies (and practices) toward financial institutions as 
well as the business sector.
iv. Limited entrance into financial markets.
v. The closed and subordinated role of capital markets.
9. Macroeconomic stability and good macroeconomic management.
10. Shared and equitable growth.
12  The high-performing Asian economies (Japan, Hong Kong, the Republic of 
Korea, Singapore, Taiwan, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand) reached out-
standing growth performance between 1965 and 1990, with a yearly average of 
5.5 percent growth rates in GDP per capita, outperforming any other region in 
the world (World Bank 1993, 2).
Szanyi - 00 könyv.indb   244 2019.11.15.   9:32
245The Changing Role of the State in Development in Emerging Economies
Due to space constraints and the main focus of the current volume, one 
aspect of the above list will be highlighted, namely the pivotal role of the 
state versus large diversified business groups in economic catching up. 
Even though we have labeled Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Singa-
pore as developmental states, there were significant differences in both 
their economic structures and strategies. While in Japan, private corporate 
groups, keiretsus, revolved around a central financial institution, in the case 
of the Korean chaebols, there was no such financial hub. At the same time, 
the industrial structure of Taiwan was more dominated by smaller compa-
nies, while in Singapore, a large state-owned enterprise sector has evolved. 
Financial sectors have also differed in their structure: in Japan, most banks 
were privately owned (and strongly linked to business conglomerates), but 
the Bank of Japan and the public postal saving system were key compo-
nents of the financial hierarchy. In South Korea, almost the entire banking 
sector was private; however, the role of government in directing capital 
toward selected sectors (and companies) has been crucial. In Taiwan, 
mainlander control dominated the banking sector, while the financial and 
industrial spheres were kept relatively separate (Pempel 1999, 150). The 
role of foreign investment has also been different, and, in general, played 
a much more important role in the South Korea and Singapore, while it 
was largely excluded in Japan. 
All in all, although state influence was present and has been a domi-
nant feature of classic development states, their economies were mainly 
dominated by private companies, and state influence was exerted often 
via indirect means (not by ownership, but in terms of close state and big 
business relations, or via financial repression). However the power of the 
state to discipline big businesses was strong (at least initially) in all classic 
DS, and in exchange for generous state support, international competi-
tiveness was expected as “each regime has operated with an eye toward 
world market” (Pempel 1999, 173). Thus state interventions have rein-
forced market principles, at least in their international dimensions (the 
domestic marketplace was dominated by entry barriers and oligopolistic 
structures).
According to Johnson (1998, 653), the classical model of develop-
mental states, based on Northeast Asian experiences, consists of “…Asian 
values on subjects such as the nature of government, priority given to the 
community over the individual, and government guidance of a nonetheless 
privately owned and managed market economy, with economic growth 
tied above all to exports.” Thus, it refers to a state-led market economy, 
and a capitalist model with substantial economic growth and increasing 
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wellbeing intended to serve the whole society (a growth-with-equity 
approach).
The Context of Economic Success in Northeast Asian Developmental States
To fully understand the success and failure of the classical model of DS, 
we have to put it in its historical and institutional context, as these unique 
conditions contributed to these countries’ overwhelming economic suc-
cess, while at the same time, they made the model non-transferable and 
unrepeatable in other times and places (Pempel 1999, 180).
The historical interplay of (political, economic, ideological, social, 
regional, and security) forces has contributed to the East Asian economic 
miracle.13 Some of these were temporal related, while others were geo-
graphically determined and region specific. 
We distinguish three elements of the general environment: 1. The 
global political context of the postwar period (the national capitalist devel-
opment concept, economic nationalism). 2. The global economic context 
of the post-war period (the neo-mercantilist approach, growing protec-
tionism, relatively closed economic systems and models). 3. The context 
of late-development (national-based Fordist capitalism, the promotion 
of strategic national industries, and, in the context of underdevelopment, 
mass poverty and infrastructural deficiencies caused by the destruction of 
war and economic catching up as the first priority supported by wide social 
consensus). These permissive global conditions meant that national eco-
nomic performance depended, to a  large degree, on the competitiveness 
of large national firms, and created the basis for national dirigist state-led 
development policies. 
In addition, three region-specific conditions have also substantially 
contributed to the unique context of the Northeast Asian developmental 
experience. First is Japan’s outstanding role within the region: 1. as 
a former colonial ruler (which created the important institutional setting); 
2. as an important economic donor, providing development aid, and, later 
on, capital; 3. in more general terms, as the regional economic leader (pro-
viding markets and serving as an economic partner); and 4. as a role model 
13  See also Doner, Ritchie, and Slater’s (2005) arguments on the interactive condi-
tions of systemic vulnerability present in the case of Northeast Asian DS. But 
the lack of these led to much less ambitious state-building efforts and, thus, 
much less outstanding development outcomes in Southeast Asian countries.
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for economic development. Second, the complex role of the United States 
in security and economic policy, whereby it provide: 1. development and 
military aid based on geopolitical considerations; 2. foreign direct invest-
ments; 3. preferential market access; and 4. in more general terms, the 
commitment of the U.S. to ensure the stability of the region by all means 
(to stop the spread of socialism-communism, and to secure the border 
between the two poles in the Cold War). All of these have produced sub-
stantial implicit and explicit benefits for the development of the North-
east Asian region. As a third special condition, we highlight historical and 
cultural factors: most countries in this region have relatively homogenous 
societies (with small ethnic, religious, racial, linguistic, or other differ-
ences); have inherited extensive and high quality institutional systems from 
the colonial period (for example strong and well-performing core admin-
istrative systems, extensive, high quality educational systems). Asian cul-
tural values have also played pivotal role by placing the community and its 
priorities above individual interests, which has had wide ranging economic 
consequences. Two examples of this are: the very strong individual com-
mitment and maximizing efforts to contribute to the implementation of 
community priorities (resulting, for example, in extremely long working 
hours compared to European standards); and second, the provision of 
social security and welfare primarily through the family, community, and 
business enterprises has freed up important state resources. 
We have summed up the most important characteristics of Northeast 
Asian developmental states, which is also called the classical paradigm 
of the developmental state. We have embedded Northeast Asian experi-
ences, namely the region’s economic miracle, in its proper historical and 
geographic context. During the 1990s (with some processes starting even 
before then), these general and specific conditions have substantially 
changed and fragmented the internal and external coherence of the model, 
which has led to the decline of the classical model of the developmental 
state (Benczes 2000 and 2002; Woo-Cumings 1999; Ricz 2017a).
The Fall of the Classical Developmental State Paradigm (DSP) 
During the 1980s and 1990s, substantial changes took place in the external 
and internal environments of classic developmental states and have led to 
changes in individual states’ room to maneuver. However, these changes 
have also altered expectations and perceptions as well as the decisions of 
economic actors and individuals. Altogether, this meant that the specific 
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context that enabled the success of traditional developmental states (as dis-
cussed in the previous section) has changed significantly and led to the 
demise of the classical model. 
The Asian financial crisis of 1997–99 (AFC) was a milestone signaling 
the end of an era (and the beginning of a new one). However, changes in 
the specific context of the classic DS already started years and decades ear-
lier and accrued, culminating in the AFC. 
The classical DS model emerged in a  closed economic system in 
which trade flows dominated interactions between national states. The 
structural transformation of the global economy started already by the end 
of 1960s, leading to an open global economy dominated by capital flows 
and transnational corporations transcending national borders. 
Another dimension of the structural transformation of the global 
economy has been the rise of the service sector’s weight and the emer-
gence of the bit-based knowledge economy. This led to the appreciation of 
human capital investments, access to information and innovation, and net-
working activities. Technological changes have not only affected sectors of 
the new economy, but have altered the organizational forms of traditional 
economic activities as well as modes of corporate governance. 
Changes in the global financial system have been even more striking 
than changes in the economic production system described above. Finan-
cial globalization led by the private sector has intensified since the 1970s. 
Several interconnected elements can be highlighted: the deregulation of 
financial systems, the separation of the flow of goods and financial flows, 
the growing weight of speculative transactions, the intensification of cap-
ital flows, the appreciating role of stock exchanges, and the virtualization 
of financial transactions. All these processes taken together have signifi-
cantly altered the options available to finance a nation-based develop-
ment model. 
Today’s economic environment and structures substantially differ 
from those that reflected the specific context of late developing states 
during the 1970s. Changes were even more pronounced in the financial 
sector. Financial liberalization, globalization, and open capital accounts 
have placed efficient resource allocation at the heart of any current devel-
opment strategy. Gone are the days of financial repression and selective 
industrial policies directed by the state and its bureaucracy as was common 
in the case of the classic DS. In light of ever more complex economic activ-
ities, the state or any other actor is less and less able to collect sufficient 
information to directly and successfully intervene in the shaping of indus-
trial structures or select leading industrial sectors or enterprises. 
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In line with changes in economic structures and the transformation of 
the financial system, global governance and the regulatory environment has 
also significantly changed (see e.g., the World Trade Organization, Basel 
Accords, International Accounting Standards, etc.). This new institutional 
and regulatory setting significantly constrains developmental states’ room 
to maneuver and their ability to apply classic tools of economic stimulation 
and deploy repressive financial practices. 
International political and ideological settings have also changed. The 
end of the Cold War and the effects of postcommunist countries’ transi-
tion have all contributed to significant changes in the specific context of 
the classic DS. It is enough to recall that the end of China’s forty years of 
sequestration from the global economy has had an unprecedented effect on 
the international competitiveness of East Asian (and especially Southeast 
Asian) countries. 
Ideational changes have also taken place, and according to Amartya 
Sen (1999), an outward orientation has been elevated over any nation-
based economic strategy, and a capability-based interpretation of develop-
ment, which has meant a significant departure from the former growth-
maximizing approach. Besides the economic dimension of development, 
social, political, and environmental dimensions came to fore, and spatial, 
generational and gender issues lie at the heart of current understandings 
and interpretations of development. 
Intensifying globalization has also led to changes in people’s daily 
lives. Demonstration effects via the spread of new ICT and new mass com-
munication tools and social media platforms have altered people’s pref-
erences and expectations in the quest for democratic systems and “good 
governance” (such as non-corrupt, rules-based, participatory, transparent, 
and accountable policy-making). 
The above described processes have resulted in significant changes 
in the special context of the classic DS, which has enabled these states 
to directly guide the market and stimulate the economy with “traditional 
tools and measures” during the mid-twentieth century. 
One of the most important implications is that, starting in the 1980s, 
the liberalization process has undermined the internal coherence of the 
classical DS model, which was not able to adapt itself to either the new 
external conditions or to the changed internal settings (shaped by weak-
ening state capacities and the ever stronger private sector). Accordingly, 
the decline of the classical DS model has to be regarded as a  systemic 
phenomenon, and the AFC only brought these internal controversies to 
the fore. 
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We sum up our preceding arguments in the following six points, which 
highlight the underlying mechanisms leading to the decline of the classical 
DS model:14
1.  The structural transformation of the economy: global, transna-
tional organization of economic production and growing com-
plexity of economic activities undermine direct state guidance 
and “picking winners” strategies in the industrial sector, whereas 
domestic subsidies in a globalized production line do not neces-
sarily increase domestic investments and production.
2.  Significant societal changes: a more urbanized and “enlightened” 
society is probably less accepting of authoritarian and repres-
sive regimes; the quest for democratization and good governance 
rises, while at the same time, altering preferences might lead to 
increasing consumerism (as in the case of Latin America).
3.  Changes in the global financial system and capital market leave no 
or very limited room for development models based on state-led 
and repressive national financial systems, in which resource alloca-
tion is subordinated to long-term industrial goals rather than any 
efficiency measures (let alone price signals). Successful integration 
into the globalized financial system and capital market is, however, 
predicated on institutional reforms, as relational banking and cozy 
relations between the state and business sector are not compatible 
with the new global rules of the game.
4.  Changes in corporate governance are inevitable consequences of 
the above-described trends, as above certain development levels, 
an increase in investment levels has to be accompanied by better 
management practices, efficient resource allocation (and well-
functioning capital markets), and foreign ownership (to acquire 
new knowledge and technology).
5.  Changes in state-business relations were also forged by the 
changes in the economic and social context. In the short run, 
Northeast Asian states could discipline the business sector. How-
ever, in the longer run, as intensifying integration into the world 
economy and efficiency criteria came to the fore, the capabilities of 
14  This argumentation builds on László Csaba’s presentation on developmental 
states and the discussion that followed, held at Central European University 
during the course “New Political Economy of Development” held on February 
19, 2015. 
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the state have weakened and crony capitalism emerged (with rent-
seeking and corruption becoming the rule and not the exception).
6.  The legitimacy of the mostly authoritarian, strong developmental 
states was provided on the one hand by US security consider-
ations during the Cold War, and on the other hand, by exceptional 
growth performance that equally benefitted different classes of 
society. Both internal and external legitimacy based on the clas-
sical DS model broke down by the 1990s, which exposed the fra-
gility of this very specific development model.
All in all, the classical model of DS reached its limits at the latest by the end 
of 1990s, as inherently signaled by the AFC. However, in the following sec-
tion we will argue that this is not the end of the story. Although significant 
changes took place in East Asian developmental states as well as in other 
emerging countries, after years and decades of market-oriented and struc-
tural reforms, the state continues to play a significant, albeit mostly altered 
and transformed, role in most emerging economies, and certain continuities 
with the past prevail (see the national case studies in the following chapters).
The Quest for a New DS Concept in the Twenty-first Century
The need for re-thinking the analytical concepts for developmental states 
can be verified with the aforementioned fall of the classical DS paradigm 
and by the new challenges that emerged (or intensified) in the twenty-first 
century and created new circumstances (both possibilities and limits) for 
governments to formulate and realize their main socio-economic develop-
mental objectives.
At this stage it is premature to speak about a new DS concept, and 
this is not the aim of this essay. However, there are some preliminary pillars 
around which consensus has formed in economic literature (Fosu 2013a 
and 2013b; Williams 2014), and these will be outlined in the following sec-
tion. It is worth noting, however, the most important insights up to now: 
both economic and political sustainability requires an inclusive, Senian 
approach to development; transformative social and economic (structural) 
policies are needed, which place special emphasis on the enhancement of 
human capabilities and the new, service-based economy; and last but not 
least, for promoting these new developmental changes, building domestic 
institutional capabilities is a sine qua non condition, which is all too often 
disregarded by policy-makers, decision-makers, and even academic circles.
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There are two straightforward ways to move toward a new DS concept: 
first, relying on the synthesis of the most recent theoretical results, and 
second, “streamlining” the latest experiences of states or groups of states 
as revealed by their development success and their economic policy prac-
tices. The theoretical starting point shall be the new paradigm of develop-
ment (Sen 1999) embedded in modern theories of development economics, 
modern growth theories, as well as in new political economics and the new 
institutional economic school (Evans 2014). For more concrete theoretical 
underpinnings, see also the new developmentalist approach shaped by the 
work of Bresser-Pereira (2011, 2015, 2016) or the excellent book by Jan 
Winiecki (2016) on economic development strategies, structural change, 
and potential “shortcut strategies” for catching up in the less developed 
countries of the Global South. Related to the other methods of constructing 
a new concept, the most recent experiences of new DS, the most recent 
experiences of East Asian countries—not only in the Northeast, but also, or 
even more so, in Southeast Asian countries (Raquiza 2012), and, according 
to some analysts, also the particular development paths of China and India 
(Hua and Hu 2015; Hsu 2018; Székely-Doby 2017) have to be taken into 
account. In a broader sense, however, the experiences of the latest Latin 
American developmentalist experiments (Schneider 2015; Wylde 2012; 
Ricz 2017b) and those of some quickly growing African economies (Booth 
2015; Routley 2014; Biedermann 2016) might offer some useful lessons.
We are convinced that approaches based on theoretical results and 
practical experiences move in the same direction, and combining both might 
prove useful for constructing a new DS concept. In this section, however, we 
have a much less ambitious objective: after some definitional issues, we aim 
to sum up the new challenges of the twenty-first century, which legitimize 
the quest for a new developmental state concept. Then, by synthetizing the 
most recent academic literature on developmental states, we aim to present 
a common analytical structure for developmental states in the twenty-first 
century. For a more practical approach and an overview of emerging econo-
mies’ most recent experiences of reform and the transformation of the role 
of the state in development, see the following chapters and case studies. 
The New Challenges of the Twenty-First Century
In the previous section we have argued that at the latest, by the end of the 
twentieth century, changes in the external and internal context of classic 
(East Asian-style) developmental states has led to the fall of the classical 
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DS paradigm. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, all the “to-be-
developmental states” face new challenges that significantly differ from the 
circumstances and conditions prevalent when the classic developmental 
states emerged during the mid-twentieth century. The first four challenges 
are based on the work of Michelle Williams (2014, 8–20). Additionally, 
a further aspect is included (in line with Fine and Pollen 2016).
The first challenge is new economic re-structuring, which refers to 
the shift from manufacturing to the knowledge and service sectors, the 
so-called bit-driven or new economy based on knowledge and innovation. 
In this “new economic” setting, beyond physical capital accumulation, 
expanding human capabilities and the spread of information (through, 
e.g., investments in education, health, and legal infrastructure) play an 
ever larger role. The modern economy is increasingly driven by knowledge, 
innovation, as well as by business and financial services, and this stands 
in stark contrast to the twentieth century, which was defined by manufac-
turing. Along with this shift, different types of activities from both the state 
and the private sector (the entrepreneurial sector) are required to actively 
promote development. The state remains important in its traditional activi-
ties, but these have to be complemented with new activities supporting the 
creation and spread of knowledge and innovation, and those related to the 
state’s new entrepreneurial roles, such as risk-taking and market-creation 
functions. At the same time, traditional networks between the state and the 
business sector have to be revised as well, in order to create a symbiotic 
rather than a parasitic relationship (Mazzucato 2013, 23).
The second challenge relates to changes in the political context of the 
twenty-first century’s developmental states. Changes in domestic politics, 
namely the move from authoritarian regimes toward more democratic 
ones is moving hand in hand with the spread of new information and com-
munication technologies. The emergence of a  new bit-driven economy 
also has direct and indirect consequences for society and politics. Given 
the increased appreciation for knowledge and human capabilities, a new 
“enlightenment” is taking place, provoking changes in social needs, norms, 
and values. As long as the specific context of classic DS was determined 
by late development, mobilization for war, the external threat of the Cold 
War, and economic nationalism (and due to all these factors the societies 
of the classic DS were willing to make some sacrifices, such accepting 
repressive authoritarian regimes), today any “to-be-developmental state” 
must create and build up a new basis for legitimacy according to the new 
circumstances of the twenty-first century. Within this new political context, 
community priorities and a developmental agenda have to be set up based 
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on a new alliance between state and society. In most cases, these changes 
imply the move from authoritarian regimes toward more democratic ones 
defined by the embeddedness of the political subsystem in society, political 
freedom, participation, the involvement of civil society, and the collec-
tive determination of the main priorities of the community. According to 
Amartya Sen (1999), a democratic political system based on representa-
tive, deliberative political participation is not just a means for achieving 
widely defined development but is a goal in itself.
The third challenge in Williams’s list (2014, 18) is related to epis-
temic changes in the meaning of development and its interpretation. The 
expansion of the meaning of development is an unequivocal move away 
from the “economic growth-centered” thinking of the last century, toward 
a “development as freedom” interpretation according to Sen (1999); the 
latter is also called a human-capabilities approach. Thus, the promotion of 
development does not equate with a “technical problematic” of economic 
growth that merely requires economic knowledge; a development-oriented 
approach has to be increasingly considered a political problematic, as social 
welfare is a function of different non-economic factors (besides, of course, 
economic growth), such as social justice, poverty, inequality, or social par-
ticipation and perception.
The last challenge mentioned by Williams (2014, 20) is ecological: envi-
ronmental limits, including the new challenges posed by climate change and 
different aspects of environmental justice. By now, it is beyond any doubt 
that the resource-intensive development path of the last century, which was 
based predominantly on fossil fuels, cannot be sustained globally in the 
twenty-first century. This inherently leads to changes in existing consump-
tion and production patterns and habits, while existing structures and infra-
structures also have to be revised and altered. In light of market failures and 
externalities, the state has to play a central role in the realization of a green 
developmental path. At the same time, according to Mazzucato (2013), envi-
ronmental limits also offer governments the opportunity to revise their devel-
opment strategies and consider green technology developments as engines 
for economic growth, employment, and innovation in the long run (and to 
realize an environmentally sustainable development trajectory). Furthermore, 
we would like to add that given the past experiences of developmental states, 
in addition to the environmental aspects, greater attention must be paid to 
the spatial dimensions of development, and consequently there needs to be 
a greater focus on rural areas and the role of agrarian development.
The four challenges mentioned above could be further expanded by 
including the pressures that twenty-first-century developmental states face, 
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which significantly alter their options and their room to maneuver: finan-
cial globalization and the experiences and effects of recent financial and 
economic crises. Due to these, the significance of efficient resource allo-
cation has increased, while the financial viability of nation-based devel-
opment interventions is deteriorating. In order to understand the logic of 
development-oriented interventions in light of financial globalization, one 
has to distinguish between productive (real) and speculative (financial) 
investments. While in the former case, it might be a stated and accepted 
objective to support employment growth or the expansion of human capa-
bilities, for the latter, state regulation might be needed to decrease financial 
vulnerability. Fine and Pollen (2016) refer to this challenge as financializa-
tion (“the extraordinary growth of finance”), and highlight its wide-ranging 
consequences, such as the influence of finance on investments, value 
judgments, and more broadly, extending over economic and social policy 
issues, which, as a result, constrains (or at least transforms and conditions) 
prospects for development or even the emergence of developmental states.
Toward a New DS Concept
In economic historical terms, we can date the most recent generation of 
developmental state literature back to the start of the millennium. How-
ever, following the global financial crisis in 2008-9, we can observe a so-
called renaissance of the developmental state approach (Fine et al. 2013; 
Mazzucato 2013; Wade 2014; Williams 2014). The most recent works on 
DS tend to build on the intellectual traditions of classic DS literature but 
also deviate from it in several key ways, such as its geographical focus, or 
by mixing institutional and economic policy approaches.
The core elements of the new, twenty-first-century DS concept are 
mostly compared with those of the classical DS paradigm, which serves as 
point of reference, to reveal the most important continuities and changes 
while drawing up the main tenets of the new DS concept. The starting 
points remain the new paradigm in development economics, the develop-
ment-as-freedom approach, and the most recent structural changes in the 
economy (the increased weight of the knowledge economy), the result of 
which has been that the expansion of human choice and capacity becomes 
a primary goal and means of development. 
According to the new paradigm of development (and because of eco-
nomic and political changes—as presented in the previous section, which 
have resulted in the need to revisit socio-economic alliances and formu-
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late a new social contract), new developmental states have to prioritize 
a  socially (sustainable) equitable and inclusive development path. Suc-
cessful “to-be-developmental states” have to dispose of a concrete (well-
determined) developmental vision that, according to Mazzucato (2013), 
goes beyond a  commitment to the development-oriented approach and 
consists of given (even sectoral) priorities. This developmental agenda is, 
however, in an ideal case defined by the inclusion and wide-ranging con-
sensus of diverse social classes, economic actors, and other interest groups.
It is beyond the scope of this paper to go into the details of the latest 
DS literature (for a more in-depth discussion, see Fine et al. 2013; Maz-
zucato 2013; Routley 2014; Wade 2014; Williams 2014). Instead, we aim 
to sketch a new analytical framework that can be used to structure thinking 
and related academic debates on developmental states in the twenty-first 
century. To identify the main levels of this new structure, we rely on the 
development regime theory originally elaborated by T.J. Pempel (1998, 
1999), and then applied by Christopher Wylde (2012) to Latin America, 
and on David Booth’s (2015) somewhat modified version applied to con-
temporary African developmental experiments. The new developmental 
regime approach can be structured into three analytical levels: 1. socio-
economic alliances or political settlements; 2. political and economic insti-
tutions, and the process of policy making; and 3. the public policy mix: 
developmentalist bias in relevant public policies.
On the first level, Mushtaq Khan15 emphasizes how a development-
oriented political settlement decreases political pressure on acting govern-
ments to patronize certain interest groups and to apply a short-term per-
spective to development.16 . One of the main specificities of developmental 
states is that by building up balanced socio-economic alliances, these can 
lessen the role and share of discretionally distributed rents for buying the 
support and/or loyalty of certain elites or interest groups. At the same time, 
these makes it possible for governments to apply a long-term development-
15  Khan, Mushtaq H. 2010. “Political Settlements and the Governance of Growth-
Enhancing Institutions.” Unpublished research material. Downloaded: https://
eprints.soas.ac.uk/9968/1/Political_Settlements_internet.pdf
16  For a more detailed explanation see Booth paper on “Political Settlements and 
Developmental Regimes: Issues from Comparative Research. A Paper for the 
Roundtable Seminar, The Ethiopian Developmental State and Political Settle-
ment, Hosted by the Ethiopian International Institute for Peace and Devel-
opment and the Royal Netherlands Embassy in Ethiopia, Hilton Hotel Addis 
Ababa, February 25–26, 2015.
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oriented approach and implement their long-term developmental vision 
(beyond short-term changes in political leadership).
Pempel (1999, 158) argues that all (post-)modern developmental 
regimes must consist of the following key characteristics if they wish to 
actively and successfully promote economic and social development: 1. it 
has to support the creation of a socio-economic coalition that is stronger 
(in terms of disposing or owning more politically relevant resources) than 
any other coalition of opposition parties; 2. it has to be able to set main 
priorities in politics and thus put forward a national development agenda; 
3. it has to be able to articulate a legitimate ideology that implicitly repre-
sents the interest of its supporters as the nation’s common interests; 4. it 
must be able to reward its supporters with sufficient benefits in order to 
secure the sustainability of their support and the regime itself.
Mazzucato (2013) even goes further when she argues that only 
a developmental (entrepreneurial) state with a clear and well-determined 
(and well-articulated) developmental vision can be an equal partner with 
the private sector, and, thus, only such a  self-confident state can avoid 
capture by certain interest groups. Such an entrepreneurial state can play 
a leading, and even a guiding role in the economy, and build up a symbi-
otic relationship with the business sphere, while focusing on such activities 
that are not taken up by the private sector because the latter is too risk-
averse and dominated by short-term thinking).
In the new DS approach, the main difference to the classical para-
digm is the inclusion of wider sectors of society (such as new relations with 
labor, which were repressed by the old DS). It explicitly aims to build new 
networks of state and society that are based on social participation, delib-
eration, and consensus building, while, at the same time, include wider 
segments of society (resulting in a new—inclusive—social contract).
Wylde (2012, 81) emphasizes that this new DR approach differs 
significantly from the classical DS theories, as the latter mainly focused 
on relations between the state and the industrial capitalist class (see also 
Evans’s [1995] embedded autonomy theory). To build up the legitimacy 
of the twenty-first century’s developmental regimes, much wider segments 
of society must be included. This is a much more complicated task for the 
new development-oriented governments; however, most groups in society 
share a common interest in expanding human choice and capacity, and the 
only task is to raise the public awareness of these issues and build up sup-
port for related investment decisions (Evans 2014, 234).
On the second level we look at the policy-making process. In the most 
recent developmental state literature (such as Booth 2015; Fosu 2013a and 
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2013b), there seems to be a consensus that the only lesson to be drawn 
from successful development-oriented experiments regarding the process 
of policy making is the primacy of pragmatic, problem-driven approaches.
By pragmatism we mean that successful East Asian countries did not 
aim to implement any grand(iose) plan, but political leaders and techno-
crats in the bureaucracy searched for the best answers to the most pressing 
problems, relying on the principle of trial-and-error and the learning-by-
doing process (Routley 2014).
Building on experiences of developing and emerging countries 
Andrews et al. (2013) also highlights the problem-driven and iterative 
learning process as the key factor behind good policy choices and adequate 
institutional architecture. In this vein, they argue that the general lesson of 
the policy-making process for “to-be-developmental states” is the problem-
driven iterative adaptation (PDIA) approach. Consequently, in the area of 
policy making, the one-size-fits-all approach is not applicable, and one has 
to search for its own solutions in light of its pressing problems and the 
prevalent context, while also learning from others’ development successes 
and failures.
Similar insights are highlighted by Fosu (2013b, 7), which builds 
on the experiences of eighteen developing countries and argues that both 
orthodox and heterodox policies might be successful, depending on the 
specific circumstances. Accordingly, the main differences between suc-
cessful and less successful countries can be linked to the application of 
a pragmatic approach to economic reforms, the specific nature of reforms, 
and the ability of countries to take advantage of market forces. At the 
same time, there is a main difference when choosing between orthodox or 
heterodox policies; the latter builds on a much broader set of active state 
interventions and requires a much more capable government with a much 
higher quality of public bureaucracy (see, for example, the classic East 
Asian developmental states). 
In the capability approach to development, the only way to determine 
social and economic development objectives is through the democratic rec-
onciliation process. Like human capabilities, one of the most important state 
capabilities is making choices, and the process of participation is not only 
the means, but also the end of development in itself (Sen 1999, 291). At the 
same time, according to the arguments of Rodrik (2000) and Evans (2014, 
234), participatory political institutions have to be regarded as intermediary 
institutions that help elicit and aggregate local knowledge and, thus, result in 
an institutional learning process through which it might become more effec-
tive to build and operate better institutions of other types as well.
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Finally, the third level consists of the analysis of development-oriented 
bias in public policies. Even though we admit that development strategies 
are context specific, and are valid within time and space constraints, and 
thus, as a rule, these cannot be emulated without adaptation under dif-
ferent circumstances. Still, we argue in line with Fosu (2013a and 2013b) 
that on the level of economic policies, there are sufficient commonalities 
across countries that are successful regarding the ability of some compo-
nents of development to articulate guiding principles for other, less suc-
cessful countries that have similar characteristics. Looking at a  wider 
range of the scholarly literature, there emerges a certain package of eco-
nomic policies that can be considered a general compass if applied flexibly 
enough, and if adapted to local conditions and circumstances. It is out 
of the scope of this introductory chapter to go into details on the specific 
characteristics and elements of a development-oriented public policy mix, 
but we can still summarize some important programmatic insights (see also 
Evans 2014; Fosu 2013a and 2013b).
First of all, both the capability approach to development and the 
newest restructuring of the economy (toward a  bit-driven and service-
based “new economy”) result in the appreciation of the role of human 
capabilities, as these become the main driving forces behind development 
in the twenty-first century. With this, investments in upgrading human 
resources and in legal (and physical) infrastructure providing access to 
information and promoting the spread of knowledge gain central impor-
tance in development policies and strategies.
Investments in expanding human capabilities tend to remain below 
socially optimal levels due to the market logic (the difference between 
social and private returns, higher risk, and longer return periods). In the 
words of Evans’s (2014, 230), “Public investment is the only plausible 
route to optimal levels of investment in human capabilities.”
The provision of services aimed at expanding human capabilities 
(such as education and health) are traditionally considered the central 
tasks of any (not only development-oriented) state, and according to the 
new approach, the effective delivery of capability-expanding services and 
investments has to be carried out aggressively by entrepreneurial public 
institutions, and placed at the top of the growth (development) strategy 
(Evans 2014; Mazzucato 2013). At the same time, public awareness of its 
immediate distributional and welfare effects has to be raised significantly 
(Evans 2014, 231).
Socially, the only sustainable development path in the twenty-first cen-
tury is the accomplishment of an equitable, inclusive, and long-term devel-
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opment agenda, not least to effectively mobilize the majority of a society 
in favor of these development objectives and to build up the legitimacy of 
the development-oriented approach. At the same time, according to a wide 
definition of social policies and the productive inclusion approach (or as 
Thandika Mkandawire [2007] calls it, transformative social policies), spe-
cial emphasis should be placed on economic incentives that enable poor 
households to leave the self-sufficiency sector and productively get involved 
in the market-based economic sector.17
A second area of development-oriented state interventions is the active 
promotion of economic growth, namely infrastructural investments and 
industrial policy. Previously, we highlighted the central role of investments 
in the expansion of human capabilities. However, in developing countries, 
in addition to the need for human capital development, other infrastruc-
tural bottlenecks often pose important constraints on development. At the 
same time, private actors can often capture the returns of public invest-
ment, and the best example of this is the case of relatively mobile human 
capital.18 To avoid this risk, a  solution might be to improve (through 
increased public investments) the complementary business environment, 
which in turn might increase the derived demands on human capital). 
According to this logic, Fosu (2013b) highlights the importance of balance 
between human and other, more traditional (such as physical, economic, 
and legal) forms of infrastructural investment in order to improve the com-
plementary business environment and to provide incentives for the better-
equipped labor force to stay. An appropriate balance19 of different (human, 
economic, institutional, and physical) infrastructural investments might 
not just decrease the exit-incentives for human capital, but often also acts 
as magnet to attract or maintain foreign direct investment (FDI), and in an 
ideal case, this might lead to the diversification of economic activities and 
technological development.
17  See, for example, the works of Banerjee and Duflo (2011) on the economic lives 
of the poor, or the most recent magnum opus of Martin Ravallion (2016) enti-
tled, The Economics of Poverty.
18  To illustrate this case, we refer to the classic work of Hirschman (1970) on the 
“exit options” of human capital.
19  See, for example, Kimura’s (2013) new interpretation of the success of Japanese 
development. He argues that although social infrastructural investments played 
an important role, their share remained below 30 percent of total infrastructural 
expenditures, and economic infrastructural investments played a comparatively 
larger role.
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In twentieth-century developmental states (at least in their classic iter-
ation), industrial policy played a central role. In the most recent develop-
mentalist approach, industrial policy has reappeared on the development 
agenda. However, according to the scholarship (Fine et al. 2013; Mazzu-
cato 2013; Szalavetz 2015; Wade 2014) discussed above, it is easy to see 
that this renaissance of industrial policy should rather be called a science, 
technology, and innovation (STI) policy. At the same time, in most cases, 
the classic DS not only financed investments in location and equipment 
(physical infrastructure), they also facilitated the access of local companies 
to information, knowledge, technologies, and the creation of networks, and 
simultaneously encouraged companies to move toward economic activi-
ties that create new knowledge (and, thus, gradually move up the value 
chain).20
Regarding their industrial structure, developing countries in today’s 
technology-induced global economy cannot flourish without a knowledge-
based development strategy, though certainly different focal points are nec-
essary for predominantly agrarian economies versus industrialized middle-
income countries. An important consequence of new technologies and 
the most recent economic structural change is that today, certain stages of 
industrial modernization can be leapfrogged.21 At the same time, according 
to Wade (2014, 781), price changes on the market facilitate gradual, step-
by-step development, and these might impede larger changes, for example 
in innovation and economic diversification. To make these changes pos-
sible, active state interventions are needed in the twenty-first century.
This “old-new”22 industrial policy role of governments is still subject 
to heavy academic debate in economics, although scholars of modern DS 
mostly argue for a proactive, entrepreneurial state and mostly oppose the 
conventional mainstream view, which has a much more sector-neutral posi-
tion and stands for the improvement of the general business environment 
and institutional infrastructure so as to attract productive private capital 
20  Evans (2014, 232) mentions China as a typical example of how the state resisted 
overprotecting monopolized (mainly northern and more developed) corporations 
and thus “supported” access to the productive ideas of its citizens and compa-
nies.
21  Thus, in this regard, Balassa’s (1981) classical stages approach is outdated. 
22  Mazzucato (2013, 21) argues that these are not new industrial policy interven-
tions and describes how the U.S. played a central role in developing new tech-
nologies, supporting new industries, but did this in a hidden way. Similarly, Sza-
lavetz (2015) writes that industrial policies after the 2008–9 crisis are not new, 
but old industrial policy practices that have been revived. 
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and decrease the risk of out-migration of (state-financed) human capital. 
In contrast to this mainstream view, Mazzucato (2013) and Wade (2014) 
argue that, in our innovation-led economy, the state has to undertake risky 
innovative activities that are not performed by the private sector (including 
venture capital). For them, the state must go beyond (long-term, com-
mitted, and “patient”) financing basic and applied research and develop-
ment activities (which are even admitted and highlighted by mainstream 
economists).
Another rather contested area relates to the role of state ownership or 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs) as an important channel of state influence 
in the economy. State ownership has long historical precedents in all parts of 
the world, and has evolved cyclically in different waves (for more details, see 
Szanyi [2016] and the introduction of this volume; chapter one by Voszka; 
and Nölke 2014, 2–5), and most of the theoretical and empirical literature 
covers the efficiency considerations of SOEs as compared to their private 
counterparts. Different schools emphasize different underlying causes of 
efficiency losses, such as agency and social and political views (for more 
details, see Musacchio and Lazzarini 2014, 4–5). We, however, emphasize 
the industrial policy view, according to which in the early phases of devel-
opment, the state should step in and offer a “guiding hand” (reducing cap-
ital controls or the costs of research and development, or by coordinating 
resources) to firms so they can develop new capabilities (see also Gerschen-
kron 1962; Amsden 1989; Wade 1990; Evans 1995; Rodrik 2007).
Moving beyond these debates is the role that SOEs play in large 
emerging economies and how this has evolved over time. In general, it 
can be claimed that SOEs have traditionally played a much more domi-
nant role in late-comer economies, and in partially different forms. But 
even after waves of privatization (and in some cases of re-nationalization), 
SOEs continue to deeply penetrate into emerging economies’ everyday life. 
Musacchio and Lazzarini (2014) describe alternative models of the orga-
nization of state influence and explore the spectrum of state interventions 
between the two extremes of full state ownership (Leviathan as entrepre-
neur) and the full private ownership. For in-between cases, the authors 
describe the Leviathan as the majority investor, where state retains majority 
control over partially privatized firms; and the Leviathan as minority 
investor, where the state has a  residual, minority stake, or where firms 
receive loans and equity from state-owned development banks or invest-
ments from sovereign wealth funds (SWF) or other state-controlled funds.
While in more developed parts of the world, the recent rise of new 
forms of state ownership or influence has been related to crisis manage-
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ment after the 2008–2009 global financial crisis (GFC), in less developed, 
emerging economies, the rise of “state capitalism” dates back to the early 
1990s and is not considered a temporary fix but constitutes a much more 
central dimension of long-term government policy and the key to eco-
nomic success (Kurlantzick 2016, 11).
We could cite the Chinese case as a prominent example of the revival 
and (re)emergence of new forms of state ownership and influence over the 
economy. However, the following chapters that examine Singapore, Brazil, 
and Turkey (respectively) show that the story goes beyond China.
A third important issue is the financing of development, as it used to 
be a point of obsession in classical DS scholarship. Like the classic DS, 
Northeast Asian DS’ very specific context (financial development aid from 
the U.S. and Japan, traditionally high domestic saving rates, relatively 
closed economic systems, and repressed domestic financial markets) con-
tributed to the financial viability of its unique national development model. 
Conversely, the financial difficulties (not least signaled by the debt crisis 
in the 1980s) of the developmentalist experiments of their Latin American 
counterparts in the twentieth century serve as the antithesis.
Taking into account the current stage of financial globalization and 
the most recent experiences of global financial (and economic) crises, it 
is clear that developmental states in the twenty-first century have much 
narrower room to maneuver to finance their broader economic growth 
(development) agenda, as did their antecedents during the mid-twentieth 
century.
In a financially globalized world economy, securing macroeconomic 
stability becomes central, as a stable macroeconomic position is necessary 
to build up business confidence, encourage investors, and attract FDI. 
Though in the short run and only temporarily today’s developing countries 
might also rely on external sources (in addition to FDI, foreign aid and 
credits) during the implementation period of their development strategies, 
in the longer run, a more balanced development budget is needed, and the 
role of domestic resources cannot be overrated. Incentives for domestic 
savings and the rationalization of government expenditures, the system of 
national taxes, as well as the government’s abilities to collect those taxes 
become core development issues.
Fourth, by the twenty-first century, it became clearly evident that out-
ward-oriented development strategies are superior to any other national-
istic and dissociative economic strategies. The experiences of the classic 
(Northeast Asian) developmental states have also confirmed the benefits of 
an outward-oriented development strategy for long-term economic growth 
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and development. In the classic cases, export-orientation implicitly pre-
sumed that bureaucratic guidelines are in line with international market 
forces (Amsden 1989; Johnson 1982; Wade 1990). Therefore, taking into 
account and relying on international market incentives was at the heart of 
the classical DS model.
In the twenty-first century, however, we have to go beyond the articu-
lation of an outward-oriented economic strategy, and in order to achieve 
export-driven economic growth, the enhancement of the role of domestic 
institutions and their improvement is inevitable. Following Fosu (2013a, 
11), outward orientation has to go hand in hand with increasing competi-
tion in the domestic market and with building domestic institutional capa-
bilities (the improvement of macroeconomic stability and the strength-
ening of institutional and human infrastructure). The most recent global 
financial and economic crisis has shown that economic diversification 
(not only in terms of export products but also export markets) is not only 
crucial for long-term economic growth; it also plays an important role in 
securing economic stability (or in other words, in decreasing economic 
vulnerability). Outward orientation (and economic diversification) plays 
a complementary role (and does not substitute for) in the development 
of the domestic market. The most recent experiences of successful large 
emerging markets (such as China) underline the need for this complemen-
tary approach, while some less successful cases (such as Brazil) serve as 
cautionary tales.
Finally, social change during the twentieth century, globalization and 
the following changes in domestic politics have led to an appreciation of 
the role of the capabilities and capacities of political institutions to effec-
tively define developmental goals. This presumes a new type of bottom-
up relationship between the state and society; it also highlights the role of 
spreading, collecting, and processing information, and shows an apprecia-
tion for the capabilities and capacities of the public sector to fulfill these 
new tasks (Evans 2014, 222). A meritocratic, well-educated, competent, 
well-paid, and—from the perspective of political power—relatively insu-
lated (but still embedded) bureaucracy forms the core of the classical 
DSP. In the new DS approach, however, not just technocratic qualities 
are needed, but also other, more political qualities are necessary to collect, 
screen, and process information in the knowledge economy and society; to 
define collective objectives in a participatory and consultative manner; and 
to reorganize relations with the business and civil sector.
Mazzucato (2013, 5–6) goes even further and argues that the public 
sector should not be regarded as the social version or imitator of the private 
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sector23; rather, its tasks and role in development should be totally recon-
sidered. The socio-economic challenges of the twenty-first century require 
a proactive, development-oriented state with entrepreneurial qualities.
This argument emphasizes the need for aggressive, effective, and 
entrepreneurial public institutions in order to secure the optimal level of 
investments for human capability expansion and to disseminate informa-
tion and knowledge. At the same time, a capable and coherent bureau-
cracy is necessary but not sufficient for building successful developmental 
states in the twenty-first century. On the contrary, we argue that a special 
economic policy mix for constructing a new DS concept in the twenty-
first century must be outlined, and at the very least it must contain invest-
ments in the expansion of human capabilities, broadly defined transforma-
tive social policies (including investments in education, health services, and 
labor market reforms), public sector reforms, as well as macroeconomic 
and industrial (or STI) policies, in addition to trade and tax policies.
These elements of a development-oriented public policy mix have to 
be taken together as a package, because they are mutually reinforcing with 
spillover effects that strengthen (or reduce) other areas. All of this under-
scores the argument that, by now, is almost a cliché in modern economics: 
it is not so much the volume of the state expenditures that matters, but 
rather its structure. Furthermore, long-term economic growth and devel-
opment presumes a  long-term commitment to socio-economic goals and 
the consistency of development-oriented public policies (not only on the 
rhetorical level, but also on the level of implementation).
The new DS approach we have outlined above is, however, much less 
a practical reality, and much more an opportunity that is too often over-
looked or ignored by contemporary governments (Mazzucato 2013, 12). 
A government that aspires to be a developmental state in the twenty-first 
century shall be characterized by the following: a  flexible and pragmatic 
approach; good networking and bureaucratic capabilities; the ability to 
coordinate the diverse interests of different social classes; and, more often 
than not, the ability to promote, implement, and realize incubation- and 
innovation-related activities. This new approach not only presumes tech-
23  Mazzucato (2013) also highlights that this does not only alter cooperative rela-
tions between the public and private sector, but also changes the expected 
returns to the state and the scale of the reward justified by the state interven-
tions, which is a central issue for all “to-be-developmental states” in the global-
ized world economy seeking to finance their development-oriented activities.
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nical capacities and proficiency (as was the case with the old DS), but also 
requires new methods to define normative and political objectives. Con-
sequently, the proactive promotion of development in the twenty-first 
century becomes more than the “simple” technical problem of economic 
growth; it becomes a central issue in domestic politics.
Conclusions 
We have presented the classical developmental state paradigm based on 
Northeast Asian experiences, and argued that changes in its unique con-
text during the last decades of the twentieth century have inherently and 
systematically led to its demise. However, more recently, with the onset 
of the global financial crisis in 2008–2009, we have witnessed the renais-
sance of the developmental state approach in economic scholarship. We 
have argued that this is not the revival of the old developmental state para-
digm, but a new one in the making, at least in theoretical terms (economic 
policy practices are still rather eclectic and diverse as will be shown in the 
following chapters). The desire to revise the role of state in development 
and to construct a new concept for developmental states was based, on the 
one hand, on the fall of the classical developmental state paradigm, and, 
on the other hand, challenges that emerged and intensified at the dawn of 
the twenty-first century.
To conclude, we want to highlight some of the major changes that 
have surfaced when trying to conceptualize the “ideal” of a twenty-first-
century developmental state. First, the classical developmental state para-
digm has been focused on the special case of latecomers to development, 
and has made economic transformation and catching up its top priorities. 
More precisely, it focused on maximizing economic growth. Due to the 
specific and unique Northeast Asian context, development was achieved 
in such a way that economic growth served the wellbeing of a wider social 
base, but this shared character of economic growth was rather an unin-
tended by-product and less the result of deliberate economic policies or 
political intentions. Any developmental state theory in the twenty-first 
century has to go beyond this old approach’s focus on economic growth, 
and instead embrace the concept of broadly defined development and the 
so-called human-capabilities approach (Sen 1999) alongside the economic 
dimension of development. New DS models also have to focus on the 
inclusive character of development. We have to go even further because the 
economic and social dimensions, the political and environmental aspects, 
Szanyi - 00 könyv.indb   266 2019.11.15.   9:32
267The Changing Role of the State in Development in Emerging Economies
and the spatial, gender, and generational dimensions of development must 
be taken into account.
Second, the classical DS concept analyzed the structural transforma-
tion of backward, mainly agrarian economies within the specific context of 
late-development; so it mainly focused on the process of industrialization. 
The new economic transformation dating back to the end of the twentieth 
century has resulted in a  shift toward the knowledge and service sector 
as the main driving forces behind economic growth. The new, bifurcated 
service sector (Evans 2014, 229) consists of a well-paid business and finan-
cial subsector providing employment opportunities for a  small minority 
of service-sector workers, and a  low paid—underestimated and under-
rewarded—subsector of interpersonal services. This results in fundamen-
tally different distributional and welfare implications just like twentieth-
century industrialization did. One of the most visible consequences is the 
unprecedented rise of social inequalities. Against this background today we 
have to go beyond the special cases of late-development and industrializa-
tion, and analyze the structural transformation of economies at different 
stages of development in more general terms.
Third, this broader approach also implies that the geographical focus, 
which originally concentrated on (North-)East Asia, will not be exchanged 
for a new focus on Africa. But the new developmental state concept should 
also be extended geographically in order to shift focus to emerging econo-
mies worldwide.
Fourth, the immaturity of the new developmental state concept is 
well illustrated by the diversity of economic literature published in recent 
years. This scholarship often uses different labels for developmental states, 
emphasizing its catalysts, enabling role, or describing it as a  facilitator. 
Mariana Mazzucato (2013, 21) even goes further in her book on entre-
preneurial states, which she based on the experiences of more developed 
economies, mainly the United States. In it, she argues that a  so-called 
“hidden developmental state”24 has played an important and active role 
in the historical economic successes of highly developed economies. 
According to her analysis, the state (of the United States) has moved far 
beyond Keynesian-style macroeconomic interventions or even the passive 
financing of research and development activities, and has performed entre-
24  For a longer discussion on the hidden developmental state, see Block’s (2008) 
original article or the review article by Szalavetz (2015).
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preneurial activities in the Schumpeterian vein, such as actively overtaking 
market risks or creating new markets.
To summarize, it might be helpful to compare the main characteristics 
of the new DS approach to the classical paradigm along the dichotomies 
of the state and society, the state and the market, and the state and the 
rest of the world. We argue in line with Pempel (1999) and Wylde (2012) 
that there is a need to go beyond the tripod alliance of the nation state, 
domestic and international capital that has characterized classic develop-
mental states.
Regarding the state and the market dichotomy, the active and positive 
role of the state in development represents the main continuity between 
the old and new DS concepts. This is manifested, for example, in the sig-
nificance of macroeconomic stability and stable investment environment, 
or in the reliance on active industrial policy. Behind these major guiding 
principles, however, there are numerous changes and differences partly 
related to the types of interventions. However, even deeper discontinui-
ties can be highlighted; due to advancements in financial globalization 
and the liberalization of capital flows, efficient resource allocation became 
a sine qua non for “to-be-developmental states,” while the need to decrease 
financial and economic vulnerability and the transformation of traditional 
industrial policy interventions also represent main discontinuities.
The relationship between the state and society has been undoubtedly 
and fundamentally changed. While the old, classic developmental states 
have achieved economic success despite the repression and political exclu-
sion of wide segments (the majority) of their societies, in the case of the 
twenty-first century’s DS, state-society relations are much more inclusive 
(to incorporate the working class) and will be based on more equitable, 
inclusive, and participatory processes. The new approach builds on the 
inclusion of the needs and interests of diverse social groups in domestic 
politics and prefers policy responsiveness and a balanced approach to these 
very diverse social needs. The formation of new socio-economic alliances 
is, however, shaped by the political institutional architecture, the distribu-
tion of political power, and bargaining mechanisms. These differ from the 
classic solutions of the old DS during the last century; further, most recent 
successful experiments also demonstrate the wide-ranging possibilities and 
diverse patterns of cooptation of different interest groups (see following 
case studies).
Regarding the relations between the state and the rest of the world in 
the era of advanced economic (and financial) globalization, outward ori-
entation (based on export diversification both in products and markets) 
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has to be placed on a new footing and backed by a stable domestic institu-
tional setting. In the golden age of DS in the mid-twentieth century, when 
nationalistic and nation-based development strategies were viable and most 
successful, East Asian DS were connected to the world economy mainly 
through the trade of goods (and their export-oriented economic strate-
gies); today outward-oriented strategies are far more complex. Taking into 
account international processes and changes in the twenty-first century is 
unavoidable, as these shape the (changing) development opportunities and 
constraints that determine the political and economic terrain of modern 
states with developmentalist aspirations. We must add, however, that 
although we have focused our analysis on the level of the nation state, the 
new DS approach must also be applied on the subnational (regional and 
local) level, as these arenas play an ever more important role in providing 
human capability expansion services (such as education and healthcare), 
and deepening democratic participatory mechanisms.
Finally, we have shown that the new DS approach, which reflects 
the new challenges of the twenty-first century, is fundamentally a market-
friendly approach,25 in which the state has an active but—compared to 
classical theories—re-defined and recurrent role in promoting widely 
defined development.
Through our presentation of the main pillars of the new DS concept, 
we have argued that, on the level of public policies and their developmental 
bias, a consensus seems to have emerged in the scholarly literature, and 
a  development-oriented public policy mix in the twenty-first century at 
minimum contains the following elements: cautious and sound fiscal and 
monetary policies supporting effective macroeconomic management and 
macroeconomic stability; transformative social policies intended to decrease 
poverty and inequality (including education and health policies aimed at 
the expansion of human capabilities); physical, institutional, and human 
infrastructural investments (in a  mutually complementary manner, and 
in a balanced way); new industrial (STI) policies that support technolog-
ical learning and innovative activities; entrepreneurial public institutions; 
a strong technocratic and meritocratic central administration; and last but 
not least, innovative forms of financing development broadly defined.
The goal of the following chapters is to present a special set of Vari-
eties of Development-oriented experiments in emerging markets. The case 
25  We can also call it developmental capitalism in the words of Bresser Pereira 
(2016).
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studies do not seek to present the developmentalist experiments of coun-
tries in their totality, across every dimensions of state intervention, but 
rather concentrate on certain defining characteristics that represent distinc-
tive features of the given case and/or are illustrative of recent trends and 
changes. These case studies can be regarded as illustrations of the ongoing 
changes to the role of state in development, and they contribute to a better 
understanding of continuities with and/or changes to the classical develop-
mental state approach.
At the same time, we have argued that neither the classical develop-
mental state paradigm, nor the newly emerging revised DS concept serve 
as role models to emulate. The main message from the classic success sto-
ries is that a pragmatic approach, along with trial and error, and home-
grown (innovative and creative) solutions might succeed.
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CHAPTER 10




During the four decades after independence (1965), Singapore rapidly 
caught up with the developed West in both economic and social terms. By 
1994, Singapore’s per capita GDP surpassed that of Australia, Canada, 
and the United Kingdom (Menon 2007, 1). In 2014, Singapore placed 
third in the IMF’s list of countries by their per capita GDP (PPP). In 
2013, Singapore was ranked ninth on the Human Development Index list of 
UNDP (UNDP 2014, 159). It came before every other Asian country. In 
2015, according to the IMD World Competitiveness Yearbook and the Global 
Competitiveness Report of the World Economic Forum, Singapore was the 
world’s third and second most competitive economy, respectively.
Singapore represents a  successful model of the developmental state 
and state capitalism (Rodan 2004; Sim 2011, 59; Hayashi 2010, 50). In 
Singapore, a state-led economy has evolved, or we might also say that Sin-
gapore is one of the archetypes of developmental states. An active govern-
mental role describes the main character of developmental states, the aim 
of which is to promote national well-being. Developmental states intervene 
in the market economy to make it more productive, to increase private 
profit as well as public revenue, and to work toward citizens’ prosperity. 
Developmental states are governed by goal-oriented and determined elites 
whose principal commitment is to the national well-being. According to 
the state-centric approach of the developmental state concept, successful 
economic and social changes require an interventionist government (Bel-
lows 2006, 231).
The People’s Action Party (PAP) came into power in Singapore in 
1959, and took on an important role in the nation-building process and the 
development of the national economy. In order to achieve social and eco-
Szanyi - 00 könyv.indb   275 2019.11.15.   9:32
276 KATALIN VÖLGYI
nomic goals, it has created a corruption free, merit-based, well-paid, and 
effective public service. Since the very beginning (especially since 1965), 
the PAP government has been characterized by high interventionism. An 
extensive state-owned enterprise sector has evolved in Singapore, although 
the government has never pursued a radical program of nationalization. 
Extreme swings between nationalization and privatization have also been 
absent from Singapore. The Singaporean government has remained com-
mitted to a market economy (Chua 1995, 271). Unlike northeast Asian 
developmental states (Japan, Taiwan, South Korea), the Singaporean 
government did not rely on the local capital class, but largely on foreign 
transnational corporations and the state capitalist sector during the devel-
opment of the economy. (The latter two have continued to propel eco-
nomic growth of Singapore [Tan 1991, 201; Chua 2015, 3]). The state 
in Singapore acts as an entrepreneur. It undertakes market risks when it 
establishes a company. State-owned enterprises operate profitably. Loss-
making companies (which are rare) are not saved, but closed. Similar to 
private companies, the operation of state-owned enterprises is regulated 
by the Companies Act (Tan 1975, 62; Ang and Ding 2006, 67). State-
owned enterprises are run by a professional management team, which is 
paid a salary competitive with the private sector.
Singapore can be considered a rare example of successful state capi-
talism. The profitable and effective operation of the state capitalist sector 
offers several benefits to Singaporean citizens: low unemployment and 
crime rates, and little social unrest; world-class infrastructure; affordable 
housing, education, and health care, etc. The profits of the state capitalist 
sector are reinvested to maximize economic growth (Sim 2011, 59–60).
Historical Antecedents
The history of modern Singapore goes back to 1819 when Sir Thomas 
Stamford Raffles, employed by the British East India Company, estab-
lished a commercial base on the island. In the following decades, Singa-
pore became an important center of entrepot trade due to its strategic loca-
tion and free-port status. Entrepot trade consisted of imports of Western 
manufacturing goods and Indian opium as well as the export of raw mate-
rials from Southeast Asian countries (e.g., rubber, tin). The British pri-
marily regarded Singapore as an important entrepot, and they did not start 
to introduce manufacturing industries on the island, although some facto-
ries and workshops were established to serve raw material processing in the 
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hinterlands. In contrast to the manufacturing industry, trade-related indus-
tries such as insurance, shipping, and banking services developed rapidly. 
After World War I, the British established a military base on the island. 
Parallel to Singapore’s growing economic role, the population increased 
continuously.1 Beside British merchants (and the staff of the colonial 
administration), other European traders (German, Dutch, French) as well 
as Chinese, Indian, and Arabic merchants began to settle on the island. 
Among the newcomers, the share of southern Chinese, Indian, and Malay 
immigrants who came to undertake physical labor in Singapore was much 
higher compared to that of the commercial and administrative personnel.
During World War II, and especially between 1942 and 1945, Singa-
pore came under Japanese occupation. After the war, the returning British 
revived the entrepot trade and military base in Singapore. Throughout 
the 1950s, the raw material exports of Singapore grew continuously. Its 
economic growth was generated by trade with Malaysia and Indonesia, 
and the entrepot trade began to concentrate in the hands of Chinese mer-
chants (Lee 1989, 11). Meanwhile, the population of the island grew from 
938,200 to 1,445,900 between 1947 and 1957 (Li 2002, 24).
In 1959, the British granted Singapore the right to self-government. 
At that time, its social, economic, and political environment was not vastly 
different from that of other former colonial countries. As an underdevel-
oped “Third World” country, it was characterized by widespread poverty, 
low levels of education, high unemployment, and inadequate housing and 
health facilities. The primary aim of PAP, which won the general election 
in 1959 (and is still in power today), was to launch an industrialization 
program to create jobs (by breaking away from the limited growth oppor-
tunities of the entrepot system) and provide decent housing, basic medical 
care, and better educational opportunities for the broader society (Soon 
and Tan 1993, 8).
Because of the small size of domestic market, the Singaporean gov-
ernment decided to form an economic and political union with Malaysia 
to achieve its aims in the field of industrialization. Like most developing 
countries, Singapore accepted an initial economic development strategy 
focused on import-substitution industrialization. To reduce unemploy-
ment, the government first sought to attract labor-intensive industries. But 
the anticipated benefits of the merger with Malaysia in 1963 did not mate-
1  Malays are the indigenous people of Singapore.
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rialize (Soon and Tan 1993, 8–9). Because of political and ideological dif-
ferences, Singapore left the Federation of Malaysia in 1965.
After leaving the Federation, the island faced a  severe macro-
economic shock for two main reasons. First, the entrepot system fell 
into decline (because of Indonesia’s Konfrontasi policy, bilateral trade 
stopped; Malaysia attempted to conduct foreign trade by explicitly 
avoiding Singapore [Lee 2000, 7]). Second, the complete downsizing of 
the British military base between 1968 and 1971 resulted in Singapore’s 
loss of 20 percent of its GDP due to the diminishing expenditures of the 
British army. The withdrawal of the British army also caused the loss 
of 30,000 jobs directly, and 40,000 jobs indirectly (Lee 2000, 52). The 
British withdrawal caused economic challenges and security uncertainty, 
which undermined the future viability of Singapore. The government also 
faced the challenge of building a nation from a multiethnic population 
constituted mainly of descendants of immigrants (Chinese: 76.6 percent; 
Indian: 6.4 percent; Malay: 14.7 percent; other: 2.3 percent [Quah and 
Quah 1989, 106]), among whom there were often ethnically-based riots 
during the 1950s and 1960s.
Considering Singapore’s status as a nascent small island state with 
a lack of natural resources; an underdeveloped economy without industrial 
capital; a multiethnic population and the concomitant social unrest; and 
a missing defense force while facing external security uncertainities, it is 
not surprising that, during the time of economic development and nation-
building, significant state intervention evolved in both the economic and 
social life of Singapore, which still exists today. Singapore adopted a state 
capitalist approach to economic development and nation-building, which, 
in short, means that the government enters into business to create employ-
ment and generate profits. Unlike the state capitalist sector created by 
other newly independent decolonized states (e.g., Indonesia) or post-rev-
olutionary communist regimes (e.g., China), Singapore established state-
owned enterprises that are run by wage-earning professional managers and 
disciplined by market forces, and they stay in business only if they are prof-
itable (Chua 2016, 500).
This study investigates the birth and evolution of state-owned compa-
nies as one of the most important tools of state intervention. On the one 
hand, this chapter explores the economic policy aims that have motivated 
their creation, and how successful state-owned companies help achieve 
these aims. On the other hand, it reveals the most important changes con-
cerning state-owned enterprises in the different phases of Singapore’s eco-
nomic development.
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The Development of the State Capitalist Sector in Singapore
THE EVOLVING STATE CAPITALIST SECTOR IN THE 1960S AND 1970S
In 1961, the PAP government put emphasis on industrialization in its eco-
nomic development plans. The initial import-substitution industrialization 
became irrelevant after Singapore’s separation from Malaysia. To replace 
it, the government chose export-oriented industrialization and free trade. 
In the absence of a domestic industrial entrepreneurial class,2 the govern-
ment primarily relied on foreign companies and the evolving state capitalist 
sector to achieve its economic development aims.3
The state appeared as an entrepreneur in several economic sectors. It 
established wholly or partially state-owned enterprises. In the latter case, 
the state entered into partnerships with foreign or domestic private com-
panies. Like governments in most developed capitalist countries (except 
the United States), the Singaporean government became the exclusive pro-
vider of infrastructure and social services. State monopolies (in the frame-
work of so-called statutory boards) were established in the fields of utilities, 
telecommunications, postal services, port and airport services, industrial 
estates, and media (e.g., radio, television) (Lim 1983, 755). Statutory 
boards were also created for financial/banking services, trade, health care, 
education, tourism, and housing. What differentiates these state activities 
in Singapore from those in other countries is that—with the exception of 
health, education, and low-income public housing—they all at least broke 
even, and most were profitable. They were not subsidized by tax dollars. 
State-owned enterprises worked for profit. The government did not hesi-
tate to close down loss-making companies (Lim 1983, 755). This still 
holds true today.
2  Domestic Chinese entrepreneurs were mainly engaged in trading, banking and 
financial services, real estate, and construction (Tan 1991, 201). Chinese mer-
chants were accustomed to short-term risks and the rapid attainment of profits. 
They did not possess industrial know-how and were reluctant to get involved in 
long-term projects (Cheng 1991, 190).
3  This decision by the government was briefly explained by Lee Kuan Yew, the 
Prime Minister of Singapore from 1959 to 1990, in the following way: “Had we 
waited for our traders to learn to be industrialists we would have starved” (Lee 
2000, 66). Moreover, we must mention that the PAP government was suspicious 
of domestic capitalists for fear of their pro-communist and pro-China attitudes 
(Yeung 2004, 45).
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Statutory boards are autonomous semi-government organizations 
established to perform specific functions laid down by special legislation 
passed by parliament. They are organizations that are separate from the 
civil service and government bureaucratic system but still remain within 
the portfolio of relevant ministries (Tan 1983, 255). Statutory boards are 
solely owned by the state. They are managed by a board of directors with 
representation from government ministries, the private sector, and profes-
sional and other interest groups (Tan 1975, 62). Like private companies, 
the operation of state-owned enterprises is regulated by the Companies 
Act. The government owns most of these enterprises through holding com-
panies. Statutory boards can also possess companies.
Some of the state-owned enterprises and statutory boards were set up 
under British rule. Later, during the era of independence, they were re-
organized and still function. Others were newly established. In the case of 
enterprises, establishment was often realized with the involvement of pri-
vate (domestic or foreign) capital. Later on, some of the statutory boards 
were also transformed into state-owned enterprises.
In relation to Singapore, the literature often uses the term “corporate-
state.” Members of the first generation of political leadership, such as Lee 
Kuan Yew, Goh Keng Swee, and S. Rajaratnam, played a significant role 
in the creation of the corporate-state and its economic success. The corpo-
rate-state covers a  large number of state-owned enterprises and statutory 
boards in addition to the civil service (Li 2002, 84).
STATUTORY BOARDS
First, it is worth addressing the role of the Economic Development Board 
(EDB) and Housing and Development Board (HDB) since the activity of 
these two statutory boards aimed to solve two of the most pressing eco-
nomic and social problems facing Singapore post-independence, namely 
unemployment and the lack of housing.
The EDB was founded with the support of international organizations 
(UNDP, ILO) in 1961, and it is still the most important state organiza-
tion for planning and managing the economic development of Singapore.4 
It launched the industrial development of Singapore and played a  key 
4  The Industrial Promotion Board, which was established by the colonial govern-
ment in 1957, was the predecessor of EDB, but its size was modest, which made 
it unable to effectively promote industrialization and economic growth.
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role in transforming the small island state into one of the most attractive 
investment destinations for transnational corporations during the last six 
decades. This transformation was also supported by the network of EDB 
branches covering several continents. The fundamental tasks of the EDB 
have not changed over time, and they include: the development of new 
industries; support for different industries’ economic growth; professional 
advocacy for companies; corporate financing through loans or equity par-
ticipation; managing the supply of a  skilled labor force; development of 
industrial estates, etc. The EDB has played a significant role in restruc-
turing the Singaporean economy and sustaining the economic growth from 
time to time. It promoted import substitution and labor-intensive indus-
tries during the initial phase of industrialization as well as the export ori-
entation and capital later on, together with the knowledge and technology-
intensive industrial restructuring. In the 1970s, the development of the 
service sector also came to the fore, which became the second pillar of eco-
nomic growth besides manufacturing in the 1980s. The EDB has proved 
to be successful not only in attracting foreign companies to Singapore, but 
also at promoting the international expansion of Singaporean (particularly 
state-owned) companies since the 1980s.
The Housing and Development Board was established in 1960. It 
replaced the Singapore Improvement Trust founded by the British in 1927, 
which failed to fulfill the growing demands for housing. Initially, the HDB 
provided housing only to low-income families, but later, the income ceiling 
for eligibility rose gradually. In 1960, 9 percent of the population lived in 
public housing. This share reached 84 percent by 1985. In other words, 
75 percent of the population obtained public housing over 25 years. The 
performance of the HDB proved to be a success story that has not been 
repeated elsewhere in the world.
Relatively early on, in 1968, the PAP government introduced legisla-
tion to allow citizens to use their Central Provident Fund (CPF) contribu-
tions to purchase HDB flats (Quah and Quah 1989, 112). The operation 
of the CPF is also controlled by a statutory board. The CPF was estab-
lished by the British colonial government in 1955 and it is the compul-
sory pension fund of Singapore. Every employer and employee has to pay 
a certain amount into the fund, but citizens can use their CPF savings for 
financing their needs in the fields of education, healthcare, and housing. 
The government also used CPF savings to finance the construction of 
infrastructure (e.g., harbors, airports, water, sewer systems, telecommuni-
cations, and electricity systems, industrial estates, schools, and universities) 
deemed essential to economic development (Soon and Tan 1993, 36).
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Beside the CPF, the Post Office Saving Bank had a significant role in 
channeling residential savings into economic development. The Post Office 
Saving Bank was founded by the British colonial government in 1877. It 
became a statutory board in 1972 and it used residential savings to pur-
chase government securities, provide loans to state-owned enterprises and 
statutory boards, and create deposits at the Development Bank of Singa-
pore (DBS).
While the state program of industrialization was advancing, the 
activity of the EDB was becoming more and more complex. The gov-
ernment decided to streamline the EDB in 1968: the basic task, namely, 
investment promotion remained under the purview of the EDB, but several 
other tasks were detached from it, for example,5 the Jurong Town Cor-
poration (JTC) took over the management and development of industrial 
estates. The Development Bank of Singapore (DBS) as a  state-owned 
company took over the financing of industrialization.6 The Interna-
tional Trading Company (INTRACO) incorporated the export promo-
tion department of the EDB. INTRACO was tasked with two objectives: 
first, developing overseas markets for Singaporean products and sourcing 
cheaper raw materials for local industries; and second, handling trade with 
other centrally planned economies (OECD 2015, 49).
In 1983, the Singapore Trade Development Board took over export 
promotion activity from INTRACO. It introduced an international net-
work of branches to increase the merchandise and service exports of Singa-
porean companies and worked on renewing Singapore’s role as an interna-
tional trading center.
Besides the detachment of the EDB from its partner institutions, it is 
necessary to mention the role of Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) in 
the country’s economic development. It started to operate as a de facto cen-
tral bank in 1971. Its major functions were to promote monetary, credit, and 
foreign exchange policies conducive to economic growth. In the 1970s, it 
helped Singapore become an international financial center (Tan 1975, 67).
Several statutory boards were created to take charge of the devel-
opment and management of infrastructure indispensable for economic 
5  For further examples of detached tasks, see Soon-Tan (1993, 26).
6  Further tasks of DBS were the following: 1) financing urban development, tourist 
promotion projects, and the conversion of British military bases to commercial 
use; 2) providing loans to enterprises or participating in their equity capital; 3) 
conducting commercial bank operations; 4) developing Singapore as an interna-
tional financial center, etc. (Tan 1975, 70-1).
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development: 1) The Singapore Harbour Board was replaced by the Port 
Authority of Singapore in 1964. 2) The Singapore Telephone Board was 
transformed into the Telecommunication Authority of Singapore. 3) The 
Public Utilities Board was established in 1963. It took over the activities 
of the former City Council (water, gas, and electricity services). 4) In the 
1980s, the Singaporean government founded the Civil Aviation Authority 
of Singapore, which became, among others, the operator of the Changi 
International Airport, which opened in 1981. It took on a key role in trans-
forming Singapore into an international air hub. 5) Metro lines were built 
in Singapore during the 1980s, and these were operated by a newly estab-
lished statutory board, the Mass Rapid Transit Corporation.
As mentioned above, several statutory boards were established in 
different fields of the economy and social life. There were also statutory 
boards related to tourism, the media, and education should also be men-
tioned. Those included the Singapore Tourism Promotion Board, Sen-
tosa Development Corporation, Singapore Broadcasting Corporation, the 
National University of Singapore, Nanyang Technical University etc.
STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES
The statutory boards mentioned above and the state-owned enterprises 
together constitute the state capitalist sector of Singapore. In a comple-
mentary way, they participated in industrialization and the construction of 
Singapore’s national economy.
According to the data published by Tan (1975, 78–84), in 1973, the 
Singaporean state had thirty-three partially and twenty-six wholly state-
owned enterprises. Through holding companies like DBS and INTRACO, 
it indirectly owned fifty-seven and sixteen enterprises, respectively.7 The 
first important investment of the government was made in the iron and 
steel industry in 1961.8 Later, in 1963, seven state-owned enterprises were 
established in different industries: the food industry/retail, real estate devel-
opment, plastics, the textile industry, shipbuilding, and the construction 
materials industry.9 The state’s first investments in the industrial sector were 
made through the EDB. During the restructuring of 1968, the EDB’s equity 
7  Data do not cover the number of subsidiaries.
8  National Iron and Steel Mills Ltd (NatSteel).
9  Sugar Industry of Singapore Ltd., National Grain Elevator Ltd., United Indus-
trial Corporation Ltd., Singapore Polymer Corporation Pte Ltd., Singapore Tex-
tile Industries Ltd., Jurong Shipyard Ltd., Ceramics (M) Pte Ltd.
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participation in companies was transferred to the Ministry of Finance, and 
later to Temasek Holdings (see later). In the 1960s and 1970s, more and 
more state-owned companies were established in the industries above as 
well as across the entire economy (e.g., automotives, aircraft, electronics, 
metals, petroleum, timber, footwear, transportation/logistics, finance, insur-
ance, tourism, etc.). At the beginning of the 1970s, the share of state-owned 
enterprises in gross output was 26.3 percent in food, 20.4 percent in timber, 
16.5 percent in chemicals, 85 percent in iron and steel, and 67.8 percent in 
the shipbuilding and repair industry (Tan 1983, 259).
At the beginning of the 1970s, the government’s paid-up capital in 
partially-owned companies mainly concentrated in four companies: 1) 
Jurong Shipyard Ltd., which was started as a  shipbuilding company 
through cooperation between the Singaporean government and a  Japa-
nese company (Ishikawajima Harima Heavy Industries); 2) Sembawang 
Shipyard Ltd., which was formed in 1968 as a  result of converting the 
British Royal Naval Dockyard for commercial use; 3) Singapore Airlines 
Ltd., which was separated from Malaysia Singapore Airlines in 1972 and 
became the state-owned carrier of Singapore; and 4) the DBS, which took 
over the development financing functions of the EDB.
In case of wholly-owned state enterprises, the capital of the govern-
ment was significantly concentrated in three companies: Keppel Ship-
yard Ltd., which took over the dockyard division of the Port of Singapore 
Authority in 1968; Neptune Orient Lines, which began to operate the 
national merchant fleet in 1968; and Chartered Industries of Singapore 
Pte Ltd., which launched activities such as the minting of coins for the 
Singaporean government and the manufacture of military equipment and 
supplies (Tan 1975, 69–73).
After the foundation of Chartered Industries in 1967, several other 
factories were opened in the military industry10 as a  result of the with-
drawal of the British army. Singapore set up its own armed forces and 
sought to ensure it could be supplied through domestic production.
To control and co-ordinate the activities of a growing number of state-
owned companies, the Singaporean government established Temasek 
10  E.g., Singapore Shipbuilding and Engineering Pte Ltd. (1968), Singapore Elec-
tronic and Engineering Pte Ltd. (1969), Singapore Automotive Engineering Pte 
Ltd. (1971), Ordnance Development and Engineering Pte Ltd. (1973), Allied 
Ordnance Company Pte Ltd. (1973), Singapore Aerospace Maintenance Com-
pany Pte Ltd. (1975), Singapore Aero-Engine Overhaul Pte Ltd. (1977), Uni-
corn International Pte Ltd. (1978)
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Holdings (100 percent owned by the Ministry of Finance) and Sheng-Li 
Holdings (100 percent owned by the Ministry of Defense between 1974 
and 1990, by Singapore Technologies Holdings between 1990 and 1994, 
and by Temasek Holdings since 1994) in 1974. Thirty-five state-owned 
companies were transferred to Temasek Holdings. State-owned compa-
nies operating in the military industry were transferred to Sheng-Li Hold-
ings. To manage the state’s investments, further holding companies were 
founded which fell under the oversight of the Ministry of National Devel-
opment (MND Holdings), the Ministry of Health (Health Corporation of 
Singapore was established in 1987, and it late became MOH Holdings), 
and the Ministry of Education (Helicon Holdings). Information about 
these holding companies is limited. Currently, MND Holdings and MOH 
Holdings are wholly owned by the Ministry of Finance. MND Holdings 
owns certain remnant, but mainly dormant company shares, while MOH 
Holdings owns hospitals (Sim 2011, 64).
The initial tasks of the most important holding company, Temasek 
Holdings, were to oversee the activities of state-owned companies and 
report on the status of the government’s investments and the operation 
of state-owned companies to the Ministry of Finance. By 1979, Temasek 
Holdings adopted a more active approach to provide focus and direction 
to its companies, to foster closer co-operation among companies, to seek 
out new investments, and to consider mergers with profitable companies. 
The “visible hand” of the state became more apparent in steering Temasek 
Holdings and the companies it controlled toward national development 
objectives (Yeung 2011, 631). 
In 1981, the establishment of the Government of Singapore Invest-
ment Corporation (GIC) also served national economic interests, as GIC 
was created to invest the budgetary surpluses and foreign reserves of the 
rapidly developing and growing Singaporean economy. In addition to 
serving national economic interests, the two SWFs, Temasek and GIC, 
also contributed to the long-term political legitimacy of the PAP-led gov-
ernment (Yeung 2011, 629).
In 1986, the state directly owned eighty-seven companies and through 
them—partially or wholly—418 other companies (Ng 1989, 297).11 Since 
then, some of these state-owned companies have significantly grown and 
become leading conglomerates in Singapore (Yeung 2004, 46).
11  Most of the state-owned companies were under the control of Temasek Hold-
ings. In addition, the state owned other companies through other holding com-
panies, statutory boards, and ministries.
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Privatization and Regionalization in the 1980s and 1990s
At the end of the 1970s, to overcome economic stagnation and unem-
ployment, developed capitalist countries started to downsize the role of 
the state and expand market forces. Following the example of developed 
countries, highly indebted developing countries, influenced by the pre-
scriptions of international agencies (the World Bank and IMF), began to 
launch privatization, deregulation, trade and investment liberalization, and 
reforms in the public sector. The Singaporean government also introduced 
such market reforms, although it had an efficient and well-managed public 
sector, which was virtually free of external debts and, thus, able to enact 
these reforms without direct external pressure (Haque 2004, 227–28). 
That is why it is worth investigating the reform motivations of Singapore 
and especially the measures and changes related to statutory boards and 
state-owned enterprises.
In 1987, the Singaporean government launched privatization in the 
state sector according to the recommendations of the Public Sector Divest-
ment Committee.12 The Committee planned not only the transfer of own-
ership—through sales of assets or shares— to the private sector, but also 
the introduction of liberalization and deregulation measures, the priva-
tization of the state’s production of goods and services, and the shifting 
financing to different state services (Ng 1989, 301). It opened a number 
of those sectors in which the state had had a  monopoly as a  statutory 
board (e.g., telecommunications, finance and insurance, public utilities, 
health care, etc.) to private companies. First, the state abandoned different 
dimensions of a defined sector to the private sector. Later, several compa-
nies that had been detached from statutory boards were incorporated and 
then were partially privatized or remained wholly under state ownership 
(more on this later).
The Singaporean government’s motivations for launching privatiza-
tion were the following: 1) The government wanted to withdraw from 
commercial activities that no longer needed to be performed by the public 
sector. 2) The government sought to add breadth and depth to Singapore’s 
12  Disinvestment of some public enterprises started earlier. The Singapore gov-
ernment privatized the International Construction Corporation in 1976 and the 
Ming Court Hotel in 1981. Only partial disinvestment took place in the case of 
Jurong Shipyard, Keppel Shipyard, Neptune Orient Lines, and the Develop-
ment Bank of Singapore (Ng 1989, 299).
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stock market13 through the flotation of state-owned enterprises and com-
panies split from statutory boards. 3) The government wanted to avoid or 
reduce competition with the private sector (Feng et al. 2004, 2465). 4) It 
also wished to increase the role of the private sector in Singapore’s eco-
nomic development.
However, compared to the more substantial changes in favor of 
market forces in many countries, the policy shift in Singapore was rather 
slow and piecemeal. In Singapore, the government did not engage in 
wholesale, but limited privatization (Haque 2004, 232). Privatization 
instead revealed the restructuring of state ownership. The government 
divested itself in whole or in part of state-owned companies,14 but con-
comitantly invested in newly evolving economic sectors15 in which there 
was a lack of private initiative to achieve its economic development aims, 
namely high value-added, technological and knowledge-intensive manu-
facturing and services industries.16 So the entrepreneurial role of the state 
continued in Singapore (Savage and Pow 2007, 33; Ng and Wagner 1989, 
216). State-owned enterprises often bought shares of other state-owned 
enterprises in sales that highlight the narrowness of privatization in Sin-
gapore. Several statutory boards were reorganized too, and companies 
were spun off from them. For example, Singtel was separated from the 
Telecommunications Authority of Singapore in 1992. The Public Utilities 
Board’s electricity and gas sector services were spun off to create Singa-
pore Power in 1995. In 1996, the PSA Corporation was separated from the 
Port Authority of Singapore. These newly established state-owned compa-
nies obtained an official listing on stock exchange and were partially priva-
tized (e.g., Singtel) or remained under full state ownership (e.g., Singa-
pore Power and PSA Corporation). In the healthcare sector, hospitals were 
sequentially incorporated and placed under the Health Corporation of Sin-
gapore, which was established in 1987. The state maintained full owner-
13  The development of the stock market had a significant role in the plan to trans-
form Singapore into an international financial center.
14  For further information about the changes (up to 1999) related to the divest-
ments and shareholdings of Temasek Holdings, see Table 2 of Yeung (2011, 
633–34).
15  E.g., biomedical sciences, interactive and digital media, environmental protec-
tion, and water technology, etc.
16  The Economic Development Board repeatedly played a significant role in devel-
oping new sectors. In 1991, it established a special company called EDB Invest-
ments, through which it invested in new economic sectors in order to support 
their initial development. 
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ship of hospitals, but they were given greater managerial autonomy (Phua 
1997, 251). The private sector’s (citizens, employers) share of national 
health care expenditures increased as the government’s share correspond-
ingly fell (Lim 1998, 19).17
In the 1990s, like privatization, the regionalization of the Singa-
porean economy, launched by the government in 1993, brought changes 
to state-owned enterprises. On the one hand, the government supported 
the restructuring of the Singaporean economy (to high value-added, tech-
nological and knowledge-intensive manufacturing and service industries). 
On the other hand, after the recession of 1985–86, it promoted regional 
investments of state-owned enterprises and domestic private companies in 
order to benefit from the rapid economic development and industrializa-
tion of the Asia-Pacific region and thereby diversify sources of economic 
growth in Singapore.18
According to the first state initiative for regionalization, the so-called 
Singapore–Malaysia–Indonesia growth triangle was established in 1989 
and was based on the division of labor among these three countries with 
different comparative advantages. Cooperation encouraged the relocation 
of low value-added and labor-intensive production processes from Sin-
gapore to Johor (Malaysia) and Riau (Indonesia) (Yeung 1998, 403). In 
1993, the Singaporean government announced the Regionalization 2000 
plan in order to build up the external wing of the Singaporean economy 
with the involvement of domestic private companies and state-owned 
enterprises and statutory boards. It conducted negotiations with the leaders 
of different Asian states to prepare the environment for foreign investments 
by Singaporean companies. State-owned companies worked together with 
domestic private companies (in the form of a consortium or joint venture) 
when they invested abroad. State-owned companies usually managed 
large-scale infrastructural projects, and the industrial parks19 established 
17  This type of privatization (privatization of financing) also appeared in the educa-
tion sector.
18  After the recession of 1985–86, there was a short period when the government 
promoted the globalization of Singaporean companies. To access new technolo-
gies and foreign markets, it encouraged Singaporean companies to form joint 
ventures with overseas companies in North America and Western Europe. But 
most of these investments proved unsuccessful, and the government put empha-
sis on regionalization instead of globalization (Yeoh et al. 2004, 4). 
19  China: China-Singapore Suzhou Industrial Park, Wuxi-Singapore Industrial 
Park; Indonesia: Batamindo Industrial Park, Bintan Industrial Estate; India: Ban-
galore IT Park, Sentosa City; Vietnam: Vietnam-Singapore Industrial Park etc.
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in China, India, Indonesia, and Vietnam constituted key elements of the 
state’s regionalization plan according to which Singaporean companies 
began their foreign operations.
The Asian financial crisis of 1997–8 also resulted in some changes to 
the state capitalist sector of Singapore. During the crisis, several experts cast 
doubt on the future of Asian developmental states, but the measures taken 
by the Singaporean government provided evidence to the contrary. The Sin-
gaporean government strengthened national companies with various state 
assistance programs and the restructuring of state-owned companies.20 It 
turned the geographical focus of Singaporean companies’ external expansion 
from regionalization to globalization. To ride out the Asian economic crisis, 
it became imperative for Singaporean companies to expand into growth 
regions in Europe, North America, South Asia, the Middle East, etc. (Yeung 
2000, 136), and this was encouraged by several business and political mis-
sions organized by the Singapore Trade Development Board.21
The Singaporean State Capitalist Sector in the Past Fifteen Years
Since 2000, privatization has remained limited and gradual,22 the state has 
continued to look for newly evolving economic sectors to invest in, and 
the global expansion of state-owned enterprises has not stopped. Several 
state-owned companies have become significant global actors in different 
industries, among others: Singtel (telecommunications), Keppel Corpora-
tion and Sembcorp Industries (shipping), CapitaLand (real estate develop-
20  For example, in 1998, the DBS acquired the Post Office Savings Bank. The 
Sembawang Corporation (formerly Sembawang Shipyard) incorporated several 
state-owned companies and was renamed Sembcorp. In 2000, CapitaLand was 
created by the fusion of two real estate developers, DBS Land and Pidemco 
Land owned by DBS and Singapore Technologies. In 2003, the PSA Corpora-
tion was reorganized and the PSA International holding company was estab-
lished. But before that, real estate (except harbors) of the PSA Corporation 
had been placed under the control of a newly established company, Mapletree 
Investments.
21  In 2002, the Singapore Trade Development Board was reorganized and 
renamed International Enterprise Singapore according to its new primary func-
tion. Priority shifted more and more from export promotion to the support of 
the foreign expansion of Singaporean companies.
22  At the beginning of the 2000s, Temasek Holdings sold its total shares in 
INTRACO, NatSteel, and the Insurance Corporation of Singapore. These com-
panies had been in the portfolio of Temasek since 1974.
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ment), DBS Group Holdings (finance), Singapore Airlines (air passenger 
transport), Neptun Orient Lines (shipping), etc.
The portfolio and the role of Temasek Holdings, which was created to 
handle most of the state’s shares in companies, has changed significantly. 
It now helps Singaporean companies expand regionally and globally and 
has invested in private local companies with international growth poten-
tial as well as in foreign global enterprises (Chua 2015, 14). Besides pro-
moting the economic development of Singapore, Temasek Holdings’ task 
of attaining long-term, stable profits and increasing national wealth has 
also been determined by the government.
Table 1 shows the most important Singapore-based companies, which 
the state has partially or wholly owned through Temasek Holdings for 
a long time.23 These companies also have additional subsidiaries that own 
more subsidiaries in a pyramid structure.24 The state has indirect owner-
ship in these companies.25 We can also find globally significant foreign 
transnational corporations (e.g., Standard Chartered, AIA Group, China 
Construction Bank Corporation, Intouch Holdings, Bharti Airtel, Evonik 
Industries, Olam International etc.) in the portfolio of Temasek Holdings.
Table 1 
The biggest Singaporean companies in Temasek’s portfolio as of March 2015
Sector/Companies Temasek shareholding (%)
Financial services
DBS Group Holdings 29
Telecommunications, Media, & Technology






Neptune Orient Lines 65
23  Mapletree Investments, Pavilion Energy, and CapitaLand are not very old. They 
were established after 2000.
24  Twelve out of the initial thirty-five companies (in 1974) have remained in the 
portfolio of Temasek Holdings.
25  Each company owns somewhere between ten and more than one hundred sub-
sidiaries.
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Sector/Companies Temasek shareholding (%)
PSA International 100
Sembcorp Industries 49








Wildlife Reserves Singapore 88
Energy & Resources
Pavilion Energy 100
Source: Temasek Review 2015
In 2015, the sectoral distribution of Temasek Holdings’ portfolio was the 
following: financial services: 28 percent; telecommunications, media, and 
technology: 24 percent; transportation and related industries: 17 percent; 
retails, tourism, and real estate: 15 percent; energy and related resources: 
5 percent; life sciences and agriculture: 3 percent; other: 8 percent. In the 
last decade, the geographical distribution of the portfolio changed: Singa-
pore’s share decreased from 49 percent to 28 percent, while at the same 
time, the share of Asia (excluding Singapore) increased from 20 percent to 
42 percent. In 2015, 70 percent of Temasek’s portfolio was concentrated 
in Asia. The remaining 30 percent was mainly distributed among North 
America and Europe (17 percent) and Australia and New zealand (9 per-
cent). The share of Africa, Central Asia, and the Middle East together was 
2 percent as was that of Latin America (Temasek 2015, 3). Temasek Hold-
ings primarily invests in Asian equities, so it is one of the least diversified 
sovereign wealth funds globally (Cummine 2015).
Since 1974, the net value of Temasek’s portfolio has increased from 
354 million Singapore dollars to 266 billion Singapore dollars. The dotcom 
crash of 2000–2001 and the global economic crisis of 2008–9 caused only 
a temporary decrease in the value of the portfolio. Due to the global eco-
nomic and financial crisis, the net value of Temasek portfolio decreased by 
55 billion Singapore dollars (from 185 billion dollars to 130 billion Singa-
pore dollars) as of March 2009, in annual terms. During the year, Temasek 
Holdings made disinvestments in value of 16 billion Singapore dollars and 
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investments in value of 9 billion Singapore dollars (Temasek 2009, 6-7). 
The exposure of American and British banks to the global financial crisis 
explains why Temasek Holdings divested out of Bank of America and Bar-
clays. Regarding the old state-owned enterprises of Singapore, the Chief 
Executive Officer of Temasek Holdings, Ho Ching declared in 2009 that 
they would retain „family jewels”,26and so it happened (see Table 1). In 
2009, regardless of the global crisis, Temasek Holdings completed the long-
planned disinvestment of three (profitable) power generating companies. 
Besides, it disinvested two of its companies founded in 1973, namely, SNP 
Corporation (printing company), Singapore Food Industries (Temasek 
2009, 9-10), and Singapore Computer Systems. The Singapore Food 
Industries and the Singapore Computer Systems were bought by SATS and 
Singtel, respectively, which are owned by Temasek. Since 2009, there have 
not been any significant changes in relation to the „family jewels”. However, 
the impact of the global economic crisis has not left intact these companies. 
This is confirmed by the fact that in the summer of 2015, Temasek Holding 
announced the sale of Neptune Orient Lines plagued with overcapacity and 
losses. (Carew and Venkat 2015).
In 2015, according to the ranking of SWF Institute, Temasek Hold-
ings (with an asset value of 193.6 billion U.S. dollars) was the world’s elev-
enth largest sovereign wealth fund. The other sovereign wealth fund of 
Singapore, GIC, was ranked eighth with an asset value of 344 billion U.S. 
dollars.27 According to Shih (2009, 331), the performance of Singapore’s 
SWFs is legendary, making them models for their peers around the world. 
In the last twenty years, the GIC portfolio generated an average annual real 
return of 4.9 percent.28 In the last ten (twenty) years, the Temasek port-
folio had a 9 percent (7 percent) total shareholder return (Temasek 2015, 
2). Although there are differences in the function and geographical distri-
bution of their portfolios, 29 Temasek and GIC have a common purpose: 
26  Retrieved from http://www.theonlinecitizen.com/2009/07/breaking-news-40-
billion-losses-by-temasek-holdings/.
27  Retrieved from http://www.swfinstitute.org/sovereign-wealth-fund-rankings/.
28  Retrieved from http://www.gic.com.sg/report/report-2014-2015/investment_
report.html.
29  On the one hand, the Singaporean government created the GIC with a portion 
of surplus foreign exchange reserves and it receives an annual transfer (discre-
tionary) from the government to help grow its principal. Temasek, on the other 
hand, has become entirely self-financing with five primary sources of funding: 
company dividends, divestment proceeds, distribution of fund investment earn-
ings, and long- and short-term debt issuances (Cummine 2015). Contrary to 
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to supplement the domestic revenues of state budget with returns on their 
investments, which are then used by the government to support Singa-
pore’s social and economic aims. The two sovereign wealth funds have an 
important role in sustaining and protecting the long-term financial stability 
of the domestic economy. Clark and Monk (2010, 431) emphasized this 
in their study on the GIC’s role as an investor of foreign reserves, which is 
very important in order to protect the Singaporean economy from financial 
crises, and, at the same time, impede the intervention of multilateral insti-
tutions in Singapore’s economy, like the IMF did in neighboring countries 
during the Asian financial crisis of 1997–98, which resulted in decreased 
national sovereignty.
The philanthropic activities of Temasek Holdings are also worth men-
tioning. The Singaporean government established the Temasek Trust in 
2007, and this organ coordinates and controls the philanthropic activi-
ties of Temasek Holdings such as disaster prevention, education, medical 
research, etc.
Summary
After gaining independence, the city-state of Singapore created an exten-
sive state capitalist sector (statutory boards, state-owned enterprises), 
which still exists and operates today. The Singaporean government inher-
ited some parts of this sector from the British colonial era, but other parts 
were built up by the government itself—in absence of a domestic industrial 
entrepreneurial class—to jump start (export-oriented) industrial develop-
ment, make the society more prosperous, and preserve the independence 
of Singapore.
Together, the state capitalist sector and foreign transnational corpo-
rations are the two main pillars of economic growth and development in 
Singapore. They have had an indisputable role in transforming Singapore, 
over decades, into one of the world’s wealthiest and most competitive 
countries.
Temasek, the geographical distribution of GIC’s portfolio does not have an 
Asian focus; the U.S. and Europe have a considerable share in the portfolio of 
GIC. By law GIC is not allowed to invest in Singapore. In 2015, the geographi-
cal distribution of GIC’s portfolio was the following: Americas—43% (United 
States—34%), Europe—25%, Asia—30% and Australasia 2%. Retrieved from 
http://www.gic.com.sg/images/pdf/GIC_Report_2015.pdf.
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In Singapore, the state acts as an entrepreneur. The management 
of state-owned enterprises is based on the principles of the market and 
effectiveness. Loss-making enterprises are not saved but closed. Since its 
creation in the 1960s and 1970s, the Singaporean state capitalist sector 
has been continuously changing. On the one hand, the state has with-
drawn from some economic sectors, while on the other hand, it has 
expanded into others according to the economic development aims of 
Singapore. As a result, the Singaporean state capitalist sector is always 
restructuring. The government decided to partially or wholly privatize 
companies not only because they were loss-making entities, but also if 
the participation of the state was no longer needed in a specific sector. 
Since the 1980s, many of Singapore’s professionally managed, profitable 
state-owned enterprises operating in a competitive market environment 
have begun to expand regionally and globally beyond the borders of the 
city-state, and have become important actors in their respective sectors of 
the global economy.
The returns generated by the portfolio of Temasek Holdings and GIC, 
which are internationally successful SWFs, are reinvested through the state 
budget to support the economic and social aims of the city-state.
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CHAPTER 11




When modern Turkey was created in 1923, one of its top priorities was 
the modernization and realignment of the economically underdeveloped 
country. The process of modernization originated from above, on the ini-
tiative and according to the plans of the state, and it experienced uneven 
success. In the beginning of the 2000s, things took an unexpected turn. 
In the country with a secular state organization that had been created by 
Kemal Atatürk eight decades ago, a party with Islamic roots won the 2002 
elections, a party that began its fifth term in office in 2018. This, however, 
has only made the latent process that began several decades ago obvious: 
the Kemalist project for modernization was less and less able to legiti-
mate itself, and in a country inhabited mostly by Muslims, a moderate but 
clearly Islamic-based approach has become more and more popular. At 
the same time, starting in the early 2000s, Turkey has become one of the 
emerging economies that has been successful in joining global economic 
production and trade flows, and thereby has experienced fast economic 
growth. The combination of these two factors makes Turkey an interesting 
case study for observing changes in the state’s role in the economy. 
This study focuses precisely on the changing economic role of the 
state in Turkey and examines the following: whether the presence of 
Islam is a special feature and how it affects Turkish economic policy; what 
answers the government finds for the challenges of globalization, and what 
special features define the Turkish model of economic policy.
Economy and State in Turkey: A Historical Overview
Capitalism reached the Ottoman Empire relatively late. Despite the fact 
that it had been more or less integrated into the capitalist world system 
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since the end of the eighteenth century, in the multinational (and multi-
religious) empire, it took until the beginning of the twentieth century to 
develop a  “national bourgeoisie” that could be the basis of an internal 
capitalist system. More specifically, it began to develop, but did so largely 
among non-Muslim populations (Greeks, Armenians, Jews, and Levan-
tines, i.e., Arab Christians). The state powers did not represent their inter-
ests, and, in fact, these groups themselves were also interested in a weak 
central power that acted in accordance with the interests of the European 
powers (Findley 2010, 102).
This era was characterized by growing foreign influence. Capitula-
tions and exemptions from local laws were provided to traders and busi-
nessmen from the West in order to increase trade and, thus, customs rev-
enues. Such exemptions evolved into measures impairing sovereignty over 
time: foreigners obtained monopolistic rights for several products in the 
Ottoman Empire, and on many occasions, they also received more favor-
able treatment in respect to taxes than did local businessmen (Kuran 2011, 
209). The treasury crisis after the Crimean War forced the Ottomans state 
to take foreign (English, French) loans in 1854. By the 1870s, this debt 
had become unmanageable, and in 1875, the state went bankrupt: the 
Ottoman Empire could not meet its payment obligations, which had risen 
over 50 percent of its revenue (Birdal 2010, 168).
To manage the tax crisis—as visible proof of strong foreign pres-
sure—the Ottoman Public Debt Administration (OPDA) was established 
in 1881. The seven-member board of the OPDA was comprised of rep-
resentatives of the main lending nations (Great Britain, France, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Austria). This organization entailed direct foreign interven-
tion into the economic affairs of the country. For the sake of debt repay-
ment, it managed over one-third of state revenues; for example, it managed 
the revenues of the salt monopoly, as well as the tax and duty revenues 
from stamps and alcohol (Echia 2010, 9). At the same time, however, the 
OPDA enforced the implementation of several modernization measures 
that improved economic performance. It forced the empire to consoli-
date its financial management, and it contributed to the creation of the 
modern system of state enterprises. The measures of the OPDA, which 
was interested in increasing revenues, also facilitated an increase in the 
competitiveness of the country and the amount of state revenue it brought 
in. Many Turks, however, see parallels between the effects and perception 
of the OPDA and later that of the IMF, as both institutions have facilitated 
the modernization of economy but at the same time serve foreign interests 
(Birdal 2010, xvii).
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After its creation in 1923, the modern Turkish state was torn away 
from many of the territories it had once ruled for many decades. Atatürk 
saw Europe and the comprehensive import of European civilization as 
a means to modernize Turkey. As Abdullah Cevdet, one of the Turkish 
intellectuals who influenced Kemal Atatürk said, “there is only one civi-
lization, and that is the European civilization. It must be imported with 
its roses and its thorns” (Lewis 1965, 231). The establishment of modern 
Turkey was the result of the breakup with the previous Ottoman Empire 
and a break with the empire’s Muslim traditions. The new state intended 
to implement a clearly Western-style modernization program.
In the beginning of the twentieth century, the Muslim/Turkish bour-
geoisie was created from above, through the active role of the state. As 
a result of this, the relationship between the state and the Turkish bour-
geoisie was strong, and the latter played a subordinated, dependent role in 
the state.
The role of the state in the economy fluctuated in the decades that fol-
lowed (division by Ayse Bugra, cited by Ahmad [1998]):
•  between 1923 and 1929 the aim was to create a modern economy 
based on private enterprise;
•  the period between 1930 and 1946 was characterized by the state’s 
increased intervention in the economy under the principle of 
etatism;
•  between 1946 and 1960, a more liberal economic system came to 
the fore;
•  between 1960 and 1980, the state experimented with planned 
economy again;
•  1980 marks the beginning of extensive liberalization, which con-
tinues to today.
After the fall of the Ottoman Empire, the new Turkish nation-state faced 
serious problems. The economically most prosperous parts of the empire 
broke away, and the Turkish economy could only count on its agricultural 
products. One of the first steps taken by the new government was the dis-
tribution and allocation of land to penniless farmers.
Besides economic recovery, social reform was the biggest challenge for 
the new nation-state. Starting in the 1930s, the Turkish state did not tol-
erate any alternative ideologies besides Kemalism. In their interpretation, 
technology and culture stem from the same roots; thus, industrialization 
meant the simultaneous adoption of Western standards as well.
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Kemalism was fundamentally based on etatism, which considered the 
state as the standard-bearer of modernism. Its presence in the economy 
became more and more obvious after the Great Depression when, in the 
beginning of the 1930s, the market for Turkish agricultural products col-
lapsed. In 1934, the Turkish government introduced planned economy 
following Soviet patterns (Findley 2010, 274). At this time in the Soviet 
Union, and thus in Turkey, economic and modernization strategy was 
based on the development of heavy industry. The program saw some suc-
cess in its attempts to establish the foundations of heavy industry, but the 
one-sided concentration of resources caused serious damage to other eco-
nomic sectors. Instead of market coordination, the state that controlled 
investments and encouraged the development of capital-intensive sectors in 
a country that was otherwise capital poor and lacked skilled labor for such 
development, while at the same time, the low-skilled labor force hardly 
had any jobs. Large state enterprises (KIT in Turkish) were established. 
Although the private sector did not disappear, private enterprises were 
heavily dependent on the benevolence and support of the state (274).
After World War II, the country received strong support from the 
United Sates within the framework of the Marshall Plan and the Truman 
doctrine, and at the same time, it joined NATO, the IMF, and the OECD. 
Further, in the years after the war, a more liberal approach was taken in 
both the political and in the economic system. A multi-party system was 
created, and when the Democratic Party, which relied on support from 
the peasantry, came into power in 1950, focus was shifted to state support 
of the agricultural sector instead of industrial development. In the begin-
ning of the 1950s, demand rose for Turkish exports (especially agricul-
tural products), which had a positive effect on the economic growth of the 
country. By the end of the decade, however, with the decline of their export 
prosperity and because of less favorable weather, the economy slowed 
down. In order to maintain its voting base, the government decided in 
favor of even higher subsidization of agricultural products instead of cut-
ting costs. The result of this policy was hyperinflation and shortages of 
products in markets, and because of the increasing economic problems, 
political differences re-emerged (Akça 2014).
In order to manage the political and economic crisis, the military 
intervened, and starting in the 1960s, the central power began to tighten 
its grip on the economy again. In 1963, that is, at the start of the first five-
year plan, state intervention in the economy significantly increased; this 
move, however, had widespread popular support: besides the governing, 
etatist Republican People’s Party, large manufacturers, and international 
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organizations (e.g., the OECD) supported the introduction of development 
planning (Pamuk 2007).
Like other developing countries, Turkey’s economic development 
policy was based primarily on import-substitution industrialization. 
According to macro figures, progress was impressive: GDP grew by an 
annual average of 7 percent, and industrial production showed an even 
quicker growth of an average of approximately 10 percent per annum 
between 1963 and 1976 (Aydın 2005, 38). Subsidies and development 
resources in the private sector were also dependent on the State Planning 
Office, which resulted in the strengthening of public-private patronage net-
works and dependency on the state. The agricultural sector, however, was 
basically left out of the plans, and resources were only rarely allocated to its 
development. Industrial development focused on supplying the domestic 
market while exports in the manufacturing industry were almost non-exis-
tent: exports accounted for 4 percent of GDP, and almost two-thirds of 
these were agricultural products. Increasing remittances sent by Turkish 
workers living abroad and loans from European money markets played an 
important role in maintaining the balance of payment of the country.
During the seventies and as a result of the oil crises, like most OECD 
countries, Turkey had to reorganize its economic structure. Reform delays 
and forced import-substitution strategies only aggravated the crisis.. The 
Economic Stabilization Program announced in January 1980 brought 
a  fundamental change to the previous, primarily state intervention- and 
seclusion-based economic strategy. Among the goals of the government’s 
Reagan-style program led by Prime Minister Özal were reducing the state’s 
role in production, prioritizing market conditions, replacing import substi-
tution with an export-oriented strategy, and strong incentives for foreign 
investments. Accordingly, the government strongly supported production 
for export by taking over 30 percent of the export costs on behalf of enter-
prises and giving them discounts on energy and transport costs.
The progress that began in 1980 was more convincing than the 
results achieved in the previous two decades. As a result of opening the 
economy, private enterprise began to flourish, and there was a boom in 
tourism and foreign investment.1 In the period between 1980 and 1983, 
when total world trade decreased by 10 percent, Turkish exports almost 
doubled. During the same period, account deficits decreased from 4.9 
1  As Turgut Özal put it, “It’s a luck that we don’t have oil, because this way we 
have to work hard for our money” (Akyol 2006).
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percent to 3.2 percent of GNP, and inflation from 110 percent to 30 per-
cent (Krueger 1995).
One of the most important consequences of this economic liberaliza-
tion was the switch to an export-oriented economy. Exports increased from 
$3 billion in 1980 to around $150 billion by 2015, which accounts for 
almost 20 percent of GDP. Primary growth was realized mainly by the tex-
tile industry, steel industry, automotive industry, and other manufacturing 
sectors, which together accounted for 90 percent of exports. The so-called 
Anatolian tigers, the relatively small but (externally) competitive enterprises 
that prospered under liberal economic conditions without state subsi-
dies, played a key role in production. New industrial districts developed 
in areas that were previously relatively economically underdeveloped and 
focused on agricultural production and traditional handicrafts.2 Industrial 
traditions provided the workforce, and at the same time, the lack of trade 
unions permitted lower wages. Most enterprises began as family businesses 
without state subsidies and foreign investment.3
In the second half of the eighties, the signs of imbalance intensified 
as a  result of the quick growth in domestic demand and the failures of 
economic management. Because of incompletely implemented structural 
reforms, huge amounts of money were spent on financing unprofitable 
state enterprises, a  result of which was a  constant increase in the state 
budget deficit (from 3.5 percent in 1986 to 8 percent in 1990). Inflation 
was permanently above 50 percent, and economic progress slowed down 
significantly (Krueger 1995).
To ease the situation, in 1989, large-scale liberalization started again, 
and this framework made the freer inflow of foreign capital possible. This 
helped finance the deficit, but the influx of new short-term capital (so-
called hot money) made the country vulnerable in times of external crises 
(Öniş and Şenses 2009).
It is not by accident that setting Turkey on a  steady path of prog-
ress failed time and again for decades. Between 1970 and 2001, GNP per 
capita increased on average by 2 percent annually, which was far behind 
the growth of 4.3 percent in eastern Asia. The differences become even 
more stark if we consider the deviation from the average: this was 2.2 per-
centage points lower than eastern Asian growth indictors, which suggests 
2  Gaziantep, Denzili, Kayseri, Malatya, Konya, etc.
3  At the same time, the capital transferred home by migrant workers working in 
Europe provided funds for these businesses, see below.
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large fluctuations in growth. Characteristically, after a couple of years of 
dynamic progress came a  setback, and in the decade after capital liber-
alization in the beginning of the nineties, there were three such setbacks 
(1994, 1999, 2001) that resulted in the decrease of GNP by 5 to 10 per-
cent during these years. The development of crises was also fuelled by the 
deficiencies of Turkish financial institutions and the poor operation of the 
banking system4 (Cizre and Yeldan 2005).
Starting in the 1980s and moving into the 1990s, the Turkish mod-
ernization process was increasingly—and openly—questioned. This partly 
took the form of a crisis in the legitimation of the “strong state.” Since 
the establishment of the modern Turkish republic, the state had been the 
standard-bearer of modernization. In the 1990s, new players and a new 
language of modernization appeared in the Turkish political sphere. The 
traditional state was less and less able to meet modern social and economic 
challenges, and its legitimacy gradually decreased.
At the same time, the possibility of alternative methods of modern-
ization emerged, which appeared not only at the level of theory, but were 
backed up by genuine and empirical social trends, among others, the return 
of Islam to public life. This alternative modernization vigorously criticized 
the overly secular-rational approach of previous modernization efforts based 
on Kemalist values, which, however, did not necessarily mean it embraced 
anti-globalist or anti-capital positions (Keyman and Koyuncu 2005).
Islamist Government and Neoliberal Reforms
The creation of the modern Turkish state in 1923 deliberately suppressed 
Islam in public life, and exclusively relegated it to the private sphere. When 
the Justice and Development Party (in Turkish Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, 
or AKP) came to power in 2002, it resulted in a growing appreciation for 
the role of Islam in public life.
By the end of the nineties, at the time of the reorganization of the 
economic and political spheres, fundamental changes took place within 
Turkish Islam, which had previously been strongly opposed to the EU and 
4  The state bank primarily funded the budget deficit, but private banks also funded 
the government with the help of foreign loans. There was no monetary control, 
either; although money supply was increased, this was used by the government 
only to finance governmental expenditures.
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globalization. The group emphasizing the advantages of integration into 
the EU became more and more powerful among Islamists. The economic 
groups that formed the basis of this movement were interested in eco-
nomic reforms, and the opening of European markets widened their export 
opportunities. Also, from the point of view of politics, the democratization 
requirements of the EU were advantageous for them. Such requirements 
limited the possibility of military intervention in political processes, and 
respect for freedom of speech and human rights allowed Islamists to have 
a more powerful public presence (Atasoy 2009, 109).
One of the secrets of AKP’s success was that it was able to gain sup-
porters among both the winners and the losers of the neoliberal globaliza-
tion process. Actually, it was more like a middle-of-the-road modern social 
democratic party that emphasizes the advantages of the market and advo-
cates for the reorganization of the state into a regulatory rather than an 
intervening-developer state that also cares about social justice (Öniş 2012). 
At the same time, however, Turkish Islam has special features. As opposed 
to many radical Islamist trends, Turkish Islamists do not fundamentally 
reject Western-style modernization; what is more, several elements of the 
Kemalist heritage (e.g., Turkish nationalism) have remained key elements 
of their ideology. Likewise, since the dominant part of the social groups 
forming the basis of the party are among the primary beneficiaries of the 
globalization process, they see globalization as more of an opportunity 
rather than a process that threatens their identity (Atasoy 2009). This was 
also reflected in the economic policy of Islamist forces.
P. Kemal Derviş, an official at the World Bank who was recalled and 
appointed as minister of the economy by the government preceding AKP, 
is credited with the recovery from the great crisis of 2001 and the launch of 
necessary and inevitable reforms. However, the implementation of the plan 
developed in collaboration with the IMF was continued by the governing 
AKP, and consequently, the results have been credited to them politically, 
and the results have been significant.
Economic success and the spectacular improvement in competitive-
ness were based on several factors. The political environment went through 
an advantageous change. Despite the centralization of the political institu-
tional framework, political divisions and weak coalitions in previous years 
made it impossible to consistently implement any political program. The 
new single-party government formed in 2002 was backed by a two-thirds 
majority in parliament and was capable of more efficient control.
The strict fiscal and monetary policies and the floating exchange rate 
increased trust in Turkey, which was also reflected in the decreasing risk 
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premiums of state bonds. The stabilization program following the 1999 
crisis applied a fixed exchange rate that completely lost its value 2001, and 
therefore, after 2001, they switched to a floating exchange rate (Öniş and 
Şenses 2009). This allowed the National Bank to concentrate on price 
stability, which also brought its results. After decades of unsuccessful 
attempts, inflation finally was reduced to single digits.
These structural reforms (primarily in the monetary sector and in 
the public sector) improved economic conditions significantly (Öniş and 
Şenses 2009). Besides the extremely expensive bank consolidation,5 the 
financial institutions managed by the state were merged, rationalized, 
and, in part, privatized. Requirements for bank reserves were raised, and, 
through other regulatory changes, banks were compelled to clean up their 
profiles and merge with each other. Growth was generated by the pri-
vate sector, while the consumption and investments of the public sector 
decreased due to strict fiscal policy.
Productivity significantly improved. Although the strengthening of the 
Turkish Lire later completely eliminated the favorable effects the massive 
2001 devaluation had on export prices, the favorable competitive position 
was maintained through the improvement of productivity. High value-
added and technology-intensive products (vehicles, electric, and electronic 
products) carried increasingly significant weight in total exports.
After years of modest inflow of foreign direct investment (FDI), 2005 
was the year of protrusion largely because of the start of privatization. In 
2005 alone $19 billion of FDI came into the country, partly within the 
framework of privatization, but large amounts were also invested in the 
banking sector and as greenfield investments. The relatively high level 
(around $10 billion annually) of capital flowing into Turkey was main-
tained the years that followed. 
The implementation of reforms was facilitated by the extended credit 
line of the IMF,6 but also fundamental was increasing political support 
from the EU. In 2002, Turkey received a promise to achieve candidate 
status within two years, which increased the influence of the EU and 
Turkey’s determination to implement reforms. The goal of EU accession 
5  The banks owned by the state (primarily ziraat Bank and Halk Bank) had a mas-
sive amount of bad loans. During the crisis of 2000–1, the state executed a bank 
rescue program amounting to almost 30 percent of GDP, which led to a signifi-
cant increase in state debts (Şimşek and Şimşek 2010, 171–2).
6  Between 1999 and 2003, the IMF provided $20.4 billion in loans. See Yeldan 
(2008).
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strengthened forces in Turkey that favored reforms, which the IMF had 
never been able to achieve (its reform requirements had a much smaller 
base of support and their effects were far more temporary).
To manage the problems caused by the 2008–9 global economic 
crisis, just like the case of other troubled “emerging markets,” for example 
Hungary, the idea of getting help from the IMF emerged. However, the 
Turkish government wanted to avoid this for several reasons. In 2008, 
Turkey had been in a  continuous relationship with IMF for more than 
a decade (since 1998), and the last $10 billion agreement had just expired 
in May 2008 (Yeldan 2008). According to official Turkish commentaries 
at the time, Turkey was now an adult, and it did not need any help main-
taining its economic balance because it had learned its lesson. Turkey 
managed to stay on stable footing without the help of IMF, although in the 
short term it was weakened, while in the long term, this strengthened the 
image of the Turkish economy overall. All of this, of course, required strict 
fiscal policies, which also meant austerity measures similar to an IMF-
package but with different areas of focus.7 
The Changing Role of the State in the Economy
State enterprises were the center of gravity in the Turkish enterprise 
system for a long time. In the 1930s, the private sector was weak, and the 
state could influence most economic sectors through newly established 
state enterprises. Following World War II, a few larger conglomerates (a 
group of enterprises performing industrial, commercial, and sometimes 
banking functions) organized on a family basis were also organized and 
played an increasing role in the Turkish economy. Starting in the 1960s, 
the state dominated again, and in this golden age of industrialization, 
state enterprises were seen as motors of economic development. During 
this era, these enterprises accounted for almost half of the manufacturing 
output of the country. Later on they became an increasingly heavy burden 
and the main source of state deficits, and their role and significance in 
production was downgraded. The main sources of problems were high 
concentration and the lack of competitors and, therefore, low productivity 
(Aydın 2005, 40).
7  For details see Öniş and Güven 2011.
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Attempts were made during the 1980s to reform the unprofitable state 
sector, but such attempts were rather limited and proved to be ineffective. 
Subsidization of the large number of state enterprises cost a huge amount 
of money, and because of the loose fiscal policy, the country’s budget def-
icit was always around 8 to 10 percent of GDP. There was an attempt to 
regroup some of the subventions so as to improve the market opportuni-
ties for flexible small and medium enterprises capable of export, instead of 
financing unprofitable large enterprises.
Table 1 
Number and economic share of employees of state enterprises (1985–2015)
Number of 
enterprises
Share within GDP, %
Total number of 
employees
from this, public 
servants
1985 48 6.24 653,066 187,276
1990 49 5.18 642,058 27,074
1995 50 4.75 496,352 13,085
2000 41 3.47 434,655 10,329
2005 32 2.01 247,262 7,012
2010 28 1.82 186,137 6,307
2015 26 0.91 119,452 4,431
Source: National Treasury of Turkey. See http://www.treasury.gov.tr/en-US/Stat-List?mid=744&cid=14&nm=829.
The number of state enterprises has been reduced by half since the 1990s; 
their share of GDP and the number of their employees have been reduced 
to a  fraction. For the time being, enterprises still owned by the state 
produce less than 1 percent of the GDP and employ a  little more than 
100,000 employees, which is negligible in a country with a population of 
eighty million. The following is an overview of the main characteristics of 
the privatization of the public sector.
Privatization
The reforms of the 1980s considered privatization and the reduction of the 
state’s ownership share of enterprises a fundamental element of the reorga-
nization of the economic structure. The process of privatization that began 
at the beginning of the 1980s had moving very slow, and it only accelerated 
in the era following the 2001 crisis under the AKP government. Between 
1985 and 2014, 270 enterprises were affected by privatization (in 194 of 
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these companies, state ownership was eliminated completely), as well as 
almost 1,500 properties, several state monopolies (e.g., gambling), and 
infrastructural assets (two bridges, eight motorways, and six ports).8
The state withdrew completely from several industries that had been 
previously dominated by companies owned by the state (for example 
the concrete and milk industries), and significantly reduced its share in 
tourism, the iron and steel industry, the textile industry, sea freight, and 
meat processing. The state privatized the most important ports and oil 
refineries as well. Within the framework of bank bailouts after the 2001 
crisis, several smaller banks owed by the state (Sümerbank, Etibank, Den-
izbank, Anadolu Bank) were sold.
Diagram 1 
Income from privatization in Turkey (1985–2014) in billions
Source: https://www.ceicdata.com/en/turkey/privatization-revenues?page=2 
Out of the almost $75 billion the state acquired through privatization 
between 1985 and 2018, it received $8.4 billion during the period between 
1985 and 2000, $33.6 billion in the period between 2001 and 2010, and 
a further $32 billion between 2011 and 2018.
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The preferred method of privatization was the so-called block sale; 
more than half of privatization income came from these. In such cases, 
the state enterprises were sold as one unit to a privately owned enterprise 
or consortium, which indicated a preference for maximizing income and 
achieving quick results. At the same time, however, this may not have 
been the best choice from the point of view of future competition, as state 
enterprises that had dominant positions in the markets were transformed 
into private enterprises in dominant positions. That is, the imbalance of 
the market structure was not necessarily corrected through this form of 
privatization. Another disadvantage of this method is that the possibility 
of corruption, especially sales below market value, is also much higher 
than for public sales. Nevertheless, stock sales involving the broader 
public amounted to a much smaller proportion of privatizations, and these 
were primarily sold after their initial public offering on the Istanbul stock 
exchange (Atiyas 2009).
The most significant privatizations were in the oil and chemical 
industry (Petrol Ofisi, Tüpras, Petkim), transportation (Turkish Airlines), 
telecommunications (Türk Telekom), tobacco (TEKEL), and financial ser-
vices (Halk Bankasi). The buyers were partly foreign corporations (British 
Tobacco, Azerbaijani SOCAR, Austrian OMV, Saudi Oger Telekom) and 
partly consortiums of domestic and foreign companies, but overall, the 
majority of state corporations were purchased by domestic capital.
Turkish Airlines was one of the first enterprises designated for priva-
tization. Shares of the airline were gradually offered to the public on the 
Istanbul stock exchange between 1990 and 2006, and since 2006, the state 
has been a minority owner (holding a 49 percent ownership share), but with 
a so-called golden share, it has control over strategic decisions. Although 
the idea of selling further state shares has come up several times, no shares 
have been offered to the public on the stock exchange since 2006. 
Fifty-five percent of Türk Telekom shares were sold in 2005 to the 
Saudi Oger Telekom for $6.5 billion, while in 2008, a further 15 percent of 
shares were offered to the public on the Istanbul stock exchange, while 30 
percent is still under state ownership.
Fifty-one percent of the Petrol Ofisi oil company was acquired by the 
Turkish Doğan Holding in 2000, and then in 2006, the Austrian OMV 
purchased a 34 percent ownership stake for $1.05 billion. In 2010, OMV 
also acquired the shares of Doğan. Thus, it now owns 95 percent of the 
company, which owns oil refineries and three thousand petrol stations.
In 2008, the Azerbaijani oil company SOCAR together with the 
Turkish company Turkas PetroKimya purchased 61 percent of the Petkim 
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petrochemical group for $2.04 billion. Then, in 2011, when SOCAR 
bought out Turkas’s shares, it became the majority owner. The state 
retained 11 percent ownership of the company, and the rest was sold on 
the stock exchange.
The privatization of Tüpras, an enterprise operating oil refineries, 
started in 1991, when 2.5 percent of shares were offered to the public on 
the stock exchange. Through secondary public offerings, this ratio rose to 
49 percent. In 2009, the consortium of Turkish Koç Holding (75 percent), 
Aygaz (20 percent), Opet (3 percent), and Shell (2 percent) acquired the 
remaining 51 percent for $4 billion.
Tekel is the leading enterprise in the alcohol and tobacco industry, 
which was created in 1925 through the nationalization of the enterprise 
(Régie) that had a monopoly under the Ottomans and was partly under 
foreign control. British American Tobacco acquired the enterprise in an 
auction for $1.72 billion in 2008. This was partly due to the fact that its 
competitors (Philip Morris, Japan Tobacco) were already market players 
made a low offer because they would have acquired a dominant position 
through the sale, which could be challenged by the competition authority. 
Tekel holds a 36 percent market share in Turkey. In the spirit of reorgani-
zation, Tekel closed twelve factories and fired ten thousand people, which 
led to serious union protests not only against the new owner, but also 
against the AKP government that sold the company.
In the case of Halk Bankasi, the first 25 percent was privatized for 
$1.8 billion through the Istanbul stock exchange in 2007. Then, after the 
uncertainty caused by the crisis, the next 24 percent of shares were sold 
for $2.5 billion on the stock exchange in 2012. The ownership ratio of the 
state is currently 51 percent, which the state also wanted to privatize. But 
because of their violation of the sanctions against Iran, the company expe-
rienced serious attacks in the years leading up to the sale. The sale of the 
insurance companies owned by the bank is also on the agenda.
In 2015, the income generated by privatization was around $10 
billion, and according to plans, further significant privatizations are 
expected in the upcoming years. Current privatization plans include 
motorways, bridges, power plants, and ports, as well as twenty-five sugar 
factories, five machine factories, the Turksat telecommunications enter-
prise, and the enterprise operating the BOTAS oil and gas pipeline net-
work. The state-owned companies in the gambling sector (Spor Toto and 
the enterprise for horse race betting) are to be privatized as well, which by 
themselves may generate an income of around $10 billion. In the case of 
the Turkish electrical works (Türkiye Elektrik Iletim) and the Turkish oil 
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company (TPAO), the sale of the 49 percent minority ownership share is 
planned.
According to Öniş (2011) all of the motivations behind the massive 
privatization mentioned in the literature were present in Turkey:
1. The government’s need for income; 
2. A centralized and strong executive power; and
3. Powerful influence from external players.
After a major crisis (as the examples of Mexico or Argentina show), a sig-
nificant change in economic policy may occur. It was also typical in the 
case of Turkey that, after 2002, groups that had previously opposed cer-
tain economic reforms—for example, privatization—weakened, while those 
in favor of such reforms strengthened. Because of the crisis and its man-
agement (e.g., bank consolidation), the government’s need for income 
increased as well. The role of certain external actors in favor of privatiza-
tion (the IMF and, to a lesser extent, the EU) was also revaluated.
According to Öniş (2011), however, a  few additional factors also 
played a central role in the acceleration of the privatization process. One 
such factor was the presence and participation of domestic capital in priva-
tization, as privatization carried out only with the involvement of foreign 
capital often generates resentment in the people. Among those opposing 
privatization—as was demonstrated by several Turkish examples (Tüpras 
and Erdemir)—the presence of “national capital” reduced resentment. The 
favorable legal and institutional framework, and the positive demonstrative 
effect of privatizations carried out in other countries in the beginning of the 
decade also contributed to successful privatization.
The State and the System of Private Enterprises
The erosion of state capitalism also entails the strengthening of oligarchic 
capitalism (Karadağ 2010). A special relationship with the political-eco-
nomic decision makers is an important part of economic life that results 
in the strengthening of traditionally strong political patronage networks. 
Liberalization, therefore, does not necessarily result in a  liberal market 
economy in the Western sense, that is, where market players compete 
under the same regulations formulated by an impartial state bureaucracy. 
As a consequence of the Turkish reforms of the 1980s, the fragmentation 
of the political sphere, the weakening of the cooperative social system, and 
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the formation of a new, closed political-business elite were fundamental 
elements of the new oligarchic capitalist system.
At the same time, starting in the late 1970s and early 1980s, privately 
owned large enterprises have come out more firmly against excessive state 
intervention, support schemes dependent on the state, and overregulated 
economic management.
The Association of Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen 
(TÜSIAD), established in the beginning of the 1970s, has advocated eco-
nomic liberalization from the very beginning. It supported the military 
coup in 1980 because it saw it as guaranteeing the execution of economic 
reforms. Today, however, it advocates European-style democratization and 
respect for human rights; these principles dominate recent publications 
of TÜSIAD as well. In addition, TÜSIAD encourages the exploitation 
of opportunities created by globalization, and it also favors EU accession 
(e.g., it publishes full-page advertisements in European papers to build 
support for Turkish membership). TÜSIAD is the Turkish spokesman 
of Western-style modernization and the liberal economic-social model. It 
rejects excessive state intervention in the economy, and it does not oppose 
elements of globalization that influence the perception of market players 
(style, taste, outlook, a consumption-oriented approach).
The enterprises left out of the aristocratic “white-Turkish” TÜSIAD 
established several organizations to represent their interests in the begin-
ning of the 1990s.
MÜSIAD is the short version of Mustakil iş adanleri derneği, that is the 
Association of Independent Businessmen, but many suspect that Muslim 
rather than Mustakil (independent) is the concept behind the name. Indeed, 
the association is fundamentally based on Islamic values, and the relation-
ship of trust is quite strong among member enterprises, which together 
form a network within the Turkish economy. It is also because of the strong 
bonds among members that MÜSIAD questions the former leading role of 
TÜSIAD in the Turkish corporate sector in contemporary Turkey.
The strongest institution in the economic heartland of Islamists is 
MÜSIAD (Özcan and Turunç 2011). MÜSIAD is a good example of the 
compatibility of modern Western economic rationality with the values of 
Islam and the harmonic coexistence of free market capitalism and Muslim 
identity. Its goal is not only economic but, in a wider sense, social and also 
moral: economic and technological progress also has to be accompanied 
by advancement in a spiritual sense, since both Western-type capitalism 
and Kemalist modernization have neglected this side of progress. It builds 
on the values of Islam, and thus, trust, solidarity, and the prioritization 
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of community interest over personal interest are fundamental (Lorasdaği 
2010). MÜSIAD also supports the EU accession of Turkey, primarily on 
economic grounds. It values the positive effects of globalization, like eco-
nomic openness and better foreign trade opportunities, because they pro-
vide a basis for the development of Muslim economic players. Business 
enterprises based on Islamic foundations are very active in the Balkans and 
in Central Asia (Losdaği 2010).
The Muslim capitalism represented by MÜSIAD is therefore different 
from the liberal capitalist concept of TÜSIAD. The basic interests of the 
two economic interest groups are, however, the same: a stable government, 
EU membership, and good relations with their main market: the West. Such 
similar business interests override the differences between the two groups.
Public Procurement and Crony Capitalism
Public procurements, or government purchase, comprise substantial shares 
of a government’s expenditures, and this is the activity in which the state 
and private sector interact most intensively. Thus, the regulation and prac-
tice of public procurements effectively mirrors state involvement in eco-
nomic interactions. Public procurement may be a policy device to support 
small and medium enterprises, but it is also a powerful tool to build up and 
finance clients. In Turkey, a new Procurement Law was enacted in January 
2003; it was primarily based on international standards of transparency, 
accountability, and competitiveness set by the UN and agreed upon by 
the EU. While the AKP government initially supported the regulation, the 
business groups behind AKP opposed the new law. They wanted previous 
unjust practices to continue because they were now the privileged clientele 
(Gürakar 2016, 5). Consequently, the government gradually changed the 
procurement law, exempting several public institutions from the law, and 
introducing a “restricted procedure” instead of open tenders.9 Public pro-
curement, thus, became an influential tool to both promote the electoral 
success of AKP and build up its own loyal elite.
Corruption has been a widespread phenomenon in Turkey and con-
tinues to be a major problem in the country. Some rents were allocated 
to the construction industry: an extensive number of permits to contrac-
9  While in 2005, 71 percent of procedures were open auctions, in 2014, only half 
of them were (Gürakar 2016, 6).
Szanyi - 00 könyv.indb   313 2019.11.15.   9:32
314 TAMÁS SzIGETVÁRI
tors with strong political ties turned Turkey to a construction site10 (Kentel 
2016, 140). According to a new regulation adopted in 2012, any buildings 
that did not pass the state’s inspection with respect to earthquake safety 
standards would be subject to “emergency nationalization” and redevelop-
ment through government tenders. A new government-enabled real estate 
market was born, and hundreds of urban renewal projects have been initi-
ated through the implementation of these laws (El-Kazaz 2015, 6). The 
new policy was not without contradictions: in December 2013, many 
officials from the Housing Development Administration (TOKI), and 
high-level figures related to a number of important government ministers 
were detained for illegal construction permits they had given to firms in 
exchange for bribes11 (Ulusoy 2014, 2).
Competitiveness and Developmental State
The program followed by AKP made economic growth and restructuring 
top political priorities. This also entailed the improvement of the invest-
ment environment. New Turkish politics were, therefore, highly oriented 
to promoting competitiveness.
Ünay (2012) examines the 2002–2012 period of Turkish develop-
ment based on the theory of the “competition state.”12 Its elements are: 
1. neoliberal monetarism instead of expansionism with inflation; 2. micro- 
instead of macro-economic governance; 3. setting strategic goals instead of 
resorting to extensive intervention; 4. innovation and profitability instead 
of well-being maximization; and 5. economic diplomacy and market share 
instead of geo-strategy and national security.
After the early 2000s, the “post-Washington” competitiveness factors 
gained strength in Turkey. The reforms of the 1980s were unsuccessful 
because of hasty financial liberalization and the lack of fiscal discipline. 
Özal’s reforms were frequently based on direct governmental interventions 
that circumvented the legislature, and this had negative repercussions on 
10  It also explains the 2013 Gazi Park protest against the “neoliberal arrogance” of 
the government (Kentel 2016, 148).
11  Erdoğan accused Islamic community leader Fetullah Gülen of being behind the 
investigation and began a revenge campaign targeting followers of the Gülen 
community.
12  The theory of the “competition state” primarily refers to the work of Cerny 
(2008; 2010).
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fiscal discipline. For the sake of growth, he also found monetary easing 
acceptable, but the high rate of inflation greatly impaired growth potential 
in the long term. Starting in the second half of the 1990s, the dual external 
pressure (EU, IMF) forced the adoption of several institutional reforms 
in Turkey that resulted in the independence of the central bank and the 
strengthening of bank and competition supervision.
Micro-economic interventions are the most impressive in the fields of 
regulation, industrial policy, and employment policy. Especially in these 
early days, the specific vision for industrial policy was also missing, and 
besides external pressure (from the EU, IMF, and WTO) and because of 
it, economic subventions were typically applied in a  sector-neutral way 
based on horizontal politics. According to Unay (2012), setting a target for 
industrial development strategy is still quite nascent even today, although 
recently there have been some shifts in this regard (see below).
Instead of (or rather in addition to) the populist, national well-being 
maximization program and policy (full employment, provision of wide-
spread public services), the promotion of an entrepreneurial culture and 
innovation may be considered the economic goals of Turkey today. In 
previous years, despite the active role of the state, a European-style wel-
fare state was not established; it may rather be defined as a minimalist and 
direct social system based on payments by employers and employees, with 
very low contributions from the state (Özdemir and Yücesan-Özdemir 
2008, 470). The increasing deficit of the system (mainly the pension 
system), however, was increasingly becoming a serious problem,13 and the 
crises of the 1990s kept the necessity for systemic reform continuously on 
the agenda. Social security reform by AKP reflected the neoliberal/conser-
vative orientation of the party and the expectations of the external players 
(the EU and IMF): instead of state involvement, they were based on the 
strengthening of self-care and the introduction of market-based systems 
(e.g., a  funded pension system). After coming into power, AKP tried to 
follow the post-Washington consensus, which tried to simultaneously 
satisfy the demands of the business sector and the needs of the broader 
society. According to Öniş (2011), however, on the whole, business pri-
orities prevailed over social aspects in Turkey. In addition, on the basis 
of its own ideological beliefs based on the Islam, AKP reinforces a social 
policy based on traditional social structures (family orientation; husband as 
13  The annual deficit of the system amounted to 5–6 percent of GDP, which had 
to be supplemented by the central budget.
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breadwinner) (Grütjen 2008, 112). Furthermore, in addition to direct state 
intervention, the role of religious caritative organizations (also supported 
by the state) strengthened.
Compared to the past, the challenges of globalization and preparations 
for the EU accession process have brought a change in foreign policy. Tur-
key’s new position after the end of the Cold War also contributed to these 
changes: while previously Turkey used to be peripheral to the Western alli-
ance, in the new geopolitical structure, it has gained regional power posi-
tions in the Balkans, Caucasus, the Middle East, and Central Asia. It was 
clear that the economy and trade were given more weight when setting pri-
orities (Turkey as a “trading state”), although at the same time, the revalu-
ation of regional geopolitics was also becoming increasingly important. In 
the case of AKP, globalization and nationalism are not mutually exclusive; 
rather the ruling party promotes and enforces national interests in global 
relations (Öniş 2012). 
Despite quick growth after the crisis in 2001, the international com-
petitiveness of Turkey still lags behind expectations. After the integration 
of China and India into world economy, the strategy of increasing competi-
tiveness through its cheap workforce could not remain the key to Turkey’s 
economic success. To increase competitiveness, effective market mecha-
nisms, an attractive investment environment, and institutional structures 
need to be created.
In the period following World War II, many countries managed to 
advance to the category of middle-income countries relatively quickly. But 
in the end, only a few of them became high-income economies. Typically, 
the initial phase of swift growth was followed by a  sudden deceleration 
of growth and production; this phenomenon is referred to as the “middle 
income trap” in the literature.14
Turkey is well aware of this threat. As the Turkish minister of finance, 
Mehmet Şimşek, emphasized in his article published in the Wall Street 
Journal (2014), Turkey, despite its quick progress, faces several challenges, 
and there are many things to do if the country wants to break from the 
group of middle-income countries. In order to succeed, it needs an appro-
priate economic policy, additional structural reforms, and a  supportive 
international economic environment. The most important priorities of 
14  According to the estimates of the World Bank, out of 101 middle-income coun-
tries (data from 1960), only thirteen became high-income countries by 2008 
(Agénor, Canuto, and Jelenic 2012).
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Turkish reforms are improving the quality of the workforce by improving 
the quality of education; enhancing labor market flexibility; and improving 
productivity through technological development. 
Accordingly, Turkey intends to implement a  strategy based on the 
strengthening of sectors and factors that are in part trendy, and in part 
necessary for progress. By 2023, the centennial of the establishment of the 
Turkish Republic, the country intends to become one of the ten largest 
economies in the world with a GDP of two trillion dollars (this means 
a GDP of $25,000 per capita), and it wants to increase employment by ten 
percentage points and increase the value of exports to $500 billion through 
the manufacture and export of automobiles, airplanes and satellites. 
In terms of specific plans, according to the long-term vision of the 
Document on Turkish Industrial Strategy, Turkey has to become the 
center of Eurasia in terms of the production of main high-tech products.15 
Additionally, the general goal of the strategy is the following: “Increasing 
the competitiveness and efficiency of the Turkish industry, restruc-
turing the industry in a direction that facilitates for Turkey that its share 
be increased within World export where Turkish export mainly consists 
of high-tech products and products with high added value, to have well-
trained workforce, while it is sensitive to environmental and social chal-
lenges” (Ministry of Industry and Trade 2010, 49). Among the strategic 
goals are increasing the weight of enterprises and high-tech industries and 
introducing products with high added values in low-tech fields.
The strategy named eight fields of industry: the amelioration of the 
investment and business environment, international trade and human 
resources, the expansion of the financial opportunities of small and medium 
enterprises, the technological development of enterprises, and infrastructural 
sectors including telecommunications, energy, transportation, environmental 
protection, and regional development. Priority sectors are the car industry, 
machinery manufacturing, household products, electronics, the textile 
industry and clothing, the food industry, and the iron and steel industry.
According to Yilmaz (2011), only a selective industrial policy that sup-
ports specific sectors can be successful. This is the basis of the economic 
success of Japan, South Korea, and Brazil, and developed countries have 
also applied this strategy; it is also, once again, becoming popular and 
accepted. The non-selective (neutral) policies that are promoted by neolib-
eral economic policy are ineffective according to Yilmaz. Strong economic 
15  According to the Ministry of Industry and Trade (2010).
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foundations (macro-stability, markets operating properly) do not neces-
sarily lead to the transformation of the economic structure; for industrial 
development, appropriate and supportive industrial policy is also a must. 
This is affirmed by Rodrik (2007, 23), although he puts his emphasis not 
on a traditional, selective industrial policy based on direct state subsidies 
but rather on the participation of a state that actively fosters the process of 
industrialization.
As Akan (2018, 164) points out, the AKP government began to trans-
form the country’s dependent institutional and industrial structures by 
launching the entrepreneurial state paradigm and focusing on industrial 
transformation programs. It partly failed in large part due to imperfections 
in the systemic functioning of the Turkish developmental regime.
A Security-Based Approach and Its Economic Consequences
In recent years, there have been substantial changes to the international 
environment of Turkey, which have given rise to the need reset foreign 
policy and partly internal policy priorities. The Arab Uprisings in 2011, 
followed by the civil war in Syria, and the strengthening of ISIS and 
Syrian Kurdish forces have produced unprecedented security challenges 
for Turkey (Keyman 2017, 59). In a more instable and insecure region, 
Turkey had to confront existential threats to its national security. The de-
securitization of the Kurdish issue initiated by AKP in 2009 was quickly 
reversed (Noi 2016, 71). In Turkish foreign policy, this meant a shift away 
from a  multi-layered, multi-actor, multi-dimensional, and soft power 
approach toward a  more focused, selective, globally limited, and hard 
power policy orientation (Keyman 2017, 62).
In internal politics, corruption allegations against Erdoğan’s circle in 
December 2013 were an important turning point for the regime. The gov-
ernment accused the Gülen (or Hizmet) Movement of creating a “parallel 
state” with increasing influence in state institutions, especially the police 
and judiciary (Noi 2016, 68). The coup d’état in July 2016 marked a new 
period in Turkey’s political history. The Turkish government blamed the 
failed coup attempt on Fethullah Gülen and his followers. A state of emer-
gency was declared, and the government started a systematic purge of state 
and media institutions. Currently, there are over ten thousand people in 
detention and allegations circulating about their ill-treatment in custody.
An economic consequence of the political changes has been AKP’s 
shift toward security-oriented decision-making and away from their 
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decade-long prioritization of the economy. The idea of a trading and com-
petition state has started to fade.
The state of emergency has a clear, negative effect on business inter-
ests. The Europeanization process that defined the early 2000s helped pro-
mote the de-securitization of Turkish domestic policy, and it contributed 
to the economic successes of the country. A return to the democratization 
process is vital for the economic well-being of Turkey. The rule of law and 
strong commitment to democracy stands at the core of a predictable and 
favorable business environment (Noi 2016, 73).
Though the yearly growth rate of the GDP has remained high (7.4 per-
cent in 2017), the fragility of the Turkish economy and the weaknesses of 
neoliberal economic reforms became increasingly visible. Turkey’s “eco-
nomic miracle” during the previous decade was partly based on revenue 
acquired through the privatization of public assets (Balkan, Balkan, and 
Öncü 2015, 3). Growing domestic demand was fueled by consumption 
and investments. However, in terms of investments, these flowed less to 
the manufacturing sector, and more to the less productive construction and 
housing sectors. The country’s current account deficit has widened to 5.5 
percent of GDP (2017), and its economic growth is largely dependent on 
access to new loans, that is, new capital inflows. Current political develop-
ments in Turkey and the unpredictable business environment have substan-
tially heightened the uncertainty for many foreign investors.16 Furthermore, 
the government’s (and especially Erdoğan’s) intention to exert pressure on 
the Central Bank to prevent a rise in interest rates (despite international 
and domestic conditions) has created even greater risks for foreign capital.
Despite hopeful structural reforms in the country, Turkish macroeco-
nomic conditions have become increasingly worrying: with its current mas-
sive deficit, weakening currency, and double-digit inflation rates, Turkey 
has become one of most fragile economies in the world.
Conclusion
Modern Turkey is changing, and the role of state has also changed sub-
stantially in the last decades. Kemalist modernization was characterized by 
an etatist, state-led reform process with large-scale state involvement in the 
16  These concerns are especially important in case of Germany, one of Turkey’s 
most important foreign investors (Szabó 2018, 8).
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economy. Most of the important industrial firms were state-owned, while 
private enterprises were highly dependent on the support of the state. With 
the neoliberal economic opening of Turkey starting in the 1980s, the Ana-
tolian tigers, a relatively small but competitive group of enterprises emerged, 
which were able to prosper without state subsidies in the new liberal eco-
nomic conditions. These firms had strong ties to the socially conservative, 
Muslim middle-classes.
After the millennium, the electoral win of the AKP brought an 
Islamist party to power. Despite initial skepticism, the new government 
pursued successful economic reforms, and it has also continued the Euro-
peanization process. The new regime made attempts to harmonize tradi-
tional Islamic values and neoliberal-type responses to the challenges of 
globalization, and it was able to execute neoliberal reforms with relatively 
strong support from the broader Turkish society. However, similar to many 
other developing countries, the reforms in Turkey have also been executed 
in the spirit of the post-Washington consensus, marked by a changing, but 
not necessarily decreasing, role for the state in the economy.
The Turkish state withdrew completely from several industries that 
had been previously dominated by state-owned companies and reduced its 
presence in others. The erosion of state capitalism, however, entailed the 
strengthening of oligarchic capitalism. A special relationship with polit-
ical-economic decision makers is still an important part of business life 
that results in the strengthening of traditionally strong political patronage 
networks. Liberalization, therefore, did not result in a  liberal market 
economy.
Regarding the future role to be played by the state, policies aimed 
at the improvement of competitiveness are clear priorities that require the 
state to formulate an active industrial and technological policy. Though the 
AKP governments have experience launching the entrepreneurial state par-
adigm and in focusing on industrial transformation programs, the results 
are still not convincing. Moreover, the shift of government policy from an 
economy-oriented to a security-oriented approach in recent years has sub-
stantially worsened the chances of the continuation of successful (or even 
EU-compatible) political and economic reforms in Turkey.
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CHAPTER 13
Strong State Influence in the Brazilian 
Economy: Continuity or Change?
Judit ricz
Introduction
The paper analyzes the changing role of the state in the Brazilian economy 
and its development. We argue that the Brazilian case is a useful example 
of how state influence in the economy has changed over the last three 
decades. Brazil, like most Latin American countries, has a  long history 
of state capitalism, best described as “hierarchical market economies” 
(Schneider 2013) and “state-permeated market economies” (Nölke et al. 
2015) that differ substantially from other more advanced countries (mostly 
analyzed in the Varieties of Capitalism scholarship and throughout this 
volume). While the emergence of the state-owned sector in Brazil has fol-
lowed a similar path as in most countries around the world,1 looking at 
the overarching, complex nature and persistence of state influence, Brazil 
substantially differs from the experiences and practices of more advanced 
countries. This makes Brazil a “good laboratory to study SOEs” (Musac-
chio and Lazzarini 2014a, 1). 
Throughout this paper we argue, that despite decades of liberaliza-
tion and privatization, the state continues to play an important role in the 
Brazilian economy, and this can be illustrated by the strategy of national 
champions, the activities of the BNDES, the National Development 
Bank, and the interventionist style of the Rousseff government in the years 
leading up to 2016. After the millennium, new developmentalist (neode-
1  After World War II, governments owned and operated oil, gas, electric, water, 
and telecommunications companies, as well as railways, shipping companies, and 
businesses in other sectors of the economy (mainly related to extraction of natu-
ral resources or infrastructure).
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sarrollista) tendencies have emerged throughout Latin America, especially 
in Brazil, where this approach to macro-economic and social policies was 
brand new. However, looking at complementary micro-economic reforms, 
and especially industrial policies and development financing, continuities 
with the old developmentalist model prevailed. Thus, we argue that the 
overall picture (and economic structure) is still dominated by institutional 
and political continuities with old developmentalist practices and the old 
developmental state paradigm in Brazil.
The biggest South American economy (as most other emerging econ-
omies) differs from other mainstream examples of the more developed 
world, as state influence was already strong (albeit altering and taking dif-
ferent forms) before the recent crisis in 2007–2009 and more importantly 
the global financial crisis (GFC) has not provoked large changes in this 
regard (at least not immediately). The direct effects of the crisis were rel-
atively mild in the Brazilian economy. After the immediate sigh of relief 
and outstanding economic growth results in 2010, the profoundly changed 
external context (with lower global economic growth rates, especially slower 
growth in China—the major trading partner of Brazil; lower commodity 
prices; higher interest rates and worsening credit ratings), and the also 
altered domestic political context, have resulted in significant changes, and 
led to an economic crisis (with important social and political dimensions), 
thus by 2016 Brazil has arrived to a new crossroad in both economic and 
political terms. 
The state has played a  substantial and far-reaching role in modern 
economic development in Brazil, and economic literature on the old 
and new developmental state (its achievements and failures) is exten-
sive.2 A good illustration of the over-sized state in Brazil is provided by 
Winiecki (2016, 184–91), by highlighting the size of taxation and public 
expenditure, as well as the intrusive regulatory environment, both of which 
impede economic growth and productivity on the longer term, We, how-
2  The recent article of Amado and Rollemberg Mollo (2015) provides a good over-
view on developmentalist thinking in Brazil, while the “classic” literature on new 
developmentalism in Brazil is mostly linked to Bresser Pereira’s (2006, 2011, 
2012) work. On the new DS is Brazil see Wylde (2012), Massi (2014), Ricz 
(2016), Schneider (2015).
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ever, do not aim to reveal the complexity of state influence3 in the Bra-
zilian economy, as it would be a “mission impossible” within the frame-
work of this paper. We aim to concentrate on the SOEs sector and argue, 
that changes within this sector illustrate well main trends in the changing 
role of state in the Brazilian economy. Our preliminary hypothesis runs 
as follows: state influence in Brazil has changed its forms and channels, 
but (though some ups and downs) remained relatively strong (com-
pared to other capitalist countries) over the decades before and after the 
millennium. 
The paper is in four parts: after this short introduction, a historical 
overview is provided to present the emergence and the fall of the state as 
entrepreneur model in Brazil. The third part is devoted to the processes 
since the millennium, more concretely to the emergence of new develop-
mentalism á la Brazil and its dismantling. Finally, we conclude.
Historical Overview of the Emergence and Fall of State as Entrepreneur 
Model in Brazil
During the twentieth century state ownership took different forms in Brazil 
(Table 1). Though certain cyclicality can be revealed, we argue, that the 
role of the state in economy has been relatively strong throughout the 
examined period. During the time of market-oriented (neoliberal) reforms 
direct state-ownership and direct state interventions have been on the 
retreat, but indirectly (in different, often new and innovative forms and 
channels) the state has in several cases and areas maintained its influence 
over the economy (with Kerstenetzky [2014, 174] words “state-led gover-
nance by the market”). After the Millennium even this restricted neolib-
eralism has been reversed and a new wave of developmentalism emerged. 
Since 2016 a new turnaround change is going on in Brazilian economic 
policies and the aim to cut back the role of state in development has been 
put on the top of the development agenda.
3  During the last century (or at the latest since 1940) the state has played a very 
multifaceted role in economic development in Brazil. Besides state ownership this 
influence took forms of tariff protection, subsidized credit, government contracts, 
research support, just to name a few direct means, while other more indirect 
forms and political influences were also widespread.
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Table 1 
Historical overview of the role of state in Brazilian economy
Features of state ownership Examples
1880s–1930s State as accidental owner Railways, shipping, banking
1930s–1980s State as entrepreneur
Energy production, mining, petroleum extraction, 
railway, utilities, tele-communications
1980s–1990s Fall of state as entrepreneur Privatization waves (see Table 2)
2000–2016
State as majority or minority 
investor, other (indirect) forms of 
state influence
State ownership in strategic sectors, role of 
BNDES, strategy of national champions and 
internationalization of Brazilian enterprises
2016– State on the retreat
New privatization wave, freezing federal 
government spending for twenty years
Source: own constructions based partially on Musacchio and Lazzarini (2014)
THE STATE AS ACCIDENTAL OWNER
Though first Brazilian SOEs were founded in the imperial period (such as 
the Bank of Brazil (BB) in 1808 and the Caixa Econômica Federal (Caixa) 
in 1861), between 1880 and 1930 the state owned enterprises emerged 
mostly as a consequence of bailouts. Early infrastructural projects (already 
in the second half of the nineteenth century) were mostly undertaken by 
commercial enterprises (railways, banks and shipping companies). The 
main task of the government by that time was to insure against failure, 
and after a series of bailouts and takeovers the government ended up as 
(residual) owner. State ownership did increase gradually, but rapidly in the 
first half of the twentieth century, but this was at least initially not a con-
scious decision, nor did it follow a specific grand plan (or ideology, at least 
until the 1930s), it happened rather accidentally (Musacchio and Lazzarini 
2014a, 4).
THE STATE AS ENTREPRENEUR
The second stage of state interventionism (1930s–1980s) started after 
World War I  with the explicit aim to use state ownership to overcome 
market failure, coordinate large sectors of the economy and push forward 
the economic development of the country. This golden age of state owner-
ship relates to the import substitution industrialization (ISI) period (also 
called old developmental state). The “state as entrepreneur” model is best 
documented by Trebat (1983), describing a  period, when SOEs were 
completely controlled and run by the state. SOEs served as direct tools 
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to promote a  big push to industrialization and economic development 
of the country, and the state invested directly in sectors in which private 
capital had no interest in or lacked the financial capacity (in line with the 
argumentation of the industrial policy view). Sometimes of course other, 
mainly social aims led the state to step in, for example to directly control 
supply or prices of public utilities (in line with the social view of SOEs). 
The creation (or takeover) of many SOEs dates back to the presiden-
cies (both authoritarian and democratic) of Getúlio Vargas and the estab-
lishment of the “Estado Novo,” and took place mainly in sectors that were 
considered strategic for economic development or for national security rea-
sons4. In this first period of ISI, the Brazilian state focused mainly on devel-
oping basic infrastructure and providing basic inputs for the industrializa-
tion, but did not dominate the whole economy. In line with the industrial 
policy view, the state played key role in sectors considered as being crucial 
for industrialization (and for economic development), such as mining, met-
allurgy and steel, public utilities and petroleum, but even in these, state 
ownership was at around 70 percent (Trebat 1983). Meanwhile in other 
sectors of the economy the private sector remained the dominant player. 
The next wave for the expansion of the SOE sector dates to the 
military regime from the 1960s to the mid of the 1980s, and was mainly 
related to sectors such as transport and telecommunication5. The number 
of SOEs exploded during the presidency of Geisel (1974–79), who was 
a strong supporter of the ISI model and allowed foreign participation only 
when it was unavoidable to obtain the foreign technology.
According to Trebat (1983, 15) by 1975, the public sector was 
responsible for 17 percent of the total gross capital formation in the 
country (equalling to 4,3 percent of GDP), with around 25 percent of 
4  For example the National Steel Company (CSN) in 1941, the famous iron ore 
mining firm Vale do Rio Doce Company (Vale) in 1942, the manufacturer of 
buses, trucks and cars, called Fábrica Nacional de Motores (FNM) founded 
in 1943, the Brazilian national bank of economic development BNDE in 1952 
(BNDE in Portuguese, later changed to BNDES when “social development” was 
added to its mission in 1982; for the sake of simplicity we use the current name, 
BNDES throughout this paper), and the national oil company Petrobrás in 1953, 
to mention just the largest ones.
5  For example Embraer (aircraft manufacturer) was launched actually in 1969 but 
based on the results from previous state-led investments in aeronautical engineer-
ing and military technology. Other example of this period could be: Embratel 
(telephone), Correios (mail), and Radiobrás (radio, TV, and other telecommuni-
cations) or Embrapa (the National Agricultural Research Company). 
Szanyi - 00 könyv.indb   329 2019.11.15.   9:32
330 JUDIT RICz
those investments coming from large SOEs (and this ratio prevailed 
roughly until the end of 1990s). The (end of) 1960s and 1970s is often 
called in economic literature the heyday of state capitalism in Brazil. The 
expansion of the state-owned sector was not only underlined ideologically, 
but it was accompanied with very high GDP growth (especially during the 
years between 1967–73, the so-called economic miracle period in Brazil 
with economic growth rates above 10 percent on annual average). Part of 
this growth could be explained with the structural transformation of the 
economy (masses of labour relocating from agriculture to manufacturing), 
but rapid capital accumulation has also played a key role. 
To sum up we can see that state ownership was mainly related to 
the state induced process of industrialization in Brazil, and large public 
investments were made initially in energy production, mining, petroleum 
extraction, while later also in infrastructure (railway and utilities) and 
telecommunications. However, we can note that by the end of the 1960s 
mechanisms to support domestic private entrepreneurs through subsidized 
credit (for example through BNDES) already existed in Brazil,6 so there 
would have been alternatives of state ownership to promote and coordinate 
investments in risky or strategic sectors of the economy. Nevertheless, the 
extensive state ownership was needed to serve multiple (mainly economic, 
social and political) objectives of the government, like guaranteeing suf-
ficient coverage, directly influencing prices, or even capturing expected 
profits. In line with the ISI model the political desire to avoid foreign con-
trol of “strategic assets” was also a key motivation. 
During this period the creation of SOEs, and the explosion of their 
number was neither a planned phenomenon, nor a pure ideological answer, 
rather an uncoordinated process and according to Pinheiro (2011, 254–55) 
mainly resulting from the following, different processes: developmentalism 
(steel and highways); concerns for “national security” (mining and oil); 
regulatory failures (communication, electricity and railways); vertical-
ization and diversification of activities of large SOEs (occupying “empty 
spaces”) and nationalization of bankrupt companies (hotels, sugar mills, 
publishing companies, etc.). 
This uncoordinated growth of the state sector was accompanied by 
poor monitoring and control over the actions of SOEs. In 1967 govern-
6  On the role of the national development bank (BNDES) in (mainly long term) 
financing of private companies see Massi, 2014, Pinto and Reis 2017 and Cav-
alcante 2018. 
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ment decentralized the control of SOEs among different ministries (with 
the aim to improve execution), resulting that the government had lost all 
control on the number of SOEs and the kind of subsidiaries each of these 
firms had. To end this chaotic situation an explicit plan to count and con-
trol federal SOEs began in 1979 with the creation of the Secretary for SOE 
control (called SEST). Above the ministries three agencies7 were in charge 
to coordinate actions of SOEs, however according to Musacchio and Laz-
zarini (2014a, 12) in practice SOEs responded to their ministries, which in 
line with the political (institutional) view, were obsessed with growth of the 
firms, or with Trebat’s (1983, 52) words with “empire building” (thus pre-
ferred to have larger firms with more jobs than concentrating on efficiency 
or profitability)—a story well-known from the experiences of East Asian 
developmental states.
As a result of the old developmentalist model (from 1930–1980/85) 
by the end of the 1980s state influence over the economy was widespread 
in Brazil: the state has owned (or was minority shareholder in) a  large 
number of companies; it had monopoly rights in many industries and large 
companies in “strategic sectors” such as oil, gas, steel, petrochemical, 
mining and defense sectors. 
THE FALL OF STATE AS ENTREPRENEUR MODEL
The ISI development model, and its intrinsic characteristic, the expansion 
of SOE sector was (at least partly) made possible by favorable external 
context, mainly based on cheap credit available in the 1960s and early 
1970s on the world financial markets. This external context has changed 
profoundly and the second oil shock in 1979, or at the latest the unfolding 
debt crisis in 1982 have marked the end of an era.8
7  The Council for Economic Development, the Council for Social Development 
and the Ministry of Planning.
8  The end of the “harmonious coexistence between private and state capital,” as 
Castelar Pinheiro (2011, 256) has put it, was already conceived in 1974 when 
businessmen and the political opposition started a “campaign against nationaliza-
tion” and against excessive state participation in the economy, in some instances 
comparing even the Brazilian style of state-led capitalism to state influence under 
the communist regimes. Still, it has to be added that main dissatisfaction of the 
business sphere by that time, was their exclusion from decision-making forums, 
like the CDE (Economic Development Council, Conselho de Desenvolvimento 
Econômico) from 1974 onwards.
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Brazilian SOEs during the ISI tended to finance their current expendi-
tures with foreign debt, in the early 1980s however with depreciating cur-
rency (and simultaneously rising inflation) and rising global interest rates 
most SOEs have experienced sharp increases in their financial expendi-
tures. At the same time governments pushed to use these SOEs for social 
purposes, so as to secure lower prices and lower unemployment. These 
two main trends have led to quickly deteriorating financial situation of the 
SOEs, and finally to a dramatic fall in gross capital formation. Even though 
these worsening conditions and in line with the social view of SOEs, 
employment was increased in most state-owned companies (to artificially 
press down unemployment) after the crisis, when comparable private firms 
downsized their employee base (Musacchio and Lazzarini 2014a, 18). 
According to the political view poor performance of SOEs can (besides the 
above mentioned trends) also be explained by the dynamics of patronage, 
the use of SOEs positions to compensate political allies, cronies and to 
build coalitions. Though this practice has been traditionally present in Bra-
zilian politics, Musacchio and Lazzarini (2014b) find no negative effect of 
having a political CEO on the performance of the SOE, however they did 
not analyze lower level managers, where the practice of hiring politicians 
has been also widespread. 
To put it short, with the deterioration of external (global) and internal 
(domestic) conditions it became more and more difficult to financially 
sustain the multiplicity of (social and political) objectives aimed to pursue 
via the SOEs, conflicting with profitability, and finally the old develop-
ment model (and with it the state as entrepreneur model) collapsed. The 
upcoming decades (mainly the 1990s) were dominated by the adoption of 
liberal policies, liberalization and deregulation of markets and privatization 
of SOEs. These policies were in line with the Washington Consensus (as 
well as the conditions posed by the international financial institutions, in 
particular the International Monetary Fund) and followed the main trends 
of other countries around the world.
During the years and decades after the debt crisis, most economic 
policy interventions aimed at economic stabilization: chronic fiscal imbal-
ances and hyperinflation were the two main challenges. High inflation 
was an inherent feature of the Brazilian economy. Lasting operation of the 
economy under high and persistent inflation was made possible by institu-
tional solutions (indexation mechanism), however counterproductive ones 
(Burlamaqui et al. 2006, 13). Accelerating inflation threatened to destroy 
the economy, while social unrest has risen and endangered political sta-
bility. Between 1985 and 1994 the Brazilian economy was subject to six 
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heterodox stabilization plans9. The common element of all these plans was 
the use of price controls and currency reform to abruptly reduce inertial 
inflation to one-digit levels. After all the way towards less state intervention 
and more market-friendly economic policies was paved.
This is the main context in which the process of privatization has to 
be understood in Brazil. Thus Cardoso’s main privatization strategy 
aimed not only at transferring state assets to the private sector, but also 
at breaking up with state monopolies and opening of many industries to 
domestic and foreign private capital (Massi 2014, 186).
Table 2 
Waves of the Brazilian privatization process
Period Political administration Main features
1980s Figueiredo, Sarney small in scope and scale, BNDESPAR reorganization
1990–1995 Collor de Mello, Franco incl. SOEs in productive and strategic sectors
1995–2002 Cardoso incl. SOEs in services and infrastructure
2012– Rousseff, Temer, Bolsonaro
mainly infrastructure (transport, energy, mining and 
sanitation)
Although the first wave of privatization is mostly associated with Collor de 
Mello and Cardoso, the idea of privatization dates back to the late 1970s. 
Already by the end of 1970s there were some worries of the huge size of 
the (uncontrolled) SOEs sectors, and even plans of “coordinated priva-
tization” existed (as that of Marcos Vianna, the President of BNDES).10 
Though these were not implemented, with the words of Musacchio and 
Lazzarini (2014a, 14) these, have “set the stage for the privatization pro-
cess and the subsequent model of state investment in which Leviathan 
is a  minority investor and in which BNDES became a  central actor as 
a lender and shareholder.” 
Under the Presidency of Figueiredo in 1979 the first national plan to 
privatize state-owned companies that were not essential for national secu-
rity was announced, and the first wave of privatization started in 1981. 
Though the Special Committee on Privatization identified 140 SOEs suit-
able for privatization, out of these 50 were listed for sale and only 20 was 
9  The Cruzado plan of 1986; the Bresser plan of 1987; the “Summer” plan of 
1989; the Collor I plan of 1990 and the Collor II plan of 1991; and the Real 
plan of 1994.
10  See Massi (2014, 186–87).
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sold, one rented and 8 were incorporated into other public institutions or 
enterprises. This first privatization (1981-84) phase did not include any of 
the large SOEs, and total revenues reached only 190 million USD (Pin-
heiro, 2011:259).
The unfolding debt crisis has pushed forward the privatization agenda: 
the crisis was increasingly associated with the huge size and inefficiency 
of SOEs or at least the perceptions regarding these. Some restrictions 
were put in place in 1985 to curb the growth of the public sector. How-
ever main former principles of privatization were maintained during the 
Sarney administration (1985-1990): foreign capital participation remained 
excluded and privatization remained subordinated to the national secu-
rity and to nationalist-statist principles (thus large SOEs vital for national 
security and infrastructure or in sectors where the state hold monopoly 
was excluded). Two main lines of change can still be revealed: first, some 
institutional changes were put in place (Inter-ministerial Council on Priva-
tization, and some transparency, evaluation and auditing measures were 
introduced) and second, a new legal structure for privatization was intro-
duced in 1988. Previous concerns related to national security and market 
reserves for domestic enterprises were side-lined, and new instruments, 
such as concessions to private capital to provide public and infrastructure 
services and others to break up with the monopoly rights of large state-
owned enterprises, were introduced. Fiscal motives also came in to play 
a role: privatization became an instrument to reduce public debt. 
Despite all these changes, privatization under the Sarney administra-
tion remained small in its scope and scale.11 As most commentators (Pin-
heiro 2000, 11; Massi 2014, 189) highlight privatization between 1985 
and 1990 in fact was the financial reorganization of the BNDESPAR, the 
investment subsidiary of BNDES, and was mostly limited to small and 
medium enterprises. Still there were few exceptions to this, and the priva-
tization of a few large and important industrial firms12 has set precedents 
for the future. 
Pinheiro (2011, 260) has highlighted three special circumstances 
that have contributed to the fact, that first wave of the Brazilian privati-
zation remained small in scope and scale: 1. SOEs still showed relatively 
11  The World Bank (1989) has even concluded that the first wave of privatiza-
tion in Brazil was a „classic example of failure” (cited in Castelar Pinheiro, 
2011:260).
12  Including the largest producer of ferro-alloy (Sibra) and the only electrolytic 
copper producer (Caraibas Metais).
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good operation performance; 2. the argument of national security was 
still widely accepted in Brazil; 3. privatization was mainly seen as a pro-
cess of denationalization and the increased presence of foreign investors 
was considered to be against the national interest. As an additional aspect 
Schneider (1988–89, 1990) emphasizes political reasons resulting in 
restricted privatization: as Sarney lacked support base in the Congress, the 
distribution of positions within the state sector (SOEs) was instrumental 
to strengthen his governing capacity. Also, domestic private sector was 
not heavily pushing forward the privatization agenda, while showing sup-
port at least rhetorically for privatization, many of the private companies 
depended on SOEs in their operation and were not in favor for a more 
drastic privatization program. 
Inherent changes during the end of the 1980s have altered however 
the context of privatization in Brazil. First of all, SOEs (mostly incapable 
to generate fiscal surplus or to borrow from abroad) relied in terms of long 
term credits mainly on domestic public funding, for political and legal 
motives (see too-big-to-fail argumentation by classic developmental states) 
were however not enforced to pay up their bills. When due to fiscal prob-
lems public banks by the end of 1980s also ended to finance the activities 
of SOEs, the only viable way remained the privatization of state assets to 
private investors. As a second motive raising support for privatization in 
Brazil in the early 1990s was the deterioration of economic performance 
of SOEs (Pinheiro 2011, 262). During the second half of the 1980s in 
most SOEs management positions were politically appointed mostly for 
short periods and rarely rewarded on the basis of economic performance. 
Lack of management technical skills and economic incentives as well as the 
already mentioned soft budget constraints led to the further losses in terms 
of economic efficiency. At the same time changes in economic model, most 
importantly processes of trade liberalization have made these shortcomings 
even more evident. 
The second wave of privatization, in fact the most important period of 
it in Brazil started in 1990 with the National Privatization Program (PND) 
of Collor de Mello.13 It broke up with the former privatization schemes 
13  To set the context of this second wave of privatization one must however refer 
to the new constitution of 1988, which was rather of a nationalizing charac-
ter, establishing public monopolies in oil and distribution of gas, telecommu-
nications, and constructing barriers to foreign investors in mining and electric-
ity. The results achieved under Collor de Mello (though limited) have to be 
regarded in the light of these constitutional restrictions. 
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in several ways: expanded its scope, addressed SOEs in productive and 
strategic sectors (such as steel, petrochemicals and fertilizers), and linked 
the process to macroeconomic stabilization. The BNDES became a major 
actor, and it was explicitly aimed to depoliticize the process of privatiza-
tion. The failure to stabilize the economy finally led to the failure of the 
overly optimistic PND, and only 16 SOEs were privatized until 1993 
(summing up to revenues at around 3,9 billion USD (BNDES, 2002).
Between 1993 and 1995 despite some changes and the rather develop-
mentalist ambitions of Itamar Franco, the schedule and practices set up by 
the PND were mostly kept in place and 17 additional firms14 were priva-
tized, leading to revenues up to 4,7 billion USD.
With the start of the Cardoso era in 1995 the Brazilian privatization 
reached a new milestone. Fernando Henrique Cardoso (FHC) expanded 
the program and decided to break up with the monopoly rights of SOEs 
in services and infrastructure,15 and also allowed for local governments to 
develop their own privatization programs (that was considered as means 
to raise revenues at local level). In the first three years of the privatization 
under FHC 80 SOEs were sold, with total revenues of 60,1 billion USD in 
receipts and 13,3 billion in debt transfers (Pinheiro 2011, 264).
Reasons leading to rapid expansion of the privatization program were 
manifold ranging from the stabilization of macroeconomic environment, 
through political support in Congress and fiscal motives on federal and 
state level, to demonstration effects of past privatizations—that have led 
to increased firm-level efficiency and investments capacity (Castelar Pin-
heiro, 2011, 264–67). Economic analysts tend to agree, that privatization 
played a crucial role in the whole stabilization process (as revenues were 
used to reduce public debt, and incoming FDI linked to privatization was 
also significant).
By 1995 previous concerns for national security and fears of dena-
tionalizing the economy lost importance in public debates. This change 
in perception and attitude towards privatization can largely be credited to 
the transition from military to civilian rule, the process of democratiza-
tion, but was also supported by changes in the external context (the end of 
the cold war). Even though some protests from unionist and leftist groups 
remained, masses of population were mostly indifferent to the privatization 
14  Including CSN, the National Steel Company created by Vargas back in 1941.
15  The circle of SOEs to sell was widened from industrial firms to incorporate pub-
lic and financial services as well as concessions in transportation, highway, sani-
tation, telecommunications and electricity generation sectors. 
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program and heavy critic and opposition was linked rather to single cases 
and related to the selection criteria of SOEs to sell (considering the sale of 
efficient and profitable firms), the minimum price set for sale (whether it 
was below market value), the impact on the quality of public services and 
the role of BNDES played in the process.
During this main phase of privatization in Brazil the importance of 
improving regulation was also recognized. Emphasis has been put on 
the introduction of competition16 in almost each sector, and the aim to 
strengthen regulation before privatization was present (although with dif-
ferent grades of success and in cases of failure mostly concessional con-
tracts contained important regulatory clauses). The most important 
success story of privatization with regulatory reforms relates to the tele-
communication sector, while in electricity provision the processes were less 
well coordinated and executed, and least progress in regulation and priva-
tization has been achieved in water and sewage services. 
The figures above summarize most striking features of the privati-
zation process in Brazil between 1990 and 2002. With total revenues of 
around 87 billion USD the Brazilian privatization was among the biggest 
ones in the world (BNDES 2002) and meant the transfer of 170 SOEs 
to the private sector. These revenues have helped to reduce public debt 
by an amount approx. equaling to 8 percent of GDP (Carvalho 2001). 
While empirical studies in line with economic literature have proved not 
just country-, but also firm-level gains from privatization (positive effects 
on performance of privatized firms).17
Most authors agree that the privatization in Brazil was in fact a prag-
matic answer to macroeconomic challenges in the 1990s18 and it was tol-
erated by the electorate mainly due to the—correct—perception that it 
contributes to achieve the main developmental objective (by that time): 
macroeconomic stability (and also allows for increased investments). The 
Brazilian privatization was in fact a result of threefold changes (Pinheiro 
2011, 272): 1) changes in politics, as foreign investment was no longer 
considered as a threat to national security; 2) a shift in the focus of devel-
16  Often supported by vertical and horizontal separation of SOEs before privatiza-
tion.
17  Pinheiro, 1996; Anuatti-Neto et al. 2005
18  In contrast to other systemic or tactical initiatives to privatization, where the 
former adjective refers to deep and ample objectives to reshape economic and 
political institutions (like in UK, New zealand, or Chile), and the latter one 
mostly focuses on short term political aims (Castelar Pinheiro 2011, 252). 
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Figure 1 
Accumulated results, annual evolution and sectoral composition of Brazilian privatization 
(1990–2002)
Accumulated Result US$ million
Period Sale Proceeds Transferred Dept Total Results
1990–1994 8,608 3,266 11,874 11.2%
1995–2002 78,614 14,810 93,424 88.8%
Total 87,222 18,076 105,298 100.0%
Annual Evolution
Participation by Sector
Source: Adapted from BNDES 2002
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opment policy away from (forced) capital accumulation towards economic 
efficiency; and last but not least, 3) close linkages between privatization 
and macroeconomic policy. In the case of Brazil, however, this third argu-
ment is considered to be the most important factor. 
Another often emphasized feature in the Brazilian case is, that 
even though twenty years of privatization experience, large masses (and 
even political fractions) in Brazil did not change their ideological views 
regarding the role of state in economy,19 thus the Brazilian privatization 
process has to be considered much more as a pragmatic than as an ideo-
logical process. 
Despite all the facts and numbers of Brazilian privatization, an addi-
tional aspect regarding the role of state or the degree of state influence 
should be added, mainly based on the logic presented by Evans (1995) 
and Schneider (2013): big business and the state has been traditionally 
interconnected in Brazil, and in fact privatization did not change much the 
degree of state influence, it rather changed its channels and forms. The 
best illustration could be the example of Vale, privatized in 1997, but in 
fact remaining under (hidden) state control ever since (via the ownership 
of state pension funds and the BNDES and other less explicit forms of 
state interference). 
Having all these arguments in mind, it should not come as a surprise 
that after a privatization peak in 1997–98 economic policy priority given to 
privatization declined, as fiscal motives became less relevant and foreign 
direct investment (apart from privatization also) increased. A  few years 
later, with economic indicators improving after 2004, the macroeconomic 
(and fiscal) imperative to support the privatization has further weakened, 
and in line with political changes (the turn to the left) the expectations 
towards the swinging back of the pendulum (to an economic model with 
increasing state influence) were curbed high. 
New Developmentalism: New Forms of State Influence Emerging
By late 2002, political rhetoric regarding privatization has been changed to 
negative, as the Working Party (PT, Partido dos Trabalhadores) historically 
opposing the program has won the elections in Brazil.
19  See for example successive public opinion surveys by latinobarometro or Alston 
et al. (2016).
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Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (from now on Lula) took office under 
stormy circumstances in January 2003: the context of external crisis, low 
growth and uncertain domestic political arena all led to speculative attack 
on real, and its devaluation. The first Lula government has had thus first 
to restore the confidence of the markets,20 and continued (in contrast to 
all expectations among his allies as well as opponents) with the macro-
economic policies of his predecessor concentrating on the fight against 
inflation and public indebtedness. With the focus on macroeconomic 
issues, and as a result of more favorable international circumstances (such 
as global economic growth and the reversal of declining terms of trade, 
mainly due to increased Chinese demand towards basic Brazilian export 
products) economic indicators started to improve from 2004.
Lula continued with orthodox, conservative macroeconomic manage-
ment (even after the immediate crisis management and in relative good 
economic times between 2003 and 2007), but at the same time, being 
a left-wing candidate also showed strong commitment to social issues. New 
and innovative social policies (like the often highlighted Bolsa Família Pro-
gram) together with the expansion of the social frontier (hand in hand with 
sound macroeconomic policies) became the trademark of the new eco-
nomic policy model of Brazil.
The third leg of this new economic policy-mix under Lula was made 
up of complementary micro-economic policies, mainly related to the 
Growth and Acceleration Program (PAC)21—a government infrastructural 
investment program—and the revival of industrial policies and with it an 
increased (albeit modified) role of state. 
New industrial policies, though innovative in some aspects,22 main-
tained or revived linkages, in terms of institutions and practices to the old 
20  “Letter to the Brazilian People” (Carta ao pavo brasiliero) issued during the 
electoral campaign in June 2002 and the institutionalization of the promises 
made in this letter by the agreement with IMF meant in practice the continuity 
with Cardoso’s (neoliberal or orthodox) economic policies.
21  The PAC (in original) was launched in 2007 and constitutes to be a cornerstone 
of Lula’s policies to promote economic growth as an umbrella term for a com-
plexity of infrastructural projects in areas such as sanitation, sewage, water, elec-
tricity, road and housing construction. The first phase of the program called for 
346 billion USD, while the second phase (extending from 2011 to 2014) invest-
ments were estimated to reach 526 billion USD.
22  For example, by linking the promotion of industrial production to foreign pol-
icy and export-orientation (see also Almeida and Schneider (2012) and Massi 
(2014). 
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DS model. Continuities can be revealed in its selectivity, concentration 
on a small number of sectors and in fact (and in contrast to all rhetoric) 
mainly leading to preserving the existing industrial sector. Related to this 
issue, one has also to refer to a discontinuity with the Cardoso era in terms 
of state—business relations. While Cardoso tried to insulate economic 
policy decisions from the business sector, Lula in contrast reopened chan-
nels of communication and negotiation and pursued a much more consul-
tative approach (see for example Boschi 2011), but at the same time and in 
the light of the rather “fuzzy” political system (in terms of party and cam-
paign financing rules and practices and the overly fragmented party system 
and Congress) these new “flexible” institutional arrangements often also 
lead to the (re-)politicization of state-business relations. 
To sum up under the Lula administration a  new form of develop-
mentalism23 emerged, representing some degree of continuity with the old 
developmentalist approach, such as building on the old corporativist struc-
tures (although improving and modifying those) and the revival of an “old-
new” industrial policy, but innovative in several areas, such as in social 
policies and in terms of a more pluralistic and comprehensive (inclusive) 
institutional model. In the following section we turn towards analyzing 
changes in the state-owned sector, and in more general terms new forms of 
state influence. 
THE STATE AS MAJORITY OR MINORITY INVESTOR, AND OTHER 
(INDIRECT) FORMS OF STATE INFLUENCE
State ownership has been transformed during the last decades in Brazil. 
Beyond some wholly-owned large state-enterprises mainly related to 
the sectors of oil, electricity and banking (Petrobras, Eletrobras, Caixa 
Econômica Federal), where the government continues to be majority 
shareholder, other forms of government control emerged and gained 
weight. State influence on private enterprises can take the form of minority 
equity investment, but also other channels of support exist: subsidized 
loans from development banks, equity and debt purchases via sover-
eign wealth and pension funds, local content requirements, to name just 
a few. The practice of picking national champions to support the strategy 
of internationalization (and the wider aim of transforming Brazil into 
23  For this see Boschi (2011); Wylde (2012); Amann-Barrientos (2014); Massi 
(2014); Ricz, (2017).
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a global player in the world economy) is a good example of new forms of 
state influence while maintaining continuities with or similarities to the old 
developmental state model.
The main cycle of privatization ended in 2002 and with the new 
political cycle commencing in 2003 (the Lula administration) some fears 
regarding a new nationalization threat appeared. However, in contrast to 
expectations24 Lula did not reverse the privatization process, but rather 
tried to encourage qualitative changes in public-private partnerships and to 
attract private investment into the Brazilian infrastructure systems. Some 
changes in the focus of privatization has started even before Lula came 
into power. This is best signaled with the big sale of Petrobrás shares25 
in August 2000 on the Brazilian Stock market (Bovespa) and the explicit 
aim to use privatization to strengthen the domestic capital market and 
attract foreign capital. Concessions granted to private actors were a new 
element under the Lula administration, such as in the case of the highway 
system and the airports26, where the lack of investment was most apparent 
and urging (also taking into account the new infrastructural needs in the 
light of the 2014 Football World Championship and the Summer Olympic 
Games in 2016). To certain extent these processes can be even regarded as 
the continuation of the privatization process (although not called like this 
in Brazil, mainly due to political, or ideological, reasons). 
At the same time Lula attacked regulatory models adopted during 
previous decade, especially in the oil and gas sector, and significantly 
weakened established regulatory agencies, by mostly giving responsibili-
ties and final decision rights (back) to ministries, and with it implicitly 
increasing the (discretionary) role of the state. The new wave of “regu-
24  It was feared by foreign investors, mainly based on the former PT’s stance 
towards privatization and on their experiences in some other Latin Ameri-
can countries (like Argentina or Venezuela). As Amann and Barrientos put it 
(2014:4) Lula was so heavily committed to transform the Brazilian economy 
into a competitive global player that he even turned in some aspects against his 
own party and its priorities.
25  With 337.000 individuals buying shares of the Brazilian oil giant, Petrobrás, pos-
sibly resulting in a record sale in the history of the Bovespa, the Brazilian stock 
market (Castelar Pinheiro, 2011, 273). 
26  These steps have to be regarded within the Latin American context, where in 
parallel some more radical leftist regimes started programs of (re-) nationaliza-
tion (in contrast to Lula, who also came to power as a leftist candidate and after 
an electoral campaign criticizing neoliberal reforms, incl. privatization—and still 
went on with it in certain areas).
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latory reforms” leading to an increased the role of political interventions 
under Lula was most apparent in the electricity sector, but also affected 
other sectors. During the second administration of Lula (2007–10) even 
attempts to establish new SOEs (e.g. in manufacture of drugs and fertil-
izers, or provision of broadband services) could be observed, while another 
form of increased state influence took the form of allocating public loans 
(mainly via BNDES) on a more politicized and interventionist way. A good 
example is the creation of “national champions” via the merger of large 
companies, and made possible by BNDES financing, such as in paper 
pulp, petrochemicals, telecom and food processing (Pinheiro 2011, 274). 
This initiative was in line with new foreign economic policies of interna-
tionalization and the aim of “Brazil going global.” This type of state inter-
ventionism was partly “justified” by the GFC in 2007–2009, as a compen-
satory means, or anticyclical economic policy, but we will see, that it did 
not decreased subsequently, and became even more pronounced during 
the following years, under the governance of Dilma Rousseff. 
State ownership in the twenty-first century in Brazil according to 
DEST data (cited among others by Musacchio and Lazzarini [2014a, 20]) 
was relatively extensive: by 2009, 47 SOEs were under federal government 
control, and 49 SOEs under state-level control, with assets equaling to 
USD 626 billion and USD 66 billion respectively. These are however only 
SOEs directly controlled by the government, and do not include a host 
of subsidiaries of state-owned holding companies. There are no exact 
numbers of the latter, but according to estimates direct and indirect state 
ownership sums up to 757 billion USD in total assets equalling approx. to 
43–45 percent of GDP. While enterprises remaining under state control 
concentrated in “strategic” sectors, such as oil (Petrobras), electricity (Ele-
trobras, Cesp), sewage, water (Sabesp) and banking (BNDES, Banco do 
Brasil, Caixa Econômica Federal, Barisul). 
The largest SOE’s are traded in the Brazilian Stock Exchange 
(Bovespa), although these compromise only 58 percent of the SOEs under 
federal and 68 percent under state level control. Listing at least in principle 
results in better corporate governance practices, better mitigation of agency 
problems and better protection of minority shareholders. In most cases it 
happened also with Brazilian SOEs, though there are some exceptions from 
more recent years (see next section), where government still aims to over-
write profitability criteria or minority stakes. To commit to higher gover-
nance practices was however not just a pre-condition and result of listing, it 
also aimed to attract external funding, private capital. This latter constitutes 
to be an urging pressure in the Brazilian case if we take into consideration 
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the constrained revenue raising capacity of the state and the low levels of 
domestic saving (leading also to low levels of gross capital formation).
This new-type of state-ownership was the “state as majority investor 
model” (Musacchio and Lazzarini 2014a), meaning that the state remains 
controlling shareholder, but at the same time accepts to follow certain 
rules to attract private investors as minority shareholders.27 One of the best 
illustration for the model of state as majority shareholder is the case of 
Petrobras, the state-owned oil giant in Brazil, which is a perfect example 
of remaining and even strengthening government interventions up to most 
recent years (with all of the ups and downs of the company economic per-
formance and political interference).
According to some estimates the state has equity interests in compa-
nies representing about 35 percent of Brazil’s stock market capitalisation, 
while adding up companies with borrowings from the BNDES this number 
would increase to about 70 percent (FT, 2015). Investors in these compa-
nies were used to and have traditionally tolerated some state interference. 
However, during the recent years interventionism has grown more intense 
(starting already under Lula, but particularly extended under Rousseff) 
and also due to the new ICT media its controversies became more visible 
for the society, providing more accurate ground for social protests against 
discretionary (ad hoc) state interference.
Despite all direct state-ownership still represents only a part of state 
influence in Brazil. As we have argued earlier state control in Brazil 
remained very strong (compared to European or Western norms) even after 
large waves of privatizations, and state influence on the economy goes well 
beyond ownership of large enterprises like Petrobrás or BNDES. These indi-
rect and hidden forms of state influence are very hard to reveal and quantify. 
It is mostly highlighted that strong external regulations (also backed by 
insulation from political appointments) would be needed to prevent SOEs 
with majority state control to pursue outright government intervention. The 
problem thus in Brazil is twofold: on the one hand, regulatory bodies are 
relatively weak (and at the same time politicised, leading to missing checks-
and-balances against discretionary government interventions), while on the 
other hand, due to an overly fragmented political party system, CEO and 
other manager positions in SOEs are part of political deals leading to wide-
spread practices of patronage. Both result in heavy threats against perfor-
27  For unintended consequences of this model in the Brazilian case see Pargendler 
(2012). 
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mance and profitability of SOEs, best illustrated by recent corruption scan-
dals related to Petrobras (and other big Brazilian firms). 
Recent Brazilian experiences with the state as majority (or even 
minority) investor shed light on the fact that the effective functioning of 
this model would require relatively developed capital markets, not only to 
attract private capital, but also to provide external monitoring and trans-
parency (with both being rather in their infancy in Brazil). Even if the 
state is only a minority shareholder, other objectives than pure profitability 
criteria (such as political or social aims) might come to fore and work as 
incentives towards state intervention—this was often the case during the 
last one and a half decade in Brazil.
A striking example how state influence over the Brazilian economy has 
changed recently could be illustrated by the case of BNDES that besides 
its long-term, financing activities recently also gained weight as minority 
shareholder (Massi 2014; Musacchio and Lazzarini 2014b; Pinto and 
Reis 2017). 
Lula and also Rousseff have expanded the reliance on direct transfers 
from government to finance activities of BNDES, and went beyond the 
former model of relying on forced savings—mainly from corporate taxes. 
This has led increasing public debt and tax burden, both high already in 
Brazil. Looking at Mazzucato’s (2013) “entrepreneurial state” argumen-
tation state induced financing (such as via BNDES) could work, if state 
would address private firms with clearly constrained or limited borrowing 
opportunities (firms that possess latent capabilities but lack resources or 
opportunities to borrow). In line with this thinking, however, if capital 
markets develop, and opportunities for firms widen to borrow (as new 
potential lenders, investors step in), then the state should curb back on his 
activities, step back, and exit. Looking at the changes in the activities and 
practices of the BNDES in Brazil exactly the opposite happened.28 
The cases of Vale and Embraer can also serve as examples of state as 
a minority investor, with capital from pension funds and especially BNDES. 
In these cases, more autonomous governance and funding has developed 
28  These shortcomings are well-known by the management of the BNDES, and 
the BNDES would in principle aim to widen its activities towards building com-
petitive advantage in high technology sectors (and there are even some examples 
of financing in the electronics sector). However, the statement of the former 
BNDES vice-president, currently one of its directors, João Carlos Ferraz is tell-
ing: “…the Bank would finance a technology-based company’s project if one 
were presented to the Bank” (cited by Massi 2014, 223).
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better technical capabilities and led to better implementation of perfor-
mance-enhancing growth strategies (however also containing the risk, that 
enhanced autonomy leads to growth-obsession, e.g., when SOE managers 
engage in empire-building). The classical lesson from East Asian develop-
mental states’ experiences is valid also in this case: the operation in com-
petitive foreign markets might impose the needed discipline on SOE man-
agers. In the case of Embraer it was only after its privatization in 1994 that 
the company became truly competitive, with new product lines for regional 
routes such as the ERJ-145 and, more recently, the so-called E-Jets. 
To sum up Lula has increased the role of government in economy via 
multiple channels. A  striking example is the raising government control 
over regulators by shifting policy-making decisions away from independent 
industry regulators to government ministries. The politicization of regulations 
has opened the door for government appointees to discretionary political 
meddling and has among others finally led to destroying stability and with 
it to deterring investments. These dynamics have contributed to economic 
troubles under the Rousseff period, to which we turn in the next section.
CRISIS MANAGEMENT AND SOME TRENDS AFTER THE GLOBAL 
FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS
Before turning to the most recent trends regarding state influence in the 
Brazilian economy, we provide a short outlook to GFC, including its con-
text, management and effects in Brazil. 
During the first decade of the twenty-first century (mainly corre-
sponding with the Lula administration period between 2003 and 2011) 
the Brazilian economy seemed to be on a positive track both in economic 
and social terms. Economic growth was mainly driven by external fac-
tors: increasing demand from Asia (mainly China) towards main Brazilian 
export products, and the rise in commodity prices led to significant sur-
pluses in current account balance (between 2003 and 2007). Economic 
growth was accompanied by social achievements, mainly due to new policy 
approach (called socially inclusive policies or extension of social frontier): 
poverty and inequality decreased, and other social indicators, such as 
formal employment, minimum wage, social protection coverage, educa-
tional attainments improved.29
29  Not just in media, but also in economic literature the period of Lula is often referred 
to as the second or new economic miracle period (see, e.g., Amann-Baer 2012).
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Within this economic and social context, the GFC at least on the 
short term had a  relatively mild impact on the Brazilian economy: the 
GDP after a 0,33 percent decrease in 2009 has rised in 2010 by an aston-
ishing rate of 7,53 percent (WDI, 2015). On the medium term, however, 
the effects and consequences of global economic crisis and the following 
changes in the external environment turned out to be more severe for 
Brazil. Before turning to these most recent trends, we first sum up most 
important (anticyclical) measures of the Brazilian crisis management in the 
wake of the GFC according to Boschi (2011, 53–54):
•  above-inflation real increase of minimum wage and adjustment of 
other benefits beyond minimum wage to maintain their purchasing 
power; 
•  expansion of directed (and subsidized) credit, especially through 
BNDES; 
•  introduction of two new individual taxes to raise government rev-
enues;
•  expansion of the circle of beneficiaries of the Program Bolsa Fa-
milia30 (reaching additional 1,3 million people);
•  increased efforts to implement the government’s infrastructure pro-
gram (PAC);
•  reduction of the annual primary budget surplus target (from 4,3 per-
cent to 2,5 percent);
•  launching a new housing program (Minha Casa, Minha Vida) pro-
viding 1 million new homes and a great impetus for the construction 
sector and
•  reducing the tax on industrialized products (IPI31) in several sectors 
(e.g. automobile industry).
There are some critics regarding economic policies afterwards the crisis, 
some highlight for example that the implementation of the PAC, the gov-
ernment’s infrastructure program after 2008 was in fact put to serve the 
Brazilian crisis management, and concentrated much less on its formerly 
laid down principles (such as social inclusion and improving productive 
30  The Program Bolsa Familia (PBF) is a conditional cash transfer programme dat-
ing back to the Cardoso era (1990s), but it was extended and institutionally 
reformed under Lula. The PBF provides financial aid to poor Brazilian families, 
if they ensure that children attend school and are vaccinated.
31  In Portuguese: Imposto sobre Produtos Industrializados.
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capacities). Still there is a consensus that the anticyclical policies in the 
wake of the crisis had a positive impact concerning employment, indus-
trial production (mainly in construction and automobile sector), house-
hold consumption and (at least) on the short term rescued Brazil from 
economic recession. Brazil’s quick recovery from the crisis was awarded 
also by credit rating agency’s promoting Brazil to investment grade.
However, after the short period of post-crisis adjustment and the 
accompanying euphoria regarding the overly optimistic Brazilian future, 
economic indicators started to deteriorate and within a  five year period 
Brazil has sunk into one of the most severe economic (and political) crises 
since the 1930s, with significant social consequences. After a deteriorating 
trend of GDP growth rates since 2010, the Brazilian economy has actually 
stagnated in 2014 (0,25percent GDP growth rate), and has declined by 
more than 3 percent on yearly average in 2015 and 2016 (WDI, 2018). It 
is out of the scope of this paper to analyse the dimensions and symptoms 
of the most recent overarching and multifaceted crisis in Brazil (for this, 
see the next subchapter below and Nagy and Ricz 2018), instead we con-
centrate on the changes regarding the role of state in economy, especially 
via SOEs and BNDES.
CRISIS IN BRAzIL: POLITICAL (INSTITUTIONAL), 
ECONOMIC, AND SOCIAL DIMENSIONS
Compared to the Lula period (2003–2010) Dilma Rousseff, and the 
Brazilian economy has faced a  much less favourable external context, 
with the deceleration of Chinese economic growth and demand, with 
deteriorating commodity prices. These external changes together with 
inherent internal (political and economic factors) have resulted that the 
Brazilian economy has been first decelerating after 2010, and turned into 
recession by 2014, and seems to get stabilized in 2017 (with an eco-
nomic growth rate around 1,1 percent). Deteriorating exchange rate and 
fiscal indicators, increasing levels of inflation and unemployment just 
to name a few factors that added up to the crisis in Brazil and resulted 
in downgrading the Brazil’s sovereign debt by all the three main credit 
rating agencies by 2016. Deterioration of economic performance was 
however preceded, accompanied and even reinforced by an unfolding 
political crisis, mainly (but not exclusively) related to corruption scan-
dals (e.g., the Petrobrás case), the internal struggles within the Working 
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Party (PT) and the new governance style of president Dilma Rousseff. 
The political crisis has many dimensions and far-reaching consequences, 
and finally led to the impeachment process against Dilma (and the PT). 
According to the Brazilian constitution the former vice-president took 
the power in September 2016, Michel Temer (PMDB) and has formed 
his new (right-wing) government.
Political and economic difficulties have resulted in severe social dis-
satisfaction, and led to country-wide social demonstrations and protests, 
first already back in 2012, then against the Football World Cup in 2014 
and Summer Olympic Games in 2016 (and the public spending con-
nected to these events), followed by demonstrations against the new gov-
ernment of Temer and its austerity measures.
Main social achievements in Brazil under the Lula era were at least partly 
the result of promoting democratic values and institutions (in line with 
the “new” Brazilian constitution of 1988) and deliberate pro-poor public 
policy interventions. However, Brazil’s social progress was accompanied 
by a deindustrialization of the economy, a “re-primarization” of exports, 
and a newly emerging dependence on China. Thus, Lula’s new develop-
mentalist model was clearly not sustainable—especially not in a less favor-
able external context, and with the exhaustion of the domestic-demand-
led model based on significant increases in private-sector indebtedness. 
Regarding the role of state in development, however we also have to draw 
attention to the fact that the consecutive PT administrations (both under 
Lula and Dilma) have failed to succeed in reforming the political system—
which according to most analysts, such as David Fleischer (2011, 2016)lies 
at the root of all corruption cases—as well as in initiating deeper running 
structural reforms, such as related to the educational, health or pension 
systems. In this vein the Lula period can be much more regarded as the 
era of lost opportunities, instead of the rise of the new Brazilian model of 
development, as it is often cited.
RISING INTERVENTIONISM AND THE FALL OF NEW 
DEVELOPMENTALISM IN BRAzIL (2011–16)
Crisis management is always about the extension of state interventions in 
the economy, the question is whether after the crisis the level (scale and 
scope) of interventions is on the retreat. In the case of Brazil the answer is 
a definite no, the retreat of the state did not happened (at least not imme-
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diately, not until 2016), on the contrary, state interventions remained on 
the agenda, and served as an important tool in economic policies. It is 
out of the scope of this paper to one-by-one illustrate this new reliance of 
Dilma Rousseff on mainly ad hoc state interventions (mostly introduced on 
discretionary manner), as they were mostly related to single decisions, and 
took new forms (instead of state ownership, rather other forms dominate). 
Most cases have been extensively recorded by domestic and international 
media, here we only try to list some examples and reveal main trends that 
illustrate these recent changes.
The above presented context in which Dilma Rousseff took office in 
2011 and has been forced to govern, has implied severe fiscal constraints 
to finance investment in infrastructure, which is considered traditionally as 
one of the most important constraint to economic growth in Brazil. The 
urgent need for infrastructural investments was even more pronounced in 
the light of the international mega-sports events in 2014 and 2016 hosted 
by the country. Rousseff has also realized the need for private investments 
and this constituted to be an important incentive or driving force for the 
government to go on with privatization of highways and airports (incl. con-
cessions for building new facilities, but also aiming to transfer the opera-
tion of some existing facilities to private firms).
These aims were however less welcomed by the public, and even less 
by her electorate. The PT has been traditionally opposing privatization 
back during the Cardoso period, and it still does not fit into its political 
discourse. So Dilma Rousseff has had to protect her plans, by explaining 
that “this time it was different” by not “selling off state assets to raise cash” 
(Bloomberg, 2012) and stating that it is a new type of program to out-
source government functions to be financed by private firms.
Even though this political and social resistance, and mainly due to 
the economic motives to revive economic growth32 it is not much of a sur-
prise that in 2012 the Brazilian government announced to sell state assets 
to private investors through long term concession deals, guaranteeing the 
right to operate roads, rails, ports and airports (many of these once built 
by the government while also containing some greenfield projects). The 
total amount of the proposed projects was estimated to be around 45 bil-
lion USD within five years. However, several adjustments had to be made 
32  Leading to struggles from quarter to quarter during 2012 to revive economic 
growth in the Brazilian economy, as the government has forecasted a yearly 
growth rate of 4 percent, and finally the economy grew with less than 2 percent 
in 2012.
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to the original plans to offer adequate returns to potential private investors, 
and this led to delays in implementation in most of the projects. The media 
has been writing about a “new privatization wave in Brazil” mainly related 
to logistics infrastructure.33
The second round of this most recent privatization phase in Brazil is 
related to some of the remaining primary airports to be privatized by long-
term concessions, with two peaks, one prior the Football World Cup in 
2014 and the other one in 2015 (preceding the coming Summer Olympic 
Games in 2016).
Together with some other concession programs announced in June 
2015, to attract private investment in productivity enhancing investments 
the government plans envisaged projects summing up to 25 billion USD 
within the period between 2015 and 2018. These plans were overly opti-
mistic and neglected the role of some important complementary reforms, 
such as to enhance competition, reduce the administrative red tape and 
eliminate rigidities in the labor market to get closer to those targets. Fed-
eral interventions during the last years of the Rousseff government forced 
utilities companies (such as in electricity sector) to accept lower prices as 
a condition to renew their contracts, and these acted towards further dis-
couraging investors.
Regulatory changes continued to be in line with the practice of Lula, 
thus mainly aimed at supporting the implementation of economic policies 
in Brazil. Ad hoc and discretionary use of regulations has flourished under 
both terms of Dilma Rousseff and once again one of the best the illustra-
tion is the example of the Petrobras and the pre-salt regulations.
The move towards more interventionism in the economy can also 
be well illustrated by the “meddling” with prices, in particularly in the 
energy sector (e.g., artificial repression of petrol prices and energy tariffs) 
to dampen inflation and by other industrial policy interventions (such as 
special taxes levied on certain industries). Since the Rousseff administra-
tions (especially since 2012) the Brazilian government often used SOEs to 
directly control consumer prices (in order to support “higher objectives” 
such as to control inflation). Examples for government regulated prices 
(mainly due to macroeconomic motives) are numerous, while the most 
often highlighted cases are related to the oil and energy sector. The Bra-
zilian government has repressed electricity prices by 30 percent, urban bus 
fares by 20 percent and gasoline prices by 15 percent between 2011 and 
33  For example, Forbes 2012.
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2014 (Bloomberg 2014), and items subject to price controls accounted for 
approx. 20 percent of the inflation index. According to some estimates just 
the fuel subsidy costed an estimated 19 billion USD during the first term 
of Dilma Rousseff (2011–2014).
In more general terms, however, the policies of ‘meddling with prices’ 
have serious consequences, going much further than just their direct costs 
and effects on the fiscal balances: depression of private investment, distor-
tion of resource allocation, encouraging excessive private consumption due 
to lower consumer prices, etc. Instead of further detailing these spillover 
effects, we just highlight two other aspect: 1. most subsidies benefitted the 
higher-income households and thus reinforced inequality (traditionally an 
urging social problem in Brazil) and 2. and artificially capped oil prices 
as well as energy subsidies artificially promoted capital-intensive indus-
tries (reinforcing distortions in production sector), while at the same time 
reduced incentives for investment in renewable resources, and accelerated 
the depletion of natural resources (hurting sustainability).
To drive back government’s discretionary interventions checks-and-
balances would be needed along strong, independent regulatory agen-
cies—the ones that have been weakened and politicised under Lula, and 
even more so under Rousseff. Discretionary government interventions 
inherently raise uncertainty, and with it destroy business confidence, which 
might have long lasting detrimental effects on an economy, where one of 
the most important constraints to economic growth is lack of investments. 
A good-working regulatory system could ensure external monitoring and 
transparency, and with it a more rules-based government policy-making, 
while also providing more stability, even if SOEs serve some social objec-
tives and are not only subject to profitability criteria.
Finally, on the one hand it could be argued that nothing new under 
sun, privatization came back to agenda in Brazil due to macroeconomic 
motives, as the government has desperately needed fiscal revenues, this is 
almost echoing the Cardoso period. On the other hand, looking at changes 
in the regulatory system, the opposite is true, a significant discontinuity 
with the reforms period of the 1990s, though the (re-)politicization of the 
regulatory schemes started already under Lula, and was continued and 
moved forward by Rousseff. The micro-managing of the industry is not 
new in Brazilian economic history, however it has been raised to new levels 
under Rousseff and lead to misuse of the anyway scarce resources in the 
twenty first century’s Brazil.
To sum up we highlight that economic growth had already started 
to decelerate during the first Dilma term (beginning in 2011), but cer-
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tain clear and deliberate (though often overlooked) policy choices also 
date back to the Rousseff government, and thus to the era of the PT and 
the leftist coalition. Serrano and Melin (2015) referred to these policies 
already as “Brazil’s Neoliberal U-Turn,” as they were explicitly aimed at 
reducing the direct role of the state in the Brazilian economy, even though 
important social policies remained in place.
It is worth to recall that in Lula’s new Brazilian development model, the 
public sector (including SOEs and public banks) was clearly the major actor 
which would stimulate aggregate demand and generate supply-side struc-
tural change, mainly by means of investments. At the end of 2010, there was 
a clear economic-policy shift, an attempt to respond to the intensifying criti-
cism coming from Brazilian corporations, banks, the media, and the con-
servative opposition, all of whom claimed that the Brazilian state had been 
intervening too much in the economy. The “ideology” behind the (rather ad 
hoc) economic-policy decisions which followed was the belief that the state 
could withdraw from its leading role in the economy, and that the private 
sector would immediately step in. The government started to offer incentives 
for private investment, mainly in the form of (unconditional) tax cuts; it also 
tried to reduce traditionally extremely high interest rates (though this policy 
was quickly reversed) and oversaw a significant exchange-rate devaluation of 
the Brazilian real (Serrano and Melin 2015, 2).
Even though all economic indicators pointed out the ineffectiveness 
of this new economic-policy direction, Rousseff’s government continued 
to pursue its market-oriented (or rather, Brazilian-type selective business-
friendly) strategy even into her second term, which began in 2015. By 
then, its primary aim was tackling the unfolding economic crisis, mainly by 
means of austerity measures such as cuts in public spending, interest-rate 
hikes, increasing utility prices, and reducing the availability of credit. By 
2018, it was clear that these measures had contributed to or even aggra-
vated the worst crisis in Brazil’s modern economic history.
In the light of the recent corruption scandals and worsening economic 
outlook, economic analysts tend to agree, that the role of SOEs in the Bra-
zilian economy should be reduced to increase transparency. Privatisation of 
SOEs (incl. state-owned banks) is essential, but should be preceded by the 
improvement of the rules of the game to ensure equal footing between the 
public and private sectors and local and foreign investors. Furthermore, 
the apparent political ties in SOEs remind us on the crony capitalism argu-
ments in classic DS literature, and it seems that Brazil has not learnt yet 
the lessons resulting from the Asian crisis and the demise of the classic 
paradigm of DS in the 1990s.
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THE NEW NEOLIBERAL TURN (2016–)
On top of all these described processes the new government of Michel 
Temer among its first economic policy steps34 announced a large privatiza-
tion program, and a twenty-years public spending cup (in form of a constitu-
tional amendment, called PEC 241 or more recently PEC 55) indicating the 
commitment the neoliberal economic policy turn and the aim to radically 
drive back of the role of state in economy in Brazil (with immense social 
costs and threats lying however outside of the new government’s focus).
The “Project Growth” was announced as the new ambitious privatiza-
tion plan containing 32 infrastructural projects mainly in transport, energy, 
mining and sanitation sectors, with an expected income of 24 billion USD 
until 2018. To attract the much needed private (and foreign) investors sev-
eral procedural and technical changes have been made, however often with 
debatable content (see e.g., the easing and speeding up of environmental 
licensing procedures). It is, however, straightforward to see the continuity 
with Dilma Rousseff’s privatization plans presented above (the underlying 
economic and financial pressures and the overly optimistic estimates also 
remained unchanged).
Finally, public spending cup approved on 13 December 2016 has 
frozen most federal expenditures (and its structure) in real terms for the 
next 20 years (via constitutional amendment, such as to be revised the 
earliest in ten years). The proponents of this extremely divisive measure 
mostly highlight the need to regain market confidence and to cut budget 
deficit and keep inflation under control to avoid a future debt crisis. How-
ever, this spending cap might not be effective as it does not include the 
social security system (that currently covers more than 40 percent of the 
mandatory government expenditures). What is maybe more important, 
and lies also beyond the mass social protests across the country throughout 
the last years, is the fear that this measure harms the poor, who dispropor-
tionately rely on services provided by the government. At the same time, it 
34  It might be worth to note that as a first political step of Michel Temer the new 
(by then interim) cabinet after the removing from power Dilma Rousseff via 
the impeachment process in May 2016 was put together by exclusively white, 
elderly men (with a rather conservative stance). This has resulted heavy criti-
cism, as Brazil is an ethnically and culturally very diverse and mixed country, 
and many social groups felt not to be represented by an all-men, all-white cabi-
net for which nobody has voted. Even the legitimacy of such a government was 
and is still currently questioned by many social groups and movements.
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also harms future economic growth prospects by freezing up expenditures 
on the anyway underfinanced educational and health systems in Brazil.
Without going more into details with these recent economic policy 
measures and plans (such as reforms of the social-security system and pen-
sion system), we highlight the swinging of the pendulum, first towards 
more explicit and extended role of the state in economy and development 
between 2003 and 2016, and most recently back towards more neoliberal 
reforms and the retreat of the state. These recent economic policy mea-
sures are still at a very initial phase, and have to be realized in the after-
math of a severe economic and political crisis, which poses high uncertain-
ties regarding their results and sustainability. 
At the same time the elections in autumn 2018 have resulted in an 
even more explicit economic and political shift. The election of the former 
military officer and far-right nationalist Jair Bolsonaro represents a come-
back for the traditional political elites and interests in Brazil (and this is an 
often overlooked difference if comparing to Donald Trump and the US), 
while his financial and economic super-minister Paulo Guedes, is a free-
market economist form the Chicago school and thus strongly committed to 
cut back the role of the state in Brazil and transform its economy according 
to the Chilean model. The power balance within such a “strange marriage” 
(of Bolsonaro and Guedes) and its effects for the Brazilian economy are 
yet to be seen, though some potential threats and negative consequences 
on the society and environment are already emerging. The composition of 
the final socio-economic outcome (pros and contras) is still an open ques-
tion, and depends also on the fact, whether this new (illiberal and radical) 
political regime will be a lasting one.
Conclusions
Throughout this paper we have argued that despite significant achieve-
ments in the Brazilian political economy during the last century (such 
as the transition to a competitive and pluralist democracy, privatization, 
deregulation, and macroeconomic stabilization), important structures and 
modes mainly related to the interconnectedness of the state with the pri-
vate sector, as well as those related to developmental and productive activi-
ties have remained in place in (or have returned to) Brazil by the beginning 
of the twenty-first century. We have presented a rather strange combination 
of pragmatic privatization and intensified state economic intervention in 
Brazil during the 1990 and early 2000s.
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We have also argued that privatization has depended more on political 
factors and economic (fiscal) pressures and much less on ideology. With 
the new, right-wing governments, first coming to power via the impeach-
ment process in 2016, and then in the presidential election in autumn 
2018 with the resounding (but not outright) victory of Bolsonaro, an ideo-
logical turn is taking place in high-level Brazilian politics. However, the 
electorate and Brazilian society more broadly is rather divided (as the share 
of votes during the election has also shown, 55 percent for Bolsonaro and 
45 percent for Haddad). At this early stage of the new era it seems that the 
rhetoric and new governance style of the acting president tends to deepen 
these divisions and hurt social cohesion. Whether this will lead to a reversal 
in the Brazilian electorate’s value-system and its rather rigid ideological 
views is yet to be seen and would require further research. 
Like Boschi (2011), we have argued in favor of the existence of strong 
continuity with the old Brazilian developmentalist model, although Boschi 
put more emphasis on the preservation of a strategic bureaucratic nuclei 
and the mostly unchanged patterns of business-state relations. In con-
trast, we did not consider this as a comparative advantage in the post-GFC 
period, but rather argue that these continuities have also contributed (as 
one important cause) to the recent political and economic crisis in Brazil, 
and have led to severe social consequences and dissatisfaction, well dem-
onstrated by the continuous public demonstrations over the past few years 
(especially since 2013), and ended up producing the unexpected elec-
tion results in autumn 2018, where the majority of the electorate voted 
for change.
The adoption of emergency anti-cyclical policies after GFC has 
strengthened the revival (or, in the case of Brazil, rather the reassertion) of 
an activist and interventionist state, and a new era in Brazil, which began 
under Lula has “flourished” even more under Rousseff and has differed 
fundamentally from the experiences of other, more advanced countries. At 
the same time, we have argued that this new interventionism maintained 
its roots and links with the old DS model from the ISI period, and by 2014 
at the latest, it proved to be unsustainable in economic and fiscal terms as 
well as socially and politically.
Finally, we have stressed that transforming SOEs through corporatiza-
tion and public listing (the model called for the state as majority investor) 
requires a well-developed domestic capital market to attract private capital 
and to increase external monitoring and transparency (not least to develop 
rules that protect minority investors, whose stakes have often been violated 
in twenty-first-century Brazil).
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The Brazilian experience has shown that a  government’s tempta-
tion to intervene is high (both in models where the state as a majority or 
minority investor). We have argued that, especially since 2011 (the Rous-
seff administration), a move towards more interventionism (though e.g., 
price controls for things like gasoline and electricity go back to 2006) and 
the strengthening state influence can be observed, and this happened on 
an ad hoc basis and via discretionary measures, which more often than not 
hurt minority stakes and undermined private investors’ confidence. Weak 
and (re-)politicized regulation and strong state influence have resulted 
in missing or unsatisfactory checks and balances in the Brazilian SOE 
sector. Furthermore, discretionary governmental decisions and actions 
have continued to pose serious threats to the performance of SOEs and 
have destroyed investors’ confidence and, more generally, the Brazilian 
business climate.
Finally, one of the most important lessons from the Brazilian model 
of the state as minority investor, derived from the activities of BNDES 
and is, above all, in line with the relatively new strain of scholarship on 
the entrepreneurial state (Mazzucato 2013). According to this view, the 
state (via e.g., state-owned development banks) might play an active role 
in financing private economic activities if selected firms have latent growth 
capabilities, but are constrained by a lack of financial resources. The prac-
tice of BNDES financing, however, was exactly the opposite, what the 
entrepreneurial state model would suggest: it provided hidden subsidies 
to the largest firms in Brazil, which clearly did not lack opportunities to 
borrow on the market.
The Brazilian explanation for BNDES subsidized credit, is, for 
example, the need for investment in a  relatively new sector promoting 
infrastructure financing related to low consumer prices set by the govern-
ment. However, this is a  tautology: more stable rules and market prices 
could have encouraged private investors to step in, and (scarce) state cap-
ital could have been used in cases where the social externalities are out-
standingly high, or in sectors private capital avoids for other reasons (such 
as high risk or overly long horizons of return, which is in line with Mazzu-
cato’s argument).
The creation of national champions has also been a  costly experi-
ment, not just directly, but also indirectly through the preservation or even 
the further distortion of the natural resource based economic structure of 
Brazil. This has strained the results of the BNDES equity arm (an impor-
tant source of earnings lately in the BNDES budget). This can also be 
regarded as the reiteration of old DS practices and assumptions that have 
Szanyi - 00 könyv.indb   357 2019.11.15.   9:32
358 JUDIT RICz
already proven to be wrong and outdated (both in practice—see the experi-
ences of east Asia—and in theory—see the latest literature on DS).
It was out of the scope of this paper to deeply analyze the complexity 
of state-business relations in Brazil. We have only explored its main roots, 
which go back to the long-term institutional development of Brazil and are 
also deeply embedded in its political system, which used to allow private 
funding during electoral campaigns until 2016. The degree and varieties 
of state influence in Brazil may be also illustrated by case study analysis, 
but this was outside of the scope of this paper (though some of these are 
already covered by existing economic literature on companies like Vale, 
Embraer, Petrobras, or BNDES). All of these cases underline the scholar-
ship of Schneider (2013, 2015) and Nölke et al. (2015), who argue that 
a distinctive institutional foundation of capitalism emerged in Brazil with 
different degrees and modes of state influence than in other, more devel-
oped parts of the world, which is best captured in the concept of a hierar-
chical or state-permeated market economy.
Our most important conclusion is that the role of the state as well 
and the degree of state influence in the economy increased in Brazil in the 
first decade of the new millennium. While state interventionism became 
even more pronounced in the Rousseff era between 2011 and 2016, the 
focus has shifted from pro-poor policies towards a more business-friendly 
approach. State influence has changed forms and channels (compared to 
the old developmentalist period of the ISI), but below the surface, state 
control survived and has heavily influenced everyday economic life in 
Brazil. The best proof of the strong interconnections between the polit-
ical and economic spheres is provided by the ongoing Petrobras scandal 
(and the Car Wash Operation), in which almost the entire political elite is 
involved. Implicitly since 2016 and more explicitly since 2019, a new eco-
nomic policy direction is emerging (first under the Temer government, and 
more recently under Bolsonaro’s cabinet), however the implementation of 
this market-friendly agenda and its socio-economic effects will yet to be 
seen in the coming years.
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When the research program for this book was designed in 2014, clear 
changes in the size and depth of state economic involvement was already 
evident. At that time, the political impacts of these changes were less clear. 
The hypothesis of the research expected different economic and political 
impacts of increasing state intervention depending on the quality and 
embeddedness of democratic political and liberal economic institutions. 
The hypothesis expected that countries with less embedded or fewer insti-
tutions would be less able to withstand the political opportunities (temp-
tations) of greater state influence. This hypothesis was largely proved by 
the research. However, since then, important changes have occurred in the 
global economy and politics. Later development in world economy and pol-
itics showed that the apogee of the neo-liberal concept reached a geographi-
cally wider area and produced further, rather serious changes in the status 
quo of the Great Moderation. Brexit, the American trade war, and the elec-
toral success of various populist parties in Europe showed that countries 
with deeply embedded institutional systems of the competitive state were 
also seriously challenged in the post-crisis period. It is, therefore, highly 
relevant to also include developed countries in the scope of research on 
business-polity interactions and the role of state ownership in them.
The overall picture of the uses of increased state ownership supports 
the initial hypothesis. Traditional market economies tended to maintain 
their specific social institutional systems, the differences of which also 
affected state ownership patterns. In the French economy, the state has 
played important role in the stimulation of the economy, especially high-
tech sectors, since the seventeenth century. Nationwide infrastructure sys-
tems together with their support industries have been also largely under 
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state influence. It is important to mention here that direct state ownership 
is frequently complemented by indirect forms of control (partial ownership 
with special voting rights for example). Overall control may be much larger 
than what the analysis of state ownership may indicate (see Somai on 
France in Chapter Two, Körösi on Austria in Chapter Four, and Kozar-
zewski and Baltowski 2016 on the example of Poland). In Chapter One, 
Voszka also showed that state ownership, together with special features of 
market regulation, should be observed in order to grasp the full impact of 
state control over various industries or the economy as a whole.
Germany returned to its previous reduced ownership pattern rather 
quickly after the necessary nationalizations that took place after 2008. 
The orientation and stimulation of the economy used the traditional 
strong institution of the tri-party system’s social consensus. The German 
economy recovered very quickly using the increased sales of exports in 
the manufacturing industry, which was supported by flexible labor market 
solutions rather than increased direct state intervention.
The Austrian case is more peculiar. Austro-Keynesianism prevailed 
well beyond its heyday in the second half of the twentieth century and 
produced a successful growth pattern for the country. It has always been 
bound to high level of direct state intervention partially based on state 
ownership. The socio-liberal governments continued this tradition after 
2008. Ownership control was even strengthened and centralized in 2015 
with the establishment of ÖBIB (Chapter Four). But after 2017, a new, 
right-wing, and to some extent populist government announced signifi-
cant changes in traditional Austrian economic policy trends. The new 
policy package puts significant emphasis on the monetary stimulation of 
the economy, supports for innovation, and family businesses. These goals 
are, of course, not new, but their primacy in economic policy reflects 
neoliberal ideas combined with the potential scaling back of direct state 
intervention.
The three case studies focusing on developed market economies 
revealed major differences in traditional institutional systems and eco-
nomic policy patterns that were not streamlined in a uniform direction 
after 2008. Varieties of capitalism remained vivid in the post-crisis period. 
Concerning the ownership policies of developed countries, Voszka con-
cluded in Chapter One that (mostly reluctant and covert) nationalizations 
and privatization continued to occur simultaneously. This means that 
states as owners changed their corporate portfolios according to specific 
governmental (and perhaps social) goals. An important goal may also be 
making profits, and this aspect is not restricted to sovereign wealth funds 
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(which, at their origin, have tended to be regarded mainly as business enti-
ties), but also manufacturing companies and service providers. Many of the 
large German, Italian, and French companies are not distinguishable from 
their private competitors in terms of their behavior (see the French case in 
Chapter Two but also similar policies in Poland, Chapter Six, and Brazil, 
Chapter Twelve). The state as owner trades with their securities and par-
ticipates in their control as ordinary stakeholders. Many times state has 
only partial ownership in publicly traded joint-stock companies as a form 
of hybrid ownership.
Throughout the book, special attention has been paid to the role of 
state ownership in the shaping relationships between businesses and poli-
ties. These links, of course, also exist in developed countries. In the case 
of modern Western economies, moderate forms of corruption like favoring 
political allies and red-carpet treatment for state representatives in the 
management and on corporate boards may be observed (see the Austrian 
Proporz-system). State companies, however, were more likely to serve 
political goals, which were usually labeled as social goals, like maintaining 
employment levels (Boycko, Shleifer and Vishny, 1996). In all these cases, 
the costs of politically determined corporate goals may be traced back. 
Effective social and political control over government agents and state 
property, as well as the control of capital markets set limits on political and 
individual rent-seeking. Voszka also indicated that instead of nationaliza-
tions, governments sought to increase control through regulatory measures 
and limitations on property rights through the “expropriation of incomes.”
Yet major political changes occurred in many Western countries 
after the crisis. Of course, the climax of the European migration problem 
contributed largely to the demise of traditional program parties and the 
advance of new “business firm” parties (populist parties). The two largest 
economies of the EU (France and Germany) hardly escaped the victory or 
at least significant political impact of populist parties in the 2017 elections. 
In Italy and Austria, they won elections. It is not very easy to foresee what 
policies these parties will pursue, since they are not traditional, ideologi-
cally driven political movements, but rather “parties of the people,” that 
promise to say and do whatever voters would like to hear and see. Never-
theless, the Austrian Kurz government’s program has some solid theoret-
ical and practical grounding, but this cannot be said about the new Italian 
government. The picture is a blur.
The transition economies of ECE had much weaker or basically no 
tradition of political democracy and a  liberal economy. All the necessary 
political, economic, and social institutions were imported, and these insti-
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tutions had just started to become embedded when the 2008–9 crisis hit. 
The populations and also policymakers lacked a firm commitment to the 
values of the Western world that were reinforced in these countries also 
institutionally by the laws of the European Union after 2004. The weak 
underpinnings of the competition state concept were discovered by several 
empirical surveys (for example, on the social rejection of privatization, see 
Denisova et al. 2010). This also meant that the risks of deferring the insti-
tutional system in ways that enhance personal and political rent-seeking 
were much larger in this region than in more established market econo-
mies. Rolling back democratic political institutions and the safeguards 
of free competition in the economy already began in Hungary before the 
crisis. An important area of retreat was increasing state property.
Our analysis in Chapter Five proved that increased state ownership 
in the countries of ECE served markedly different purposes than in most 
of the more developed market economies. The demise of the neo-liberal 
concept weakened the factors that reinforced the merger of the region into 
the competitive state system. International institutions became aware that 
the suggested institutional solutions might become counterproductive in 
unfamiliar (to them) social environments and were discouraged. Pressure 
from the EU also softened after the successful accessions. Bourgeois eco-
nomic patriotism spread across the ECE region. Under the umbrella of 
economic patriotism, a new system of patronage was established. Favor-
itism was not used generally towards inhabitants or firms of “patriae,” but 
was selectively addressed to political clients. In this realm, state property 
played an important role. Besides the previously described “traditional” 
rent-seeking opportunities, SOEs could be effectively used for corruption. 
Against this background, the expanding state sector can be interpreted as 
the reversal of the political and institutional goal of privatization. This is no 
less than an attempt at widening the channels of rent-seeking and corrup-
tion, and it could be implemented because of the lack of solid political and 
social control and social disappointment.
Less private and more public property in itself should not cause prob-
lems. After all, the size of the state sector in many established market econ-
omies is still larger than in Poland or Hungary. The problem is caused 
when it is used or plays an increased role in political rent-seeking and cor-
ruption. Another related problem is the method of expanding state prop-
erty as opposed to privatization. In many cases, property expropriation 
occurred, if not through outright theft or robbery (see the Russian practice 
of corporate raiding in Viktorov 2013), then through regulatory capture. In 
any case, many of the nationalizations were bound to the violation of pri-
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vate property rights. As such, basic institutions of the free market economy 
and the principle of competition state have been weakened. This tendency 
paralleled the outright rolling back of democratic political institutions in 
Hungary and Poland. Similar attempts in other ECE countries were less 
successful.
After giving a general overview of transition-related privatization pro-
cess, ECE country case studies concentrated on issues that were typical 
and distinct to the given country. The highlight of the Polish case study 
was the successful combination of privatization and the development of 
capital markets (especially the Warsaw Stock Exchange). This topic nat-
urally leads to corporate governance issues, since, in many cases, state 
control is exercised with partial state ownership. The exposure to com-
petition on the capital market helped increase efficiency and transparency 
that in turn put limits on political objectives. Despite this positive feature, 
the interdependence of politics and the economy has remained strong in 
Poland. Much of the space for rent-seeking and corruption has remained 
in place. Most current events were the result of the deceleration of the 
privatization of remaining state property after 2011 and the new 2015 pro-
gram of increasing Polish (state) ownership in the economy, called “re-
Polonization.” These steps were also taken in the name of economic patri-
otism. However, there is growing evidence that the transactions mainly 
served political rent-seeking purposes.
The Slovenian case in Chapter Seven clearly demonstrated the polit-
ical stakes of privatization versus nationalization. The Slovenian transition 
process had long enjoyed a very good image because of the relatively strong 
macroeconomic performance and seemingly deep and quick advances in 
institution building and privatization. As we saw however, privatization 
was, in many cases, only surface privatization, and state ownership was 
retained, albeit in indirect forms largely through state-owned financial 
intermediaries. Moreover, incumbent management generally remained in 
place. This meant that the political goal of using privatization to replace 
the old nomenclature went unfulfilled (see Frydman and Rapaczinsky 
1994), and important tasks of the neo-liberal agenda were not realized. 
This failure came back to haunt the state in the 2000s, when the new elite 
wanted to accomplish political transition and wanted to remove incumbent 
management from directly or indirectly state-controlled companies. Mac-
roeconomic imbalances increased when the financial results of the mis-
management of quasi-privatized firms were realized.
Chapter Five clearly describes the various goals of privatization in the 
transition process in ECE. Poland stood out with a relatively slow, albeit 
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very transparent privatization process that enjoyed social consensus. Hun-
garian privatization was quick and deep and built largely on the involve-
ment of foreign direct investments. In both countries, political tasks, such 
as eliminating communist party officials’ political and economic power, 
were failures. Yet, various political and business elites were confronted 
over the distribution of economic positions. These confrontations were also 
politically interwoven: the comprador elite serving foreign firms’ interests 
was to be pushed back in business (together with “their” foreign firms). 
This has been one of the main arguments of populist Polish and Hun-
garian governments since the mid-2010’s. In Slovenia, multinational busi-
nesses did not participate in the privatization process, hence it was not the 
comprador but the incumbent elite that had to be removed. The clash of 
various political and business elites may create macroeconomic problems, 
but, even worse, it also damages market institutions.
The Hungarian chapter described the process by which the Hungarian 
government rolled back important institutions in order to eliminate con-
trol over rent-seeking and corrupt transactions. The study also highlighted 
changes in the source(s) of rents. After joining the EU, the primary source 
of rents became EU financial transfers from structural funds and the agri-
cultural fund. State-owned enterprises played an important role in political 
rent-seeking: in the reduction of utility prices and by providing financial 
support for various politically motivated programs. Corruption (that can 
be also legal) mainly targeted public procurement tenders that used EU 
funds. At the same time, the economic patriotism mantra was used to legit-
imate massive attacks against foreign business mainly in the service sector 
and trade. Foreign firms’ market positions were to be captured either by 
state-owned companies (in public services in order to slash prices to buy 
election votes) or by partisan firms (e.g. in retail, trade, and banking). At 
the same time, the Hungarian government continued to support foreign 
manufacturing investments. Foreign investment attraction in certain seg-
ments of the economy remained very strong. The structure of the economy 
and especially exports became highly concentrated in the automotive 
industry and electronics, which increased vulnerability as was evidenced 
during the 2008–9 crisis.
Studies on the ECE region are also important from the perspective 
of developed countries. Negative anomalies of business and polity inter-
actions in the old EU member states were not clear yet. An important 
reason for this are the relatively solid political (regular, free elections) and 
social controls (watchdog institutions). But major changes occurred in 
core Europe’s party system as well! Business firm parties were established 
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well before their advance in ECE. Silvio Berlusconi’s political career or 
Jörg Haider’s election victory preceded Viktor Orbán’s second or Jarosław 
Kaczińsky’s first governments in Hungary and Poland respectively. Further 
damage to the traditional parties in core Europe may easily lead to similar 
dangers that we are witnessing now in ECE.
Emerging market economies are especially important fields of obser-
vation regarding the impact and applicability of classic democratic polit-
ical institutions and liberal market economic principles in different cul-
tural, historical, and political backgrounds. In fact, some countries on 
the peripheries of Europe and the US (Turkey, Mexico, and Russia) have 
repeatedly attempted Western-style modernization during their history. 
Chapter Eleven provides a brief overview of the latest Turkish attempts. 
The modern history of that country can be interpreted as the competi-
tion between social and political groups favoring Western modernization 
and those that call for a more traditional developmental course with strong 
Islamic features. The very long story of Turkey’s association with the EU 
and the clumsy negotiations over membership reflects the fundamental dif-
ficulties of fitting the country into an alliance of such culturally diverse 
countries. The current popularity of President Erdoğan, and his successful 
policy of rolling back barely established democratic institutions, shows the 
declining impact of Western competition on the state’s principles. Turkey’s 
departure from European values worries the European Union but obvi-
ously not the majority of Turkish society. It is not yet clear if the presiden-
tial system and new economic policies will bring prosperity or decline.
There are also other countries with non-traditional economic models 
that proved to be successful, at least in some periods. Singapore’s model 
has been regarded as a  true success story (Chapter Ten). Nevertheless, 
the family of a charismatic leader has dominated the economy, state, and 
social life. Economic success was not bound to political competition. State-
owned firms virtually meant the personal property of the ruler. Very spe-
cific circumstances, among others the strategic location of the tiny country 
and the British military presence, which provided exceptional opportunities 
that were cleverly utilized. Hence, the Singapore success story is rather 
unique, despite the fact that it is regularly mentioned as part the East-
Asian developmental state model, together with other, equally distinctive 
Asian success stories (Taiwan, South Korea).
Chapter Nine deals with the issue of the revival of the developmental 
state concept. New statist approaches are applied to support the catching-
up process of emerging market economies. These new attempts, however, 
must be different, not only because of the variety of countries’ socio-eco-
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nomic models, but also because the operating environment has changed. 
Globalization redesigned the international division of labor with an out-
standing role for large multinational companies that operate in global value 
chains of international corporate networks. This makes the development 
of new global players based in emerging market economies extremely dif-
ficult. Global free trade and many multilateral agreements limit the pos-
sibilities for traditional infant industry protection. Clift and Woll (2012) 
described the process of reinventing control tools over open markets as 
new forms of protectionism.
Other important differences stem from the altered structure of pro-
duction and employment. Today, developmental success must be based 
on strengthening national participation in current dynamic sectors, most 
importantly in services, rather than the industrialization process of mid-
twentieth-century national success stories. This focus also means different 
social impacts. In Chapter Nine, Ricz argues that today’s typical employ-
ment structure focuses on highly paid knowledge intensive services and 
badly rewarded interpersonal services. The social impact of this specializa-
tion pattern is growing polarization. This stands in contrast to the industri-
alization process fifty years ago, which was based on massive labor realloca-
tion from poorly paid agriculture to better paid industrial jobs with little 
wage inequality. Today’s development pattern produces growing inequality, 
which may seriously undermine the political sustainability of such growth 
patterns. The case studies in the volume could not find convincing policies 
that improved the inclusiveness of economic development.
Although new developmental state concepts emphasize the role of 
enabling policies, there are many examples of a strong state sector pres-
ence tasked with the facilitation of national development goals. Singapore 
as an archetype is clearly such an example, although, most recently, when 
the development goals have been achieved, few SOEs were privatized. The 
other interesting case is Brazil (Chapter Twelve). Prevailing traditions of 
a  less successful developmental state experiment contributed to recent 
political and economic crisis and social dissatisfaction, especially after 
2014. The 2008–2009 crisis strengthened the reassertion of the activist 
state that has maintained its roots in the old type developmental state 
model after a period of less intensive state involvement (in the manage-
ment of SOEs), which has also been earmarked by privatization transac-
tions. This attempt proved to be unsustainable both in economic and fiscal 
terms, and politically and socially. The Brazilian government’s tempta-
tion was too high to directly intervene in the management of SOEs. These 
interventions were sometimes unsuccessful and hurt private minority 
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shareholders’ interests. Weak and politicized regulation and strong state 
influence undermined the effects of checks and balances in Brazilian SOEs. 
Discretional government decisions posed serious threats to the perfor-
mance of SOEs, destroyed investors’ confidence, and weakened the busi-
ness climate. This was also reflected in the privatization process through 
public listings, as investment opportunities in majority state-owned compa-
nies did not attract sufficient private capital.
The chapters in this volume analyzed direct economic interventions 
by the state mainly through state-owned firms. The primary aim was to 
distinguish different patterns of involvement in countries with different cul-
tural and political backgrounds and development levels. The hypothesis 
that more stable institutions will resist the temptation of using increased 
state ownership after the 2008–2009 crisis has been proven. However, 
more detailed analysis revealed the fact that institutions’ long traditions 
of and relationships with the institutions of the competition state will not 
provide full immunity from the temptations for more developed countries. 
The rolling back of democratic institutions has started in many emerging 
market economies as well as in some of the new EU member countries, 
with the potential threat of undermining the whole European institutional 
system. Potentially, these practices can be exported to core Europe as well. 
The state sector has played important roles in supporting various political 
goals in most of the countries analyzed here. Some of these goals were not 
economically rational. Although we discovered practices in harmony with 
the concept of the entrepreneurial state (Mazzucato 2013), more often, 
state intervention increased and often lacked business considerations. 
Actions of political rent-seeking discouraged private investment in pub-
licly traded companies. Forced nationalizations and encroachments under-
mined the rule of law and the institutions of the competition state.
Based on the results of the analysis of direct state actions in the 
economy, we can continue our research on other areas of business polity 
interactions. The two areas should be simultaneously analyzed in an appro-
priate theoretical framework. Kornai (2000, 2016) has carried out simul-
taneous research on economic and political processes that have theoretical 
relevance. His concept of the system paradigm can be used as analytical 
tool in comparative studies. Most countries in the contemporary global 
economy can be treated as hybrids standing between the two major eco-
nomic and political systems: capitalism and socialism (communism). 
Moreover, the demise of the neoliberal concept produced a major shift 
from the liberal-democratic pole of Kornai’s dichotomy to the authori-
tarian-illiberal pole. This is reflected in the latest political events in var-
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ious countries (Putin’s Russia, Erdoğan’s Turkey, Orbán’s Hungary). 
Traditional Western democracies’ institutional systems were largely main-
tained until now, but there are question marks in several countries (e.g., in 
Italy). We can therefore check whether it holds in any developed country if 
increased state economic involvement is not about the efficient allocation 
of economic resources, but about maximizing political control over society 
and the economy (Acemoglu and Robinson 2012).
Kornai explored the two main economic systems above as two ideal 
types of existing socio-political formations. Allowing for a wide range of 
actual implementation, Kornai (2000, 2016) described the fundamental 
characteristics of the two regimes as a  dichotomy. Primary (decisive) 
system-specific characteristics were identified as determining the two sys-
tems as a whole. They are differentiated from secondary (reactive) features 
that modify the actual appearance. The three primary aspects that differen-
tiate socialist and capitalist systems are the following: 1) the relation of the 
political sphere to property forms and economic coordination mechanisms, 
2) the dominant form of property, 3) the dominant economic coordination 
mechanism. These main characteristics influence six secondary character-
istics: 1) power relations between the two sides of the market for goods 
and services, 2) power relations between the two sides of the labor market, 
3) the speed and qualitative features of technical progress (innovation), 4) 
the resulting income distribution, 5) the softness/hardness of firms’ budget 
constraints, 6) the main direction of corruption.
Kornai (2016) distinguished three types of political categories: the two 
traditional politico-governmental forms; democracy and dictatorship; and 
a third form: autocracy. However, in Kornai’s words (2016, 566) “autoc-
racy, in this paradigm, is no blurred ‘middle way’ between democracy and 
dictatorship, but a sharply identifiable type in the sense Max Weber termed 
an ‘ideal type.’ It is a theoretical construct that in my approach is distinct 
from two other types: democracy and dictatorship.”
In order to label one or another existing regime according to the three 
big politico-governmental forms, one has to first look at the following four 
primary characteristics: 1) the possibility of removing the government 
through peaceful and civilized procedure; 2) the existence and strength of 
institutions that jointly guarantee the conditions of removing the govern-
ment; 3) the existence of legal parliamentary opposition and a multi-party 
system; 4) the existence of terror and/or other means of coercion applied 
against political adversaries. In the background of these main attributes, 
the following six areas have to be analyzed as secondary characteristics: 1) 
the use of repressive means against the parliamentary opposition; 2) the 
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strength and independence of institutions functioning as checks and bal-
ances on political power; 3) the dominance of the ruling political group’s 
appointive practices; 4) the strength of civil society and the legal con-
straints against civil protest; 5) levels and practices of participation (in 
decision making); and 6) freedom of the press legally and in practice. 
These dimensions of economic and political systems can be veri-
fied, and therefore, they seem to be suitable for timely international com-
parisons. Cross-section analysis has to be supported by ample evidence 
gathered from case studies as well. The task is urgent, because the global 
economy and global politics change very quickly. Complex research on 
the economic and political drivers of the processes support and promote 
a better understanding of these changes.
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The state is back on the economic agenda. After decades of the predominance of 
economic liberalism, state-centered paradigms have started to play a much more 
prominent role in economic discourse and policy. However, the increased promi-
nence of the state is not always beneficial. Sometimes, increased state activism can 
degenerate into harmful rent-seeking. It is in this context that Seeking the Best Master: 
State Ownership in the Varieties of Capitalism is a most valuable contribution to the 
international debate. Based on a broad range of empirical country case studies, it 
provides a very nuanced picture of beneficial and less beneficial forms of state in-
tervention and ownership. Its core claim that for increased state intervention to be 
broadly beneficial we need a well-working system of checks and balances should be 
heeded by policy-makers and voters.”
Andreas Nölke, Professor of International Relations and International 
Political Economy, Goethe University, Frankfurt
The state is back—and not only for a transitory period. Lastingly negative real rates 
of interest coupled with fiscal laxity counts as the ‘new normal’ macro-economics, 
from the United States to the European Union and Japan. Parallel to this sea change, 
state activism is also revived. This means both an enhanced role of discretionary in-
terventionism and a sustained role of public enterprises across the globe. The present 
collection provides ample evidence for how and why many countries at various levels 
of development opted for more activism—and more statism. As the title suggests, 
depending on the context, more active public policies may, and often do, translate 
into the shortest way to competitive markets. There is no golden route, no single 
best solution to ensure improved public welfare. Anyone interested in the theory 
and policy of comparative development should be confronted with the vast evidence, 
theoretical and empirical, marshalled in this volume.”
László Csaba, Professor of International Political Economy, Central European 
University and Corvinus University, Budapest and Member of the Hungarian 













he economic crisis of 2008–2009 signaled the end 
of the post–Washington consensus on restricting the 
role of the state in economic and development policy. 
Since then, state ownership and state intervention have 
increased worldwide. This volume offers a comparative 
analysis of the evolution of direct state intervention in 
the economy through state-owned companies in Austria, 
Brazil, France, Germany, Hungary, Poland, Turkey, Sin-
gapore, and Slovenia. Each case study includes substan-
tial explanations of historical, cultural, and institutional 
contexts.
All the contributors point to the complex nature of the 
current revival in state economic interventions. The few 
models that are successful cannot hide the potential 
problems of excessive state intervention, linked to high 
levels of moral hazard. State-owned enterprises are pri-
mary tools of market and price manipulation for political 
purposes. They can be used outright for rent seeking. Yet 
state-owned enterprises can also play important roles in 
prestigious national initiatives, like major public works or 
high-profile social and sports events. The authors con-
clude that after the uniform application of democrat-
ic market economic principles, the 2000s witnessed a 
path-dependent departure from standard economic and 
political operating procedures in developed countries.
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